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Abstract 
This study attempts to analyse the internal dynamics of the most recent 
Kurdish resistance movement in Turkey. The main focus of analysis is the PKK's 
organisational existence - its ideational and material structure. As the leading entity of 
the Kurdish movement, the research focuses on the PKK's recent growth - asking how 
it became capable of revitalising the "buried" body of Kurdishness in Anatolia that has 
been incorporated (in both demographic and geographical terms) into the Turkicized 
Republic. 
Within the framework of the case study method, much of the research is 
devoted to answering an indirect question: why wasn't it the other Kurdish "national" 
configurations that came to prominence? To this end, the study tries to appraise the 
extent of national and non-national ingredients in the make-up of the movement - the 
leadership, the grassroots and the masses that give their support. 
The conclusion reached is that the successes and failures of the PKK in 
bringing about Kurdish opposition in Turkey are fundamentally related to its 
philosophy of recruitment and organisational diligence, rather than to its scrupulous 
use of arms or other contextual factors. The form, content and intensity of educational 
activities give the organisation its strength. This "education war" - concomitant with 
the contextual tension of Turkey's Kurdish question - produced a "sparking" Apo 
charisma. In its originating period, the "pure form" of this charisma contributed much 
to the PKK's ability to mobilise the Kurds. The later "routinised" form of the very 
charisma has become one of principal determinants in what is known as the 
movement's "shrinkage process". 
It was also found that the substance of the party education - mainly involving 
Öcalan's talks - embodies a philosophy of human nature (rather than a strictly 
nationalistic content) in search of the re-appropriation of "human naturalness". In the 
party leadership's view, this human naturalness has to be extricated from the plague of 
civilisation's property mechanisms, which apparently have degenerated the humane 
faculties of man's spiritual structure. However, it ought not to be understood that the 
intensively worded philosophy depicts the extent of such extrication in the 
personalities of the cadre body of the Organisation. And the field research indicates 
that this is the Party's greatest internal contradiction. 
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This study looks at the internal dynamics of the Kurdish revitalisation in Turkey, as 
led by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK - Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan). 
There have been many rebellions recorded in Kurdish history - each bearing 
the ethnic demands of Kurdishness to varying degrees. In fact, with the PKK-led 
movement, Kurdish ethnicity has entered into supra-tribal resistance. It has moved 
towards becoming a nation, transcending the societal and geographic boundaries of 
tribal structures. The objective of this study is to examine the extent of the party's 
organisational share in this process. 
In Southeast Anatolia, Turkey has been at war with a Kurdish guerrilla army 
led by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) for 15 years. The war started in August 
1984, and over 30,000 lives have been lost. Most recently, the high-profile abduction 
of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, from Nairobi, Kenya in February 1999, hit 
the headlines worldwide. Öcalan's capture, which was aided by "international 
cooperation", meant that he became the second "Turkish citizen" since 1923 to feature 
on the front page of Time magazine. The other was Mustafa Kemal, founder of the 
Turkish Republic. 
Millions of Kurds in Turkey - the numbers range from twelve million to over 
twenty million - had been buried "on the sidelines of history" (White, 2000) or had 
"slipped off the pages of history" (Fuller, 1993) for more than half a century. At the 
end of the twentieth century, following a deadly silence for decades, "for the first time 
a Kurdish movement emerged from below" (Ergil, 1995) and "mounted its biggest 
challenge to the Turkish state" (Olson, 1996) in its republican history - by launching a 
guerrilla war and organising mass mobilisations. This study puts the "life segment" of 
the PKK's organisational entity - from the "incubation period" of the early 1970s to 
the "shrinkage period" that ended with Ocalan's abduction in 1999 - into perspective. 
In short, this study asks: how did the PKK turn from a group of university students 
into a mass movement? 
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IA General Picture 
The nature of the PKK is the subject of much contentious debate. The PKK has been 
described as both the "most violent terrorist organisation in the world' and a "re- 
humanisation movement headed by a revolutionary socialist". Ocalan's arrival in 
Rome, Italy, highlighted the disagreement over whether he is a terrorist or a freedom 
fighter. While the "Baby Murderer" and the "Head of the Separatist-Terrorists" are 
used as titles for Öcalan by almost all the Turkish press, some western journalists have 
called him "the last revolutionary of the century" and "the last of a dying breed of old- 
style Marxist-Leninist revolutionary" (Rugman, 1998). 
The PKK insists on identifying itself as Marxist-socialist - and it flourished 
even in the tumultuous years following the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 
the 1980s, when many socialist countries and parties suffered a crisis of confidence. 
The PKK, founded by (in the words of a Turkish official) "a handful of bandits", 
continued to grow as a mass movement in the early months of 1990, immediately after 
the collapse of "socialism" - even though it persisted in calling itself socialist. 
In subsequent years, the PKK has again proved itself as the largest party in the 
Kurdish territories under Turkish rule, winning a large number of votes in various 
general and local elections throughout the 1990s. It won slightly more than 50 per 
cent of votes through the legal parties it backed - election results that were obtained 
despite the oppression and underhand techniques of the Turkish state forces. 
The PKK spread itself beyond Turkey to such an extent that it managed to 
assemble two hundred thousand people at a festival in Germany, where the scattered 
Kurdish population is estimated to be around half a million. As a result of such mass 
participation in Kurdish politics within Germany, German leaders have initiated a 
semi-official dialogue (Gunter, 1998 pp. 84,85; Özkan, 2000, p. 58) with the PKK. 
In 1997-98, Germany released several leading PKK figures who had been imprisoned 
on charges of organising violent attacks on Turkish targets, while the United States 
still brands the PKK "the most dangerous terrorist organisation in the World". Despite 
pressure from the U. S. and Turkey to seek Ocalan's extradition from Italy (he was 
wanted for murder in Germany in an international arrest warrant issued in 1990), a 
senior government source in Bonn declared (23.11.98) that Germany did not want 
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Öcalan extradited. Worried about the potentially explosive impact of mass 
mobilisations following any trial involving Öcalan, the German source claimed that "if 
[Öcalan] had to stay in Rome it might help to launch a peace initiative between Ankara 
and the Kurdish rebels" (Traynor and Walker, 1998). Some commentators emphasised 
that the fear of the "potentially explosive" impact of Kurdish mass protests 
outweighed the legal system and the constitution of Germany. 
One might think that such a "profitable area" of research would be to the 
student's advantage. However, the reality of the situation could potentially jeopardise 
the objectivity of scientific deductions, as the issue is surrounded by an atmosphere of 
obscurity - largely created by the opposing sides' tendency to exaggerate and 
propagandise. Furthermore, because of my own standpoint -I politically dislike the 
Turkish regime inherited from the Ottomans, and have both a pity for and solidarity 
with the Kurdish people - my own conclusions might be particularly vulnerable to the 
foggy atmosphere. 
To reduce this vulnerability, I will diligently follow the basic methodological 
principles of science in the course of my research. In this context - that is, in the field 
of political science - one of the prime remedial measures for retaining one's 
objectivity is by relying on figures and facts, which cannot be forged or twisted. 
Hopefully, this will minimise the subjective nature of my work. 
Accordingly, it would be best to begin picturing the movement and its power 
of mass mobilisation by using the quantitative evidence recognised by the antagonistic 
parties - Turkey and the PKK. Sociology, I believe, requires observation and the 
testing of facts, just as other scientific disciplines do. So I shall refer to the figures and 
facts; and further, to those figures on which the rival parties almost "compromise". 
My study shall primarily be concentrated on up-to-date facts and figures on the 
PKK. This will help preserve a sense of direction in my studies. Also, while shedding 
light on the most up-to-date picture of the "case" being studied, to begin by presenting 
a perspective from the Western - or Post-industrial - World on an "incident" occurring 
in its homeland will enhance an accurate assessment of the dimensions of international 
concern, controversy and consensus surrounding the issue. 
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a. The "Rome March" 
On the morning of 13 November 1998, Turkish national TV channels turned their 
entire programming schedules over to continuous news feeds under a single flashing 
title: "Apo Roma'da Yakalandi" (Apo Captured in Rome). The details of his 
detention released by Italian officials were sketchy - it soon became clear that he was 
not in custody or prison but in hospital, and later in a privately rented house - but this 
particular news story enjoyed prime space in the Turkish media for weeks. 
In the days immediately following the news of the "capture", Madeleine 
Albright, then US secretary of state stressed that "there is a problem with Mr. Öcalan" 
and "he should face justice in Turkey". Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz called 
on the United States for assistance, "although Italy has emphasised that the matter is in 
the hands of the courts". (The Guardian, November 14,1998) In response to the 
Turkish Prime Minister's call for help, James Rubin, the U. S. State Department 
spokesman, said: "... we hope a way will be found to extradite him to Turkey, 
consistent with international and Italian law"; and he added: "we have no doubt that 
this man is a terrorist, and he therefore should receive no safe haven" (International 
Herald Tribune, November 19,1998). 
The American Ambassador's statement demonstrated the extent to which the 
US holds the initiative in struggling against the PKK and its leader. Verging on 
backing Italy's resistance against the Turkish offensive in the case of Öcalan's 
extradition, the European Union's principal powers and diplomatic sources from 
Russia and Iran released carefully worded statements to the press in the following 
days. Yet at the same time, the European Commission produced a report on Turkey's 
progress towards joining the European Union (EU), and called on Turkey to start a 
dialogue with the Kurds and to look for a non-military solution to the conflict. Then, 
under pressure from Turkey and the US, Italian Prime Minister Masimo D'Alema and 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder met in Bonn on 27`x' November for talks on 
Ocalan. There were also a number of visits to the other principal member states of the 
EU - France, UK and Austria. Furthermore, the EU Parliament made a declaration in 
support of Italy, through the Austrian term president, which underlined the EU's "full 
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solidarity with Italy in her determination to fully implement her laws and treaty 
obligations" (Turkish Daily News, November 23 1998). 
During that time, Germany revealed its invalidation of the 1990 international 
arrest warrant, which culminated in abandoning the extradition of Öcalan. Soon after 
the parliament's declaration, the European Commission adopted a resolution 
concerning threats of a trade boycott by Turkey, warning Ankara that "it could face 
retaliation from all EU members if it went ahead with threats to ban Italian products in 
protest at Italy's refusal to hand over the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party 
(PKK)" (The Guardian, November 25,1998). 
But despite the official statements from the principal powers of the European 
Union in support of Italy's resistance against the US and Turkey - and consequently 
in support of Öcalan's asylum in Rome - the whole of Europe participated in a deadly 
silence following the meeting of the NATO Ministers' Council held in Brussels. Italy 
then blamed Bonn for the crisis, asserting that "Öcalan would not have been arrested 
when he arrived in Rome on November 12 had it not been for an international arrest 
warrant issued by Germany in 1990". Likewise, in spite of Öcalan's publicised 
insistence (Med TV, live telephone interviews, 25.12.1998; 31.12.1998 and 01.01. 
1999) on a dialogue with Turkey through Europe, he has been dragooned into leaving 
not just Italy but the whole territory of the EU. Repeated statements in which "a 
dialogue through Europe" was highlighted as the only cause for his "Rome Venture" 
-for he had often previously identified the "Republic of Turkey" as the "illegitimate 
child of the West, which the West had dragonised"- did not have any effect. 
Öcalan eventually departed from Rome on 16`h January 1999, provoking much 
speculation about his next "strategy". Again, Turkish TV made it the top story for 
days. The United States released an official statement the following day, expressing its 
"worry" about Italy's position on "international terrorism". 
b. Individual and Mass Reactions 
While European and American powers got increasingly concerned about Öcalan's 
presence in Rome, mass mobilisations and horrific acts of individual self-immolation 
broke out among the Kurdish community both abroad and at home. As the breaking 
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news appeared under the title of "Apo Captured in Rome" on Turkish TV, Kurds in 
various European countries began to gather in Rome and at once went on a mass 
hunger strike in Chellio Square. Subsequently, on 17`h November, a march called 
"You Cannot Extinguish Our Sun" was held in Rome. Estimates of the numbers 
participating in the march varied from ten thousand (The Times, Le Repubblica, 
L'Unita, Corriere delta Sera, 18 November, 1998) to thirty thousand. In Bonn, on 
19`h December, there was another mass demonstration organised in favour of the 
Ocalan's demand for political asylum and a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question. 
Here, numbers were estimated at around forty thousand (Associated Press, 20 
December; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21 December; Frankfurter Rundschau, 21 
December). From the day after Öcalan's arrival at Rome Airport onwards, widespread 
mass hunger strikes took place in 147 Kurdish associations (KON-KURD, Federation 
of Kurdish Associations in Europe) all over the European, Scandinavian, Caucasian, 
and Middle-Eastern countries, Russia, and symbolically in the US, Canada and 
Australia. 
Eventually, Öcalan himself sent out word to stop the hunger strikes on 21" 
November, the day he settled in a private house. The "preliminary" hunger strikes had 
actually started when, in the course of a live telephone interview on Med TV on 19`h 
October, Öcalan had mentioned a "non-accomplished Great International Plot" against 
him and the PKK. At the same time, he asserted that the button for the plot had been 
pressed on 91h October 1998. But there was a sudden increase in the number of 
hunger strikers following the "capture of Öcalan" news. 
The striking reaction to what Öcalan called a "Plot" seems uniquely peculiar 
to the Kurdish movement. From the date of Öcalan's emphasis on the "Great 
International Conspiracy" in the interview by Med TV (19.10.1998) to the 
aftermath of his capture (19.02.1999) - that is, within the space of four months - 
69 people set themselves on fire and 15 of them burned to death (See Apendix 3). 
They included an eleven year old school girl from East Kurdistan (Iran) and a fifty-six 
year old housewife from Istanbul. 
Several attempts at organising hunger strikes or demonstrations were also made 
in or around the premises of some HADEP' branches in Kurdistan and the 
metropolitan cities of Turkey following Öcalan's appearance in Rome. These were 
"disguised" with the slogan "A Peaceful Solution to the Kurdish Question". There 
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were also general hunger strikes in prisons by around ten thousand PKK prisoners - 
but these were soon raided and crushed. Such incidents culminated in two deaths. 
Hamit cakir was found dead in custody in Diyarbakir2. Metin Yurtsever was lynched 
to death in front of a HADEP branch in Izmit (a Western city in Turkey near Istanbul) 
during the police raid on the premises. 
"Turkey's First and Only English Daily" paper summarised the tense events with 
the headline: "PKK sympathisers face angry crowd, saved by police" (Turkish Daily 
News, November 18,1999). In reality, the trouble was the result of specific 
instructions by the authorities issued under the heading "Activity Programme of 
Interior Ministry Concerning the Preventive Measures to be Taken Due to the Capture 
of Apo in Rome". The first article of the "Activity Programme" is worth extracting in 
order to assess the "how" of the "social movement" (McCharty and Zald, 1977; Turner 
and Killian, 1957) - particularly regarding the "physical" circumstances required for 
an effectively organised movement to build up the mass mobilisation of crowds in 
Turkish and Kurdish provinces. 
Activity No: 1. 
The subject-matter of Activity: Taking psychologically impressive physical 
measures against the Organisation's cadres and supporters. 
Activity Time: 17-30 November 1998. 
Executing Institutions: The Military Headquarters, The Interior Ministry, The 
Headquarters of Gendarmerie, National intelligence Organisation (MIT), General 
Directorate of Security Forces. 
Co-ordinator Institution Responsible for Execution: The Interior Ministry. 
Targeted Community: Members of the Organisation. 
The way of Execution: Psychologically impressive physical measures will be taken 
and executed by governing bodies of provinces against the Organisation's cadres 
who attempt demonstrations or hunger strikes or passive resistance etc. within the 
appearance of a legal framework which tends to raise the sympathisers' morale. 
The General Directorate of Security Forces will be in co-ordination with the 
Headquarters of Gendarmerie when necessary. 
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In addition to other articles pointing to specific targets (such as how to command the 
means of mass communications, how to wield religious institutions, how to motivate 
the kin of soldiers who lost their lives in clashes, and so on), "Activity No: 10" of the 
"Program" focuses on HADEP and the newspapers or the periodicals sympathetic to 
the party. The "Activity Program" was brought into effect on 17`h November. On 
19`h November, police raided all HADEP premises and the offices of pro-Kurdish 
newspapers Ülkede Gündem and Welat based in Turkey and the "Southeast", 
following an order by the Ankara State Security Court (DGM). The "balance sheet" 
for a month's implementation of one article of the "Activity Program" was as follows: 
- the mass detentions of 3,215 people in total, the arrest of 130 members of HADEP, 
including 9 administrators of headquarters and the leader of the party himself, Murat 
Bozlak (who was badly wounded in an attack on his house on an earlier occasion), 
- heavy casualties with many serious injuries, 
- the lynching of a man by an "angry crowd" and a dead body in custody. 
The vast majority of HADEP's leading members were arrested (three members of the 
Executive Organ, 11 chairmen of administrative provinces, and 86 members with 
administrative duties [Kemal Peköz, General Accountant of HADEP, Live tele- 
interview by Med TV, 04.02.1999] and the head of the party, Murat Bozlak). This 
happened shortly before the general election of 18 April 1999. Yet, on 29`h January 
1999, Vural Savas, Attorney General of the Republic, brought a lawsuit in the 
Constitutional Court against HADEP and called for the Party to be banned, claiming 
he had discovered proof of "organisational links" between the Party and the PKK. 
A sequence of pro-Kurdish legal parties known to be HADEP's predecessors 
(HEP, ÖZDEP and DEP in order) had been banned in previous years by the 
Constitutional Court for the very same reason (Kartal, R., 1995, pp. 183-187). 
Furthermore, Murat Bozlak's attempt to enter Diyarbakir, for an officially arranged 
mass meeting, was prevented a short while prior to his arrest by the region's military- 
dominated security forces due to "lack of security measures". 
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c. The Abduction of Öcalan 
The "Great International Conspiracy" - in fact the explicit international hunt for 
Öcalan (led by the USA) since his disclosure in Rome - came to its conclusion on 16 
February 1999. Öcalan thought he had received clearance from the Kenyan 
authorities to go to the airport and fly to the Netherlands. The car in which he was 
travelling pulled out from the convoy of cars (provided by the Kenyan security 
police) and disappeared on the evening of 15`h February. Öcalan was bound, gagged 
and drugged, and placed on a jet back to Turkey from Nairobi. The plane arrived 
safely at 3.15 am on 16`h February. 
While Turkish authorities declared 16`" February the most historical day in the 
history of the Republic, the "Council of Presidency of the PKK" announced 15 
February as "milat" (Birth of Christ) for Kurds. 
Some states denied participating in the abduction of Öcalan - but it wasn't 
enough to convince papers unsympathetic to Öcalan and the PKK. 
Despite strong denials from the United States and Israel, it appears that Ankara 
was able to call on the service of the American and Israeli intelligence services to 
keep track of Mr. Ocalan's movements across Europe and to provide positive proof 
that he was in hiding inside a Greek diplomatic compound in Nairobi, ... 
Although 
the full story behind the plot to kidnap Mr. Öcalan was being deliberately `muddied' 
yesterday by all those involved, ... 
" (The Times, February 18,1999). 
... However, one US official at the state department, who requested anonymity 
said: "We were engaged for months diplomatically (italic -AKÖ) to bring him to 
justice". (Howard, 1999. p. 83. ) 
But in his first statement through his lawyers after being abducted, Öcalan emphasised 
that Turkey was not involved in his abduction. Further, Tuncay Özkan, a Turkish 
journalist close to intelligence services, suggested that the U. S. had decided to hand 
Öcalan over to Turkey following a detailed report presented by Michael M. Gunter 
who interviewed him in Damascus on 13`h to 14th March 1998 (Özkan, 2000, p 57). 
Clearly, the exact details of Öcalan's abduction from Nairobi or the parties' 
stances on the day of his delivery to Turkey are not the main issue here. But these 
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"minor" details do show his importance for both regional parties and global powers. 
There is considerable data indicating Öcalan's importance, and the influence of his 
charisma among Kurds in four parts of Kurdistan, and abroad. 
As news broke of Öcalan's delivery to the Ankara authorities, Kurdish activists 
across the world once more mobilised to protest at what they saw as an international 
conspiracy. Greek embassies and consulates (along with some property of Israel, 
Kenya and international bodies) were stormed in more than twenty cities across 
Europe, where almost 1.5million scattered Kurdish people live. 
In Berlin, four Kurdish protesters were shot dead by security guards when they 
attempted to storm the Israeli embassy. Another six protesters were shot dead during 
several demonstrations against Turkish diplomatic premises in the principal Kurdish 
cities of Iran. Tens of thousands of Kurds of the south (North Iraq) participated in 
mass demonstrations held in "safe haven" provinces ruled by either KDP or PUK. 
And yet again, demonstrators engaged in horrific acts of self-immolation. Some 
protesters set themselves on fire, including a 15-year-old girl in London, a 56 year-old 
housewife in Istanbul, and even an 11 year-old child in Iran. 
Following the self-immolation attempt by the young girl in front of the Greek 
embassy in London, an American reporter asked protesters: "Why is this man so 
important for you? " The question may be a simple one, but the answer is not so 
straightforward. However, by examining the facts, researches and data, a sociological 
answer can be found. 
d. The Wave of Mass Demonstrations of the Early Nineties 
In presenting a general picture of the mobilising dimensions of the Party, we must not 
bypass the widespread mass riots (serihildans)3, including the participation of an 
overwhelming majority of the quasi-rural population. 
The "unexpected" demonstrations erupted on the streets of many Kurdish 
provinces in March 1990 and continued until the late months of 1993 (examined in 
Chapter 6). Both the state forces and the other Kurdish political circles who intended 
to be the "vanguard parties" of the "National Liberation Movement" were reluctant to 
recognise this fact at first (Yekitiya Sosyalist, April, 1990; Peseng, April/May, 1990; 
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Riya Azadi, April, 1990 et al). For the military-dominated State sources, "this group 
of people were `just a bunch of bandits' who had taken to the mountains and/or young 
adventure-seeking activists" (Imset, 1992, p. 7). 
Similarly, when a mass reaction to the exhibition of the corpses of 13 PKK 
guerrillas in Nusaybin4 led to the most recent rebellion, the rest of the Kurdish national 
groupings tended to explain the phenomenon within a feudal-tribal frame of reference 
by pointing at the tribal origins of guerrillas. But the fact remains that the paragraphs 
outlining "A Revolutionary Organising Plan For Kurdistan" in the early issues of the 
Organisation's official periodical, Serxwebün5, present an detailed plan of how to 
"build up" crowd behaviour (Turner and Killian, 1957, p. 58) under the social 
circumstances of the Kurdish populated territories. The "Revolutionary Organising 
Plan" had to be made because, according to Öcalan, "society has been de-organised 
from top to bottom by the Turkish colonising system" (Örgtitlenme Uzerine, 1983). 
The "Serihildans" gradually expanded until 1993. Mass participation in them 
increased and spread into many other Kurdish towns and territories. The largest was 
the funeral procession of the head of the Diyarbakir branch of HEP, Vedat Aydin, who 
was murdered by assassins. Around 150,000 people were attacked by heavily armed 
security forces - supported by armoured vehicles and helicopters - leaving twenty-one 
dead and hundreds wounded. 
Ragip Duran, a specialist Turkish journalist in the region's affairs, wrote about 
these casualties in a report submitted to the "International Conference on North West 
Kurdistan (south-east Turkey)", held on 13`h to 14`h March 1994 in Brussels. Duran's 
words give some clue to what lay behind the mass mobilisations in the region: 
Nineteen journalists, nearly all of whom are of Kurdish nationality (including Musa 
Anter who was 70 years old) have been shot and killed over the last two years in 
south-east Anatolia. Government authorities claim that these deaths are the work of 
unknown assassins. (More than 500 people have been shot or hacked to death. ) A 
document from the Turkish Minister of the Interior says that the victims "were people 
who had links with terrorists and were consequently victims of the internal battle 
within terrorist organisations". Delegates from the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly (of Turkey -AKÖ. ), the European Parliament, Amnesty International, the 
Association of Human Rights and the Committee for the Protection of Journalists, 
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who made detailed, on-the-spot investigations of these assassinations, conclude that 
"the security forces were involved, in one way or another, in these assassinations". 
(Duran, 1995, p. 71. ). 
e. "Official" Figures 
Before we finish outlining a general picture of the movement, it is worth noting that 
even pro-State sources recognise the mass dimensions of the Party. 
The first English book published by the Turkish Daily News6 addresses the extent 
of what it labels "massification". 
The fact that the PKK is now rapidly gaining mass support throughout the 
Southeast [implying Kurdish populated areas - A. K. 
Ö. ] and is now bidding for 
further control in the region, has led to tension on the part of Turkish officials based 
here. 
Many of the smaller settlements, with populations ranging from between 10,000 
to 60,000 have been converted into self-styled PKK fortresses. Even regional 
officials accept that "the PKK is everywhere" or in the hearts of everyone. (Imset, 
1992, p. 264. ) 
The pro-Kurdish legal party, HADEP, for which the PKK sources announced their 
support, won 19.5 per cent of the votes in 18 provinces where more than "15 per cent 
of the population declared their mother language as Kurdish" in the 1995 elections 
(Kirisci and Winrow, 1997). The percentage in the "capital" city of "Turkish 
Kurdistan" was 73 in the general elections. 
Estimates of the number of deaths caused by the 14-year Kurdish guerrilla war 
against the Turkish army (which began on 15`h August 1984) range from between 
29,000 to 37,000. (The Independent, 14.11.1998: 29,000; Financial Times, 14/15. 
11.1998 and The Guardian, 14.11.1998: 30.000; International Herald Tribune, 16. 
11.1998: 30,000-37,000; The Times, 18.11.1998: 37,000. The numbers given by 
human rights analysts are also between 30,000 and 37,000). 
There may be controversy over the identification of the PKK, but there is a 
greater "consensus" concerning the leader of the Party. The point on which almost 
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everyone agrees is the extent of the "determinativiry" and "indispensability" of 
Öcalan. This will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
In general, my study is designed to throw light on the processes of the PKK's 
"massification" - its mobilising sources and dimensions among the people of 
Kurdistan. These people are divided by solid physical, as well as spiritual, borders - 
and they retain active and vital pre-feudal institutions. In addition, the effects of the 
PKK's influence in the process of Kurdish nationalisation, in terms of detribalisation, 
will be discussed at length. 
However, the central question I shall endeavour to answer is how the 
movement came into being - how it went from a "single man's efforts", developed, 
"massified", and eventually became part of an international controversy. 
To this end, the study will attempt to examine the Organisation's role in the 
process, partly by examining theorisation on social movements, but mainly through the 
analytical framework of nation and nationalism, and of Marxist conceptualisation on 
the "national question". So the main question shall be concerned with the inner 
dynamics of the movement. What is the determinative internal factor in the 
organisational growth of the Ankara-born PKK - which has enabled it to extend 
Kurdish resistance beyond provincial borders, and to expand resistance not just 
nationally, but internationally? In view of the effective, functional "primordial 
loyalties" (Alavi, 1973) and rivalries (clannish, tribal, religious, sectarian and regional) 
in Kurdish society - which appear as a point of consensus in the literature on Kurds - 
there may be such a decisive factor. 
Considering the multi-causal nature of the development processes of social 
phenomena, historical and up-to-date realities must not be ignored - particularly 
within their contexts. 
The initial proposition is that the circumstances that gave rise to the PKK are 
intimately linked to the emergence and formation of Turkish capitalism and the 
Republic. Namely, it is linked to the "manufactured character of the Republican 
Turkish identity" (Kadioglu, A., 1996, p. 177). Further, the "manufactured" character 
of Turkish identity and the Republic is both an effect of and part of the process of the 
Republic's way of "colonising" part of Kurdistan. Without studying and understanding 
the nationality of Turks and the Statehood of the Turkish Republic, it is not possible to 
assess the true nature of the PKK. 
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To summarise: subsequent chapters shall search for the dominant cause of the 
PKK-led Kurdish insurgency ("291h revolt")7, which developed from a "group of 15-20 
university students" (Aydin, 1992) into the "biggest challenge to the Turkish state in 
the twentieth century" (Olson, 1996). I am aware that when an inquiry orientates 
itself towards the most operative internal factor of a process, there is always a risk of 
ignoring - or at least lessening the importance of - the context in which the 
phenomenon is considered. I shall therefore strive to maintain this study's intellectual, 
theoretical and empirical balance - and avoid confusing phenomena and context. 
II Methodological Framework 
a. Scope of the Study 
The PKK's organisational insight and its relation to Turkey's Kudish question are the 
principal items under investigation. 
Together, they (Turkish State and the PKK) form an antagonistic manifestation 
of the earlier contradictory process that led to the emergence of the "Republic", in the 
form of a solidly Turkicised nation-state out of the defeated Ottoman Empire. Within 
the cause-effect frame of reference, the nature of Turkey's Kurdish question was 
handled as the context in which the PKK was situated as the main issue of the study. 
Namely, the method and strategy of the research and the presentation of the thesis 
were organised in accordance with an exploratory study of structural aspects of the 
Kurdish movement in Turkey. The efforts of the research's theoretical survey, 
observations and fieldwork were orientated towards gaining insight into the 
organisational structure of the Party. 
Instead of just looking at the PKK's inner workings or its formal constitutional 
rules and regulations, I investigated its practical functions - in terms of motivating 
individuals as part of mass mobilisations. The study's objective is to ascertain the 
extent and/or composition of "national" and "humanisational" sentiments, aspirations, 
longings and impetuses that determine the recruitment of individuals to the Kurdish 
cause as represented by the PKK. 
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Accordingly, the core focus in searching for the source of individual Kurd's 
motivations are the educational "activities" and their self-contained philosophy. In 
other words, the central inquiry of this study is into the peculiar nature of individual- 
organisation interrelations in the PKK, which rest mainly on the over-emphasised 
philosophy of cadre education - otherwise known as the "education war". 
Both the theoretical and empirical research have primarily looked at how the 
non-national insights of the PKK's philosophy of education have generated incitement 
among the party militants and adherents, and how far this philosophy relates to the 
successes and failures of the organisation. That is, the intensively worded philosophy, 
which substantially engages with the notion of the "self-shaping spiritual re-formation 
of personalities" of the Party's operating cadres, has become the core theme of my 
argument in relation to the fate of the Kurdish movement in Turkey. 
The peripheral objective of this study is to look at the relation between the 
nature of Turkey's Kurdish question and the mould of the PKK's theory and action. 
So the study seeks to assess whether the rise (and fall) of the PKK is determined by 
certain conjectural factors formed by the rivalry between regional and imperial powers 
and Turkey's Kurdish policy - or determined by the Party's peculiar philosophy of 
cadre education and organisational performance. 
To date, no systematic study of the Kurds in Turkey, as an ethnic entity, has 
been carried out. Most textbooks concerning Kurds and Kurdistan make two simple 
arguments: 
a) "primordial" loyalties: the tribal, kinship and religious institutions of Kurds; 
and, 
b) the political, economic and/or military tensions between regional and 
imperial powers over the strategic significance and riches of the Kurdish 
homeland. 
As a result, the inner dynamics and processes of Kurdish society have been almost 
totally neglected. The scarcity of attention paid to the internal dynamics and the 
political insights of Kurdish societal entities within upper Mesopotamia, those Kurds 
assimilated into Turkey, is particularly stark. The first and only doctoral thesis (in the 
domain of English and Turkish sources) on the PKK appeared recently in Turkey. 
That study, however, concludes in its first chapter that "the existing findings prove that 
the PKK was founded by the intelligence services of the two countries of the Eastern 
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Bloc, Syria and Bulgaria, which acted on behalf of the Soviet Union" (Özcan, N. A., 
1999b, p. 48). So my study aims to fill a massive gap - by examining what main 
dynamics of Kurdish societal structure, in the final analysis, determine the nature of 
the "question" of "Turkish Kurds". 
An interesting point worth noting about the Kurdish movement is the 
remarkable participation of women. In the sphere of both civilian (mass protests, 
marches, celebrations, festivals) and military (guerrilla) activities the noteworthy 
presence of women appeared to me to be an important phenomenon. Considering the 
unusually high percentage of women in Kurdish guerrilla forces and the fanatically 
religious and largely pre-feudal state of Kurdish society - and also in view of the fact 
that the Party persists in identifying itself as Marxist-socialist - the women issue 
cannot be ignored. However, this issue necessitates an additional study in itself. 
Furthermore, as a man I felt discouraged from examining an issue that I might not 
fully understand, subjectively. 
b. The Literature on the Kurds 
The studies on Kurds and Kurdistan - excluding some historical works - are limited 
to analyses of conflicts within the region and tend to assume that Kurdishness is only 
an element of either an international or regional conflict. The studies of relatively 
objective scholars -mostly of western diplomatic missionaries- have either been the 
works of conflictual analyses in terms of inter-state politics or historical narratives. 
The works of indigenous authors are stuck with political or vulgar nationalistic 
concerns. There is almost no proper sociological study of the Kurds beyond 
informative paragraphs within the pages of political or historical works - at least, so 
far as I could ascertain among English and Turkish sources. If there are any studies in 
Arabic, Persian or French, they probably concern themselves with southern (Iraq) or 
eastern (Iran) parts of Kurdistan. Alas, there would not be much benefit from such 
sources in my inquiry inasmuch as I hypothesise that the socio-political structure of 
the possessor of Anatolian Kurdistan (Turkey) has been the fertilising and shaping 
ground for the PKK and the Movement it leads. 
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Most works on the Turkish-ruled part of Kurdistan and the PKK8 appeared 
following the wave of large-scale mass demonstrations, which commenced in the 
spring of 1990. These studies and articles which appeared throughout the nineties 
have devoted their intellectual efforts towards discussing either how the Kurds became 
an element of the cosmopolitan conflict in the region or how they became a ready- 
made tool of the powers taking part in the "wolfish" quarrel over the rich natural and 
cheap labour resources of Kurdistan. 9 The overwhelming majority of these scholars 
focus on the aspect that the Kurds have always, in the ultimate stage of each rebellion, 
been betrayed by the ex-allied powers as soon as the parties of the conflict reached a 
compromise. No doubt, the aims of these works are not in vain, nor are they pointing 
at illusory features of Kurdish sociality. On the contrary, they highlight a pandemic 
trait of the social history of the Kurds. However, these attempts have by-and-large 
passed over the need for a comprehensive sociological study of the Kurdish social 
structure. The works have exhausted their intellectual efforts on the Kurdish 
"problem" or the Kurdish "question". Many titles of books and articles (e. g. Kirisci 
and Winrow, 1997; Olson, 1998; Barkey, 1993) engaged with Kurds include the words 
"question" or "problem" - if not "dilemma", "imbroglio" or "puzzle" etc. Olson 
rightfully devoted his latest book "To the Kurdish peoples: may they live when their 
existence is no longer defined as a `question' or a `problem' " (Olson, 1998). 
The principal studies or books dealing exclusively with the PKK and Öcalan - 
at least the ones of which I am aware - are either concerned with journalistic (Imset, 
1992; Birand, 1992) or political (Olson, 1996; Kirisci and Winrow, 1997) aspects. 
The works with a pro-State bias (Aydin, 1992; Kirzioglu, 1968 et al. ) rather resemble 
"made to measure" products. 
In short, there has been no comprehensive study of the Kurds of the Turkish 
Republic and the PKK in sociological terms, except for the Turkish sociologist 
Besikci's works. His works include his doctoral thesis (Besikci, 1969a) on a Kurdish 
nomadic tribe (Alikan), the subsequent work based on the thesis and his experiences 
during PhD research (Besikci, 1969b). More recent studies by Besikci rest mainly on 
his restricted observations, readings and dialogues with PKK militants while he was 
incarcerated in various prisons in Turkey and Kurdistan (Besikci 1992 and et al). 
The works of pro-Kurdish sources on "Turkish Kurds" provide more factual, 
historical and political information. Yet from a sociological point of view, they are 
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not much more helpful than "made to measure" books by pro-State professors. These 
pro-Kurdish publications, which are either sponsored or directed by various Kurdish 
political circles (Göktas, 1991; Asan, 1991; Kaman, 1997), purvey propagandising or 
agitating exaggerations about the "national" dimensions of Kurdish society, in reaction 
to the State's policies of oppression and denial. 
Furthermore, in the studies dealing with the concepts of "nation" and 
"nationalism" which appeared before the 1990s - when theorisation and hypotheses 
are exemplified with ethnic communities from various continents - the Kurds of 
Anatolia are ignored, probably due to a lack of knowledge about them. For instance, 
in his scholarly work, State and Nation, Akzin mentions the Kurds twice (Akzin, 1964, 
pp. 85,108), when he describes the assimilation and integration of a "subordinate" 
ethnicity by the dominant ethnic group in the context of State-nation relations - but in 
both instances the example is the "Kurds in Iraq". Yet the assimilation programme of 
the Turkish State in relation to the Kurds of Anatolia is a far better case in point for 
Akzin's argument than the "Kurds in Iraq". 
In fact, Iraq's assimilation policy does not include denying Kurdish ethnicity, 
nor denying their land, nor banning the Kurdish language - all of which takes place in 
Turkey. In the official language of Iraq - and also of Iran - the Kurdish-speaking 
population is called "Kurds" and the territory where they live as a majority is called 
"Kurdistan". In Turkey, however - with more than half of the whole Kurdish 
population and homeland - they have been officially and "scientifically" 
10 declared to 
be mountain Turks or a sub-branch of Turks, since the transition from the Ottoman 
State to the Republic of Turkey. Recently, they have even been "recognised" as Turks 
of Kurdish origin. The territory they have inhabited for almost four millennia is strictly 
named "Dogu" (East) or "Güneydogu" (Southeast) -a way of denying them their 
national legitimacy. 
But despite the lack of sociological studies and reliable sources concerning the 
"Kurds of the Turkish Republic", there are substantial questions to be studied, 
answered and demystified surrounding this particular social phenomenon. 
When surveying the "available" literature on Kurds, one cannot help but 
conclude that the tribal structure is essential to the existence of Kurdishness. It is 
acknowledged that tribality 11 does not only apply to traditional Kurdish society, but is 
also fundamental to its political, economic and cultural life. The tribal phenomenon 
24 
helps explain the sense of disunity among Kurds, the absence of accord, the pitiless 
internal clashes, and therefore the "intrinsic" traitorous sentiments. However, the 
tribal existence (ashiret) has been handled as an entity of feudatory extension, whereas 
the Kurdish ashiret that has preserved itself as a basic property of the society up until 
the twenty-first century descends from pre-medieval history. My study does not 
include the ashiret itself, but rather its cultural manifestation in the form of "treason" 
as an inseparable element of the Kurdish ethnic personality. I have argued that 
"treason" has been the "dormant resource" of the Kurdish "semi-nationalist" resistance 
against Turkey, and has been well-grasped and converted into its opposite (an effective 
sentimental base of "national" awareness) by the leadership of the PKK. 
c. Fieldwork and Theoretical Setting 
Contemporary students of social movements seem to appreciate the holding of 
ideological positions. According to Pakulski, such students "are divided by their 
political and ideological allegiance" (Pakulski, 1991, pp. 29,30). This seems no less 
true of the theorisation on nations and nationalism, as Nairn emphasises: "the theory of 
nationalism has been inordinately influenced by nationalism itself" (Nairn, 1981, p. 
94). This may be fitting for the "scientific" atmosphere of post-industrial "rationality" 
- but holding ideological positions would never be fitting for the science produced by 
students who aim to examine "the spirit and power of philosophy". Nor is it fitting for 
the students of political sociology "to whom the question of whether any new 
knowledge could be made useful in their art is one of living and urgent importance" 
(Wallas, 1910). 
Studying a highly controversial phenomenon carries a grave risk of becoming 
biased. This risk increases when the "case" being studied is most commonly the object 
of averse or hostile approaches (Berkant, 1998). Then, research from an alternative 
("sympathetic") point of view may well be partisan. So although I have claimed to be 
"otherwise", I have made every endeavour not to introduce bias into the research or to 
allow bias into my inferences and deductions. 
The empirical ingredients of this study rested mainly on my prolonged 
observations, an unstructured interview with Öcalan and an "illegal" questionnaire. I 
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also conducted a number of unstructured - and strictly unrecorded - interviews with 
ordinary guerrillas and middle-rank commanders during my several visits to the region 
in 1998 and 1999. I had to spend seven or eight weeks in the summers of each year to 
have the chance of these focused interviews. However, direct observations - and 
partly participant observations - over almost a decade constituted a larger proportion 
of my field material than is usual in sociological fieldwork. 
So what sparked my initial interest in carrying out this research? It started with 
my experiences as an interpreter with a Kurdish community association in London 
between 1987 and 1996. The preliminary empirical knowledge drawn from partial 
participant-observation is based on my voluntary work for the community centre from 
1990 to 1995. Being a voluntary interpreter "upgraded" me to being an "activist", and 
consequently I was regarded as deserving to be included in a "one-week intensive 
education" programme held by the PKK in 1992. 
Then, in the summer of 1996,1 was allowed to interview Öcalan himself in his 
base. I travelled to Syria via Lebanon, and stayed there for four weeks, where I was 
allowed to join the education programme of the Party Central School (Parti Merkez 
Okulu) in which Öcalan's "Analyses" (cözümlemeler - his recorded and edited 
inculcation talks - took place after the closure of the guerrilla camp in Bekaa Valley, 
Lebanon, in late 1992. 
I spent three weeks in the Turkish- language 12 training school, during which 
time I interviewed Ocalan twice in the presence of over one hundred and fifty of his 
pupils. These interviews were recorded by video camera. I strictly followed the rules 
and regulations of the school. In fact, I wanted to be treated as a participant of the 
education programme, with all that that meant, rather than being treated as a "guest 
student". 
During my final week in Syria, I was due to travel to Qamislo and surrounding 
townships (Derik and Endiwar), which neighbour south-east Turkey. These areas are 
totally populated by Kurds, most of whom fled in the first half of the century from the 
"North" (Turkey). I carried out unstructured interviews with parents (and other family 
members) of PKK guerrillas who had lost their lives. 
I selected three localities for my questionnaire to be filled out. They were 
Diyarbakir, Mersin and Ankara. Diyarbakir had to be selected for it was the "heart" of 
"Turkish Kurdistan" in which every sort of class and stratum of Kurdish society were 
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condensed - in particular following the inflow of the rural population which fled from 
the war that intensified in the period from 1993-97. The selection of Mersin was 
because of the outstanding presence of the newly fled population from all Kurdish 
provinces of Turkey, insofar as it has begun to be counted as a Kurdish metropolitan 
city. '3 The reason for selecting Ankara as third locality in the "field" is twofold. It is 
on the one hand the capital city of Turkey in which the most solid grasp of state 
control over Kurdish affairs is evident. On the other hand, the presence of Kurdish 
immigrants in Ankara is the steadiest one, and it has been far less affected by the total 
war of fifteen years than the other major metropolises. In addition to these selected 
cities, I had a few completed questionnaires from Izmir14 just because of the 
availability of a contact person there. 
Just under half of the total amount of respondents (91) were taken from 
Diyarbakir, and the rest from other places. 
But finding PKK activists to fill out the questionnaire was not as easy as 
selecting localities! First of all, I had to remove the name of the party "PKK" from the 
questions and replace it with either "Party" or "HADEP" in its Turkish version. This, 
despite my additional diligence, caused some confusion. I strove to reduce the 
perplexity among the respondents to its minimum level by verbal emphases on the 
PKK "beneath" HADEP to every "person" to whom I handed the questionnaire. 
However, the responses contained much less confusion than I expected. '5 Eventually, 
I managed to gather 184 substantially completed questionnaires. This was not all done 
through a one-on-one basis, but by occasional in-groups ranging in general from five 
to ten. For that reason, I have to call it "illegal" fieldwork. 
Because of the nature of my questions, I received some manipulative or 
slightly deceptive answers from some "sophisticated" respondents - but not a great 
number. Also, the essence of my inquiry made it important for me to find out what the 
Kurdish people think rather than just what they are. To my mind, this reduced the level 
of problematic data in terms of the generalisability of findings in my questionnaire. 
A final confession: I made every endeavour to draw the most from a 
questionnaire carried out illegally, but the fact remains that I could not prevent myself 
from leaving a number of wasted questions and considerable portion of unused 
findings behind. 
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The extent of the relevance of theories of collective action and/or social 
movements is, beyond a doubt, problematic for the study that I undertook. But this, of 
course, does not mean that I could do the study of the socio-political phenomenon of a 
tribal or pre feudal society without some light thrown upon it by the theoretical 
formulations originating in American and European post-modern experiences. Both 
the combination and the mobilisation of the grassroots of the Party and the nature of 
the actors in the Movement necessitated making some references to the intellectual 
perspectives of the sociology of social movements. That is, when I had striven to 
understand the "why" of the mass mobilisations, I had to refer to conceptualisations of 
collective action to some degree. When I turned to explore the "how" of the 
individuals' motivations, I needed the intellectual means to argue over the "new 
paradigm" of Western "new social movements". 
However, both in the realm of collective action analyses and theoretical 
accounts of social movement studies, there are already, as a corollary to the theories' 
controversial nature, enough enduring problems of interpretation. For instance, despite 
Diani's optimistic conclusion that there's "a greater underlying consensus in the field 
than one might assume" (Diani, 1992), there appears a "greater" disparity than 
resemblance between Diani himself and Pakulski (1991) on even labelling or 
classifying the main trends within contemporary social movement analyses. Diani 
places social movement approaches in four main streams, each with a group of 
representative scholars, and, for example, mentions the names of Touraine and 
Melucci as leading figures in the "new social movements" interpretation. He 
particularly refers to Turner and Killian (1957) in relation to the "collective behaviour" 
perspective; whereas Pakulski talks of six main theoretical accounts, and labels the 
fifth stream as the "action-identity approach" citing Touraine's name, and attributes 
the "consistent `classical' account of collective behaviour" to Smelser's Theory of 
Collective Behaviour (1962). Furthermore, Klandermans and Tarrow (1988) brand the 
"new social movements" trend as a "European" approach and the rest as "American", 
whilst Pakulski traces it back to both European and American scholars. 
Wary of falling into too much scrutiny on the matter, Tilly's noticing of "a 
good deal of agreement about the characteristic life history of movements and 
widespread disagreement about why and how movements arise in the first place" 
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(Tilly, 1978, p. 41) makes me feel more confident. However, his "parabolic" passage 
is probably a good illustration of my point of view: 
The analysis of collective action is a risky adventure. For one thing, there are too 
many experts around. It is a bit like food, or sex, or speech. Almost all of us know 
enough about food, sex and speech to survive in our own environments, and none of 
us likes to be told he is ignorant in any of these three regards. Yet from a scientific 
point of view, we all have lots to learn about all three. The same is true of collective 
action. ... (Tilly, 
1978, p. 5). 
The same is consequently true of social movements and of my concerns. For example, 
the following conclusion drawn from American experiences intimately refers to the 
mode of action of the PKK: "Social movement leaders use bargaining, persuasion, or 
violence to influence authorities to change. Choices of tactics depend upon prior 
history of relations with authorities, relative success of previous encounters, and 
ideology. Tactics are also influenced by the oligarchisation and institutionalisation of 
organisational life. " (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p. 1217). 
This certainly provides a framework for explaining the Kurdish Offensive's 
"terrorism" or "revolutionary violence". But it must be appreciated that studying an 
extremely peculiar phenomenon, as an outcome of the fusion of the "manufactured 
character" of Republican "nationalisation" or "modernisation" (Kirisci and Winrow, 
1997) and the "dehumanised/degenerated" (Öcalan, 1995,1996 et al. ) condition of 
Kurdishness, creates difficulties with making broader generalisations. That is, This 
study does not encourage one in constructing all-embracing generalisations vis-ä-vis 
some receptive concepts such as "ethnic violence", "terrorism" or "revolutionary 
impetus". On the other hand, using theories of "over-civilised" individual motivations 
to explain the intensity of the self-immolation protests in an "over-tribalised" ethnic 
community, which reached their apex after Ocalan's arrest, seems inappropriate. 
So theorisation on the concepts of nation and nationalism -though they are 
highly "mongrelised" and confusing- has been my main analytical framework. For a 
clearer application of the theories of nationalism, I began by revisiting the most 
recognised scholars' works in the field, and attempted to distil the "twin concepts" 
(nation and nationalism). 
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d. Outline of Chapter Headings 
The initial part of introduction draws an up-to-date picture of the Kurdish movement 
led by the PKK, with some indisputable facts and figures recognised by both rival 
parties to this conflict. This, I hope, provides a context for the study of the subject 
matter. 
In Chapter 1,1 revisit general theorisation on "nation" and "nationalism", in an 
attempt to provide a conceptual framework for interpreting facts about the PKK. The 
main aim in this chapter is to escape the "trap" that is engendered by the 
"mongrelisation" of the main concepts. Because the Organisation under study claims 
to be Marxist-socialist, the "national question" of Marxism is also incorporated into 
the chapter's literature research. 
The basic focus of Chapter 2 is the source and peculiarity of the ethnic - not 
national - question of Kurds under the Ottoman State and the Turkish Republic, and 
the historical background of the particularity of the conflict between Turkey and the 
Kurds. This chapter draws attention to the roots of the tension between Turks and 
Kurds in the new "nation-state", which was shaped during the struggle for "Turkish 
National Independence". 
Chapter 3 looks at how the PKK emerged in the 1970s, following the silent 
decades which began in the aftermath of the repression of the most recent revolt 
(before the current attempt) in Dersim province in 1938. The emergence of the PKK 
from a group of six housemates in Ankara (the capital of Turkey) to the foundation 
congress of the Party in a village affiliated to Diyarbakir (regarded as the capital of 
Kurdistan) is put in perspective in an approximate chronological order. 
Chapter 4 discusses the formation and development of the ideology and 
programme of the Party, its initial political demands and objectives, and the tactical 
and strategic transformation at specific stages of the struggle in conjunction with the 
Party's organisational expansion, massification and confrontations. The chapter 
examines the alterations in the PKK's ideology and programme with the totality of its 
consistent, flexible and metamorphosed aspects. In particular, the chapter discusses the 
nationalist undertakings of the Party in comparison with its socialist aspirations. 
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Following a summary of the "intrinsic" tradition of the socio-political history 
of the Kurds, Chapter 5 focuses on the particular character of the PKK's organisational 
structure with the birthmarks of a traditional communist party. To explicate individual- 
organisation relations, I investigate the form and content of cadre education and the 
limits placed upon a militant's life in the party. At micro-level, I look at the 
leadership's source of power in the recruitment process, which consequently orientates 
and motivates the constituency of the Party. The chapter is devoted to exploring the 
Organisational "share" in the actualisation of the movement, in the light of the 
findings of data collected from Turkey and Kurdistan during the fieldwork. 
The first section of Chapter 6 tackles the fundamental reasons for the PKK's 
success, which have transformed it from a "bunch of bandits" in 1984 to the mass 
movement of the early 1990s. I explore this evolution to facilitate an understanding of 
the process of the PKK's decline, which led to Öcalan's abduction from Kenya. 
The second section of Chapter 6 examines organisational problems within the 
Party, to extend the argument about the inner dynamics of the Kurdish movement. The 
exploration of the PKK's "subjective share" in the "revitalisation" process of the 
Anatolian Kurds is broadened with reference to the paradox-like entanglements of the 
Organisation. And these investigations also draw upon the fieldwork. 
In the Conclusion, I first summarise the principal conclusions of the items 
explored in the main chapters following a brief outline of preliminary chapters. 
Finally, I present a general discussion on an essentially unchanged aspect of human 
history - attempting to argue that the most universal question of humanity, which 
manifests itself in the uniqueness of the Kurdish phenomenon too, in fact bears the 
stamp of a perpetual feature throughout class societies. 
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Notes 
1 Pro-Kurdish legal party (People's Democracy Party - Halkin Demokrasi Partisi) 
2 The city in eastern Turkey often considered as being in effect the capital of "Turkish Kurdistan". 
Serihildan: a Kurdish term equivalent to the Palestinian "intifada". 
4A town in a Kurdish province neighbouring Syria. 
s These writings were later gathered in an unsigned book published by the party (Örgiitlenrne Üzerine, 
1983, pp. 210-223). 
6 Turkish Daily News defines itself as "Turkey's First and Only English Daily" paper, and, it is widely 
regarded as the State's official bulletin, targeted at foreign diplomatic missions. 
7 The term "29`h Revolt" was employed by the State authorities - after the PKK launched its initial 
attack - to emphasise that it was only a repetition of the previous "28" bandit-like Kurdish revolts. R The principal among them are Gunter, 1990,1998; Imset, 1992; Robins, 1993; Brown, 1995; Ergil, 
1995; Olson, 1996,1998; Kadioglu, 1996; Kirisci and Winrow, 1997; Barkey and Fuller, 1997; Atiyas, 
1997) 
9 Paul White's recent work, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernisers is an exception (White, 
2000). Even if the study contains limited sociological argument and corresponding conceptualisation, its 
main theme concerns the Kurds of Turkey, the PKK and Ocalan. 
'Ö For instance, academics such as Ord. Prof. Dr. S. Dönmezer, (1989), Prof. Dr I. Giritli, (1989) Prof. 
Dr. A. K. Bilgiseven (1991), Prof. Dr. O. Türkdogan, (1998), Prof. Dr. M. F. Kirzioglu (1968; 1984) 
devoted their overall intellectual efforts to demonstrating that the Kurds are actually Turks - the Turks 
who forgot their Turkish language because of their lengthy mountain life. 
11 The concept of tribe is subject to controversial definitions in the relating disciplines such as 
anthropology, history and sociology. However, the conceptualisation that dominates the concerned 
fields reefers the pre-feudal segment of human's societal development (Morgan, 1919; Davis, 1978; 
Gellner, 1983; van Bruinessen, 1992; and et al. ). Tribe, as a socio-political device of humanisation, is 
most generally defined in terms of kinship relations, but in which the initial governmental form of 
sociality as the nucleus of future State that has ever been the indispensable entity of class societies was 
fertilised. The remarkable consensus among the scholars vis-ä-vis tribe is that its coalescence, 
amalgamation, integration and dissolution give rise to nation because it becomes the "fetter" for the 
adolescent bourgeoisie's desire to "national market". The Kurdish tribe (ashiret) does not differ in 
nature from the universal experiences but, in occasions, the fusion or confederation of several kinship 
structures composes an individual tribe. (The concept is further discussed in Chapter 5,1 b) 
1' There existed a similar Kurdish-language school in the vicinity of Damascus to which I went on 
occasion for interviewing wounded and mutilated guerrillas. 
" In a local election held in 1999, the pro-Kurdish party HADEP (known as a PKK backed legal party) 
lost the mayoralty of Greater I4el (Mersin) following a contentious vote count. The HADEP won the 
election in the largest sub-district of Mesrsin (Akdeniz) nevertheless. 
"The third largest metropolitan city of Turkey. 
15 This may be attributed to the PKK's organisational "vulnerabilities" concerning legal activities for 




REGURGITATED OR DEMYSTIFIED? 
The PKK emerged as an illegal organisation in the late 1970s, claiming a national 
liberation struggle for the Kurdish "nation" within the official borders of Turkey. 
Its programme is a "Kurdicised" copy of those customary communist parties 
that undertake a nation's "national" liberation as an "initial stage" of the ultimate 
socialist revolution. The ideology by which the PKK formulates this initiative's aims 
and objectives is a Middle-Eastern translation of traditional Marxist socialism. So for 
the purposes of interpreting the nature and dynamics of the ethnic resistance 
movement that the Party generated and led, we should begin with outlining a general 
theoretical framework. 
In so far as this study's primary unit of analysis is a political party that claims 
to be ideologically Marxist-socialist and programmatically undertaking a "national" 
emancipation, we need to revisit the concepts of nation and nationalism along with 
their communist conceptualisation. By doing this, we will be able to outline the 
equivocal nature of the Organisation's claims about its "national liberationism" and 
"socialism". This will, hopefully, sharpen our analytic focus - as the nature of Kurdish 
nationhood itself is also susceptible to further equivocalness. 
There are two needs that this theoretical chapter proposes to meet. First, it will 
provide a conceptual framework for the codification of the study's findings and 
corresponding conclusions with regard to the particularities of Kurdish experience in 
Turkey. Second, we shall see that we ought not to, at least, impute further 
multifariousness to these "vulnerable" concepts, because the literature in this field is 
not just utterly confusing but also convoluted. To achieve such an uneasy task, a brief 
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and selective combing of the conceptualisations offered by mainstream scholars in the 
field seems to be the only option to begin with. Whether or not I make a contribution 
towards distilling the concepts "nation" and "nationalism" under the pressure of a 
burgeoning critical literature, it ought to be fairly certain what I shall denote by 
employing these terms. 
Because the central concepts are inherently problematic, the confinement of the 
boundaries and main objectives of my arguments need to be stated here to better 
enable the progression of my argument. 
A generally recognised definition of nation continues to be left unresolved, no 
matter how fast the literature grows. The classification of "types" of nationalisms also 
continues to be deeply controversial, in addition to the absence of a consensual 
definition of the concept. 
A great deal of theorisation on ethnicity, nation and nationalism in the Marxist 
tradition excludes the "large" nationalism -namely, the national politics of pre- 
existing states for preserving and/or furthering their market interests in hinterlands or 
peripheries. Also, as an unavoidable logical extension of this, the nationalism of 
"small" nations is generally evaluated as "progressive" or "good", and consequently 
the tradition is tempted to pose nationalism in terms of a "healthy"/"morbid" 
dichotomy. This, in turn, locked Marxists into the self-contained "enigma" of the 
"national question" for it has never been possible to distinguish the healthy from 
morbid. It would thus be my concern to "immunise" my reasoning against additional 
enigmas of the "national question" arising from the Marxist mainstream approach, as 
well as the ones already there in the general conceptualisation on nation and 
nationalism. 
As final introductory remark: despite the occasional overflows beyond 
modernity in various respects, it is overwhelmingly acknowledged that nations and 
nationalism are -as either contingent invented or unavoidably emergent- entities of 
modernity's industrialisation. Favouring neither the former nor latter accounts, I share 
the view on the timeline, and, therefore, I do not find it a prerequisite to incorporate a 
discussion on segmental timing into the argument. 
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I Distilling the "Mongrelised" Twin Concepts of Modernity 
Although they are largely elided, scholars' attempts to decouple the "twins"' do exist. 
David McCrone, in his recent attempt to employ sociological scrutiny to this subject, 
The Sociology of Nationalism, summarises part of the problem by, first, alluding to the 
suggestive coupling statements by writers such as R. Miles, W. Connor, S. Bruce, L. 
Greenfeld, S. Hall. Of these, Connor -when justifying why he did not simply call his 
collection of essays "nationalism" but "ethnonationalism"- claims that "there is no 
difference if nationalism used in its pristine sense" (Mc. Crone, 1998, p. 22). Bruce 
draws lessons from the case of "Scottish nationalism" by deducing that "it is precisely 
the lack of a single identity of `people' with common ancestors, common language, 
shared religion and a glorious history which prevented nationalism emerging in 
Scotland... " Quite likewise, Greenfeld also couples ethnicity with nationalism, and 
expresses that 
"nationality" became a synonym of "ethnicity", and national identity is often 
perceived as a reflection or awareness of possession of "primordial" or inherited 
characteristics, components of "ethnicity", such as language, customs, territorial 
affiliation, and physical typet. 
According to McCrone's interpretation, Miles more radically argues that "`nations' 
have no independent existence without the discourse of nationalism" - just as in the 
"couple" of race and racism. Anthony D. Smith titles his work National identity, in 
which the very identity is defined in a scholarly way and distinguished from the 
principal set of other identities by basing it on the ethnic entity of social man (Smith, 
1991, pp. 19-42). Smith, however, devoted the larger share of the book to studying the 
nation and nationalism for he, too, interweaves the twin phenomena with the ethnic 
catalyst. In fact, the term "ethnicity", McCrone calls to mind, has been referred to as a 
social scientific concept "only in mid-twentieth century" (1941,1953) before it made 
its "official appearance in the Oxford English Dictionar>> as late as the 1970s" 
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(McCrone, 1998, p. 24), while we all know that this phenomenon began to steer the 
modern segment of history over one and half centuries beforehand. And then, in the 
face of these and the other very many similarities, Hall state that there awaits "a great 
deal of work to do to decouple ethnicity, as it functions in the dominant discourse, 
from its equivalence with nationalism, ... " (op. cit. p. 25). 
In the wide-ranging debates on nation and nationalism, the competing 
arguments in search of distinguishing/merging the cultural and political occupy much 
space. Students of nation and nationalism will encounter, in Nairn's metaphor, a 
Janus-like entanglement when plunging into the literature. We will come back to this. 
But before that, in order not to vacillate between the "twins", it seems more viable to 
handle them one by one, and to begin with "nation". A Turkish saying asks: "If meat 
starts to become smelly you salt it; if salt smells, what then do you do? " Since 
disagreements arise on both concepts, we need to decontaminate, so to speak, the 
"salt" first. 
a. Nation 
The definition of nation is more problematic among the scholars than the question of 
the nation (or the "national question") itself as the emphatic politics of the past two 
centuries. 
Is an exhaustive definition of this "elusive-evasive" concept possible? This is 
the question that every author of a study endeavouring to address the subject begins by 
posing. The question is a simple but dazzling one: what is a nation? Smith talks of 
"the chimera of universally valid, once-for-all definitions" pursued by "earlier writers" 
which, he believed, were not pinning down the same elusive `essence"' (Smith, 1983, 
pp. 165). McCrone complains about the absence of "neat definitions of key concepts" 
at which "the student of nationalism can quickly become disillusioned". And he adds, 
"There simply is no agreement about what nationalism is, what nations are, how we 
are to define nationality" (McCrone, p. 3). Seton-Watson felt driven to conclude, "no 
`scientific definition' of a nation can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and 
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exists" (Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 5). Anderson also recalls this very observation of 
Seton-Watson while in search of support (Anderson, 1983,13) for his argument. 
While Nairn finds it a "by nature ambivalent" phenomenon (Nairn, 1981, p. 348), 
Gellner names it an "elusive concept" (Gellner, 1983, p. 7), and so forth. Or, from the 
same perspective expressed in the reverse, Hobsbawm in the final paragraph of his 
influential work, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, comes back to the very same 
recurrent concern and concludes that 
"nation and "nationalism" are no longer adequate terms to describe, let alone to 
analyse, the political entities described as such, or even the sentiments once described 
by these words. (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 192) 
So the central source of competing standpoints among social scientists and historians 
is the question of whether "nation", as a societal phenomenon, is primarily a cultural 
entity facing back to history or a political entity based in the present with a futuristic 
outlook. Because of this divergence of views, it is vital to glance at the most 
condensed definitions by the recognised scholars in the field. This will hopefully show 
how to conceptualise the phenomenon and illustrate the concerns behind the shifting 
approaches to it, owing to the "evasiveness", "elusiveness" or "equivocalness" of the 
concept "nation". A juxtaposition of the main arguments - bearing the historical order 
in mind - will help us address the "question" of the nation. 
The Most Discussed Definitions of the Nation 
In his famous seminal lecture in 1882 on "what is a nation", Ernest Renan 
provides the most realistic, if not revealing, picture of the "nation" as the realpolitik of 
the adolescent bourgeoisie. Even if his standpoint is characterised by the vindication of 
the French Revolution in the face of the Germanic nationalism that overemphasised 
ethnic-primordial ties, the approach is free of self-deception and the temptation 
towards playing with the facts. Renan eliminates the widely recognised criteria and 
reduces them to a single impetus for the invention of a nation. Elements such as "race, 
language, religious affinity, interests, geography and military exigency" are 
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"insufficient". That is, they are by no means compulsory pre-requisites of a nation but 
a soul is the one that makes nations. 
A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which strictly speaking are just 
one, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the 
present. One is the common possession of a rich legacy of memories; the other is the 
actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage 
that has been received in common (Renan in Woolf, 1996, p. 57,58). 
Renan, while implying the cultural background of the "soul" by emphasising the 
"common legacy" that existed in the "past" of a would-be nation, rewrites a slight 
racial base. Nonetheless, in context, he tends to state that if needed, a nation may well 
be imagined, manufactured and invented from a collection of ethnicities in a newly 
discovered land or in newly made satellites with a newly proclaimed official language 
made of all ethnies' languages. 
For Renan, the determinacy attributed to the pasts of a nation, race (in the sense 
of ethnic stock) and languages are also artefacts. "Race, as we historians understand it, 
is something that is made and unmade. ... and Europe's first nations are essentially 
mixed blood". And, he continues: "nothing is more false" regarding languages, to 
which additional political importance is attached by almost all scholars, "as signs of 
race" (Renan in Woolf, 1996, pp. 54,55). In sum, nations are politically and socially 
constructed communities by "strictly one" impetus -a soul, a spiritual principle in 
Renan's definition. 
Otto Bauer, one of the earliest theoreticians on the "national question" in the 
Marxist tradition, defines the nation in terms of ethnic-primordial roots -just in the 
sense of cultural natio independent of any political aspect. He calls this "a 
psychological theory of nation" (Bauer in Woolf, 1996, p. 78), from which Stalin 
derives his notorious "spiritual" definition. He, in effect, defines ethnicity but calls it 
"nation". "A nation's inherited qualities are nothing other than the sedimentation of its 
past, its history frozen, so to speak" (op. cit., 1996, p. 61) according to Bauer. He 
thereby reaches the "condensed" definition of his conceptualisation: "The nation is the 
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totality of people bound by the community of destiny in a community of character" 
(op. cit. p. 71). When one replaces the "nation" with "ethnicity" or adds the suffix 
"ality" to it, then no questions remain. But the essay's heading is "The Nation" and it 
is subtitled with "The Concept of Nation" before the formulation above appears. 
Moreover, Bauer traces the nation as far back as our earliest humanisation from an 
anthropological perspective, by relying upon Marx's teaching of materialistic 
conception. 
A nation does not come into being at the early stage at which men merely seek their 
food without having to work for it and support themselves by simply appropriating or 
occupying ownerless property they find, but instead at the stage where man extracts 
the goods he requires from nature by labour. The emergence of a nation and the 
special characteristic of each nation is thus determined by people's mode of labour, 
by the means labour they deploy, by the productive forces they control and the 
relation of production they enter into. It is the Karl Marx's historical method which 
has enabled us to solve the great task of understanding the emergence of the nation of 
every single nation, as part of mankind's battle with nature. (op. cit. p. 64) 
The argument proceeds with not very much involvement in the cultural and political 
debate. This is because he is engaged in a discussion about rights (of self- 
determination) for the "oppressed nations". He devotes the rest of his argument to the 
conceptualisation of "national sentiment" and "national consciousness". But we should 
not solely attribute his conception of nation "as a community of culture" (op. cit. p. 69) 
to Marxist understanding. For example, the views of Gwyn A. Williams, a radical anti- 
nationalist historian with a pro-Marxist approach, are in sharp contrast to Bauer's. 
Nations have not existed from Time Immemorial as the wrap and the woof of human 
experience. Nations do not grow like a tree, they are manufactured. Most of nations 
of modern Europe were manufactured during the nineteenth century; people 
manufactured nations as they did cotton and shirts. (Williams in Woolf, 1996, p. 192) 
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This is the Stalin's definition of "nation" which, despite his harsh critique of Bauer, 
was copied from Bauer's "psychological theory": 
A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic 
life, and psychological make-up manifested in community of culture [Italics as 
original] (Stalin, 1936, p. 8). 
Stalin arrives at the definition above following a sequential set of four "characteristic 
features": language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up or the 
"spiritual complexion of the people ... which manifests itself in peculiarities of 
national culture" (op. cit., p. 7). It is not easy to situate the definition in either cultural 
or political categories, as it seems to be a "made to measure" definition in search of 
"criteria" that comply with the "right of self-determination". 
More interestingly, it is followed by a mechanical or mathematical condition, if 
you like. "It must be emphasised that none of the above characteristics is by itself 
sufficient to define a nation. On the other hand, it is sufficient for a single one of these 
characteristics to be absent and the nation ceased [italics added] to be a nation" (op. 
cit. p. 8). It also "must be emphasised that" this well-known essay by Stalin was 
arranged under Lenin's tutelage -and Lenin's pragmatic politics- for the purpose of 
vindicating the "right of self-determination for nations" which was believed to 
overcome the "national question". The essay is crucial, not because of its scholarly 
merit, but because the politics and intellectual circles of the "communist world" were 
dominated and guided by it until the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The next clear political conception of nation is presented by the political theorist 
Elie Kedourie, with no reference to an ethnic ingredient - like Renan. 
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A nation came to be understood as that body of persons who could claim to represent, 
or to elect representatives for, a particular territory at councils, diets, or estates. 
(Kedouire, 1966, p. 14) 
He also cites a neater definition from Sieyes who asks himself "What is a Nation? ", 
before answering: "A body of associates living under one common law and 
represented by the same legislature" (op. cit. p. 15). 
Ernest Gellner is the closest we have to a contemporary version of Renan, in 
terms of his conceptualisation of nation and nationalism. He poses the very same 
question in his book, Nations and Nationalism: What is a Nation? (Gellner, 1983, p. 
53). While the former revealed that "getting its history wrong is part of being a 
nation", the latter constructed a useful maxim, stating that "nationalism, sometimes 
takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and 
often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is reality, for better or worse, and in general 
an inescapable one" (op. cit., 1983, p. 49). The second distinguishing facet of 
Gellner's theorisation is the contrast he draws between "culture-mediated nationalism" 
and "structure-mediated tribalism" which more neatly provides the framework of his 
understanding of the concept "nation". He defines the phenomenon by relying on the 
objectivity of subjective fact. "In this sense", he concludes, 
nationalisms are simply those tribalisms, or for that matter any other kind of group, 
which through luck, effort or circumstances succeed in becoming an effective force 
under modem circumstances. They are only identifiable ex post factum. Tribalism 
never prospers, for when it does, everyone will respect it as a true nationalism, and 
no-one will dare call it tribalism. (op. cit., p. 87). 
For Hobsbawm, the phenomenon represented by the concept "nation" may be 
recognised -"as conceived by nationalism"- prospectively: "the real `nation' can only 
be recognised a posteriori". That is, he tends to say, nation is a political entity in 
which its shifting components and criteria are "imagined" and "invented". He then 
explicates further. 
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It [nation] is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern 
territorial state, the `nation-state', and it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality 
except insofar as both are relate to it. Moreover, with Gellner I would stress the 
element of artefact, invention and social engineering which enter into the making of 
nations" (Hobsbawm, 1990, pp. 9,10). 
His condensed conclusion is that "nationalism comes before nations" - and also 
"nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round" (op. cit., 1990, 
pp. 9,10). 
In the preface to the second edition of his comprehensive study, Theories of 
Nationalism, Antony D. Smith makes the "vital distinction" between "cultural" and 
"political" nation, stating that it was first formulated by Friedrich Meinecke and 
elaborated by E. K. Francis. But he takes no risks by favouring one or the other. He 
suggests that Francis "contrasts `ethnic' with `demonic' nations" and "prefers to 
reserve the term `nation' for the dominant ethnic community or `ethnie' within a state" 
(Smith, 1983, pp. xii, xiii). Smith views the "statist" and "ethnicist" approaches of 
parties as being coterminous with the political and cultural approaches. He evaluates 
the former as being misleading for it "obscures what should remain as a fundamental 
distinction -between `nation' and `state"', and the latter as "itself ambiguous" (Smith, 
1983, p. 180). 
Later, in the early 1990s, Smith contrasted these approaches again, while 
referring to Kemilainen's definition of nation "as a community of people obeying the 
same laws and institutions within a given territory" (Smith, 1991, p. 9) and the non- 
western model as an "ethnic" conception of nation saying that "a nation" is "first and 
foremost a community of descent" (op. cit, p. 11). Smith, however, decides on a 
version of "ethnicist", or at least non-statist, conceptualisation by constructing the 
italicised definition below by which he "intended to convey the essentials of the many 
images of the ideal nation held by nationalists everywhere". 
The nation is a large, vertically integrated and territorially mobile group, featuring 
common citizenship rights and collective sentiment together with one (er more) 
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common characteristic(s) which differentiate its members from those of similar 
groups with whom they stand in relations of alliance or conflict (Smith, 1983, p. 
175). 
He refers to states as being made up of multiple nations and nations of multiple states 
when citing the dialogue in which Kostic "explained" that "one nation can live under 
several different governments, and again several nations can form a single state" 
(Smith, 1983, p. 177). That is, he employs the term "nation" that at any time one may 
replace with ethnicity or nationality. 
Karl W. Deutsch's Nationalism and its Alternatives begins with the following 
sentence. 
"A nation, " so goes a rueful European saying, "is a group of persons united by a 
common error about their ancestry and common dislike of their neighbours" (Deutsch, 
1969, p. 30) 
In Imagined Communities, while he points out that scholars suffer from a 
misunderstanding of the twin concepts, Anderson goes further when stating his point 
of departure. He recognises not only nation but also nationality -or, nation-ness as he 
prefers to call it- as "cultural artefacts of a particular kind". In agreement with Renan, 
Gellner, Hobsbawm, Deutsch, Kedourie and Williams, Anderson conceptualises the 
term "nation" as a political community that has been imagined prospectively and 
invented accordingly - "because the members of even the smallest nation will never 
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds 
of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson, 1983, p. 15). 
Although Anderson applies to the support of his argument for the imaginative 
element of the nation in its formative process, Hugh Seton-Watson at first glance 
seems to perceive the nation as a political entity but, in effect, defines it in solely 
cultural terms. "A nation", for Seton-Watson, "is a community of people, whose 
members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national 
consciousness". (Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 1). In accordance with this logic, he quite 
convincingly states in the second paragraph of his major work, Nations and States, that 
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A nation can be coterminous with the population of one state, or be included together 
with other nations within one state, or be divided between several states. (op. cit., 
p. 1). 
Within the framework of Seton-Watson's approach, one is bound to talk of the 
single nation of tens of Arab states or of the four nations of Switzerland, or the two 
nations of Belgium, and of many similar others in the East and West. 
Because of the fear of the "concealed contradiction" between the "demand for 
an exhaustive definition" of nation and the "relatively rapid development" of its 
"distinguished features", Miroslav Hroch prefers not to interfere with the "opinions of 
other authors", but instead to "put before the reader" the "author's own conception of 
the nation". And the author's view is "decisively to be differentiated from the notion 
that nationalism is the primary formative factor and the nation is derivative" (Hroch, 
1985, p. 3). 
That is, the nation does exist there as a cultural entity with the sequential 
components of the "sedimentation of its past" before nationalism arrives, for Hroch, in 
effect, views nationalism as the device of "small" nations whose struggle for a nation- 
state or a similar form of emancipation is the case. He is comprehensive in his 
illustrative comparative study on several European examples, but nevertheless 
confines the discussion to "small" nations' "national liberationist" nationalisms. 
McCrone analyses the varied approaches instead of favouring or advocating a 
particular perspective - similar to what Smith does. But in contrast to Smith, he is neat 
enough when focusing on the "common error" (Deutsch, 1969) vis-ä-vis primordial 
ancestry and the "obliterated" (Gellner, 1983) character of pre-existing cultures in the 
chapter titled "Inventing the Past" -by referring, in particular, to Renan's precondition 
for being a nation, in which the nation gets "its history wrong". His selective reference 
to Renan is more than clear. 
`Getting history wrong' is the precondition of nationalist history because it requires 
not only collective remembering but collective forgetting. This `forgetting' said 
Renan, `I would go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation 
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of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger for 
[the principle of] nationality' (McCrone, 1998, p. 44) 
What I shall Denote by "Nation" 
It is evident from the selection of principal scholars above that the most 
"condensed" definition of nation leaves out some essentials, since the cultural and 
political are not in a dialectical interrelation. 
Rather than engaging in ethnic quarrelling between neighbouring culturally 
diverse social entities, nation-states are historical results of an "internecine" struggle 
between modernity's fellow ruling classes. The adolescent bourgeoisies of 
industrialisation emerged one after another within their various outdated dynasties as 
the result of the leap forward of productive forces. There exist notoriously prosperous 
American, Belgian and Swiss nations of two or more ethnies and over 20 modern or 
semi-modern nations of a single Arab ethnie, whose borders were drawn up on the 
maps with slide-rules by the local and global rulers of the time - including Syria- 
Palestine and Iraq whose "founder-fathers" were two brothers, Feisal and Abdullah 
(Rodinson, 1968, p. 23). Not to mention the Spanish-speaking nations of Central and 
South America, the other English-speaking advanced nations of Canada and Australia, 
the German-speaking and neighbouring nations of Germany and Austria, separately 
institutionalised Scandinavian nations of Northern Europe and so forth. 
No one would think of considering these states as anomalies. There are the 
intimate neighbours, France and Germany, each of which is one of the most advanced 
nation-states in "native" Europe, and which no one could deny arrived at their modern 
nation-statehood through the poles of the processes of becoming a nation-state 
(McCrone, 1998, p. 9) - the former on a non-ethnicist path, the latter on a non-statist 
one. 
There are also convincing non-anomalous examples to suggest that language 
too is not a determining component in the rise of nations and nation-states. Scholars 
largely agree that the French language was a scarce minority language among 
Parisians before the Great Revolution produced the "prototype" of the nation-state 
recognised by everyone. Likewise, after only three quarters of a century, M. Kemal's 
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Nutuk3 has been translated into Turkish from the previous official Ottoman language 
for the current generation in Turkey. Hobsbawm, with regard to "national languages" 
refers to Hebrew and firmly states that they are "almost always semi-artifical 
constructs and occasionally, like modern Hebrew, virtually invented" (Hobsbawm, 
1990, p. 54). And, I suggested earlier, no one would dare to brand either those 
successfully post-industrialised states with two or more official languages or those 
neighbouring states with the very same languages in the heart of Europe4 as anomalies. 
Therefore, one of the most endemic essentials of nationalism's ideological 
obligations is the preservation and exaggeration of the sovereigns and, in turn, the 
assimilation and integration, and -if needed and managed- the annihilation of the 
subordinates. The dustbin of history is full of assimilated and/or annihilated ethnic 
entities of various kinds. 
Nationalist discourse is historicist; it relies on genealogy for the legitimation of the 
nationalist cause, on the historicization of the national origin for the affirmation of 
the self and denial of the other (Vati, 1996, p. 23). 
Vali, too, does not avoid emphasising the nature of nationalist historical discourse, 
which entails "distorting the truth, misrepresenting the historical reality of the 
formation of nations and nation-states" (op. cit., p. 23). Although it has been the fate 
of every example ranging from France to Turkey - as some prosper, some do not- the 
fact is best expressed in Renan's epigram: Getting its history wrong is part of being a 
nation. 
Neither the pre-existent homogeneity of ethnicity, nor that of a common 
language are the precondition for a sovereign nation-state. Further, in these very cases 
around the world, given that they are among the most prosperous nations rather than 
being anomalies, a would-be definition of nation must encapsulate these phenomenal 
examples. At least, it ought not to omit the examples of United States, Switzerland, 
Belgium, each of which continues to represent a conspicuous mode of the nation-state 
in the post-national (global) world of our time: the USA as the head of both "world 
politics" and the "free world"; Switzerland as the most secure and stable nation with 
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its diverse economical, political and cultural components; and Belgium as the "capital 
state" of the European Union. 
Unfortunately, as the most potent "impetus" which forces the concept "nation" 
to be either "evasive" or "elusive" or "equivocal", there exists a hidden concern pre- 
occupying people's minds and prejudicing who (which ethne) may or may not qualify 
to be a "nation-state" - or who may be "recognised" as having the right of "national 
self-determination. Or, in Nairn's citation, who qualifies to take things (the "national" 
market) into one's own hands (Nairn, 1981, p. 339)? 
A corollary to this "concern" has been the misrepresentation of facts. This 
solely political concern, as it arises from the form and positions of the vacillating 
arguments, appears to be the fundamental source of a great deal of hesitation regarding 
what the concept "nation" should primarily encompass. 
What then should I denote by the term nation in order not to, at least, 
contribute to its "elusiveness"? 
The versions of political -or at least non-cultural- denotations of "nation" are 
more clear and unbiased, and consequently more viable for discursive deductions. The 
usage of the term "nation" in this study's discussions shall mean "an institutionalised 
political, economical and legislative jurisdictional unit of community that is realised in 
the form of what is called a `nation-state', independent of a pre-existing homogeneous 
ethnic and/or cultural entity". In order to make the logic of this study more lucid, this 
will be the only framework by which a community may "qualify" to be a nation. This 
is also a "viable" conception of "nation" through which we can circumvent the 
"question" of definition that misses out the examples of those nations which in respect 
of fame, prosperousness and also quantity are more than mere exceptions. In addition, 
this is the "political value" that modernity contributed to the course of human history, 
which had already produced appropriate cultural superstructures. It is because the form 
of the nation, in its overall societal sense, is an artefact that denotes a qualitative 
"onslaught" towards socio-political-economical human reorganisation, that the 
adolescent bourgeoisie of rising capitalism was led to introduce it to social man's 
history for the sake of capitalism's "home" market. The artefact, either as contingency 
or inevitability, was made possible by the leap forward of productive forces, known as 
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industrialisation. And nation was manufactured and distributed by superstructural 
forces of nationalism, which were made of innate ethnic-primordial-patriotic human 
sentiments. One consequence of this social development was that Americanness, 
Britishness and emerging Europeanness have already been the undeniable subjects of 
"trans-ethnic" identities that associate not with "inner" ethnie but "outer" patrie. And 
as a necessity of this very "spiritless" logic (the logic of development of the forces of 
production that bears a constant reproduction/reconstruction "faculty" based on the 
interrelation and/or interdependency between the elements of a "three-ring circus" 
-man's will to live better, man's labour productivity and the means of production), 
which in our time largely manifests itself in the growing "sentiments" of growing 
markets, late capitalism will foster and proliferate trans-ethnic "nations" of trans- 
national-states of various kinds in the motion towards a "world nation". Renan 
prophesied the European Union more than a century in advance, in 1882: 
... 
Human wills change; but what does not change in this life? Nations are not 
something eternal. They began, so they come to an end. A European confederation 
will probably replace them (Renan in Woolf, 1996, p. 59) 
Deutsch's prophecy of an integration that "changes" circumstances towards a trans- 
national "nationalisation", which indicates a fusing fate of nations, lies in a similar 
understanding of the logic of development of productive forces (Deutsch, 1969, pp. 
34,35). 
In my argument above, at least in this study's approach if not in general, the 
concept of "nation" is fairly decontaminated. When employing the term "nation", we 
will not imply any "qualified" cultural/ethnic entity in a community which is akin to 
the sedimentation of its past -"history frozen"- but very simply the population of a 
modern state. We do not find it necessary to mean by the word "nation" any culturally 
homogeneous, ethnically self-satisfactory communities' "frozen history". There are 
sufficient words for such phenomena, such as ethnicity, nationality or the familiar 
French word ethnie. 
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Here is the next, indirect, question: Does nation relate to nationalism? For this, 
we need to revisit the definition of nationalism through the question of how it well 
played on the totality of the individual's innate-primordial sentiments, which is termed 
"mass nationalism". 
b. Nationalism: Regurgitated or Demystified? 
While the concept of the nation suffers from a sometimes overly "scientific" 
definition, nationalism suffers rather from a mass of classifications - both vertical and 
horizontal. Among the vertical classifications we may count ancient, medieval, 
modern, post-modern, neo- or supra- and eventually "post-communist" nationalisms. 
Horizontal classifications appear to be liberationist (small) and colonialist (large) 
nationalisms or the nationalism of oppressed nations and of oppressing nations, or 
unity nationalism and expansion nationalism, progressive and regressive nationalism 
and so forth. 
In sociological terms, however, the primary question vis-ä-vis nationalism 
ought not to be how an all-embracing definition should be structured or how wisely we 
classify it in horizontal or vertical dimensions but, more crucially, how it operates. A 
provisional definition, then, would be more embracing and consequently more viable. 
The Departures and Arrivals of National Politics 
So the impetus that steers the course of history is not the innocent-naive innate 
sentiments towards primordial and geographic-patriotic "values" but the insatiably 
greedy market "sentiments" of market forces - in the case of modernity and 
industrialisation, the adolescent bourgeoisie. The modern segment of human history 
has provided more than enough evidence to prove this. The Hundred Years' War, the 
Thirty Years' War, the Seven Years' War, the Seven Weeks' War or the Napoleonic 
Wars and many other equivalent wars provide no symptoms indicating that the nave 
innate sentiments of the masses were the driving force behind these wars. These wars 
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of greater Europe were precisely those that gave birth to richly modelled modern 
nation-states in their "native land". 
True, "there exist no more arresting emblems of the modern culture of 
nationalism than cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Solders" (Anderson, 1983, p. 17) 
on which the countless names of "ordinary" patriots are engraved whose bodies were 
not found or collected. But this fact does not present us with any evidence to infer that 
the masses (the herd or mob in Nietzsche's metaphor) have had a share in steering the 
course of history. It merely stimulates the question of "how faithfully the nationalism 
-of the nation-state for a national market and of the imperial-state for a trans-national 
market- operated". 
Secondly, this fact tells us how the nave ethnic-primordial-patriotic sentiments 
of ruled masses were refined as the most vacant and viable "raw material" at the 
service of market "sentiments" by competing adolescent bourgeoisies to manufacture 
nations of "indivisible territorial dignity" for their respective nation-states. However, 
we should not be misled into inferring that "stupid" mobs have been totally 
manipulated for the sole purposes of market wars. No doubt, many within the masses 
devote themselves to "national" struggles5. At first glance, the masses partake of the 
gains of triumphant liberation movements, such as being free of "foreign rule", 
enjoying the freedom to experience the particularities of primordial and local 
identities, and so on. 
But this only represents a "tiny", or more accurately dysfunctional, facet of the 
historicity of prosperous "national liberation" or "national union". Soon after the 
"victory", the longings for indigenous cultural "values" and the particularities of 
"home" identities are smoothly followed (most visibly, in almost all cases of the 
liberation movements of "oppressed" or "small" nations) by the former ruler's "more 
civilised" equivalents and the new home ruler's incentives. For instance, while the 
Turkish language has been reinvented to the extent that Ataturk's Nutuk (the speech of 
a nationalist hero) is barely comprehensible to the current Turkish citizen, the TV and 
radio programmes that perform Turkish national particularities are evidently marginal. 
Moreover, in the case of "Turkish Kurds", Medya TV (Pro-PKK Kurdish Satellite 
Television -formerly Med TV) broadcasts have long been dominated by mongrelised 
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and badly copied or translated versions of Turkish/Western cultural artefacts. More 
interestingly, this was implemented simultaneously with the "heavy struggle" to 
unearth the oppressed Kurdish identity faced with serious annihilation, just as the 
Turkish media has done with overemphasised Turkish nationalism. In response to 
critiques of the spectacle, the current "broadcast politics" is justified by new or 
potential rulers' claims about the vacant availability of the "present state" of the 
people -that is, the easiest cultivatable "raw material" for the sake of "victory". What 
then does national victory represent? 
What ought not to be overlooked here is that the departures and arrivals of 
"national" movements are without exception doomed to be alien to one another. The 
primary "things" longed for in the hearts of the entrepreneurs of national 
emancipation, generally within the intelligentsia, and the "things" envisaged in the 
heads of the bureaucrats who accomplish the national construction are gravely distinct. 
In a general way, while the former departs from "national sentiments", the latter 
arrives at "home market" longings. The former is driven by the impetus stemming 
from aspirations to enjoy and experience their innate ethno-cultural elements in the 
face of others'. The latter are attracted by the gains of "control of the distributive 
system" (Hah and Martin, 1975) against respective others'. The former moves from 
the "heart", and is consequently emotional and maximalist, the latter moves from the 
"head" and so is by nature calm, rational and realistic, and also pitiless. An old 
Turkish saying expresses: "While the sheep concerns itself with its life, the butcher 
concerns himself with its meat". In the case of national movements, however, the 
"butcher" is always the eventual winner. 
The alienation of arrival from departure, not in terms of theory and/or 
discourse but in terms of the realpolitik of nationalism, is a striking aspect in a 
national movement's overall history. This is without exception the most striking and, 
at the same time, the most elided facet of the factual politics of nationalism. 
"National" movements are always initiated and theorised by a bunch of romantic 
intelligentsia 6, but, in effect, they are always triumphed over by a rational class that 
emerges from the fusion of bureaucratic, military and financial components, no matter 
what it calls itself. With regard to this aspect of the modern segment of history, the 
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experience of the Giuseppes of Italy is the case that one may derive with least effort 
from the historical clues. Mazzini, the founder and theoretician of Young Italy who 
would also be called "the prophet of European nationalism", was eliminated when 
Garibaldi (who joined Young Italy as Mazzini's disciple, and later was to be the 
military-political leader) decided to form an alliance with Victor Emmanuel II, the 
King of Sardinia. The entrepreneur intellectual Mazzini was right in his "heart" to be 
an "undeviating republican" in keeping with his beliefs, but Garibaldi was realistic in 
his "head" for the sake of assuring "victory". When discussing "bureaucracy and 
intelligentsias", Seton-Watson refers to Kuomintang's China and conveys how first the 
intellectual elite were eliminated, and then how "a new bureaucratic structure" took 
the sole initiative following the Japanese occupation. 
... in the following years a large part of the intellectual elite was alienated from the 
Kuomintang, and came to prefer its rivals, the new revolutionaries -that is, the 
communists. Communist victory was achieved by a new military and political elite, 
enjoying massive peasant and workers' support. With the communists in power, a 
new bureaucratic structure took shape, which was then deliberately combated by the 
leaders through the Cultural Revolution. ... The results of this remarkable struggle, 
continuing in the 1970s, could not be predicted (Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 424). 
It could not be predicted, but what has since unfolded is the pitiless truth that the 
recurrently "naive" intelligentsia, like its predecessors around the world, lost the battle 
in the Cultural Revolution. That is, the Cultural Revolution, along with the "Great 
Leap Forward" which was launched to combat the emerging bureaucratic structure, 
turned against itself -against its launchers. And the elimination of entrepreneur 
intellectuals was finalised, including Mao Zedong himself in his presence at the Ninth 
Party Congress in 1969, in spite of Mao's "unchallenged" re-election as Chairman. 
Mao's harsh fight-back through mobilising youth in the Red Guard's bloody riots to 
attack the party establishment and accomplish the near destruction of the party in late 
1960s did not have an effect. The sovereignty of the "bureaucratic structure" was 
consolidated in the following congress held in August 1973. Mao's name was 
preserved as Chairman at the new apparatus' service owing to his charisma. While the 
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bureaucratic apparatus "jealously" appropriated the charisma of the "national" hero, 
the person of charisma has in fact been rendered ineffective. This would be more 
evident at the Forth National People's Congress (January 1975), at which the 
"rehabilitated victim" of the Cultural Revolution Deng Xiaoping was allowed to rise. 
A fairly similar process in Bolshevik Russia provides is also instructive. In 
Russia too, the romantic intellectuals, in Gramsci's term "the Russian maximalists" 
(Gramsci, 1977, p. 31), were brutally annihilated. The process began with Lenin 
himself during his later years and ended with Leon Trotsky being assassinated in 
Mexico. This was a fate from which few escaped, including most prominent early 
Bolsheviks such as Bukharin, Kamanev, Zinovyev and so on. It is known that Stalin 
climbed to the top of the party and consequently to the head of the state in spite of 
Lenin's initial warnings and his later calls for Stalin's removal in his political 
"testament". 
The widely emphasised idea that "luck, wise tactics and adroit manoeuvrings" 
enabled Stalin to suppress Lenin's opposition is nonsensical from a sociological 
viewpoint. Such important phenomena cannot be reduced to a personality's rise to the 
throne through charisma. Further, Stalin's charisma was endowed upon him owing to 
his particular state of personality and intellectuality? and so was in keeping with the 
aspirations of the rising Russian adolescent bourgeoisie out of the "ashes" of the 
Bolshevik Intelligentsia. Charisma does not function for the person of charisma and it 
by no means operates through the person of charisma. Both the person and persona of 
charisma are only "bewitching sticks" in the hands of the bureaucratic apparatus 
wherever this apparatus is built8. 
The "founding four" of Young Turk's Ittihat ve Teraki9 (Union and Progress) 
were pushed aside as the Initiative spread rapidly, and were superceded by the army's 
"high officials". A similar version of this "inescapable fate" is the case, for instance, 
with Germany's Burschenschaft, Vietnam's Vietminh and even with the Jacobeans of 
the Great French Revolution. When one reads between the lines of history, it does not 
seem hard to follow that the Jacobeans were first terrorised and then eliminated. Also, 
in the case of revolutions in ancient and medieval times, the history of religions tells 
us that prophets were eliminated for, so to speak, being proclaimed and being qualified 
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to be recognised as prophets. This appears to be the most recurrent fate of all 
revolutionary apogees of class societies in the course humankind's socio-political 
development. In the modern era of history, this recurrent feature reaches its climax in 
the form of the politics of nationalism. The entrepreneurs of nationalist movements of 
any kind have been, at certain stages -depending on the dynamics of the given "proto- 
nation" (Hobsbawm, 1990)- eliminated, from Italy's Mazzini to Vietnam's Ho Chi 
Minh. This spectacle has been evident in the most notoriously triumphant movements, 
such as in France's Jacobeans, Italy's Young Italians, Turkey's Young Turks, Russia's 
Bolsheviks, China's Kuomintang, Vietnam's Vietminh and so forth1°. 
"Types" of Nationalism 
The wisest taxonomy of nationalism, thus, would only contribute elusiveness, 
ambivalence and ambiguity to the concept of nationalism, rather than helping. Rather, 
I maintain, an exclusion of "non-historical" features at the point of departure will 
stabilise this very "volatile", "evasive", "equivocal", "elusive" and so forth concept. 
For the purpose of bypassing an illusory argument on nationalism, one point of 
pre-exclusion and another point of further diligence must be made clear. First, the 
nationalism which the principal central and West European nation-states generated in 
the early phase of the rise of capitalism, and which is widely personified in the 
irredentism of Italy, is classified by Seton-Watson as "nationalism fighting for 
unification" (Seton-Watson, 1965, p. 15). I shall exclude this "type" of nationalism 
-apart from necessary references- because this social-political phenomenon no longer 
exists and is not the source of blame for making nationalism a "bric-a-brac" concept. 
The second type merits additional scrutiny: the "mass nationalism" which is in effect 
not a nationalism. While we shall largely exclude the first type, we shall pull the 
second into focus for it relates to how nationalism operates as an ideology within 
masses. 
If we come back to the question posed above at the end of a previous section; 
nationalism, of course, does relate to nation as a political artefact of modernity. That 
is, one should say, it does if we take the nation to be the population of the nation-state 
institutionalised in its "national borders" and coterminous with the "home" market, 
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which I found to be the most accurate definition and the one which does not force the 
researcher to forge the facts, following my argument above. Quite understandably, it 
does not at all relate to "nation" in the sense in which one means the nationality or 
ethnicity of "frozen history", for which nationalism invents a politically 
institutionalised, culturally assimilated and integrated, socially re-identified 
community in the form of the so-called nation-state. This is well delineated by several 
prominent scholars in the sphere such as Renan, Gellner, Hobsbawm, Anderson and et 
al. Therefore whilst revisiting the analytic conceptualisations of nationalism, I take it 
for granted that nations are made of ethnic entities - with either single or multiple 
ingredients - but nonetheless nations emerge as new phenomena qualitatively 
differentiated from their constituents. My argument will then not be engaged with 
decoupling the mongrelised "twin" concepts of nation and nationalism -I have made 
an endeavour above to de-mongrelise the latter- but to decouple ethnicity (well- 
utilised -if not exhausted- in the work of "market wars") and nationalism (McCrone, 
1998, p. 25). 
So then, "are there genuinely different types of nationalism" (Smith, 1983, p. 
xi) deserving categorisation? Smith poses this question as being the fundamental 
concern "that underlies a good deal of the attempt to construct an all-embracing 
typology of nationalism or nations". Most generally, three ways of emergence of 
nation-states are acknowledged by the scholars, each of which would give rise to 
respective types of nationalisms: 1) from unification of dynasties to, 2), from 
dissolution/reunification of empires to, 3) from "liberation" to: belated unification'. 
However, insufficient distinctness exists between them to categorise the nationalisms 
of each under separate subtitles. Since, as Nairn rightly states, "taking things into 
one's own hands' denotes a good deal of the substance of nationalism" (Nairn, 1981, 
p. 339), or in the conceptualisation of the synthesis theory of Hah and Martin, (1975, 
pp. 361-386) since "control of the distributive system" is equally the central concern 
in the unification, reunification and belated unification movements and is led by the 
ideology of nationalism in each, categorisation would not contribute to our 
understanding of the phenomenon. In a way consistent with the essential nature of the 
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phenomenon, Seton-Watson classifies "nationalist movements", rather than 
nationalism itself, into three types. 
Nationalist movements can conveniently be divided into three types. The first type is 
the movement fighting for independence from foreign rule. The second type is the 
movement fighting for unification with an already independent state of its fellow- 
nationals. The third type is the movement which has achieved independence and 
unity, but has still to create a deeply-rooted national feeling among its subjects 
(Seton-Watson, 1965, p. 15). 
Although the third type Seton-Watson lists needs further clarification about creating "a 
deeply-rooted national feeling among its subjects" 12, he in fact emphasises that each of 
the three types of movements actually entails not three separable individual 
nationalisms but one. He adds that all "three situations may be described as struggle 
for independence, irredentism and nation-building. Only when the process of nation- 
building is completed does the dynamic explosive force of nationalism begin to die 
down" (op. cit. p. 15). That is, the overall objective of all "types" of nationalism is a 
statehood that is territorially unified, socially re-identified, ethnically re-forged or re- 
formed. In sum; the sole objective is an economically, culturally and politically re- 
institutionalised independent state - what Smith calls "an essential goal of every 
nationalism" for which "possession of territory is, after all, a sine qua non" (Smith, 
1983, p. xiii), no matter how "diverse" the "types" of the movements are. 
Another general temptation is to classify nationalism into two sorts: a) state or 
official nationalism (unionist, assimilationist), b) liberationist nationalism 
(secessionist). Put that way, we have the nationalism for existing state and nationalism 
for potential state. In other words, the nationalism of "oppressed nations" for the 
rights of "poor" and/or "backward" periphery (Nairn, 1981, p. 339) and the 
nationalism of "oppressing nations" for the further rights of the "rich" and/or 
"advanced" centre. Smith adds to the latter's name ("official") the phrase 
"institutional nationalism" by which "the ruling class seeks to assimilate ethnic 
minorities through an educational programme of nationalism, backed by major 
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institutions, so to "homogenise the population into a compact nation" (Smith, 1991, p. 
102). 
Nairn also talks of "two kinds of nationalism" coterminous with the 
classification above. In Nairn's understanding, one is the "main, essentially healthy 
sort we applaud in Indo-china and Mozambique" and the other is "the derivative 
(italics added), degenerate sort we oppose in, for example, the American working 
class, Gaullism, the Chilean Junta and so on". For him, the "main" kind is progressive 
as it is the "mainspring of nationalism" by which the periphery targets the centre's 
"foreign" or colonialist rule. So the "derivative" kind is a regressive, "abusive" version 
of the former, tending "towards the encouragement of social and psychological 
atavism, the exploitation of senseless fears and prejudices, and so toward violence" 
(Nairn, 1981, p. 347). First, although his general emphasis on a progressive and 
regressive dichotomy13 seems to be a fair reflection of the truth, Nairn's branding of 
the nationalism of the periphery as the main one and that of the centre's expansion as 
derivative is misleading. 
Nairn situates his conceptualisation of nationalism in the interrelation of centre 
and periphery that is necessitated by the uneven development of capitalism. This is an 
insightful explanation of the phenomenon of nationalism in the dialectic of cause and 
effect relations within the logic of the development of productive forces, despite 
Nimni's strong objections (Nimni, 1991). But it is not clear how he finds the 
periphery's reaction14 to the centre to be the "main" type. He contradicts himself -in 
his reading of the phenomenon within the framework of uneven development- in 
recognising the "reaction" as the main type. Here, it is not the "reaction" of the 
periphery that is primary but the "action" of the centre's expansion, 5. Nairn, 
nevertheless, continues with a frankly illuminating passage with regard to separating 
nationalism into sorts. 
Without for a moment denying that these political and moral distinction are justified, 
and indeed obvious, one is none the less forced to point out that the theoretical 
dimension attaching to them is quite mistaken. The distinctions do not imply the 
existence of two brands of nationalism (Nairn, 1981, p. 347). 
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That is, Nairn clarifies; any classification of nationalism in terms of its real nature will 
not fit smoothly into an unbiased sociological theorisation -a theorisation which is not 
"influenced by nationalism itself' (op. cit. p. 94). However, the premise on which the 
conclusion is structured is the "ambivalent nature" of nationalism, and he 
consequently fails to escape from Gellner's or Renan's vindication of nationalism 
according to which, the latter believed, the nation is generated as "One great 
aggregate of men" (Renan in Woolf, 1996, p. 59). 
The point is that, as the most elementary comparative analysis will show, all 
nationalism is both healthy and morbid. Both progress and regress are inscribed in its 
genetic code from the start. This is a structural fact about it. And it is a fact to which 
there are no exceptions: in this sense, it is an exact (not a rhetorical) statement about 
nationalism to say that it is by nature ambivalent (Nairn, 1981, pp. 347,348). 
Two Faces of the "Modern Janus" 
If one ventures into an abstraction about the seemingly tricky "two-faced" state 
of nationalism, then neither nation nor nationalism will be "elusive" or "ambivalent". 
One would then be free of the difficulty to see that each actual "face" of nationalism is 
not so tempted to interfere with the affairs of the other. Once this is done, one would 
also not find it difficult to see that the philosophy of "periphery" (small nation, 
oppressed nation, hinterland people etc) nationalism in terms of its "hard core" is by 
no means distinguishable from the "central" nationalism. So, one would not deviate to 
applaud the "progressiveness" and "healthiness" of the "poor" periphery against the 
centre's morbidity. While the periphery's nationalism lies in "taking things -the 
"things" of "home"- into one's own hands", the centre's in keeping the "things" -the 
"things" of neighbouring or distant lands as "theirs". Let's see what abstraction I am 
talking about. 
The crux of the issue is the cultural burden involved in the "work" of the 
national, which has become the real subtlety due to the exhausting "core exigency" of 
the realpolitik of nationalism. The task of a viable abstraction is precisely an untwisted 
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separation of "national sentiments" and market "sentiments". The former sentiments 
are to do with the individual's cultural self. The totality of individuals constitutes the 
"masses" for which Nietzsche used the term herd or 'nob, for he knew that it has been 
dysfunctional throughout history. The latter, meanwhile, are to do with the insatiably 
burgeoning market desire of unevenly developing capitalism -the "love" of both 
"home" and "non-home" objects with which its abundance and scarcity, its richness 
and poorness have so far decided how the course of history has run. That is, once the 
task of abstraction has been accomplished, one will have no hesitation in saying that 
nationalism has nothing to do with ethnic -or "national"- identity. In his study of 
identity, National Identity, Anthony D. Smith, analyses ethnic identity as a collective 
cultural phenomenon by distinguishing it from a set of other human identities such as 
gender, regional, class, religious identities; and he endeavours to juxtapose some 
components of nationalism. Those, in brief, are: "a consciousness of belonging", "a 
language and symbolism", "an ideology", "a social and political movement" (Smith, 
1991, p. 72). Then he arrives at an italicised definition of nationalism, which is 
repeated in almost same words on the following page. 
I shall define nationalism as an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining 
autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its 
members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation' (op. cit., p. 73) 
The argument followed and the definition structured above are settled in the chapter 
titled "Nationalism and Cultural identity" for he thinks -and states in the first sentence 
of the chapter- that "it is nationalism that creates national identity" in the "`modernist' 
image of the nation" (op. cit., p. 71). Namely, Smith strives to delineate how 
nationalism as a "movement" relates to cultural identity in its form of "ethnic" or 
"national" identity. Later, he refers to Gellner's idea of "invention" about the nation 
and Kedourie's conception of the "doctrine" of nationalism, and raises a double 
question which concerns my argument about separating the two "faces" of 
nationalism: "How shall we understand such `invention"'? In what sense does 
nationalism invent or create nations `where they do not exist'? " 
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First, as a crucial point, Smith takes nationalism not as ideology but as 
"ideological movement" in which ideology is only one of the components -the 
component which Seton-Watson rightly recognises as the "form" of the constant "core 
of nationalism". 
Nationalist movements have usually been strongly influenced by whatever political 
ideas were current at the time of their struggle. ... But always the 
hard core of 
nationalism has been more important than its ideological form (Seton-Watson, 1965, 
p. 15). 
At first glance, Smith is not in agreement with Gellner's conception of the nation as 
"invented" by nationalism or with Hobsbawm's nation as "made" by nationalism - 
but he is nonetheless fairly consistent with them by grasping nationalism as an 
ideological movement "for attaining and maintaining" a potential or existent nation. 
Smith's definition of nationalism repeats that it "is an ideological movement for 
attaining and maintaining the autonomy, unity and identity (italics in the original) of 
a nation" (Smith, 1991, p. 74). The repeated definition scrutinises the "hard core" of 
the politics of nationalism: attaining and maintaining the nation. This interprets the 
nationalisms of both "periphery" and "centre" as an ideological movement for 
either taking or keeping things - no matter whether these are "home" or "non- 
home" things. So, Smith, in the final analysis, is not in disagreement with 
Hobsbawm or Gellner or Renan in the "sense" of how "nationalism invents or 
creates nations". In fact, none of the scholars above imply that nationalism invents 
nations from nothing in a religious conception. Gellner's notorious remark on the 
invention of nations by nationalism "where they do not exist" is followed by a 
transparent explanation on the manner of invention: "... -but it does need some pre- 
existing differentiating marks to work on... " (Gellner, 1964, p. 168), which Smith 
himself does not think to elide. '6 The central issue here, which concerns my 
argument, is that "inventionist" approaches to the linkage between nation and 
nationalism do conform to the view that nationalisms "work on" some pre-existing 
entities when inventing the nation -that is, ethnicity or ethnic communities of 
60 
Hobsbawm's "proto-nation" as the most viably vacant entities pre-existing there to 
be refined, redefined and re-identified. 
Nations are made of ethnic entities by the nationalisms of either existing 
states or of emerging liberation movements. Nationalisms are made of innate 
sentiments of the most available sorts as "raw material", such as ethnic, primordial, 
patriotic and -eventually- laborious (contributed by "communist nationalism") 
ones. While the basic "raw material" for nations is ethnic entities, they provide their 
innate sentiments to nationalism. But just as nations are not ethnicities any more, 
nationalisms are not individuals' innate sentiments in its full-scale operation for the 
realpolitik of rising industrial capitalism. Who can say that the impetus behind the 
two World Wars of the first half of the past century and the wars and quarrels of its 
second half between national "communist" states was due to the totality of the 
masses' innate cultural sentiments? 
In its very sense, not as an entity of theoretical discourse but as a course of 
politics, nationalism is a non-eschewal of the bourgeoisie's desire and its love of 
geography and demography for which it had to foster devices cultivated from varying 
aspects of man's primordial inwardness which "is inherent in the nature of things" 
(Gellner, 1964, p, 157), and which manifests as innate patriotism among the masses 
vis-ä-vis "language, race, culture, and sometimes even religion" (Kedourie, 1966, p. 
73). 
What the sociology of nationalism needs to decouple here is the masses' innate 
ethnic-cultural sentiments from the insatiable market "sentiments" of capitalist 
enterprises while decoupling ethnicity from nation. Hobsbawm states that "official 
ideologies of states and movements (italics added) are not guides to what it is in the 
minds of even most loyal citizens and supporters" (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 11). Here, he 
precisely points at the non-linked visions in the heads of the ruling apparatuses of 
states and of the elite of institutionalised national liberation movements in the stage of 
the "proto-state" when the "naive" initiator intelligentsia is eliminated or rendered 
dysfunctional. When Seton-Watson subordinated the "ideological form" of 
nationalism to its "hard core", in particular highlighted in the "form" of "Marxist 
nationalism" in the 1950s and 1960s, and added that "nationalist leaders of nationalist 
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movements who are influenced in a more general way by Marxism seem usually to 
turn out more nationalist than Marxist" Seton-Watson, 1965, p. 15), his argument also, 
I assume, revolves around the distinction between prospects in the head and pursuits in 
the body of nationalism'7. Here, I have to recall the metaphor I mentioned above 
regarding the concerns of the "sheep" and the "butcher" with which the parties are 
respectively occupied, with no interest in the views of one another. The sheep's 
concern is the innate-instinctual will to live free; the butcher's is a freshly emerged 
desire to a self-contained market - and so far history has always witnessed the final 
triumph of the latter. 
The nationalism of the nation-state, as the rising bourgeoisie's politics of unity, 
envisages a geographical market (as large as possible) and a demography -not 
necessarily entailing an ethnic homogeneity- (as massive as possible) independent of 
the extent of the manipulation of the masses and the severe exploitation of "raw 
material" to depletion as "purely passive recipients" (Woolf, 1996, p. 29). The skilful 
use of "cultural freedom" -culture as the principal premises of the spiritual existence 
of humankind as social beings- by both power-holders and power-pursuers (Nairn, 
1981, p. 333) to keep/gain "the control of distributive systems" (Hah and Martin, 
1975) ought not to "force" one to confuse these two disparate "faces" of nationalism 
as an "ideological movement". Rather than the interests beyond national borders, the 
distillation of the concepts of "national interest" or "the interests of the nation" and the 
cultural "interests" within the nation needs to be the primary concern of a sociological 
conceptualisation. Seton-Watson claims that "nationalism is an explicit doctrine and a 
movement" and accordingly emphasises an evident aspect of the phenomenon. 
The doctrine declares that the interests of the nation, as interpreted by spokesman, 
come before all other interests within the state, of all other communities beyond its 
borders, and in the case of extreme totalitarian nationalisms, before all considerations 
of morality and religion. Nationalist movements aim to realise the interests of the 
nation at the expense of its enemies. (Seton-Watson, 1965, p. 5). 
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It is true that the nationalist politics of either the states of "large" nations or of the 
liberation movements of "small" ones aim to realise their interests at the expense of an 
external enemy. However, while the interests of the community within the borders are 
themselves fairly explicit, they do not lie in the "doctrine" of nationalism as such. On 
the contrary, they are obscured and concealed in the discourse of any form of 
nationalism. Home communities have no noticeable interests in values beyond their 
borders but millions of them have died for these values -in, for example, the two World 
Wars of last century and they did so in the earlier wars of weeks, months, years, 
decades and hundred-years. Their names are engraved on the cenotaphs and tombs of 
Unknown Solders in the absence of their bodies. The pursuit of external interests during 
the seventy years of Russian nationalism with its communist ideological form 
contributed much to Russia as a State which became a superpower, but we all 
acknowledged, following the demystification of 1989, that nationalism did little or 
nothing for the community of insiders. This was unearthed and "caught virtually 
everyone unawares" (McCrone, 1998, p. 149) as an undeniable fact, in spite of the 
absence of the ordinary form of private property in the means of production, which 
Marx diagnosed as the only source of surplus exploitation. The same is true -but still 
implicit in discourse- in the case of liberation nationalisms (I argued above under "The 
Departure and Arrival of National Politics") once the movement comes to the threshold 
of power. Nairn arrives at the very same point from a different angle. 
Mass nationalism was good up to a point, in certain specific conditions, in the fight 
against alien oppression, and so on. Beyond the point it immediately degenerated 
again into a morbid delusion and an instrument of bourgeois reaction (Nairn, 1981, p. 
351). 
That is, the mass "nationalism" of human expectations of freedom is, without 
exception, doomed to an inescapable "betrayal". The spectacle illustrates that nation is 
not a compact entity whose interests are inseparable. There lies within the nation a 
truth of non-resembling interests, which rather equates to the interests of the "sheep" 
and the "butcher". Here, in the discourse of any nationalism, the term "national" itself 
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may well have been merely a means of obscuring two disparate phenomena. Rosa 
Luxemburg, an uncompromising anti-nationalist and an opponent of the "right of 
national self-determination", recalls three factors as "typical aspects of a bourgeoisie 
society" with reference to Karl Kautsky which indicate, she asserts, "what is actually 
hiding behind the mask". 
... the desire of the bourgeoisie to assure for itself an internal or 
domestic market for 
its own commodity production; second, the desire for political freedom - democracy; 
and finally, expansion of the national literature and culture to the populace 
(Luxemburg, 1976, p. 159). 
In my view, the extent of the latter two aspects has actually fulfilled and determined 
the illusory ability of the "mask" that veils the "first" one, which in the final 
analysis has an impact on the fate of so-called nation-sate. 
The vital question in the light of the most recent developments -in particular 
surrounding the unfolding of "post-communist" nationalism- shall have to concern 
itself with what nationalism does rather than what it says. That is, is nationalism a 
discourse of verbal and textual wordings or a course of premeditated action that locks 
onto the needs of a self-contained "free market", independently of what is being 
theorised? 
It has became less easy to assert the former answer to this question following 
the dissolution of the pseudo-communist regimes of "iron curtain" world, because 
nationalism in their experiences has been demystified rather than "regurgitated". 
Rather than heralding the "end" or "beginning" of history, the distortion and 
perversion of the "national sentiment" in the service of market forces has emerged 
increasingly following the fall of the "iron curtain". Gellner, in his "introductory" 
analysis on nationalism in Thought and Change, blames the people "who had heralded 
the decline of nationalism" for underestimating "the power and hold of the dark 
atavistic forces in human nature" and for overestimating the "power of reason" over 
what he calls "Dark Gods" which include "apparently the call of ethnic and territorial 
loyalty" He goes into deeper discussion of the philosophical and psychological roots 
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of the "atavistic gods" by referring Freud, Mill and Dostoevski. However, Gellner 
does not endeavour to analyse'8 how and for whom these "gods" come to operate on 
such a fateful scale "with a shallow psychology, one which saw man as finding his 
gratification in pleasure" (Gellner, 1964, pp. 148,149), and which did for no more 
common men than carrying their names on the plates of Unknown Soldiers' cenotaphs. 
One is compelled to ask why these gods of "atavistic force" -as part of human 
nature-, which include the call of ethnic and territorial loyalty, have been rendered so 
inactive or "dormant" among the single ethnicity of 22 Arab states in search of a 
greater unity? "An utterance of Schleiermacher's" selected by Kedouirie has a lot to 
say vis-ä-vis the extent of the distortion and perversion of humankind's innate 
sentiments which are generally conceptualised as "patriotism" and briefly defined as 
"affection for one's country, or ones group" before they deviate to become 
nationalism. 
`How little worthy of respect is the man who roams about hither and thither without 
the anchor of national ideal and love of fatherland; how dull is the friendship that 
rests merely upon personal similarities in dispositions and tendencies, and not upon 
the feeling of a greater common unity for whose sake one offers up one's life; how 
the greatest source of pride is lost by the woman[19] who can not feel that she also 
bore children for her fatherland and brought them up for it, that her house and all the 
petty things that fill up most of her time belong to a greater whole and take their 
place in the union of her people! ' (Kedourie, 1966, p. 73). 
A parodic columnist Bekir Coskun in Hurriyet, a Turkish daily, satirises the living 
experience of such a perverted "Dark God" in Turkey in relation to the nationalists' 
severe reaction against the European Union's demands for the democratisation of 
Turkey, which prompted the sudden "united front" composed of extreme right and 
left circles (Hurriyet, February 26,2002). Cockun raises a plain question: "Why are 
these National Forces20 not visible and why do they not act or react when the IMF 
and World Bank have their monthly inspection into our country's every privacy but 
are so prompt when democratisation is brought to attention by the EU? " (Coskun, 
2002). What "communist nationalism" contributed to this factual essence of 
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nationalist politics - and the essential source of pivotal force drawn from "mass 
nationalism" - is a perversion of "laborious" sentiments (Lester, 1997, pp. 37-40). 
Further, the distortion and perversion of patriotic sentiments are not the sole 
case within a single nationality. They may well deviate far more to the extent that the 
members of one ethnicity can be exhaustedly motivated for another ethnic nationalism. 
Not only can they be mobilised for "another" nationalism, but they can be mobilised 
against their fellow ethnic population -as is in the case with the Kurds of Turkey. The 
most notorious activists of extreme Turkish nationalism are among the Kurds of 
poorly Turkish-speaking youth. The strongest mass base of the pro-state nationalist 
parties of Turkey resides in three Kurdish populated cities -Elazig, Erzurum and 
Malatya. 
I have argued above that nationalism is made of national sentiments just as 
nation is made of ethnicity. Things are not called by what they are made of. No one 
would think of calling "bread" "dough" simply because it is made of dough. 
Alternatively, we never confuse an ashtray with a bottle because they are both made of 
glass. Why then do not we invent a single term to denote "iron" and "hammer" for the 
hammer is made of iron? Or, why do we express "dough" and "bread" by 
ethnologically distant terms even though they are made of the same prior materials? 
This is the most elided, but essential and consistent, part of the reality of nationalist 
practice. This is the most hidden part of the phenomenon with which the theory or 
sociology of nationalism needs to reengage, if the primary task is to delineate how 
nationalism has worked and continues to work -at least for some further decades- in 
the face of the full-scale expansion of globalisation. 
The researcher is compelled to ask why one should not employ similar or at 
least kindred terms, but should insist on the same one for these remarkably distinct 
concepts - so called national (identity) sentiments and nationalism? Smith talks of 
distinguishing "nationalism" and "national sentiments" for analytical purposes (Smith, 
1983, pp. 169) but does not allocate them to "above" and "below" of the nationalist 
movements - to the leading elite and the supporting combative masses of nationalism. 
Rulers have no national sentiments in their governmental practices. Smith's 
exemplification of some African movements who are or were "durable `nationalist' 
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movements, but hardly any `national sentiment' outside the adherents of the nationalist 
movement itself' is inconceivable. Further down the page, it becomes clear that he is 
tempted by the conception of nation as "ethnicity" for he believes that "you can have a 
`nation' (say Poland in the nineteenth century) without a `nation-state'... " (op. cit., p. 
169). 
The pivotal agenda that is needed to be raised and refreshed, in terms of 
sociological understanding, ought to be how nationalist agitation has its effect among 
the politically dysfunctional masses That is to say, the point is not what nationalism is 
but rather how fatefully it operates. Hroch produces a penetrating comparative study in 
this sense (Hroch, 1985). But because it is confined to liberation movements of 
"small" nations due to a zealously traditional "Leftist" approach, the study becomes 
disabled in terms of embracing generalisations vis-ä-vis how states' official 
nationalisms work among their citizens with no need for the "three stages" of 
collective action. What is vital in studying nationalism from a sociological approach is 
to delineate the most general processes through which the masses are mobilised and 
utilised in the service of the insatiable bourgeoisie. These processes can not be 
confined within the national liberation struggles of the "small" nations. In addition, it 
is not possible to distinguish between the respective processes of "large" and "small" 
nations in terms of agitation, mobilisation and manipulation of the masses. 
The real shortcoming of theorisation on nationalism is the ostensibly 
coinciding disparate needs and aspirations of distinct social entities which are in effect 
directed against one another (Hah and Martin, 1975, p. 369) - highly attractive surplus 
values of market forces and inward-innate values of individuals that are not easily 
dispensable. Since these two totally distinct (as in the saying: the worries of "sheep" 
and "butcher") phenomena are taken to be an "interwoven compound", the attempts 
towards the clarification or classification of nationalist theory and politics will only 
contribute to the proliferation of "facets" of the "multifarious" nation and nationalism. 
Thus, the contribution will effect continuous ambivalence, double-facedness, 
symbiosis, multifariousness and so on surrounding these concepts. 
By and large, nationalism as the realpolitik of modernity, which was entailed 
by the leap-forward in the development process of productive forces manifested in the 
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form of industrialisation, is being further demystified as a mere politics rather than an 
ideology. The fall of the "Iron Curtain", behind which the depressed -and 
consequently underdeveloped- nationalistic dissatisfactions blazed and promptly 
proliferated, contributed a great deal not to the regurgitation of nationalism but to its 
demystification (This will be briefly taken on board in "Marxism and nationalism" 
below). It is an intimately destructive and constructive -however, mostly internecine- 
form of politics of a historical arc during which the respectively rising adolescent 
bourgeois classes (of the centre and periphery) quarrelled about taking or keeping 
things in one's own hands. And this politics took shape in accordance with the needs 
and results of modernity's industrialisation -in fact, its severe "uneven diffusion" 
(Gellner, 1964, p. 166). An additional "catalyst" for over-pushing the implantation of 
nationalism's power of perversion into the "national consciousness" of the lower 
social strata is that it has been well grasped as a reaction or counterattack by everyone 
from the young bourgeoisie in its heyday to infantile Marxism: a political and 
ideological antidote. 
The perverted ethnic-primordial sentiments among Nietzsche's "herd" has duly 
produced a European saying. It deserves repeating: "A nation is a group of person 
united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their 
neighbours". The fortunate thing appears to be that the bourgeoisie of global 
capitalism in our time is, as a mater of fact, not adolescent any more. And accordingly, 
the flooding "localisation of globalisation" (Deutsch, 1969, pp. 169-174) -in keeping 
with supranational market "sentiments"- has been pushing nationalism of any "type" 
towards obsolescence. This has also been the fate of the communists' nationalism of 
"laborious sentiments". 
II The Twilight of "Communist Nationalism" 
No argument can be held by the scholars on nation and nationalism without taking on 
board what Marxism has said and done. Although both Marx and Marxism -with all 
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its variants- have so far, since "scientific socialism" was introduced, had no 
significant effect upon the factual course of the history segment called "the era of 
nationalism", this is conspicuously so. And this is why Anderson rightly states that 
"nationalism has proved an uncomfortable anomaly for Marxist theory and, precisely 
for this reason, has been largely elided rather than confronted" (Anderson, 1983, p. 
13). That is, I interpret Anderson, the adolescent bourgeoisie's rational nationalism 
triumphed over infantile Marxism's emotional proletarianism and its over-exaggerated 
internationalism. 
Since there will be no major gains in tracing this "failure" back to the early 
"founding-fathers" of scientific socialism and "infantile" Marxism, it will not be wise 
to exhaust much of the argument on bygone years. However, in order to advance the 
reasoning from the central views on nationalism to the "national question" of Marxist 
tradition, we need to look at the mainstream opinion of the early days. 
a. The Banal and Nave "Realpolitik" towards the "National Question" 
A temptation to self-deception is the case among the maximalist intelligentsia (not 
executors) of the premature revolutionary communist power-project by which 
"Marxism's great historical failure" in relation to the "national question" is generated. 
While the "wise" or "realistic" politicians of the early communist "odysseys" have, 
soon after they ascended the throne, "persuaded" themselves to obey the necessities of 
the objective and subjective vacancies of the history there; whoever resisted the "flow 
of history" to some degree was ultimately eliminated. I partly argued this above when 
highlighting the deviant trajectory of the practice of nationalism between its departure 
and arrival. This, of course, is not only a fate of pre-adolescent communist enterprise. 
It is also a factual facet of recorded human history - with sufficiently instructive 
recurrent experiences from Jesus Christ to Lenin, from Hz. Ali to Trotsky, from 
Mazzini to Mao, from Napoleon Bonaparte to Ocalan, and so forth. This, no doubt, 
does not fall into the realm of the current study and surely deserves a self-contained 
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research. However, if we come back to Marxism's "great failure" in its confrontation 
with the "national question", the picture may become more lucid. 
It is frequently said that Marx and Engels -especially the latter- were hostile 
towards "oppressed nations" for they considered them to be "non-historical". True, 
Marx and Engels did largely ignore the non-historical ethnic entities, which were 
assimilated or annihilated. Nevertheless, this was not because they wanted these 
entities to be non-historical but because they saw them to be non-historical. This was 
also a consistency in their theory of the irreversible development of the forces of 
production. In the time of nationalism as "uneven diffusion" (in Gellner's words), the 
economy as the "base" of sociality or the relations of production, which Marx and 
Englels called infrastructure, did assimilate and annihilate many of the "small" 
ethnicities because they were "non-historical". The dialectical equilibrium between the 
forces of production and the relations of production, as manifested in the form of the 
"uneven diffusion" or "uneven development" of industrialisation in modern era, did 
and still does determine the trajectory of the social history of humankind just as Marx 
formulated. 
Thus, the need to search for the "sins of the past" in the legacy of Marx and 
Engels concerning the "national question" is not vital. Their standpoint was more than 
clear in the ad hoc articles written mostly on the colonial questions of the time. This 
standpoint was positioned in the "heat" of the episode from the 1848 Revolutions to 
the Paris Commune in keeping with their conception of -and sympathy towards- the 
development of productive forces. This has been fairly unequivocal in the light of the 
extensive and impressive lessons of Soviet "communism" in general and of the 
"communism" of National Liberation Movements in particular. 
Thus, it would not contribute much to go far back to what the "founding- 
fathers" said in the first place -in Nimni's words, "the perplexing legacy of Marx and 
Engels (Nimni, 1991, pp. 17-43). Arguing Marxism's essentials, in effect, contributes 
more to the question of nation and nationalism than the Marxist theory on the 
"national question" for the "failure" relates to the "infantile" nature of the theory. 
That is, "nationality theory ... is in fact a central part of Marxist theory" (Davis in 
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Luksemburg, 1976, p. 12) that represents its "pre-puberty", which rendered it "sterile" 
in its confrontation with "national question". 
However, in order to relate the "question" under discussion to the blameable 
essential(s), it will be useful to explain the main concerns of the competing 
standpoints. The "essentials" of Marxist theory that lie behind the "failure" in its 
confrontation with nationalism and the "national question" are the over-emphasis on 
the proletariat and its internationalism. This of course is not the whole edifice of the 
theory but it is the one which fundamentally underlies the "question" -the "question" 
which rendered the so-far socialist branded revolutions "national liberation" of each 
individual adolescent bourgeoisie's capitalist severe swing. 
The Right of Nations to Self-determination 
The positions moulded on the "national question" by the Marxist mainstream 
manifest in the concept of "national self-determinations", which -as is in the general 
lack of consensus on nationalism- concerns politics rather than theoretical 
conceptualisations. Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg represent the best of the positions 
taken vis-ä-vis "the right of nations to self-determination". 
Just like Marx and Engels, Lenin has set out no systematic thoughts on the 
theoretical aspects of this issue. Rather, he instructed Stalin to fulfil the "task", which I 
discussed above in brief. What Lenin provides in his related writings, mainly in his 
notorious pamphlet The Right of Nations to Self-determination, is a polemic on the 
rights of "oppressed nations" against "national oppression". Lenin was additionally 
determined, clear and uncompromising on the side of the "rights of nations to self- 
determination" for he believed that the right implied "only a consistent expression of 
struggle against all national oppression" (Lenin, 1968, p. 159). However, he was not 
that unequivocal in relation to how of its implementation in proportion to his firmness 
on the "indispensable" right. Although he talks of the "complete freedom to agitate 
for secession and for a referendum on secession by the seceding nation", the how and 
who of such "free" conditions are not discussed because if there is such an opportunity 
for the "seceding nation", then there is no "national oppression". Lenin justifies his 
71 
"proletarianist" position in the traditional self-misguiding naivety of the entrepreneur 
intelligentsia. 
The proletariat of the oppressor nations must not confine themselves to general, 
stereotyped phrases against annexation and in favour of the equality of nations in 
general, such as any pacifist bourgeois will repeat. The proletariat can not remain 
silent on the question of the frontiers of a state founded on national oppression, a 
question so "unpleasant" for the imperialist bourgeoisie. The proletariat must struggle 
against the enforced retention of oppressed nations within the bounds of the given 
state, which means that they must fight for the right to self-determination. The 
proletariat must demand freedom of political separation for the colonies and nations 
oppressed by "their own" nation. Otherwise, the internationalism of the proletariat 
would be nothing but empty words; neither confidence nor class solidarity would be 
possible between the workers of the oppressed and oppressed nations; ... (op. cit., pp. 
160,161). 
As has been rendered indisputable by the break-up of the "Iron Curtain", the 
proletariat did not do this. Lenin's naive "pragmatism was then fossilised by the post- 
1917 history" and "the revolution" did "easily fall victim to a renascent Great Russian 
nationalism" (Nairn, 1981, p. 85). While Lenin acutely draws attention to the sense of 
"empty words" if the proletariat do not demand and fight for "freedom of political 
separation for the colonies and nations oppressed by `their own' nation", he is not as 
concerned with the contingency that the "right of self-determination" may be doomed 
to receiving only lip service. Davis quotes an interesting excerpt from Amilcar 
Cabral's Revolution in Guinea, which penitently questions how Lenin's position was 
"fossilised" by the subsequent course of affairs and, moreover, how it served just the 
opposite purpose. 
I would even go so far as to ask whether, given the advance of socialism in the world, 
the national liberation is not an imperialist initiative. Is the judicial institution which 
serves as a reference for the right of all peoples who are trying to liberate themselves 
a product of the peoples who are trying to liberate themselves? Was it created by the 
socialist countries who are our historical associates? It is signed by the imperialist 
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countries, it is the imperialist countries who have recognised the right of all peoples 
to national independence, so I ask myself whether we may not be considering as an 
initiative of our people what is in fact an initiative of the enemy? Even Portugal, 
which is using napalm bombs against our people in Guine, signed the declaration of 
the right of all peoples to independence. ... The objective the of imperialist countries 
was to prevent the enlargement of the socialist camp, to liberate reactionary forces in 
our countries which were being stifled by colonialism and to enable these forces to 
ally themselves with the international bourgeoisie. The fundamental objective was to 
create a bourgeoisie where one did not exist, in order specifically to strengthen the 
imperialist and the capitalist camp (Cabral in Luxemburg, 1976, p. 39, quoted by 
Davis) 
But what Cabral was not aware of, just like almost everyone in favour of the "socialist 
camp", was that those "socialist countries" themselves who were their "historical 
associates" at that time, had long been converted to states which created a 
"bourgeoisie where one did not exist". This was to be further demystified by the "1989 
revolutions". 
The position of Rosa Luxemburg was respectively firm and uncompromising 
on the "rights" of "oppressed nations" to secession and "self-determination" against 
Bolsheviks. Cabral's radical questioning appears to be the heir to her approach on the 
early disputes of Marxist politics. Luxemburg did emphasise decades before him that 
"especially striking about this formula is the fact that it doesn't represent anything 
specifically connected with socialism nor with the politics of the working class". For 
her, the so-called remedial formula for the "nationality question" had been reproduced 
from the "paraphrase of the old slogan of bourgeois nationalism put forth in all 
countries at all times: `the right of nations to freedom and independence"' 
(Luxemburg, 1976, pp. 102,103). What actually stands out in Luxemburg's standpoint 
is not the "thing" demanded by the formula but the applicability of this demand. 
"There can be no self-determination under capitalism", she insists. 
It is true that socialism recognises for every people the right of independence and the 
freedom of independent control of its own destinies. But it is a veritable perversion of 
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socialism to regard present-day capitalist society as the expression of this self- 
determination of nations (op. cit., p. 289). 
She adds a question to highlight the concern above: "Where is there a nation in which 
the people have had the right to determine the form and conditions of their national, 
political, and social existence? " Contrary to Lenin, she strove to bring before the 
socialist movement that the proletariat was not reluctant to achieve "freedom of 
political separation for the colonies and nations oppressed by `their own' nation" but 
merely talking about the "right" itself would be "empty words", for this right is 
impracticable under capitalism. The course of subsequent decades has corroborated 
Luxemburg's persistent assertion that "in a class society; to speak of self- 
determination for the `people' would ordinarily mean the self-determination of ruling 
class; the workers would be left in a subordinate position as before" (Luxemburg, 
1976, p. 15). 
Revolutionary Romanticism Versus the Fact of Social 
Societal historiography has been so fragile against the triumphant advances of 
the history. This appears to be one of the greatest vulnerabilities of historiography with 
regard to the recorded affairs of humankind's overall socio-political trajectory in 
general, and to the discourse of experienced socialism in particular. In the case of the 
"national question" of the Marxist mainstream, both the theorisation and political 
practice of this tradition have been victims of this "soft" side of history. The spectacle 
from behind the shattered "Iron Curtain" has further revealed that the acute anti- 
nationalist Luxemburg was a victim of this misleading historiography and the 
corresponding self-deceptive theorisation of the "romantic" intelligentsia. Her ideas 
have been rendered nonsensical by Lenin's pragmatism and, of course, his great 
success in introducing the first communist endeavour in Russia -the October 
Revolution of the Bolshevik intelligentsia. While early theoreticians of the Marxist 
mainstream such as Otto Bauer and Antonio Gramsci are not exempt from being heirs 
to the banal romanticism of the entrepreneur intelligentsia in historical leaps forward, 
Luxemburg was defeated by the prosperity of Lenin's Soviets. Bauer, in this sense, 
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represents an initiating figure in the Marxist tradition that confined nationalism to the 
struggles of "oppressed nations" and rendering nation ethnicity. His vindication of 
"cultural nationalism" in a multi-national state has also been elided by the protagonists 
of the "right of self-determination" in the prosperous Bolshevik endeavour. I partly 
discussed his associated ideas above. In a similar manner, Gramsci represents the 
romanticism of the early tradition of the Marxist intelligentsia. One of n his articles 
written in 29 April 1917 comments on the events of the "February Revolution" and is 
a clear mirroring of the spiritual fact. The article begins by posing the question: "Why 
is the Russian revolution a proletarian revolution? " After comparing the French and 
Russian revolutions and emphasising the resemblance that is "only on the surface" in 
terms of the "act of violence", Gramsci evaluates the Russian Revolution in its early 
stages. 
The bourgeoisie newspapers have attached no importance to another intriguing event. 
The Russian revolutionaries have not only freed political prisoners as well. When the 
common criminals in one prison were told they were free, they replied that they felt 
they did not have the right to accept liberty because they had to expiate their crimes. 
In the Odessa they gathered in the prison courtyard and of their own volition swore to 
become honest men and resolved to live by their own labours. From the point of view 
of the socialist revolution, this news has more importance even than that of the 
dismissal of the Tsar and the grand duke. The Tsar would have been deposed by 
bourgeoisie revolutionaries as well. But in bourgeois eyes, these condemned men 
would still have been the enemies of their order, the stealthy appropriators of their 
wealth and their tranquillity. In our eyes their liberation has this significance: what 
the revolution has created Russia is a new way of life. It has not only replaced one 
power by another. It has replaced one way of life by another. It has created a new 
eioral order, and in addition to the physical liberty of the individuals, has established 
liberty of mind (italics added) (Gramsci, 1977, pp. 29,30). 
What the new "way of life" or "new moral order" generated in 72 years, which 
"virtually caught everyone unawares" (McCrone, 1998, p. 149) was a mere picture of 
the Russian capitalism of the "greenhorn" Russian bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie was 
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well-institutionalised in the form of the bureaucratic apparatus of the communist party 
with the nationalism's ideological "form" of socialist utterance. And one of the most 
disappointing results of the "way of life" of almost three quarters of a century has 
emerged as the flood of prostitution into Turkey, the nearest profitable market, to the 
extent that this flood replaced the Turkish word for prostitute orospu with the Russian 
female name Natasa. Gramsci makes himself believe that even if there were a 
"material base" for the qualitative significance of liberation that effected the change in 
the lifestyle of the peoples of Russia. 
Only in an atmosphere of social turbulence could such an event occur, when the way 
of life and the prevailing mentality is changed. Liberty makes men free and widens 
their moral horizons; it turns the worst criminals under an authoritarian regime into a 
martyr for the cause of duty, a hero in the cause of honesty (op. cit., p 30). 
And he ends the article with the following sentence. 
And once again it is from the East that light comes to illuminate the aged Western world, 
which is stupefied by the events and can oppose them with nothing but the banalities and 
stupidities of its hack-writers (op. cit., p. 30) 
This naive and self-misleading romanticism dominated the Marxist theoretical 
tradition not only on the "national question", but on social affairs in general, except for 
the enduring intellectual essays21 admired by the humiliated Trotskian standpoint up 
until the "1989 revolutions". 
When pointing at the "intimate link between nationalist politics and 
romanticism, although he defines it as the "cultural mode of the nationalist dynamic", 
Tom Nairn provides an attractive generalisation on the insight of romantic spirit. 
In the context, all romanticism's well-known features - the search for inwardness, 
the trust in feeling or instinct, the attitude to `nature', the cult of the particular and 
mistrust of the abstract, etc. - makes sense (Nairn, 1981, p. 104). 
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This very spirit is a recurrent case among the patriotic intelligentsia. But it is not less 
true of their Marxist fellows. The point that I seek to bring out here is that, the 
finalising factor in the actual course of history is not the banal truth of the 
intelligentsia's nave romanticism in relation to either nationalism or Marxism but the 
realities of class interests and class struggle entailed by the irreversible progress of the 
forces of production and its conflictual equilibrium with the relations of production. 
This, however, occupies a great deal of the arguments with regard to Marxism's 
"historical failure" in the politics of nationalism and the "national question". In this 
field, the positions of Tom Nairn and Ephraim Nimni are illustrative of the principal 
approaches to the "question". 
b. What is to Blame for "Historical Failure" 
In his book, which is evaluated by some scholars as path-breaking, The Break-up of 
Britain, Nairn devotes his 9`h chapter to nationalism and, in particular, the "national 
question" of Marxism. Although he handles some basic aspects and elements of 
nationalism in an earlier chapter on "Scotland and Europe", the actual argument 
follows in "The Modern Janus"-Chapter 9. The chapter begins with a frank statement 
to which many refer: "The theory of nationalism represents Marxism's great historical 
failure" (Nairn, 1981, p. 329). "My thesis", he asserts, "is that this failure was 
inevitable. It was inevitable, but it can now be understood". 
The inevitability lay in the fact that, during the era when Marxists struggled most 
desperately and brilliantly with the enigma - before the onset of the Stalinism - the 
general process of capitalist development had not gone far enough. The overall 
characteristics of "uneven development" had not yet been sufficiently delineated by 
history itself (Nairn, 1981, p. 355). 
Nairn breaks new ground by relating this inescapable "historical failure" not to the 
founding-fathers' "ad hoc dealings in the real issues of each individual case" but to the 
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essentials of the theory of Marxism in its historical context. His confidence that the 
cause of inevitable "failure" "can now be understood" rests on his understanding of the 
need to reinterpret history itself with the historical materialist system of thought which 
"can perfectly escape from the prolonged and destructive impasse in which it has been 
on the issue" (Nairn, 1981, p. 329). Nairn points towards the need to rescue 
materialism from its "native" idealism and to provide an outlet from the "prolonged 
and destructive" ordeal. Thus, 
to perceive the cause of this failure is to see something of Marxism's real place in 
history, some of its limitations, some of the unconscious roots which tied it blindly to 
the course of modern historical development. It means seeing Marxism itself as a part 
of history in a quite uncomplimentary sense, one which has nothing to do with the 
holy matrimony of theory and practice. It means losing for all time that God-like 
posture which, in the guise of science, Marxism took over from Idealist philosophy 
(and ultimately from religion) (op. cit., p. 329). 
Because socialist theory, "whose intellect and heart lies more in the Marxist tradition, 
is the heir of the Enlightenment", it also, for Nairn, involved theoretical errors, and the 
error concerned class. And because socialism was born prematurely, "it was not yet 
possible to employ the concepts of historical materialism in relation to their proper 
object, the only object which gives them genuine meaning: that is, the world political 
economy" (op. cit., p. 352). Thereby he endeavours to lay down the prerequisite for 
"unlocking" the Marxist theorisation on nationalism, which resides at its centre, and 
which history now allows thrive. Nairn suggests in confidence that 
the task of framing a "theory" of nationalism is that of understanding the destructive 
mechanisms and contradictions of uneven development - and this, in turn, is the task 
of re-interpreting modern history as a whole. In this sense the puzzle of Marxism's 
"failure" over nationalism is simple: the problem is so central, so large, and so 
intimately related to other issues that it could not be focused on properly before. 
History itself is now helping us towards a solution (Nairn, 1981, p. 357). 
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The logical extension of Nairn's account would probably be as follows. What the 
"infantile" revolutionary socialism did not apprehend or could not afford to respond to, 
was not the "perplexing" ad hoc articles of Marx and Engels printed in various 
journals of the time and referring to individual cases. What they could not do was to 
experiment on monopoly capitalism to germinate the two World Wars at the apogee of 
nationalism before these things occurred -that is, what they could not do was analyse 
the coming course of history! 
By contrast, Ephraim Nimni searches for the theoretical-conceptual roots in the 
early writings of Marx and Engels. Referring to the primary sources of socialist 
theory, Nimni is, to a degree, right when vilifying the tradition's class-reductionist 
approaches to the "national question". He vilifies the temptation to reduce nationalism 
to the only disguised form of class struggle. But, he also longs for the eventual 
discarding of all the socio-economic devices of socialist theory. When drawing 
attention to Marxist parameters (Nimni, 1991, p. 6,7) to which he traces the "historical 
failure", Nimni refers to Trotsky's "futile attempt" in Russia. 
Trotsky's well-known theory of combined and uneven development is a significant 
acknowledgement of the difficulties experienced by doctrinaire and eurocentric 
theories of evolution in Russia and, at the same time, an ingenious but ultimately 
fatal attempt to overcome those difficulties without discarding the overall universal 
and developmental logic of Marxist thought [italics added] (Nimni, 1991, p. 196). 
Along with this demand, which seems to be a reactionary impulse, Nimni searches for 
the "origins" of "Marxism's great historical failure", through which the "perplexing 
legacy" of the "founding-fathers" of scientific socialism is found to take the central 
blame. Frequently referring to the Marxist parameters, he pays great deal of attention 
to the role attributed to the productive forces in the process of human social 
development. Nimni never attempts to say what the "forces of production" actually 
denote, but though they are not analysed under a title bearing their name, the concepts 
of the forces of production and the relations of production, and their dialectical 
interdependence are delineated in a fairly understandable way for an ordinary 
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academic reader. True, in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Marx, 
1971, pp. 20,21,37), the conceptualisation of the relation between these universal 
dynamics of social development is confined to an abstract discussion. But it is at least 
understandable in other writings by Marx. In the first volume of Capital, as the crux of 
the concept of productive forces, the notion is individualised into its elements. And 
from there, it is noticeable how the notion of the forces of production in Marx is even 
intimately linked with human will through the productivity "device" of human labour 
- though the latter is not in effect analysed by Marx22. On some occasions, Marx talks 
of productive forces as the "means of production". However in Section 1 of Chapter 
VII, under "The Labour-process or the Production of Use-values", he explains the 
inseparable relation between instruments of production (labour tools) and the 
productivity of human labour as each of the elements of the social forces of 
production. 
The elementary factors of the labour process are 1, the personal activity of man, i. e., 
work itself, 2, the subject of the work, and 3, its instruments (Marx, 1974, p. 174). 
A little further on, after referring to Franklin's definition of man "as a tool-making 
animal", Marx re-contemplates the means of production and the productivity of man's 
labour, and their interdependency. 
If we examine the whole process from the point of view of its result, the product, it is 
plain that both the instruments and the subject of labour, are means of production, 
and that the labour itself is productive labour23 (op. Cit., p. 176). 
What is not familiar from Nimni's overall arguments regarding the social forces of 
production, as one of the prime Marxist parameters that is also used for analysing the 
"national question", the human element -the productivity of labour as the defining 
faculty of humankind- in which the intellectual and spiritual wholeness of the human 
species resides, and which encapsulates human's will to develop and to live better. 
Thereby one may unequivocally talk of the ineluctable "desire" of the forces of 
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production to develop in themselves. This is what Nimni finds so abstract and acutely 
avoids including into his argument but, in fact, it is this for which he abstractly blames 
the Marxist approach for being over-deterministic. 
On the other hand, with the same line of reasoning, Nimni grasps Nairn's 
concept of "Marxism's great historical failure", but he is reluctant to handle Nairn's 
related argument of capitalist "uneven development" and corresponding socio- 
economic theorisation vis-ä-vis nationalism's fertile material base. Whereas, Nairn's 
overall argument on nationalism revolves around the "absolute relative deprivation" of 
the peripheries caused by the uneven spread of capitalism (Nairn, 1981, p. 128) in 
which he analyses these processes with the materialistic codes of the Marxist 
conception of history ̀ 4. Nimni does not interfere with the "backbone" of the argument 
whatsoever. 
Conclusions 
Three interwoven premises of Marxism appear to be the essentials that are imbedded 
in the "questions" about the theory, which also undermine its confrontation with the 
"nationality question". The initial point of critique of the Marxist tradition that had to 
be raised here is the vulgar conception of the materialist dialectic from which many 
facets of class reductionism and the corresponding subordination of the material 
inwardness of human's spiritual satisfaction25 emanate. Following the fall of the "Iron 
Curtain", one may more confidently state that humankind as a spiritual-social agent is 
in a deadly battle for spiritual-cultural values even ahead of material ones. This may 
well head the agenda of scientific socialist theorisation as the most general 
philosophical deficiency of the Marxist account of the dynamics of society. Marxism's 
second essential defect, which has been totally refuted by post-Marxian history, and 
which has been re-demonstrated by its post-Soviet segment, is the "historical role" 
endowed to the proletariat as both the "class in itself" and "class for itself". This 
seems, more than ever before, to be a Messianism26 in Marx and Engels under the 
"depressive" wave of the 1848 Revolution. This has been unearthed by the most recent 
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spectacle of "communist nationalism" as the actual question of the theory that 
germinated the "national question" for itself, as well as the questions of nation and 
nationalism in general. And this, of course, is a political manifestation of the former 
defect -the fundamental materialist weakness of philosophical materialism. Finally, 
the third interrelated "question" of Marxism's materialist conception of history is the 
presentation of history as the "history of class struggles", which Nairn calls upon for 
reinterpretation -not only modern history but the history of class societies "as a 
whole". Accordingly, one might begin with a modification of the first sentence of the 
first chapter of the Communist Manifesto saying "The history of all hitherto existing 
society**27 is the history of class struggles" between, "in a word, oppressor and 
oppressed". Instead, while not ignoring the struggle between power-holders and 
"labour-holders", the sentence needs to be modified to say, "the written history of 
human sociality is overwhelmingly the history of struggles between respective ruling 
classes" - from the times of Gilgamesh to Muhammad, of Alexandra the Great to 
Saladin, of Caesar to Napoleon, of Hitler to Stalin, and so forth. The fundamental 
impetus behind this unstable sequence of struggles is the power-holding ruler's 
insatiable market "sentiments", just like the broader episode of modernity's 
nationalism, and like the manifest form of the conflict between the social forces of 
production and the relations of production. 
Therefore, we may deduce some rudimentary conclusions. 
In terms of both the conceptualisation and the politics in Marxists' agenda, the 
concept of the "national question" is confined to the "small" nations' national 
liberation movements. This is the initial illusory aspect of Marxism when handling the 
"question" because the phrase "national question" equivocally encapsulates two 
disparate issues. One is the belated bourgeoisie's rational aspirations; the ineluctable 
desire for the "home" market. The other is the innate cultural values of the masses, 
which are subject to emotional-spiritual satisfaction, to which an individually distinct 
political approach is required. The second illusory aspect of Marxism is that the 
concept of "nation" is understood as an ethno-cultural entity from Marx and Engels 
themselves onwards. This adds the additional illusion to the "prolonged and 
destructive impasse" of the "national question". 
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Deutsch's significant remark calls for attention of the student of politics and 
nationalism. "The real progress of human knowledge has usually been achieved by a 
dialogue between a succession of theories and a succession of findings or data" 
(Deutsch, 1969, pp. 129,130). Within this frame of reference, only the fact of 
"fratricidal" fights inside the Kremlin Palace between radical and moderate pursuers 
of re-capitalisation at the outset of the "1989 Revolutions" as the chief protagonist of 
the revolutions may guide one to conclude that the experience of Russia deserves to be 
the most notorious explanatory case of nationalism in its "communist" ideological 
form. Soviet experience, by and large, denotes a relatively belated capitalism's leap- 
forward during which it initially insulted, then deceived, and eventually 
metamorphosed the Bolsheviks' "greenhorn" endeavour at a socialist revolution. In 
this sense, Leninism and the Bolshevik revolution was, so to speak, an attempt by 
"infantile" Marxism to have a baby by impregnating Russia while the "couple" was 
still shy of reaching puberty. In consequence, "Leninism" has fascinatingly enabled a 
gigantic leap-forward for Russian capitalism28. In the light of this "succession of 
findings or data", the blend of communism and nationalism in the form of either 
"communist nationalism" or "national communism" in the person of the rejuvenation 
of the CPRF29 (Lester, 1997, pp. 37-45) would be no more than an old platitude. The 
"blend" of communism and nationalism is doomed solely to be a nationalism polished 
with communist eloquence. 
The endeavours of socialism through national liberation victories -including 
the legendary Vietnam of Vietminh- have solely built nation-states for their respective 
"adolescent" bourgeoisie. No modest exception in which one may observe an 
institutionalised communist social transformation, let alone a cultural transformation 
of the premises of superstructure, exists in the current world. Further, how far have the 
triumphant national liberation outcomes contributed to the "confinement of terrain for 
imperialist exploitation", including Lenin's unhesitating support for Mustafa Kemal in 
the emerging Turkey? 
Some are discontented with the general theorisation on nations and nationalism 
for they find it Euro-centric. Though this discontent draws attention to the significant 
lack of engagement with non-European phenomena, the theorisation deserves not to be 
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branded as "Eurocentric" because it was generated by Europe, just as the Renaissance, 
the Enlightenment and industrialisation were -just as we ought to be "Middle-East- 
centric" when classical civilisation is the case. It is a corollary to the factual course of 
history that one can not "get it wrong". 
To summarise, the "question" of the "national" does not lie in the lack of 
theoretical formulations or in unwise conceptualisations, but in the course of the 
development of the material forces of production as Renan and others prophesied. 
Since the philosophical endeavours of socio-political aspirations have not been 
materially institutionalised and spiritually "coagulated" in the form of societal 
aberrations from the persistent course of the private property-based cultural lineage of 
class societies, they will continue to persist as masturbatory intellectual odysseys. 
Since the remedial theoretical devices for social maladies do not institutionalise and 
thereby culturalise themselves, they will bear no more significance than being the 
subjects of resilient academic arguments from which banal exam questions are drawn, 
for college students to pass. This is, by and large, what the Bolshevik endeavour and 
subsequent fellow experiences taught to everyone, which may divert or reshape the 
"realpolitik" and the corresponding theorisation of the banal-nave Marxist 
intelligentsia. 
Although the PKK has been partially critical of Bolshevism and especially of 
the overall socialism of the Soviets, the Kurdish experience under its leadership 
provides a less "sophisticated" -in other words, a caricatured- version of the Soviet 
style. That is, Kurdish "national liberationist communism" has, to a significant extent, 
been heir to the banal Marxist tradition and its "naive" intelligentsia. We, therefore 
need to have a brief look at the "form" of nationalism and the "national question" of 
the Kurds of Anatolia 
III The Kurds' Nationness and Nationalism in Modern Turkey 
The emergence of a modern Turkey with its "reborn" Turkishness came into being 
following the dissolution of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. That is, it came into 
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being through one of the three basic, but also the most classical (via the 
dissolution/reunification of empires), ways of inventing nations. The Ottoman Empire 
was a multi-ethnic religio-feudal state, but with the Turkish ethnicity at its core. Its 
cultural and ideological complexion was based on religious sentiments, rather than on 
ethnic ones. In response to the Allies' attempts to dismantle the Ottoman State, a 
coalition of the military and civilian elite led by the Ottoman Army general Mustafa 
Kemal promptly organised an Anatolian resistance movement composed of mainly 
Turks and Kurds, with a conspicuous over-emphasis on religious concerns. This 
response succeeded and culminated in the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Up to this 
point, the movement was solely a "religious liberation movement" (discussed in 
Chapter 2) in terms of its "form of ideology" (Seton-Watson, 1965, p. 15) and its 
utterance. 
The proclamation of the Republic of Turkey was then followed by the Turks' 
"war of national liberation" - in fact the over-condensed struggle of the invention of 
Turkish nationhood. Once the elimination of the "primitive" Kurds and other minor 
ethnic entities was accomplished, the genuine "liberation war" was launched 
immediately. This is the most striking particularity of the way in which Turkish 
nationness, and hence the "modern" Kurdish question, was invented and implanted in 
the new Turkey. 
Following the "silent decades" from 1938 to 1968, which began with the most 
recent historical phase of Kurdish tribal resistance (and its absolute suppression) and 
ended with the knock-on effect of the Europe's "68 Generation", a group of university 
students gathered under Abdullah Ocalan's leadership and their organisation gained 
momentum in the early 1970s. The group emerged from within the Turkish radical 
Marxist left and was composed of members of various ethnic groups - the most 
prominent of which were Kurds and Turks. The gathering first became known as 
Apocular (followers of Apo). Then, in 1978, it declared itself a party (PKK) which 
would undertake "the war of national liberation" of the Kurds of "Northwest 
Kurdistan" against Turkey. 
In the experience of the Kurds of Turkey under the PKK, a kind of 
caricaturised endeavour by "adolescent" Marxist entrepreneurs seems to be the case. 
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Along with the attributes or the unique societal facets of Kurds in general and of 
"Turkish Kurds" in particular, the conspicuous birthmarks of the banal Marxist 
tradition are evident in the emergence and development of the Party's discourse and 
practice. Bearing in mind this aspect of the phenomenon under study, we need to look 
more closely at both the theorisation and agitation that relate to the PKK's Marxism - 
that is, to the "national question" of the Kurds of Anatolia. 
Relying on his multi-comparative study, Miroslav Hroch begins by warning 
everyone to avoid the "urgent temptation to consider their own national history (and 
therefore their nation as well) as a unique, specific and incommensurable component 
of the world's development" (Hroch, 1985, p. xi). The warning, of course, is not at all 
nonsense or baseless. But, on the other hand, every nation or ethnic entity is subject to 
some uniqueness. Each individual person out of billions on this planet has unique 
personal characteristics, including the most diligently "programmed" test-tube twins 
from the same ovaries. So too with social entities and ethnicities. Theories in the 
discipline of psychology are constructed with the "cement" of individual uniquenesses. 
In our case, the fair treatment would be to grasp the uniqueness in the light of most 
generalities, and then reach another "most general" level through the totality of 
uniqueness. Within this framework, both the Organisation (PKK) and the ethnicity 
(Kurds) bear unique particularities. But surely, neither is an "incommensurable 
component" of this world. 
The Organisation, the central focus of research in the current study, has come 
into existence as a corollary of "uneven development" in Anatolia, manifesting in the 
Kurdish periphery's "vindicated" nationalism. It emerged with a customary struggle 
for "national liberation" and a "reprinted" programme of "national-social 
emancipation" stamped with the communist utterances of preceding fellow 
entrepreneur intelligentsias. Following the capture of the organisation's over- 
charismatic leader Ocalan, the movement eventually converted itself from "Party" to 
"Congress" in its 8`h ordinary congress, which ended recently in April 2002. The PKK 
has become KADEK (Konreya Azadiya Demokrasiya Kurdistan - The Congress of 
Freedom and Democracy of Kurdistan). Its programme is by no means the one 
aspiring to "national liberation". In fact, the PKK as a "party" had already adopted a 
86 
non-national liberationist programme in its 7`h extraordinary congress held in January 
2000 (Chapter 4) at which, instead, the "Democratic Transformation" of Turkey 
became the principal "strategic target" that would enhance the "solution of Kurdish 
question". That is, the programme of a party of "Kurdistan" has basically become a 
party with a socialist perspective on Turkey in general. At the latest congress at which 
KADEK was generated, it was declared that the point of the metamorphosis from 
"party" to "congress" was that the "movement" should become a non-power- 
envisaging organisational entity. And, after all, these dramatic organisational changes 
have taken place in accordance with Ocalan's "perspectives" passed on through the 
"notes of meetings" with his lawyers in Turkey's Imralli prison. 
The "Marxism" of the movement has been adopted from the wave of the 
Marxist Left in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapter 3). Although the "national 
communism" of the organisation has totally diverted from the Turkish Left in the 
emergence of the party as the PKK, the group originally appeared under the name of 
Apocular as one of the minor components of Turkey's Marxist-socialist movement. 
The Marxist ingredients and the ideology of the PKK are the main theme of later 
chapters - Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
What needs to be initially stated is that the "uniqueness" 30 of Kurdish existence 
(as the "intrinsic" nature of the Kurdish ethnic tradition which has "coagulated" in its 
"national consciousness") will, I assert, be the Kurds' "indispensable" temptation to be 
on the alert not to miss out on a subordinate "space". That is, the ethnicity has a 
consistent tradition of seeking not to be the leading entity but a trusty "right arm" of 
the superior power. This seems to be the most "unchanged" trait of Kurdish ethnic 
existence throughout its history since the Enkidu of Gilgamesh3' -discussed in the first 
part of Chapter 5. 
The roots, the shaping and the nature of the Kurdish question in Turkey in its 
peculiar course of affairs are the points of concern in the following chapter. 
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Notes 
1 By "twin concepts", the inventions of nation and nationalism are meant here. However, [ may quite 
interchangeably use the term "ethnie" or "ethnicity" or "nationality" or "nationness" along with 
"nation" up until I clearly distinguish the political nationhood of market borders and the cultural 
nationhood of "frozen history" (Bauer in Woolf, 1996, p. 61). 
2 Cited by David McCrone (1998, p. 23). 
Nutuk (Speech) is the only book by M. Kemal Ataturk and is edited from his six-day address to the 
Great National Assembly in 1927. 
" Ernest Renan also has an aphorism-like saying vis-ä-vis the space of language in the formation 
processes of nations. "The political importance we attach to languages stems from our regarding them 
as signs of race. Nothing is more false" (Renan in Woolf, 1996, p. 55). He continues with some famous 
examples in various parts of the world, such as Prussia, Wales, Spain, Egypt and so on. 
s Miroslav Hroch, in his richly exemplified comparative study (Hroch, 1985, pp-22-30), explores how 
this is effected, and analyses this process by allocating it into three phases. The study is additionally 
explanatory in terms of delineating the processes of mass participation in "small" nations' liberation 
movements. 
6 A. D. Smith asserts convincingly in his influential work first published in 1971, Theories of 
Nationalism, that the intelligentsia "do, indeed, play a definitive part in the rise of nationalist 
movements -everywhere" (Smith, 1983). Also, Tom Nairn presents a brief and scholarly analysis on 
"The Role of Intellectuals", and points towards its place "behind and beneath the more visible 'rise of 
bourgeoisie"' (Nairn, 1981, pp. 99-103). 
7 Stalin's personality was occasionally described by Lenin as being "too rude" towards and too 
"tempting" to Great Russian Nationalism. 
" This aspect of the argument, I suggest, is the most phenomenal insight which Max Weber left out of 
his penetrating analysis on "The Types of Authority and Imperative Co-ordination", in particular on 
"Charismatic Authority". Weber distinguishes "Legal Authority" from "Charismatic Authority" by 
explaining that the manner of its implementation through "a bureaucratic administrative staff" is the 
particularity of the former. However, "a bureaucratic administrative staff' is not a less factual case in 
"Charismatic Authority" than in the legal one. It is probably the background concern of Weber's 
tempting vindication of the "spirit of capitalism" that drove him to such an elision (Weber, 1947, pp. 
324-423. 
' The organisation which was founded by a group of military medical doctors at the close of the 19th 
century for Turkish emancipation from the dissolving of Ottoman Empire. It will be discussed further in 
Chapter 2 under "The Vital Concern of the Republican Turkish Political Elite". 
10 Antony D. Smith talks of the role of the intelligentsia as "a necessary condition of all nationalist 
movements" in the approach of the "third group of sociological theories of nationalism" which he 
considers as "a more historical theory" (Smith, 1983, pp. 86,87).. 
" Antony Smith reduces it to a more general separation: "... the civic-territorial and the ethnic- 
genealogical, and the two rotes of the formation of nations, that of bureaucratic incorporation and that of 
vernacular mobilisation" (Smith, 1991, p. 123; op. cit., pp. 59-68) according to which he, however, does 
not tend to approve of "genuinely different types of nationalism" including "religious nationalism" (op. 
cit., p. 49). 
12 I understand this as the assimilation and integration of subordinate ethnic entities to be shaped as a 
corollary to the would-be nation that is qualitatively differentiated from its former constituents. Seton- 
Watson is here precisely consistent with a non-cultural or non-ethnic conception of nation, that is, with 
the political one. 
13 Horace B. Davis takes this on board as "good" and "bad" nationalism by referring to the prominent 
British Labour Party politician of the 1930s, Harold Laski, in the very sense that Nairn discusses. He 
begins by saying "Nationalism may be considered on balance good; or on balance bad; or neither good 
nor bad; or both good and bad at the same time" (Davis, 1978, p. 46). 
14 The 'nationalism' in that sense which has dominated historical development since early in the I9`h 
century, was in essence the forced reaction of one area after another to the spread of capitalism (Nairn, 
1981, p. 127) 
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15 This seems somehow to be an heir to the volatile temptation of the leftwing tradition towards 
rendering nationalism as the struggle of "oppressed nations"; the "progressive" nationalism whose 
success was believed to be restricting the exploitation of territories of imperialist expansion. The 
temptation needs to be traced back to infantile Marxism's dizziness on the "national question", and in 
particular to Lenin's historical mistake - being the principal proponent of the "right of nations for self- 
determination" in opposition to Rosa Luxemburg. This will be argued further below in relation to the 
"question" of Marxism. 
16 What contributes some confusion to Smith's argument is that he does not clearly 
distinguish between ethnic identity and the identity of nationhood by employing the term 
national identity for both. The terms "national" and "nationality" already bear problems in 
their English usage. So, instead, using the terms "ethnic" and "ethnicity" escapes the 
possible confusions. And in the case of identities, the usage of the "identity of nationhood" 
for, say, Swissness in Switzerland or Britishness in the U. K. and of the "identity of 
ethnicity" for Frenchness, Germanness and Italianness in Switzerland, or Englishness, 
Scottishness, Irishness and Welshness in Great Britain. 
1' In the conclusion of his Nations and Nationalism, under "What is not being said", Ernest Gellner talks 
of nationalism as "a very distinctive species of patriotism" in terms of its "higher" manifestation but 
"only under certain social conditions". But nevertheless, he does not want to be involved with 
distinctions between the history-making insatiable desire of the emerging class of the "modern world" 
-that is, the adolescent bourgeoisie- and the masses' expectations of freedom. This, of course, is 
merely a consistent extension of Gellner's vindication of nationalism, which he evaluated as "the 
consequence of a new form of social organisation, based on deeply internalised, education-dependent 
high cultures" (Gellner, 1983, p. 48). Whereas, the "insatiable desire" of the modern world's rising 
bourgeoisie in its "teens", which has, up to this very moment, had the last word on the course of history, 
has nothing to do with the "patriotic" desires of the "herd" or masses. 
18 The very elision in Gellner is Hobsbawm's "major criticism of Gellner's work" which he expresses as 
lack of "attention to the view from below" (Hobsbawm, 1990, pp. 10,1 1). However, his understanding 
of nation and nationalism does not differ from Gellner in terms of handling them as "dual phenomena". 
Although he, in a sense, distinguishes the "national sentiments" of "below" from the market 
"sentiments" of "above", for him the "assumptions, hopes, needs, longings, and interests of ordinary 
people" are "not necessarily national and still less nationalist". This (the worries of below) is precisely 
what I strive to separate from nationalism and nationalist politics as an "ideological movement". 
'91n a video-cam recorded interview held by myself with a Kurdish woman in her late 50s in Qamislo 
(Syria), whose four children -boys and girls- lost their lives in the clashes with Turkish army, she 
calmly says, in response to a question, "Thank god, I have four martyrs". 
-Ö "National Forces" is a verbal translation of "Kuvai Millive" which was an unofficial movement 
composed of civil and military elements in the Anatolian struggle against the Allies' attempts to 
dismantle the Ottoman State in the late 1910s following her defeat, before the Grand National Assembly 
of Turkey was proclaimed on April 23,1920. The prompt emergent unity of left-right reaction had 
defined their "spirit" in terms of Kuvai Millive's spirit. Coscun refers to the conditions of Turkey at the 
time in which this movement emerged, and makes humorous comparisons due to funnily inappropriate 
circumstances. 
Frank Furedi's work, The Soviet Union Demystified, is a distinguished study of this sort supported by 
extensive quantitative information. Further, the study was accomplished some years prior to the "1989 
Revolutions" and, following the illustration of how the "adolescent" bourgeoisie of Soviet-Russia took 
over and over-developed the works of belated Russian capitalism by an absolute control of labour-value 
allocation in the whole of its society, Furedi heralds that "bureaucracy is more than a caste, but not yet a 
class" and "bureaucrats would like to become a class" (Furedi, 1986, p. 179). 
22 This very point, I suggest, appears to be the most vital and most elided shortcoming of scientific 
socialist theory, on which severe vulgar materialism settled - the wholeness of the materiality and 
sýn . rituality of both forces and relations of productions. 
The footnote that Marx left here for further explanation is as follows: "This method of determining, 
from the standpoint of the labour-processes alone, what is productive labour, is by no means directly 
applicable to the case of capitalist process of production. " 
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24 In fact, the concept of class or class struggle is not at all the central premise of Marxist theory but 
only an aspect of it. The central theme is the materialist conception of history with the dialectical grasp 
and depiction of the "development of production", that is, the logic of development of productive forces 
in constant relation-contradiction with the relations of productions. Marx himself put emphasis on such 
a misinterpretation: "... I do not claim to have discovered either the existence of classes in modern 
society or the struggle between them. Long before me, bourgeois historians had described the historical 
development of this struggle between the classes... " And his claim of a contribution is "to show that the 
existence of classes is merely bound up with certain phases in the development of production" (Marx in 
Marx and Engels, 1983, p. 62). 
25 The concept "spirit" or "spiritual" is taken here in an Epicurean sense. Epicurus endeavoured to 
define spirit/soul in physical terms in about the third century BC. Later, Descartes of the Enlightenment 
was to analyse humankind's "spiritual world" further in medical terms as being "really joined to the 
whole body" (Descartes, 1988, pp. 218-238). 
26 Reinhold Niebuhr use the term in relation to Marxist utopianism as a "religio-political form of 
Messianism" which 
is really an old form of religious self-righteousness, and combines the two forms of 
interpretation with which we are concerned - realism and idealism. Thus, Marxism is realistic 
about the human nature and behaviour of the "sinners", the competitors, the bourgeoisie, but is 
idealistic about the "redeemed" group, in this case not the church or the chosen nation, but the 
messianic class. (Niebuhr, 1965, p. 38) 
27 Engels footnoted this in 1888 by adding the word "written": "**That is, all written history.... " (Marx 
and Engels, 1975. P. 32). 
2' Horace B. Davis has an illustrative table showing the growth of industry and agriculture in the Soviet 
republics from 1913 to 1966 (Davis, 1978, p. 121). 
2' The Communist Party of the Russian Federation under Gennadii Zyuganov. 
30 Quite probably it has an equivalence with the Scottish case regarding its superior (the English or 
British state) for which Grieve came to say that "the absence of nationalism is, paradoxically, a form of 
Scottish self-determination" (Cited by Nairn, 1981, p. 126). 
;1 The Middle Eastern epic known as the first literary work in human history, by which Biblical writers 
and many stories of Greek mythology were influenced. Gilgamesh is the eponymous hero of the epic. 
A "wild-brutish man", Enkidu, lives with his tribe (of Gutians or Horrits which means the "people from 
mountains" in the Summerian language who are claimed to be the ancestors of the Kurds) in the forests, 
and later is "domesticated" by Gilgamesh and used against his tribe. With the help of Enkidu, the epic 
narrates, Gilgamesh captures the leader of the tribe. Gilgamesh decides to "domesticate" him too in 
order to support for himself better. But Enkidu persuades his senior Gilgamesh to kill him, for Enkidu 
believes that he would lose his secondary position if the leader of the tribe stays alive. 
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Chapter 2 
THE SEEDS OF TURKEY'S KURDISH QUESTION 
While setting out the study's questions concerning the PKK and the "Turkish Kurds" in 
the introduction, I posed a fundamental question: 
What is the determinative internal factor in the organisational growth of the 
Ankara-born PKK which has enabled it to extend Kurdish resistance beyond 
provincial borders and to expand resistance not just to the national geography 
but to an international scope - wherever "a bunch" of Kurds exists in Jewish- 
like Diaspora? 
I also assumed three principal hypotheses, which may be formulated as follows: 
1) The "why" (and, to some extent, the "how") of the PKK is an outcome of the 
peculiarity of the "Turkish War for Independence" and the artificial - or 
"manufactured" (Kadioglu, 1996) - character of Turkish "nationalisation". 
2) The PKK has led to the first Kurdish "national" movement in terms of the supra- 
tribal mobilisation of the Kurdish masses. 
3) The leading body in the Party is not in itself a national liberationist leadership. 
So it is now necessary to take a closer look at the specificity of the Turkish 
Republic's emergence and of the survival struggle of the Ottoman Turks in Anatolia - 
through which Turkey's Kurdish question took shape. 
In short, we need to look at the transition process from the Ottoman State to the 
Republic of Turkey, and we need to grasp the First World War's relationship to 
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Turkey's formation. The historical context in which the "birth" of the "republic" 
occurred has been crucial to the Kurds' destiny. 
I The Last Push for the Last Refuge 
Both the establishment of the Turkish Republic and its "colonisation" of Anatolian 
Kurdistan are anomalous in the sense one may assert that the Turkish state is not a 
republic and that Turkish-ruled "Kurdistan is not even a colony" (Besikci, 1990). 
Common exaggerations in pro-Western textbooks about "Atatürk (Father Turk) 
Revolutions" seem motivated by Turkey's stabilising role for the West, against the 
potential threat of Bolshevism and Islamicism, both coming from the east of the globe. 
Such exaggerations do not provide useful data for sociological argument. It is more 
beneficial to deal with the factual process of the period concerning "The Rebirth of a 
Nation" (Kinross, 1964), which has either not been mentioned at all or has not received 
detailed analysis. 
a. An Aesthetic Expression: The National War of Independence 
In almost all studies of the Turkish Republic by Western scholars, the Movement of 
Ottoman Turks led by Mustafa Kemal is labelled "The Turkish War for Independence" 
or "The National War of Independence" or "The War of National Resistance" or the 
"Turkish Revolution" against imperialist invasion. (Luke, 1936; Frey, 1965; Lewis, 
1968; Shaw and Shaw, 1977; McCharty, 1997). 
For now, I will omit the interesting "accounts" of the transition period of the 
Turkish state from a multinational Empire to a unitary Republic - accounts which have 
been manipulated by many Turkish historians. Suffice to say that this tradition is 
strikingly commonplace among the non-Turkish authors engaged with the subject. 
The facts conveyed in these same works do not manifest the symptoms of a people's 
national resistance or liberation movement but a State's desperate dash to salvage her 
shrunken body from the victorious "Allies' attempt to dismember the Empire" 
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(McCharty, 1997, pp. 366,374; Barkey and Fuller, 1998, p. 9), "the Turkish state 
under Ottoman Sultans" (Luke, 1968, p. v). 
When we bypass the speculative extracts, the real nature of Kemal's movement 
stands out. 
McCharty, who expresses his gratitude to staff at the Turkish Embassy in 
Washington, illustrates the circumstances of the Ottoman State's last push, as stamped 
onto the strategic pattern and the tactical innovations of the Ottoman Army led by 
Mustafa Kemal through "the rebirth of a nation" - 1919 to 1923. 
It is difficult not to cast the War of Independence in heroic, even melodramatic 
terms, because the cause of the Turks at first looked so impossible. For more than a 
century, Turks and other Muslims had been forced their homes in the Caucasus 
region the Crimea, and the Balkans. One generation might have been forced from 
the Crimea or the Caucasus into Bulgaria, the next generation forced from Bulgaria 
into Ottoman Macedonia, the next generation forced into Anatolia. Now the 
Ottoman Empire had been finally defeated; its provinces in Europe and the Arap 
world were lost. Anatolia, the last refuge, was certainly all that remained to the 
Turks, but Anatolia too was threatened. (McCharty, 1997, p. 371). 
McCharty gives us a melodramatic picture of the Ottoman Turks at the culmination of 
the First World War. The point is to illustrate whether this situation was a stimulus for 
the Turkish people to enter into a National Liberation War or a stimulus for the 
Ottoman Army to invent a new outlet for salvaging the body of the Turkish State, 
which had been shrunk after the First World War, in "the last refuge" - Anatolia. This 
exploration is necessary if researchers want to reach unbiased conclusions, rather than 
conclusions reached through intuitive, sometimes unreliable statements. 
Another description of the period before the "Kemalist Revolution" from a non- 
Turkish observer would prompt us to search for the factual processes of the transition 
period, in order that we may draw more reliable conclusions. 
... They (Turks - A. K. 
Ö. ) saw Nationalism grow, and bear fruit, among their 
Greek, Rumanian, Serb, Bulgar and even Arab fellow-subjects before they felt that 
the time had come to develop the ideal among themselves. It now seems surprising 
to the non-Turkish observer that while the nineteenth century had witnessed 
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throughout its length spread of Nationalism among the Christian peoples of the 
Balkans, it was not until the twentieth century that the Turks began to realise that 
they alone of all its components races had no place of their own in the Empire which 
they had created, and began at long last to envisage the possibility of a Turkish 
instead of an Ottoman Turkey. (Luke, 1936, p. 167). 
It is inaccurate to compare the growing nationalistic tendencies of the Balkans' 
Christian peoples and the equivalent sentiments among the Muslim Ottoman Turks at 
that time. These two communities differed in their socio-political and socio- 
psychological composition. Even if we put aside the non-Muslim Balkan peoples' 
close contact with the modern wave of nationalism in Western Europe, the Turks and 
Turkey were not conquered and ruled by an alien power (Ottomans), but by a theocratic 
"Empire which they had created". 
Since its inception, the Ottoman State as a sovereign imperial power had fellow 
Muslim Turks at its core. There are no reliable sociological data in the archives of 
historical documents to indicate that the Turkish people "saw and began to realise that 
Nationalism grew, and bore fruit", and "began at long last to envisage the possibility of 
a Turkish instead of an Ottoman Turkey". This is the critical question relating to the 
seeds of the complex conflict of the "Turks of Kurdish origin". 
Such a "national consciousness" in "Turkish Turkey" was indeed a veiled 
aspiration within the Turkish core of the Ottoman Army and its "civil" organisation, 
the Committee of Union and Progress" (CUP). This would have become apparent after 
the consolidation of Turkishness in the "new" Turkish State. But Turkish nationalists 
"never disclosed such views" (Atatürk, 1938, p. 19), as any emphasis on "Turkish 
nationalist sentiment" or any demands in favour of Turkish ethnicity would have 
jeopardised the "only possible" (Atatürk, 1938, p. 9) outlet to salvage a last refuge for 
the Empire -a participating State on the losing side in the First World War. So they 
would have prevented the other Muslim ethnicity's (in fact, the Kurds') participation in 
the Anatolian war. 
Mustafa Kemal, at the beginning of his famous six-day speech of 1927 reviewing 
the years leading up to the "revolution", unveils the nature of his struggle. 
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The Ottoman State, its independence, padishah, calip, government, all these were 
without meaning and consisted of senseless words. ... 
Gentlemen, in the face of this 
situation there existed only one possible decision. That was to establish a new 
Turkish State, unconditionally independent, based on national sovereignty (Atatürk, 
1938, p. 9). 
These striking words provide an insight into what Kemal actually did: "... in the face of 
this situation there existed only one possible decision. That was to establish a new 
Turkish State". Nevertheless, before understanding the extent of the newness of the 
State revised under his leadership or what Kemal meant by describing all of the old 
institutions as "meaningless and nonsense", the "unconditionally independent" 
character of the "new State" also requires clarification; for it also relates to Turkey's 
Kurdish Question. 
b. Kemal's Initial Proposal 
At the beginning of his initiative, Kemal sought "aid" from some great power, implying 
America, at the Erzurum Congress (July 23 - August 7,1919). This action is 
recognised as the first major step in the so-called National Liberation War. He raised 
the question in Erzurum but astutely avoided mentioning the name because the word 
"America" was associated, in the popular mind, with the detested proposal of an 
Armenian State, which would claim annexation of Erzurum. 
Yet four weeks later, at the Sivas Congress, the matter - not "American aid" but 
rather the debate of the mandate - was located almost at the centre of the Congress' 
agenda by Kemal. An emissary (Mr Louis E. Browne, ostensibly the correspondent of 
the Chicago Daily News) of Mr. Charles R. Crane, "whose King-Crane Commission 
was appointed by the Big Four in Paris to study the mandate question", was sent to the 
Congress at M. Kemal's request through Ms. Halide Edip. 
The only non-Muslim to attend it, he was well received by Kemal. In a series of 
talks with him Kemal used the term `American aid' rather than `mandate' as being 
more acceptable to Turkish pride. It should have a social and economic as opposed 
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to a political character. Asked whether the Congress would pass a resolution 
inviting America to take such a mandate, Kemal replied, `yes, but added the crucial 
reservation, `Provided you can assure me that America will accept it, if offered. ' 
[italics-A. K. Ö. ] Brown expressed doubts as to whether his country would do so. 
(Kinross, 1964, p. 188). 
Kinross also states that M. Kemal envisaged an authoritarian "big brother" relationship 
at the meeting held with the American General Harbord and his mission, (which 
arrived in Sivas a week after the end of the Congress) and that the General "replied that 
no self-respecting nation would accept a mandatory responsibility without complete 
authority" (Kinross, 1964). 
In fact, the historical record shows how the relationship was formed. The 
"interrelations" between Turkey and the USA after the First World War resemble 
neither a "big brother" relationship nor a "mandate" nor "only a social and economic" 
relationship. The nature of relations prove, at least, that Turkey has never been 
"unconditionally independent" since the triumph of the "National Independence War". 
Ottoman Turkey was certainly less modernised than Republican Turkey but not less 
independent considering her sovereign power over a realm stretching across the "three 
continents" and encompassing peoples of various nationalities and religions. 
c. Revolution or Reforms and Revisions? 
The term "new" that Kemal employs in describing what he had to do is significant for 
two reasons. In one sense it is a concession. First, it is a concession because Kemal 
concedes that the old state was also a bona fide Turkish State. Second, the term is an 
exaggeration because Kemal did not alter the essential body of the state. 
The genuine Turkish-cored Ottoman State was still there, with its powerful 
structure and deep-rooted traditions. Reforms and transformations in the remaining 
Ottoman country were substantially targeted at, on the one hand, the assimilation of the 
Anatolian society, and on the other, at Western modernisation and imitative 
westernisation. Furthermore, the changes were made for the sake of the consolidation 
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of the State apparatus and for securing subordinate ethnic entities' (mainly the Kurds') 
appreciation of the State's Turkicised character. 
Some scholars draw attention to this intrinsic feature of the Turkish State 
(Rustow, 1959; Szyliowicz, 1969 and et al. ). Among these scholars, Davison's 
remarks seem to be more instructive. "What Mustafa Kemal did", he states, "was to 
decapitate the Ottoman Empire. The head of the state was lopped off the Turkish body 
politic. Two strokes disposed of the Ottoman sultan ... and of the caliphal title that the 
later sultans had assumed. But much of the body remained". Davison continues to 
explain the crucial aspect of the transitional reforms by referring to Kemal's Speech. 
... 
He calls the sultanate "a gang of madmen with no ties of conscience or of thought 
to the fatherland and nation. " But he refers without any condemnation or stricture to 
constitution, cabinet, parliament, election, deputies, vilayet, vali, mutasarrif. These 
facts of life, these heritages of political concept and institution from the Ottoman 
Empire, he accepted. (Davison, 1990, p. 243). 
One of Davison's asides is more interesting in relation to the essential point of the 
argument. For unknown reasons, he omits the "backbone" of the argument. 
He [M. Kemal-A. K. Ö. ] referred also to the army, another fact of public life 
inherited from the Empire. Although the army was essential to the state as its 
bulwark and sometimes its backbone I shall omit it from my discussion. (Davison 
1990, p. 260). 
Davison means to show the insignificance of the changes that Kemal made within the 
state structure of the Ottoman Empire during the transition to the Republic, by using 
the metaphor of "decapitation". But the metaphor is exaggerated because the "head" 
of the State, as well as the backbone, was in fact still there - indeed, the old head was 
the Subject who was in charge of these very changes. First, the sultanate and the 
caliphate were actually one institution, because the later sultans had as Davison 
emphasises, assumed the caliphate. Second, the sultanate itself was not at all a 
significant institution of the State apparatus, in the sense of functional power, in the 
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latter decades - if not throughout the whole life - of the Empire. In the Republican era, 
the "Presidency of the Republic" (Cumhurbaskanligi) replaced the sultanate. 
The army constitutes the "backbone" of the State structure in any country - but 
in the Anatolian history of the Turkish State the army's role is additionally important in 
accordance with the Turks' nomadic status in the region. 
Almost a century ago, Sir Charles Eliot drew attention to the Turkish army's 
role: "The Turkish army is not so much a profession, or an institution necessitated by 
the fears and aims of the Government, as the active but still quiet (sic) normal state of 
the Turkish nation" (Eliot, 1908, pp. 91,93). Eliot suggested that the roots of such a 
peculiar tradition are to be found in the nomadic origins of the Ottoman Turks. 
Ramsaur cites "another writer [who] declared in 1908, `The whole Ottoman 
race is an army permanently encamped upon its conquests"' (Ramsaur, 1957, p. 115). 
Likewise, in his detailed discussion of the Turkish political elite, Frey concludes that 
all Turkish revolts to date follow a strict tradition of "revolts from above" (Frey, 1965). 
In addition, the Sultan at the culmination of the Tanzimat' era who had reigned for the 
preceding 33 years of the "First Constitutional Revolution", Abdulhamit II, was 
deposed by the Third Army corps, which arrived from Salonika in 1909 with no signs 
of resistance. The sultan viewed these events "as the will of God" (Shaw and Shaw, 
1977, pp. 281,282). Essentially, the "Second Constitutional Revolution" (1908) had 
also been executed by the Committee of Union and Progress, for which "Ismet had 
been working with the Second Army in Adrianople, as Kemal had been working with 
the Third in Salonika" in co-operation with an "active group of patriotic young 
officers" - "Fethi, Rauf, Kiazim Karabekir, Rafet, Ali Fuad, Tevfik Rustu, an army 
doctor, and some others... " (Kinross, 1964, p. 37). These very same names would 
become the prominent figures of the "Republican Revolution" (Lewis, 1968, p. 247; 
Selek, 1987, pp. 276,289; Tuncay, 1990, pp. 59-70; Kutlay, 1990, p. 3; Baskaya, 
1991, p. 36). 
The use of the word "revolution" by western or non-Turkish scholars to 
describe Turkish political history is difficult to understand as a sociological term. Two 
examples: if Frey concludes in his sophisticated study, The Turkish Political Elite, 
(which Lasswell and Lerner cited as the "conclusion of capital importance" in the 
Foreword) that "all Turkish revolts to date, including the Young Turks, the Atatürk 
Revolution, and the `Gentle Coup' of May 27,1960, ... were revolutions primarily to 
98 
maintain or enhance the prestige of the state, not essentially to admit a rising new 
class to power or adjust a society to major economic or social changes" (italics added), 
why then should he call them "revolutions"? In particular, Kemal's reforms followed 
not even an ordinary coup d'etat but a comprehensive reorganisation of the State elite, 
with the consequent transfer [tebdil-i mekan] of necessary governmental officers to 
Ankara (Baskaya, 1991, p. 36) in co-operation with the Istanbul government (Tuncay, 
1990, p. 60) due to the desperate needs created by the unpleasant outcomes of World 
War I. Davison, under his quite reasonable title, "Atatürk's Reforms: Back to the 
Roots", initially writes: "The Republic owes much to the Empire; the Empire also owes 
much to the Republic, for some concepts and institutions that the Empire developed but 
could not make workable, the Republic took over and made workable. " (Davison, 
1990, p. 243). Davison cites Siddik S. Onar's remark that "... The Republic inherited 
the system, bureaucracy, and schools. Second, the Tanzimat created a top-to-bottom 
provincial administration with the vilayet law of 1864 and its subsequent revisions, 
again on a European model, which the Republic took over. ... " (op. cit. p. 258). 
Then, by some system of reasoning Davison has come to believe that "... the revolution 
continues. Its work is not yet done. One might speak of it in terms which historians 
have used of the great French Revolution of 1789: The Turkish Revolution began long 
before it occurred, and continued long after it stopped" (op. cit. p. 260). If one were 
to employ the word not metaphorically but literally, then the term evolution may well 
be more explanatory and more plausible for the process of Turkish westernisation or 
modernisation. These terminological confusions may stem either from sympathies 
towards Kemal's westernising efforts or from aesthetic concerns. Otherwise, the use of 
the term "revolution" denotes, as Lasswell and Lerner state, "major economic" and 
"social changes". 
An ordinary English dictionary definition of revolution says the "overthrow of a 
system of government by force". The Ottoman Army never loosened the ropes of 
governance and, in the case of the Republican reformers, Kemal's clique had obtained 
full control of the power to rule from 1908 onwards (Kinross, 1964, p. 29; Shaw and 
Shaw, 1977, pp. 267,282). 
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d. The Central Aim of the Efforts 
In addition to these social and political reforms, the scholars in this field ironically 
draw attention to the central aim of the Turkish political actors. The aim of a social or 
political action may best be recognised by its concrete end-results because the aim, in 
large measure, dominates - and consequently manifests itself in - the quality of 
changes. Through its actions, the aim engenders the factual end-results which should 
give considerable clues for the researcher to identify the social or political 
phenomenon. However, scholars of various persuasions share common ground as to 
the eventual ends of the agents of the "Turkish Revolution". They describe these ends 
as being to either "salvage" or "maintain" or "strengthen" or "enhance" or "keep alive" 
the existing State apparatus. For instance, several scholars describe the situation as 
follows: 
The Young Turks who came into power in 1908 were Ottoman Imperialists as much 
as were the representatives of the previous regime, but, as men of the left, believed in 
other methods of government and hoped to keep the Empire alive by substituting for 
autocracy a limited monarchy... (Luke, 1936, p. 153,154). 
... they saw reforms as a means of strengthening a dying empire rather than as an 
end in itself. (Ramsaur, 1957, p. 4). 
... But the essential point is that most of these reforms were characteristically 
devoted to securing the grip of the state over the society, ... (Frey, 1965, p. 41). 
... The actual purpose of the leading cadres of the 
Millet Movement was to revive 
the collapsing State. ... (Baskaya, 1991, p. 42) 
... The young officers were little interested 
in ideologies and social panaceas as 
such. The fundamental question that concerned them was survival, the survival of 
the Ottoman state which they and their fathers had for generations served, and both 
their actions and their discussions revolved around this central problem. Bu devlet 
nasil Kurtarilabilir? - How can this state be saved? (Lewis, 1968, p. 212). 
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II The Vital Concerns of the Republican Turkish Political Elite: A 
"National War" Without Nationalism 
It should now be easier to understand why Kemal declared the "Ottoman State" to be 
meaningless, and called the sultanate "a gang of madmen with no ties of conscience or 
of thought to the fatherland and nation". We can also see why he avoided "any 
condemnation of or strictures upon constitution, cabinet, parliament, election, deputies, 
vilayet, vali, mutasarrif" and above all why he did not condemn the State's "backbone", 
the army. Moreover, we can understand how Kemal managed to triumph in "An Anti- 
Imperialist War [against a block of imperialists -A. K. Ö. ] Without Opposing 
Imperialists" (Avcioglu, 1977a). Finally, we can see why he did not need to invoke 
Turkish nationalism in order to motivate the Turkish people for a "Turkish National 
Liberation War" but, on the contrary, diligently refrained from doing so. 
A little further in the Speech, Kemal reveals that he has previously disguised his 
political cause and that he has taken "the only practical and safe road" to achieve his 
goal: 
It would undoubtedly have been of little advantage if we would have put forward our 
demands at the very beginning in a resolution of such far-reaching importance. On 
the contrary, it was necessary to proceed by stages, to prepare the feeling and the 
spirit of the nation and try to reach our aim by degrees, profiting meanwhile by our 
experience. This is actually what happened. If our attitude and our action during 
nine years (referring to the period of direct rule by the CUP, 1909-1918 -A. K. Ö. ) are 
examined in their logical sequence, it is evident from the very first day that our 
general behaviour has never deviated from the lines laid down in our original 
resolution, nor from the purpose we had set out to achieve. ... 
But we never 
disclosed the views we held. If we had done so we would have been looked upon as 
dreamers and illusionists. ... 
The only practical and safe road to success lay in 
making each step perfectly understood at the right time. ... This was how I acted. 
(Atatürk, 1938, p. 19; cited by Frey, 1965). 
As a result, we cannot find any hint of a nationalistic programme - or even a 




Revolution" until after the proclamation of the Republic - the culmination of the 
struggle for survival. Davison suggests that Atatürk's language in the Speech - some 
four years after the proclamation - "is almost pure Tanzimat language" (Davison, 
1990, p. 260). Baskaya argues that the ideology of Kemal's leadership is nothing more 
than mere Tanzimat Westernism (Baskaya, 1991, pp.. 29-36). The language of 
Republican "ideology" is indeed the extension of Tanzimat language except for the 
considerable purging of Arabic, Persian and other vocabularies. This view is shared by 
many other studies. 
In some cases, the Republican "ideology" worsened, as is evident in the 1961 
and 1982 constitutions. But the vital point that reveals the roots of the "Turkish Style 
Kurdish Question", is that the words "Turk", "Turkish", "Turkey" were withdrawn 
from view, to be replaced by "Fatherland and Nation" (Vatan ve Millet) during the 
years of the Turkish State's Salvation and Survival Struggle (1919-1923). 
The dominance of Turkishness erupted in the provinces of Anatolia 
immediately following the proclamation of the Republic by the "Nationalist" 
Leadership under Kemal. [The terms vatan and millet were, of course, deliberately 
chosen. In particular, "millet"2 is a vague term obscuring the Army's hidden 
Turkification purposes, as the word is associated with a religious context rather than an 
ethnic one in the Ottoman Turkish language (Dodd, 1980) as in the "Muslim Nation" 
(Müslüman Milleti)]. In contrast with such obscurity until the safe announcement of 
the Turkish Republic, the bombardment of Turkishness onto the Kurdish populated 
regions was extreme, to the extent that Atatürk's famous maxim, "Happy is the one 
who call himself a Turk" was displayed not only on the public squares and the streets of 
towns and counties, but also on countless rural hillsides with huge lettering made of 
stone and concrete. 
There is one odd question: "How could a National Liberation War be organised, 
mobilised, executed and brought to fruition over approximately three years (May, 
1919-Sept, 1922) by a leadership whose views on the `Holy Cause' were never 
disclosed in the course of struggle; i. e. a leadership without any nationalist propaganda, 
nationalist slogans, nationalist ideology or a nationalist programme? " 
In seeking an answer, I will briefly go through the documents about the 
fundamental stages of the "National War" and its organisational entities. This war and 
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its significance underlie the Kurdish Question in Anatolia and, consequently, the nature 
of the Kurdish movement of "Turkish Kurdistan" and its leadership - the PKK. 
a. The Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress 
The Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) was not vital to the 
Turkish State's transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic. But the facts of 
its foundation, organisation, transformation and activities, and especially of its 
intervention into the State's affairs, illustrate the process of transition. 
Both Turkish and non-Turkish observers converge on the importance of the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) with respect to the roots of the invention of 
the Turkish nation. This matter falls substantially outside the realm of this study for it 
relates to Turkish history, but aspects of the Organisation's nationalism and its 
composition are crucial to the argument here nonetheless. This is because the seeds of 
the Republican Turkish State's - but not the Ottoman Empire's - Kurdish question 
took shape in accordance with the ideological and structural transformation within the 
"Young Turk" movement during approximately a decade of its history. 
CUP's formation took place during the final decade of the nineteenth century. 
A group of students at the Military Medical School in Istanbul - who became known as 
the "Young Turks" - tried to set up the committee, which marks the beginning of the 
movement. Historians and researchers writing after the event have misnamed the 
"Young Turks" (Ramsaur, 1957, pp. 3-7; Kutlay, 1990, p. 4 and at al) as was the case 
for the Ottoman Empire's earlier modernist generation of the Tan; imat era (1839-1876) 
who called themselves "Yeni Osmanlilar" (New Ottomans). The official title of the 
latter is the "Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress". 
In the basic documents of the CUP we scarcely come across such terms as 
"Turk", "Turkish" or even "Turkey", though it has been used by western authors "since 
its (Anatolia's-A. K. Ö. ) conquest by the Turks in the eleventh century" (Lewis, 1968). 
The first clear view of the CUP appears in M. Ahmet Riza's article published in the 
society's journal, Mechveret, (Dec. 1895) under the heading, "Our Programme". 
Ahmet Riza, 3 is counted as being the prime figure with nationalistic sentiments among 
the principal members of the early group. He took a distant viewpoint on religion due 
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to the strong influence of Auguste Comte and of his modernist vision. Riza took the 
post of director of Mechveret, the official organ of the CUP. In this first programme, 
which was "clearly more the work of Ahmet Riza than of the society" (Ramsaur, 1957) 
we by no means witness any signs of Turkism. The term "young Turk" is mentioned in 
the programme once, in the sentence concerning foreign readers: "A French 
supplement will put foreign readers au courant with the tendencies and desires of the 
Young Turk party". A striking article emerges in the "programme", regarding the 
party's "ethnic" dimension: "We demand reforms, not especially for this or that 
province, but for the entire Empire, not in favour of a single nationality, but in favour 
of all Ottomans, be they Jews, Christians, or Moslems. " (Ramsaur, 1957, pp. 22-25). 
In the language of the programme, the various religious communities are referred to by 
the term "nationality". 
Following the Turkification practices of the Society's first governmental 
experience (1908), during which Ahmet Riza was the first president of the new Turkish 
Chamber of Deputies, it became evident that the programme was rather superficial. 
But at the inception of the society, Turkification was not the real aim of the founders. 
Further, there was not a Turkish founding member at the first meeting of the Group. 
Two founder members were Kurds (Abdullah Jevdet and Ishak Sukuti), " the man of 
"driving spirit Ibrahim Temo was Albanian, and the other, Mehmet Resit, was 
Caucasian (Cherkez). Yet following several initial meetings, symptoms of the endemic 
Ottoman tradition of the "Army-Nation" or "revolts from above" started to appear. 
After a while, the Initiative "rapidly spreads" to "high officials", i. e. army personnel, 
and climbs "above". In fact, it is gradually taken over by the army. 
Within the Military Medical School the movement spread rapidly and soon 
overflowed into the other government higher schools in Constantinople, such as the 
Military Academy (Harbiye Mektebi), the Veterinary School (Bavtariye), the Civil 
College (Mülkiye), which was a school for training government officials, the Naval 
Academy (Bahriye), and the Artillery and Engineering School (Topcu ve 
Mühendishane). (Ramsaur, 1957, pp. 17,18). 
Ramsaur elaborates further: 
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We can only say that in the two or three years prior to 1896 a number of prominent 
men joined the society and that the leadership commenced to pass into their hands. 
Chief among these men were Haji Ahmet Efendi, a civil servant in the bureau of 
accounting of the Seraskerat [War Office], ... 
(1957, p. 21). 
The horizontal growth of the society among military officials accelerated dramatically 
following the take-over of the leadership by 1896 - to the extent that the society 
became mature enough to schedule a coup d'etat for August of that year. 
The coup d'etat conspirators who were guilty of treason were exiled by the 
ruthless Sultan Abdul Hamit, even though procuring their execution would not have 
been difficult. During the years of the "exile period", throughout Europe, the leadership 
eliminated the groupings of the subdivided liberal wing, "favouring progress in terms 
of a decentralised regime, on more democratic principles, and with autonomous rights 
for the minorities" (Kinross, 1964, p. 34). 
It also developed intimate relationships with Freemasonry (Luke, 1936, p. 145- 
153; Ramsaur, 1957, pp. 103-107; Shaw and Shaw, 1977, p. 265). By the end of this 
period, the society had opened many branches within the territory of the Empire. These 
branches were founded by serving high-ranking commanders. 4 In less than two years, 
Kemal had transferred his society's headquarters and himself to Salonika. He managed 
this by leaving his post in Damascus at first "without permission", then on the 
ostensible reason of "recovering his health" and in the end having secured "official 
permission". And within this time he had accomplished the "fusion" of Fatherland and 
Liberty and the CUP, based in Paris. Just eleven months after the fusion of the 
societies, the "Young Turk Revolution" - the revolution "without any real revolution" 
(Shaw and Shaw, 1977) - took place as a result of the threat of a "revolt from above" 
by the Third Army Corps in Salonika (July 1908). The "revolution" was seen through 
without any sign of opposition from almost twenty other Army Corps in the enormous 
Ottoman State. 
Sultan Abdul Hamit was compelled to reinforce the constitution of 1876, to 
suspend the parliament and "for all practical purposes" to give up most of his powers. 
A year later, the Sultan was deposed after a thirty-three year reign, due to a "counter- 
revolutionary" plot involving "the murder - supposedly at the hands of the Committee 
[of Union and Progress-A. K. Ö] - of the insignificant editor of a liberal newspaper" 
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(Kinross, 1964, p. 34). Thus, the years of the direct rule of the Party of Union and 
Progress commenced, to which M. Kemal would later refer to as "our experience of 
nine years", in the Speech of 1927. He considered these years to be the only guide of 
his action during the period of the Salvation War. 
Among the seven articles of the "fusion" declaration we still do not see any 
evidence of Turkism. It had even withered away a little in comparison with the first 
programme, in spite of the far stronger consolidation of the Turkish core of the CUP. 
In the last article, "Turkish" and French are mentioned as the languages of the society's 
"instruments of public dissemination", Surayi Ummet and Mechveret. The 
"revolution" unexpectedly motivated the Christian peoples of Balkans. 
... 
The Revolution, far from arresting the disintegration of the Empire, as the Young 
Turks hoped, at once accelerated it. The response was in effect a Balkan counter- 
revolution. Within a bare three months of the establishment of the Constitution, 
Bulgaria proclaimed her independence; within the same week, Austria annexed the 
Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Crete voted for union with 
Greece. (Kinross, 1964, p. 31). 
Nevertheless, the revolution did not have similar effects on Muslim nationalities 
because of Islam being the State's official religion. The level of societal development 
(in terms of national consciousness and of its structural equivalence in terms of its 
organisational dimension) was not comparable with the peoples of Balkans. Kemal 
was well aware of this phenomenon. Therefore, he rightly did not lose his hopes of 
profiting from the predominantly Islamic ethnicity of Anatolia (Kurds) and never 
underestimated the "experiences of nine years" of the CUP's rule. He proceeded "by 
stages" along the pathway to the goal they had set out from the very first day of the 
Republican struggle. The leadership did not by any manner of means invoke Turkish 
nationalism. They did not need to use it, either prior to or throughout the "Turkish 
National Liberation and Independence" war. More importantly, just the opposite - the 
concealment of nationalist envisages - was vitally necessary. This is apparent without 
exception in the language of all the documents of the CUP's history. The deep concern 
in Kemal's overall tactics throughout the struggle for the Holy Cause was to perpetuate 
the survival of the State as the last refuge of the Ottoman Empire. 
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b. The Steps Subsequent to the CUP's Experience 
The principal primary steps - which Kemal calls "stages" - of the struggle and its 
declarations were as follows: 
Amasya Protocol (21 June 1919). The protocol was constructed and signed by 
Mustafa Kemal, Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Rafet Bele, Kazim Karabekir5 (Shaw 
and Shaw, 1977, p. 344) with no reaction from the rest of the Ottoman Army. The 
seven articles of the protocol, largely considered to be the "Declaration of 
Independence of the Turkish Nation", do not mention words Turk, Turkish, Turkey 
(Kirisci and Winrow, 1997, p. 92). Likewise, these words do not appear in the three 
articles of the telegram distributed to a number of civil and military authorities (Lewis, 
1961, p. 247). Nothing more explicit than Fatherland and Nation is used to express the 
ethnic or national aspects of the struggle. 
Erzurum Congress (July 23-August 7,1919). This, as an initial step, was held 
with 54 delegates of the eastern provinces, including a large number of Kurdish tribal 
and religious leaders (Selek, 1987, p. 276) in Erzurum, "the `capital' of eastern Turkey" 
(Kinross, 1964). One is struck by the strict diligence in refraining from the use of any 
term that may be associated with Turkishness throughout the ten-point resolution, 
which later came to be known as National Pact (Misak-i Milli). The repeated emphasis 
on preserving "the integrity of the Fatherland and Nation (Vatan ve Millet)", and on the 
"defence and protection of the sultanate and caliphate" is also very clear in the ten 
articles (Shaw and Shaw, 1977). 
Sivas Congress (September, 4-11,1919). The congress opened with the 
participation of 39 delegates from all over the regions of the Vatan (Fatherland), 
including far-off Thrace. At Sivas, the aim was to extrapolate the decisions taken at the 
Erzurum Congress to cover the whole country. Although the aims discussed at Sivas 
were not as clear as they were at Erzurum, the Congress reaffirmed its loyalty to the 
Sultan along with the well-worn rhetoric of "Fatherland and Nation". The first 
sentence of the oath taken by delegates was "I shall follow no personal interest or 
ambition but the salvation and peace of my Fatherland and nation" (Kinross, 1964, 
p187). In the telegram which was sent to the Sultan by the participating army 
commanders at the end of the congress, they were "begging him to `deign to order the 
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formation of a new government, loyal and respectful of the privileges of Your Majesty 
and of the Caliphate' " (Lewis, 1961, p. 249). 
Grand National Assembly. The last resolution of the Erzurum Congress 
entrusted the Representative Committee (Heyet-i Teinsiliye) it had elected with the task 
of establishing "national unity on all levels". This task was also approved at the 
following Sivas Congress. The Committee accomplished the task in seven months, 
and the so-called "first phase of the National Independence War" culminated in the 
announcement of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara (April 23,1920), with the 
participation of 120 deputies chosen by countrywide branches of "The Society to 
Defend the Rights of Anatolia and Rumeli" (the renamed state of the CUP). The 
deputies included a large number of Istanbul Parliament members (Selek, 1987, p. 341). 
In the debates and resolutions of the Assembly's first, second and following days 
reflected in the recorded sources, words associated with Turkishness were totally 
excluded from its language (Komal, 1975; Shaw and Shaw, 1977; Besikci, 1969b; 
Selek, 1987). Even the Assembly gathered with no pre-determined name with which 
the Law of Treason -Buyuk Millet Meclisi (Selek, 1987, p. 344) could acknowledge 
Assembly members. The word Tükiye (Turkey) was added afterwards. Particularly in 
the early days of the Assembly, M. Kemal emphasised the loftiness of the CUP's 
multi-ethnic composition (Barkey and Fuller, 1998, p. 9). In a speech given in May 
1920, Kemal explicitly highlighted this ethnic assortment. 
The individuals which constitute our Assembly are not only Turk, or Kurd, or Laz, or 
Cerkez; but the components of the Nation of Islam composed of all. It is a sincere 
community. Consequently, the nation that we strive to defend and protect does not 
consist of single element. It is composed of various Muslim nations [italics added]. 
(Atatiirk, 1952, p. 28). 
The Lausanne Conference. In a session on 23 January 1923, while the Ankara 
Government representative Ismet Inonu was conveying the official view of the Turkish 
State, he reduced the national components of the Government and the Assembly to two 
fundamental equals. 
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The government of the Grand National Assembly is also the government of the 
Kurds as much as of the Turks. This is because the bona fide and legitimate 
representatives of the Kurds have taken part in the National Assembly, and have 
been enjoying the right to participate in the government and to rule the country 
(Besikci, 1969b, p. 399). 
Later in the negotiation - in response to the British delegation which accused Turkey of 
rejecting the Kurds' demands for autonomy - Inonu considered such a position to be 
humiliating for the Kurdish people: "... the rights which claimed to be given to the 
peoples of so-called autonomous territories will by no means satisfy a people of such 
noble descent as the Kurds" (op. cit. p. 401). 
Yet in the course of the discussions referring to the Treaty of Sevres, the question 
of the Kurds' aspiration for an independent state was at issue, and the Conference 
decided to gauge the opinions of the Kurdish members of the Assembly by telegram. 
M. Kemal gathered the responses of Kudish deputies in a secret session and 
telegraphed them back to the conference at once. In this secret session, H. Anvi Bey, 
deputy for Erzurum, stated in the presence of Kemal: "This country belongs to the 
Kurds and the Turks. Only these two nations have the right to speak on this platform: 
the Turkish and the Kurdish nation" (Hasretyan, 1995, p. 76). Similar categorical 
statements taken from many other Kurds in the Assembly - such as " Kurds never think 
of separation from Turks" or "We Kurds and Turks are brothers, we do not want to 
separate, there exists no difference between us" - were submitted to the conference. As 
a result, the articles concerning the issue took shape, and the Lausanne Conference 
signed a peace treaty on July 24,1923. In the treaty, Turkey was entitled to the 
"legitimate right" to deny (Nikitin, 1986) not just the Kurdish national share of victory 
against gawurs (non-Muslims), but also the very existence of Kurds as an ethnic entity. 
The Constitution of 1924. Just three months after the signatures at Lausanne, the 
Grand National Assembly declared the "Republic of Turkey". The following year it 
accepted the new constitution. The bombardment of Turkishness onto the Kurdish 
population and the landscape began to manifest itself in the Constitution, which 
insisted that "anyone who is a citizen of the Turkish Republic" is a Turk. Article 88 of 
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the constitution was clear: Inhabitants of Turkey shall be deemed to he Turkish 
irrespective of their religion and race. 
In the 1924 constitution, the terms "citizenship" and "citizen" had been equated 
with Turkishness. Accordingly, the document stated that one had to be a Turk to 
become a member of parliament and the like. Certainly the Kurds could qualify as 
"Turks, " but only at the expense of denying their own ethnic identity. Here then 
the seeds for eventual Kurdish dissatisfaction were planted: In a state now 
officially defined as "Turkish" the Kurds were not Turks, and only by giving up 
their ethnicity could they be treated as Turks. (Barkey and Fuller, 1998, p. 10). 
From here onwards, there was a flow of "scientific works" by professors, 
demonstrating the origins of the Kurds. These books mainly agreed on the Kurds' 
identity as "Mountain Turks" because of the "kirt-Kürt" sounds heard when walking on 
the frozen surface of snow on the mountains. Accordingly, the "K" pages of Turkish 
dictionaries were rewritten (Chaliand, 1980, p. 58). The explanation of the word 
"Kurd" in an encyclopaedic dictionary published in 1971 is worth translating: "A 
community composed of Turks who have largely changed their language, speak a 
broken Persian and inhabit Turkey, Iran and Iraq; and an individual who belongs to this 
community". In others, terms associated with Kurds were entirely withdrawn from the 
pages. 
This "new ideology" and policy of the "new" Turkish State managed to hide the 
Kurdish question for half a century - causing social pathologies intensified. These 
pathologies eventually led the most recent constitution of 1982 to be the first 
constitution which bans mother tongues. The pathologies also led the Kurds of East 
Anatolia to give birth to the PKK. 
No language other than Turkish shall be thought of as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at 
any institutions of training or education (Article 42. ). 
Kurdistan is the place where humanity itself fades away in its most solid form. ... 
if in some 
place humanity descends so sharply and deeply, then the concomitant rise of humanity will be 
as strong and splendid (A. Öcalan in Kücük, 1993, p. 125). 
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III The Sharp Contrast between the Two Policies 
a. The Nature of the Battle 
Turks and Kurds fought together against "gavurs"6 in the Turko-Greek war7, 
subsequently known as the "National Independence War of the Turkish Nation". The 
spokesman of the Ankara government at Lausanne, Ismet Inonu, had to emphasise the 
Kurds' cotribution carefully. 
Our delegation deems it our task to convey the great emphasis placed by all 
commanders of the Turkish Army, who participated in both the Great War and the 
Independence War, on their full respect and adoration for the Kurdish People's 
service and self-sacrifice. ... against the Greek invasion, as in the various 
fronts of 
Anatolia which was under the intensive attacks of our enemies, Kurds and Turks 
worked in perfect co-operation with one another for the common purpose and the 
ideal (Besikci, 1969b, pp. 400,401). 
Kurds fought for the salvation of the ummet (Muslim nation) enthusiastically, but the 
veiled and disguised purpose of the Ottoman elite was quite distinct - to keep the 
dying Empire alive in the last refuge. Or, as Bernard Lewis (1968) formulated the 
question: Bu devlet nasil Kurtarilabilir? How can this state be saved? 
The saved Turkish State had by no means been involved in a war of National 
Liberation or Independence. Turks did fight - again together with Kurds - against 
Imperial powers (Allies) between 1914 and 1918, but no one talks about a National 
War of Independence in these years. The years from here onwards became the stages 
of the Turko-Greek rivalry. At the Aegean (West Anatolia) Congress, held in Alasehir 
a week after the Greek offensive at Izmir (23 August 1919), a telegram was sent to the 
British General Milne on full approval of all delegates. It emphasised that no one 
among them thought of opposing the Allies and added that "if certain needs necessitate 
the invasion of Izmir, we will appreciate it if it is accomplished by the Allies' humane 
and civilised army instead of the cruel Greek army" (Avcioglu, 1977, pp. 21,22). The 
victorious Allies' plans to dismember the Ottoman State had become nonsense, even 
dangerous, due to the unexpected occurrence of the Great October Revolution. From 
this angle, some scholars have stated that the Turkish War "of Independence" with the 
Greeks and Armenians was in fact a diplomatic continuation of the First World War, in 
the sense that it constructed barriers against Bolshevik Soviet expansion (Baskaya, 
1991, pp. 29-44). That is to say, "the First World War ended in 1923" (Keyder, 1989, 
p. 61). 
Years later, in his statement released on the fiftieth anniversary of the 
proclamation, Inonu revealed that "the success of the Independence Struggle had 
essentially become feasible after Britain compelled other Allied nations to accept it 
(Baskaya, 1991, p. 33). Over and above, its Turko-Greek character, the scale of the 
"private" war has been exaggerated. The total number of deaths in the frontline of the 
war was 9,167, whereas a loss of 22,543 lives was recorded in these very same years as 
a consequence of various diseases (Baskaya, 1991, p. 47). 
In addition, a "Civil War", which usually follows national struggles, did not 
exist at all in the Turkish case. The two substantial components [Yesil Ordu (Green 
Army) and the guerrilla forces led by Cerkez Ethem] of the Kuva-vi Milliye (National 
Forces) - which operated against the non-Muslim civilians of Anatolia for some time 
after the Greek invasion. of Izmir - were completely eliminated without hesitation by 
late 1921, two years before the declaration of the Republic (Shaw and Shaw, 1977, 
pp. 352,353). 
As well as the victorious Allies' share in the Ottoman Republic, the 
contribution of Freemasonry to the Turkish Cause is certainly worth a mention. I have 
to exclude the large body of literature that searches for the roots of the "Turkish 
Revolution" in the "world-revolutionary conspiracy" of the Freemasons for it falls 
outside of my realm of study. However, the words of a prominent figure in the CUP, 
Refik Bey, in an interview with a Paris newspaper, tell us something about the extent of 
the Freemasons' part in the rise of "Turkishness" in Anatolia: "It is true we found 
moral support in Freemasonry, especially in Italian Freemasonry". They "rendered us 
real service and offered us a refuge. We met there as Masons, for many of us are 
Freemasons, but in reality we met to organise ourselves. Besides, we chose a great part 
of our comrades from these lodges, ... 
" (Ramsaur, 1957, p. 107). That is, the 
arguments revolving around the international network of Masonry's contribution to the 
nationalismless "national" triumph of Turks are significant. 
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b. The Seeds of the Question are Planted 
Despite all, the surviving Empire did invent a Turkish nation, no matter how 
paradoxically it was manufactured and constructed following the "astute" war with its 
neighbouring non-Muslim nations (Greeks in the West, Armenians in East Anatolia). 
The paradox does not arise out the triumph of Ottoman elite saving the Ottoman State, 
without employing nationalist ideology and agitation, from the Allies' attempts to 
dismember her. The fact which engendered the paradox of Turkish nation-building 
-and which simultaneously planted the seeds of Turkey's Kurdish question- is that the 
Turkish imitation of the "nation-state" did not come into existence following a national 
movement which was socially based on either the bourgeoisie's or the people's national 
demands, but an existing state's Salvation War led by its existing military body, based 
on the support of the Muslim peoples (mainly Turks and Kurds) of Anatolia with 
fundamental religious concerns. Accordingly, the operating state elite constructed a 
careful contrast between the policies prior to and after the proclamation of the Republic 
of Turkey. In sharp contrast with the former period's "intimate brotherhood, " when 
"distinct components of the Muslim nation" considered "How this state can he saved", 
the consistent policy of the latter period, from 1923 to today, was to somehow 
manufacture a "single-bodied" Turkish Nation out of many Muslim entities, who 
questioned "How can this state survive? ". Thus, the Turkish national identity "was 
hardly posed as `Who are the Turks? ' but rather as `Who and/or how are the Turks 
going to be? '. " (Kadioglu, 1996). Naturally, the envisaged Turkishness would 
basically emerge from Turks and Kurds, because of the demographic and religious 
reality of the "raw materials" of Anatolia. 
Ismet Inonu, firmly stated that "The government of the Grand National Assembly 
is also the government of the Kurds as much as of the Turks". Only two years later, 
in 1925, Inonu's position was the extreme opposite. 
... 
In the face of a Turkish majority other elements have no kind of influence. We 
must turkify the inhabitants of our land at any price, and we will annihilate those 
who oppose the Turks or "le turquisme". (Simsir, 1991, p. 58). 
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In 1930, Mahmut Esat BozKurt, the Minister of Justice, was more confident when he 
was talking to a crowd in the presence of the press. 
We live in a country called Turkey, the freest in the world. As your deputy, I feel I 
can express my real convictions without reserve: I believe that the Turk must be 
the only lord, the only master of this country. Those who are not of pure Turkish 
stock can have only one right in this country, the right to be servants and slaves. 
(Kendal in Chaliand, 1993, p. 56). 
The way in which Turkish nation-building was conducted, in the context of the 
demographic reality of the new Turkey, left no ideological exit for the Ottoman elite: 
Atatürk Nationalism (Atatürk Millivetciligi) was to be formulated by Kemal's well- 
known maxim, "Ne Mutlu Türküm divene". Happy is the one who calls himself (not 
who is - A. K. 
Ö. ) a Turk. In other words, the happy ones are not original Turks but 
Turks with other origins, or as a matter of fact, the "Turks of Kurdish origin" in view of 
the demographic map of Anatolia. On the other hand, the "invention" was, in certain 
respects, a remoulded extension of Ottoman's profound tradition of recruiting 
devsirmes8 and dönmes9. A "remedy" would thus necessitate a categorical denial of the 
ethnic existence of Kurds (who populate almost one-quarter of the whole country) and 
their spiritual elements: name, language, culture, history etc. So, the Kurds became 
"mountain Turks". Kurdish "broken Persian", Kurdistan "the South East" and the 
Kurdish question "the South East question". As a result, the regularly repeated rhetoric 
of the State's official view "demonstrates" the absence of the question as well as the 
absence of Kurdish material and spiritual existence. Of course, every Kurd "can be a 
businessman, a professor, a governor, the Prime Minister, even the President of the 
State" providing he is happy to call himself a Turk, and thus happy being doomed to 
deny his/her own identity. In explanation of the phenomenon, Besikci makes a 
comparison between South Africa and Turkey. 
In South Africa, the Apartheid policy essentially tended to say "You blacks do not 
resemble us, you are bad, you therefore should not join us". But Turkey tells 
Kurds "you are us, you should live with us as Turks, you must resemble us". This 
racism is much more destructive than the "you do not resemble us, you then should 
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live separately" type of racism. This is Turkish-style racism. (Besikci, in 
Serxwebun, 1998, issue 199, p. 6). 
Hobsbawm quotes from Ernest Renan: "Getting its history wrong is part of being a 
nation. " And he adds: "Historians are professionally obliged not to get it wrong, or at 
least to make an effort not to". In the case of Anatolian Kurdistan, "where human 
beings have such deformed and destroyed personalities" (Balli, 1991, pp. 15,16), not 
only the historical record but also the social consequences of this history stretch very 
far beyond that. It seems to me that genuine historians, sociologists and psychologists 
have encountered an inverted phenomenon. 
Since the inception of his struggle, Öcalan's distinct approach to both his own 
people and the Turkish State might be the very result of apprehending this fact. As he 
frequently repeats: "the Kurdish people is a düsürülmüs [degenerated/debased] people". 
Or as he suggests at the outset 
We are the movement responsible for repositioning justice from its basasagi 
(upside-down) position (Ocalan, 1986). 
However, from the proclamation of the Republic onwards, the process of 
inventing the Turkish nation is not dissimilar to fellow processes that occurred in the 
"native land" of nations -Europe. Turkey, in effect, has endeavoured to imitate the 
experience of France as a typical example of nation-building. The new Turkish State 
with its new solid Turkish nationalism has invented the Turkish nation precisely 
according the generalisations of Gelner, Hobsbawm1° and many other scholars. What 
was unusual and unworkable, and what has consequently become the real "seed" of 
Turkey's Kurdish question was the historical state of the ethnic nature of Turks and 
Kurds, and their form of interrelation throughout the Ottoman rule. Kurds were not 
assimilable, due to their deep-rooted cultural existence and indigenous large population 
with a homogeneous demography, and Turkey could then not "digest" them. True, the 
state of the Kurds under the Ottomans was subordinated and far more backward to the 
Turks politically and socially, but they were nevertheless more than semiautonomous in 
their home affairs. And, in addition -probably more importantly with respect to the 
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particularity of Turkey's Kurdish question- the Kurds had taken a significant part in 
the "liberation war" of the Ottoman State and its transformation into a Republic. 
Notes 
1 Tanzimat (reformation or reorganisation) is the term employed for political reforms introduced by 
Sultan Abdulmejit in 1839, which were applicable to the era followed. 
2 The word millet is also used in daily language to mean "nation" but it rather denotes the "people". 
Ahmet Riza was son of an Austrian mother and a father with Anglophile tendencies - who was 
consequently called "Ingiliz (English) Ali". 
° For example, M. Kemal founded the Fatherland and Liberty Society while he was Commander of the 
Fifth Army in Damascus. The Ottoman Liberty Society was led by Talat Bey, a local postal officer who 
later become a major Young Turk figure, Cemil Bey, adjutant to the military governor of Macedonia, and 
some other high officials of the Third Army; and others did likewise in Jerusalem and Jaffa (Shaw and 
Shaw, 1977, p. 265; Lewis, 1968, p. 205). 
s The positions of signatories other than M. Kemal were as follows: Rauf Orbay, former minister of the 
navy and Ottoman delegate to Mondros; Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Commander at Ankara, Rafet Bele, 
commander of several corps in north Anatolia: Kazim Karabekir, the Fifteenth Army Corps commander 
in the East. 
6 Gavur is a derogatory term for non-Muslims in the Turkish and Kurdish languages 
The Turko-Greek war was "pronounced to be a private war between Greece and Turkish Nationalists" 
(Luke, 1936, p. 175) by the Allies at the London Conference of March 1921. 
Devsirme is the term used to denote convert non-Muslims (Davison, 1990, pp. 13-17). 
9 Dönmes is the Turkish word for converted Sephardic Jews, (Ramsaur, 1957, p. 96). 
'"'Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round" (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 10) or 
"Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not 
exist" (Gerllner, 1964, p. 168). 
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Chapter 3 
ENTER THE PKK 
To further provide a context for the study of the Organisation's growth, we have to 
look at the ground in which the phenomenon was rooted. In this chapter, the PKK's 
development from a group of housemates (early 1970s) to the founding congress of the 
Party (1978) will be looked at in perspective. 
I The Accumulative Period 
According to Turkish State officials, the offensive launched by the PKK on 15 August 
1984 was the work of a "bunch of bandits". The offensive was later considered to be 
the "29`h revolt", which would be smashed in weeks or months just like the preceding 
28 attempts. The most recent revolt, "the 28`h,,, took place in Dersim province in 
1937-38 and was over in less than six months - the longest one to date. 
But the 29th revolt sparked a destructive 15-year war (1984-1999). The revolt 
took place after a period of relatively uninterrupted peace. Its political and social 
ramifications extended far beyond Kurdish and Turkish territories. 
a. The Silent Decades 
The sudden appearance of the Turkic face of the "new state" - the translation of the 
pre-republic terms vatan (fatherland) and millet (nation) into Turkish and the negation 
of Kurdishness following the proclamation of the republic - engendered three big 
Kurdish armed uprisings in 1925,1930 and 1937, all led either by religious figures or 
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tribal chieftains. Their suppression by the "Young Republic" took no more than 
several months in each case. The quiet years followed the suppression of the 1938 and 
continued until the 1960s. 
The crushing of the 1938 Dersim Revolt was designed by the authorities to be 
an unforgettable lesson for future generations. A guidebook published by the Governor 
and army commander of Dersim described how to destroy a village in an artillery 
attack and how to burn down individual houses (Göktas, 1991, pp. 140,141). 
Indiscriminate massacres, massive deportations and the elimination of anything that 
might be associated with Kurdishness - all of these were used to intimidate the 
population into silence, submission and obedience. The effects lasted for at least three 
decades. 
A paragraph in a report by Osman Mete, correspondent for Son Posta, the 
Turkish paper of the time, details these effects some ten years after the suppression of 
the Dersim rebellion. 
I went to Tunc Elli, the old Dersim. The place was desolate. Tax collectors and 
policemen are still the only state officials the people have ever seen. I tried to meet 
people, to get to know their way of life, their spirit. But unfortunately very little 
remains from the period before the revolt. There are no more artisans, no more 
culture, no more trade. I met unoccupied people whose whole life now seemed to 
revolve around a flock of a hundred goats. No trace of civilisation has yet 
penetrated the area. There are no schools, no doctors. The people do not even know 
what the word "medicine" means. If you speak to them of government, they 
translate it immediately as tax collectors and policemen. ... (Son Posta, April 1948). 
Following the Second World War, the military "republic" led by Kemal's successor, 
Ismet Inönü, felt obliged to give its regime a democratic facade. Inönü, the Milli Sef 
(National Leader), liberalised the regime to a limited extent, so that it could be deemed 
a "multiparty parliamentary system". This led to the founding of several political 
parties in 1946. In the Republic's first general election (1950), the Democratic Party 
backed by the bourgeoisie came to power on a wave of popular support by pooling 
more than 50 percent of the votes. Led by bourgeois landlord Adnan Menderes, the 
Democratic Party ruled Turkey for 10 years. This "Menderes period", with its limited 
118 
anti-military and/or anti-Kemalist initiatives, was undoubtedly a considerable move 
forward for Turkey. Yet the Kurdish issue remained marginal. The appearance of a 
small number of "Dogucu" (Eastist) publications in these years, demanding 
desperately infrastructural developments in the "East" (that is, Kurdish territories), was 
an isolated example of the coverage of Kurdish concerns. These documents did little 
to lift the pall of silence, which had descended over the Kurds following the ruthless 
oppression of the thirties. 
However, the "backbone" of the state, the military body, could not endure the 
modest attempts of the bourgeoisie at self-rule and liberalisation for more than 10 
years. On 27 May 1960, the rule of the Republic's first civilian party was ended by a 
military coup d'etat led by the chief of staff, Cemal Gürsel. Prime Minister Menderes 
and two ministers of his cabinet were executed for infringements of the constitution. 
"The Committee of National Unity" composed of the principal participants in the coup 
took over the government of the country for almost a year and a half until the elections. 
It then handed power to a "civilian government" - which must have learnt its lesson 
well - with the new constitution of 1961. The Gürsel coup d'etat is known as the "°27 
May Revolution" in Turkish Republican history. 
b. The Emergence of the Turkish Left through the Democratic "Gaps" of the 
Coup 
Ironically, the soldiers' new constitution introduced the society to some important 
democratic rights - probably as a symbolic manifestation of the Ottoman tradition of 
"revolts from above" (Frey, 1965), or in Kemal's words: "If communism is needed for 
this country, we will bring it". Among the new rights were public freedom of 
expression, press freedom, the right to organise public meetings and demonstrations, 
and the right to form trade unions and associations. (Turkish Constitution of 1961, 
articles 20,23,24,25,28). Moreover, by 1963, ambitious and progressive 
interpretations of some articles had led to the granting of the right of strike and to 
make collective agreements. 
After the constitution was pushed through, three political parties were founded 
- including the Workers Party of Turkey'. This party attracted people's attention, and 
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constituted a parliamentary group in the National Assembly with 15 MPs after the 
1965 elections. In the 1960s, some other leftist political factions and trade unions 
emerged. But such democratic liberties did not apply to the Kurds. Several "pro-East" 
Turkish and bilingual publications were banned as soon as they appeared, and after the 
declaration of the Republic, the monthly magazine Yeni Akis (The New Current), 
which used the term "Kurdish people" for the first time, was banned in 1966. When 
its fourth issue was published, the editor was imprisoned for writing "the Kurdish 
people". 
After the launch of an armed struggle by southern Kurds in the north of Iraq, 
Cemal Gürsel, leader of the military coup, stated his position on the probable 
aspirations of the "mountain Turks" of Turkey who might think of benefiting from 
some democratic articles in his constitution. "If the mountain Turks do not keep quiet, 
the army will not hesitate to bomb their towns and villages into the ground. There will 
be such a bloodbath that they and their country will be washed away. " (Chaliand, 1980, 
p. 65). 
Despite all the obstacles, the Kurds did manage to benefit from the limited 
democratisation in the 1960s. In addition to the emergence of various radical leftist 
groupings gathered around certain publications and youth associations, a few public 
associations led by Kürtcü (Kurdist) intellectuals of aristocratic or feudal origins also 
arose towards the 1970s. While Kurds attempted to raise the "Eastern Question" in 
spite of the clear warning by the leader of the "democratic junta" General Gürsel, many 
other threats appeared from civilian sources on the pages of various papers and 
magazines. Kendal talks of more than twenty such articles and cites a paragraph 
published in June 1967 issue of the "nationalist" journal Ötüken, by Nihal Atsiz, one 
of the authors: 
If they [the Kurds] want to carry on speaking a primitive language with 
vocabularies of only four or five hundred words, if they want to create their own 
state and publish what they like, let them go and do it somewhere else. We Turks 
have shed rivers of blood to take possession of these lands; we had to uproot 
Georgians, Armenians and Byzantine Greeks. .. 
Let them go off where ever they 
want, to Iran, to Pakistan, to India, or to join Barzani. Let them ask the United 
Nations to find them a homeland in Africa. The Turkish race is very patient, but 
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when it is really angered it is like a roaring lion and nothing can stop it. Let them 
ask the Armenians who we are, and let them draw the appropriate conclusions. 
(Kendal in Chaliand, 1980, p. 77). 
By the late 1960s, opposition movements increased in size and influence, coinciding 
with a wave of student movements in the West. As well as moderate socialist trade 
unions and student and youth organisations, professional associations of teachers, 
medical doctors, engineers, public officers and even police officers emerged 
throughout Turkey, all of which expressed disenchantment with the system. Soon, the 
Workers Party of Turkey (TIP) began to suffer from internal conflicts - which started 
to split into factions after 1969. These included moderate "parliamentarists" and 
radical "Leninists", as well as the "Turkish Left" and "Kurdish Left". 
Even if the Party carried a motion on the Kurdish question, which later caused 
it to be banned, the "Eastist" figures in the Party acted separately. The faction known 
as the "Eastern Group" had organised "Dogu Mitingleri" (East Meetings) in the 
principal towns of Kurdistan in 1967. The Group later evolved into a "Kurdish" 
political circle. 2 Meanwhile, in 1969, a series of mass and/or youth associations were 
set up by various patriotic Kurdish figures from mainly aristocratic and feudal 
backgrounds. 
These associations initially operated in the two largest metropolises of Turkey, 
Istanbul and Ankara, then in several main towns in the "East". These groups were 
influenced more by the Kurdish armed struggle under Mustafa Barzani's KDP in the 
south, than by the Turkish socialist factions. Associations named DDKO (Eastern 
Revolutionary Culture Guilds) were embracing organisations for the emerging Kurdish 
nationalists in Turkey, as was the Turkish Workers Party (TIP). Consequently, the 
disintegration of the Turkish Workers Party led to the formation of a dozen pro- 
Kurdish organisations in the 1970s (Imset, 1992, pp. 379-406). 
c. The Radical Tradition of Youth Movements 
While the TIP was striving to benefit from any democratic "gaps" in the 1961 
constitution for a socialist orientation in Turkey, the Turkish youth organisation, DEV- 
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GENC, influenced by the tradition of the Latin American revolutionaries (and later by 
the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutionaries), became widely known and organised 
strikes all over the country. This organisation evolved out of the earlier Federation of 
Debating Clubs (FKF). The Federation of these debating societies originally came into 
being in 1965 "as a side-arm of the Türkiye Isci Partisi (TIP)" and was modified into 
the Federation of Revolutionary Youth (DEV-GENC) in October 1969 (Imset, 1992, p. 
407). 
The DEV-GENC was a movement organised in reaction to the TIP's 
parliamentarist and pro-Soviet policies - and its militants were aggressively critical of 
the "pacifist" and "stencilist" practices of the Workers' Party. They initially got 
involved in violent activities against the State backed armed militias of the MHP 
(Nationalist Action Party) and they later formed the armed organisations of various 
political mainstream movements, whose members were trained in Palestinian camps. 
The three radical "adventurer" mainstream groups of the Turkish pro-Marxist left had 
appeared under different names and leaders by the end of 1970, and they provided 
fertile ground for the cleavages of many further factions during the rest of the 1970s: 
1) The Popular Liberation Party of Turkey (THKP) under Mahir Cayan remained an 
imitator of the Latin American revolutionaries, in particular Che Guevara, and was 
quite critical of the socialist powers of the time, the USSR and China; 
2) The Popular Liberation Army of Turkey (THKO) under Deniz Gezmis adopted the 
oppositional policies of Eastern European socialist states against the Soviet Union, 
particularly the policies of Albania; 
3) The Communist Party of Turkey / Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML) under Ibrahim 
Kaypakkaya affiliated itself to Mao's China. 
Abdullah Öcalan, the founder and leader of the PKK, was a sympathiser with 
the THKP and its leader Mahir Cayan until 1973. 
The Organisations of the "Kurdish Left" were, Olson rightly states, offshoots of 
three political trends: the Democratic Party of Kurdistan-Iraq (KDP), the Workers 
Party of Turkey (TIP) and the DEV-GENC (Olson, 1996, p. 22). But there is a vital 
detail missing from Olson's valuable work, "The Kurdish National Movement in the 
1990s": namely that, while more than 20 Kurdish parties or party-like political 
configurations in Turkish-ruled Kurdistan stemmed from either the TIP or DDKO (in 
fact the KDP of Northern Iraq) or both, the PKK alone originated from the DEV- 
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GENC - or more accurately from its further sub-faction, the DHKP, or later the 
DHKP-C. Öcalan explains his position as a "very ordinary sympathiser" as being the 
cause of his escape from the "sword" of the Military Intervention in 1971 (Öcalan, 
1995a, p. 40). 
II The Emergence of the "Apocular"3 Group 
a. The Army Marches in Again 
Due to the rapid growth of legal and illegal pro-Marxist organisations, the Army 
believed that civilians were once again meddling dangerously with the 
"democratisation opportunities" they had been presented with. On 12 March 1971, the 
Chef of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces overthrew the Demire14 government, which 
was considered to be a successor to Menderes' mainstream government. A state of 
emergency was imposed, associations of all sorts were dissolved, the Workers' Party 
(TIP) was banned, the right to strike suspended, ongoing strikes were ended and 
widespread arrests of politicians and "extreme" activists took place. 
The "Adventurer" Left did not intend to surrender and attempted to initiate an 
armed struggle against the "oligarchic" or " the "boss-lord" state. But their romantic 
aspirations were at odds with reality. Deniz Gezmis, leader of the THKO, and other 
leading members of the organisation were captured or killed in various clashes. 
Gezmis and his two closest comrades, Yusuf Aslan and Huseyin Ivan, were 
hanged on 6 May 1972. Mahir Cayan, eight leading militants of his party (the THKP- 
C), two prominent members of Gezmis' organisation (the THKP) and three English 
radar technicians were surrounded on 30 March 1972 in a house in Kizildere5. The 
foreign technicians were being held as hostages for the purpose of preventing the 
execution of Gezmis and his two friends. All the occupants of the house were killed 
by rockets and bombs, including three English staff from the military base in Turkey. 
Only Ertugrul Kürkcü, who met and interviewed Ocalan in Damascus twenty-two 
years after the event (Öcalan, 1995a), survived. Ibrahim Kaypakkaya, the leader of the 
TKP/ML, died on 18 May 1973 in Diyarbakir Prison "under torture" according to 
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leftist circles, but official documents describe him "committing suicide" (Imset, 1992, 
p. 437). 
However, the Turkish Army handed over power to the government formed 
following elections held in October 1973, as they had done on the earlier occasion - 
probably feeling that they had successfully re-established law and order. 
b. The Impact of Particular Events on Öcalan's Leadership 
On 7 April 1971, Öcalan was arrested in Ankara and imprisoned for seven months, 
after being found guilty of taking part in an illegal protest against the Kizildere 
Massacre in the Political Science Faculty of Ankara. Öcalan's political adventures 
began on a personal level with the Kizildere Massacre. Öcalan was released from 
Mamak Prison in October 1972. 
In an interview, Öcalan "naively" replies to a question about the beginning of his 
story. 
If the "Defeat of 71" have not occurred in the form of Kizildere, I would have 
remained a good sympathiser or member of the DHKP-C at the very most; I could 
not have ventured on structuring a new theory. ... 
The emergence of myself would 
have been impossible if Kizildere had not happened. (Yüce, 1997, p. 188) 
In the course of the interview with Ertugrul Kürkcü, the only person who survived in 
Kizildere, Öcalan refers to the impression made on him by the execution of the THKO 
leaders while he was in Mamak prison: "They fell into earth, and we sprouted from 
there" (Öcalan, 1995a, p. 42). The first meeting with Kürkcü made Ocalan feel excited. 
His first words to Kürkcü were: "Twenty-two years later, we took your revenge [on the 
State for the Kizildre massacre]". He also adds in the same interview: 
If I were to state a commencement date, one of the most important beginnings would 
be this [the Kizildere event]. Because I was imprisoned and these months were an 
incubation period for me. (op. cit., p. 40). 
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When he was released from the prison in October 1972, Öcalan began looking for 
friends who might be willing to take the same course as him during what he envisaged 
as the "incubation period", but he moved steadily and took diligent steps. He even 
acted in a contradictory manner. Öcalan was involved in the activities - and was 
elected to the management committee - of the AYÖD6 (Ankara Higher Education 
Association) which was in fact a legal platform for THKP-C sympathisers. On the 
other hand, he simultaneously continued to compose the nucleus of a future 
organisation. (He later chaired the management committee of the student association 
for some time before it was banned in 1975). 
In fact, as soon as I came out [of prison], I tested my options. I took my chance in a 
manner that did not draw attention. ... 
[I was a] THKP-C sympathiser, but a 
Kurdish group appeared [Italics-A. K. Ö. ]. (Öcalan, 1995a, p. 43). 
The contradictory nature of Öcalan's political performance dominated his style 
towards the announcement of the Party in the late 1970s, it faded away in the 80s, then 
returned during the mid-1990s together with unilateral ceasefire policies. "Until the 
end of 1975", one of his early friends states, "it was not clear whether President Apo 
led either a Group of Kurdish or Turkish Left. " (Yüce, 1997, p. 200). So the twofold 
nature of the Leadership of the "Kurdish National Movement" in Turkey was not just 
a characteristic feature of the movement at the outset, but has always been the case in 
the PKK to varying degrees. 
While the Group was being formed, Öcalan's two close Turkish associates 
within the AYÖD, Kemal Pir and Haki Karer, hesitated to participate in the very first 
meetings - but joined the group after several meetings 
had taken place. The 
"incorporation" Pir and Karer had included a slogan, which would become well- 
known in pro-PKK publications: "The Revolution of Turkey has to pass through 
Kurdistan". 
The strategic target of the PKK for an independent Kurdistan has always been 
contradictory and vague. Likewise, 
Ocalan's project of the "Anatolian Revolution" 
published in 1997 under the heading "Towards the Great Revolution of Anatolia" 
(Serxwebun, December 1997, issue 192) and the proposal for a "Democratic 
Republic" - in which the Turks and Kurds, who share the "common fatherland", 
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Anatolia, aspire to enjoy equal opportunities. These concepts, formulated in his 
fundamental defence document (Öcalan, 1999a, 1999b), are essentially an extension of 
a consistent line. On his first appearance in a Turkish court, when Öcalan stated that 
he would be proud to serve the state in a democratic republic -because, for him, it was 
"a virtue to serve a democratic republic" (Sabah, 24 June 1999) - many observers 
inferred that Öcalan had submitted and/or betrayed his ideals. However, a few who 
were more familiar with the PKK's background referred to interviews given in early 
1990s and showed that Öcalan was merely keeping to his previous line with these 
seemingly "shocking" statements before the court (Can Dundar, Aktuel, March 1999). 
Ismet G. Imset, the former editor of the Turkish Daily News, draws attention to 
another aspect of the "contradictory" nature of the PKK. 
Thus, the story of the PKK dates back to the early 1970s. It emerged not in the 
guerrilla camps on the rugged terrain of Southeast Turkey, and not in any other 
neighbouring country in the Middle East but in Turkey's capital city one day in 
1974. In other words, as far as its original roots are concerned, the PKK came to 
being not in the Kurdish-populated eastern parts of the country but in Central 
Turkey. It has, however, always been dominated by Öcalan. (Imset, 1992, p. 9). 
D. McDowal points towards a similar distinctive feature of the PKK. 
... The Apocular 
[Apoists: Derogatory name given by opposition circles but later 
used by themselves with pride - A. K. 
Ö. ] were unlike all other Kurdish groups in 
Turkey (or elsewhere) in that they were drawn almost exclusively from Turkey's 
growing proletariat. (McDowal, 1996, p. 418) 
By emphasising the Turkish and Ankara-related roots of the PKK, it is not my 
intention to suggest that Öcalan's leadership and the PKK were built on the ruthless 
suppression of Turkish romantic revolutionaries to whom 
Öcalan had previously been 
sympathetic, or the Army's similarly oppressive and cruel actions during the 12 March 
Coup of 1971. The factors mentioned above were not the causes of the PKK, but they 
had a significant influence on its organisational style. When we view it like that, these 
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factors are actually not clues to help us explore the why of the PKK, but largely the 
how of the PKK. 
On many occasions in the course of interviews or during dialogues with his 
pupils, when talking about the beginning of the Movement or about the "Mamak 
Days"7, Öcalan has repeated: "Once I get out of here, I was saying to myself, the 
organisation I must create should guarantee its continuity: An organisation and the 
insured assiduousness". And, "I must not be back here again" (Öcalan, 1995a, p. 71). 
Öcalan has "fulfilled his promise" on continuity. The organisation has 
extended its active existence for more than two and half decades so far. But he was 
somehow recaptured in Kenya after some 27 years, following an international 
abduction operation in which the World's superpowers were involved (Ucar, 2000). 
He is now "back there again" in a one-man prison on an island (Imralli) encircled by 
the Turkish inner sea (Marmara). He awaits the death penalty, to which he was 
sentenced on 29 June 1999. 
c. Preliminary Steps towards the Group 
The idea of founding a group arose in Ocalan's mind when he was experiencing his 
first imprisonment. 
Towards the end of the year [1972] we were released. I still remember; the first 
thing I had to do was to pass my exams in fifteen days and have the right to attend 
the second year of the faculty. As soon as I achieved that, I had one-to-one meetings 
in the utmost secrecy with each individual probable person for the nucleus of the 
group. The idea of colonialism was emerging at that time. "The Kurdish question is 
a colonial matter, " I said. Nobody had thought of such a diagnosis [about Kurdistan] 
if you remember. But the terms "Kurdistan", "colony" came to my mind. ... 
do you 
believe that when I was going to tell someone I used to go to the deepest room, if 
there were two doors I shut them both, and I was simply whispering into the ears. 
(Öcalan, 1995a, p. 44). 
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These terms were what Öcalan always refers to when he says: "I began with two 
words", which he regards as the "key words" for initiating the struggle for National 
Liberation. 
These ["Kurdistan" and "Colony"] were only key words. You have to place the 
key in the door and turn it in the relevant direction before you can open the door 
and see inside the room. (Özcan, A. K., 1999, p. 35). 
He considers National Liberation to be "only a means" of his struggle: "... I keep 
asking: How will a human type of our era be formed? There are humanist ideologies; 
what is human and what is the thing that is humane? In this sense, national liberation 
is only a means of my struggle. " (Serxwebun, 192, December 1997) 
Öcalan's first attempt to implement his plans for forming the group envisaged 
during his "incubation" months was at a meeting in April 1973, arranged as a picnic 
with seven people (including Öcalan) in a rural area of Ankara. "Taking the picnic 
was not the ostensible task in my mind, " Öcalan states. The meeting was organised 
"with the intention of gathering a group". ... "This is a style in my manner of acting. 
I smelt the atmosphere there as an opportunity for a meeting, and I did it" (Yüce, 
1997, p. 44). 
These six persons did not know one another very well, but rather they had one- 
to-one connections with Öcalan. Some of them kept asking: "When are we climbing 
up the mountains? ". However, they sided with 
Ocalan only for a few months before 
returning to their ordinary life - except one, Ali Haydar Kaytan. He is currently one of 
the chief guerrilla commanders at the PKK's main headquarters. In fact, there has 
been no remarkably permanent participation in the group for more than a year: "It was 
not so easy to pull someone into the group. Whoever joined us first, they were 
listening for one or two months, then going back to their work and duties". The on- 
and-off recruitment subsequent to the first "unofficial" meeting continued in this vein 
until the end of 1974, during the time which activities revolved around the student 
association mainly based in the Political Science Faculty, AYÖD. 
The first meeting in terms of organisational structure was the one held in 
Tuziucayir (a district of Ankara) at the end of 1974 when AYÖD was on the verge of 
being closed down. There were again seven people present at the meeting, but unlike 
128 
the preceding meeting they are known and recorded in the history of the Party. The 
participants, who were to rise to fame later in the history of the PKK, were Abdullah 
Öcalan, Haki Karer, M. Hayri Durmus, Kemal Pir, Mazlum Dogan, Cemil Bayik and 
Sahin Donmez (Yüce, 1997, p. 251). Along with Ocalan, only Cemil Bayik, a current 
member of the Presidency Council of the PKK8, is still alive. He appears to be the 
most influential personality among the top ranks of the party following Öcalan's 
capture. The other early members have been eliminated or have died in various ways. 
Haki Karer, known as the first martyr of the Party, was killed by an emerging Kurdish 
group (Isterka Sor) in Antep on 18 May 1977. M. Hayri Durmus and Kemal Pir died 
during a hunger strike at the Diyarbakir Prison in 1982. Mazlum Dogan "committed 
suicide" on Newroz day (21 March, Kurds' national day) of the same year in protest 
against the "brutal torture practices of the Diyarbakir Dungeon". Sahin Donmez was 
killed by PKK militants in Izmir for "betraying the cause" following his release from 
the Diyarbakir prison. 
In this meeting, Öcalan created a strong position for himself, and from then on he 
began to be recognised as the obvious leader. He "was gradually becoming a leader 
for their nameless gathering" and the rest of the participants noticed that Apo, "among 
all of them, was the most outspoken voice on `Kurdish rights', then a major taboo, in 
Turkey" (Irrset, 1992). Unlike the earlier "provisional" meeting, those present knew 
one another, knew each other's standpoints and were also aware of what Öcalan 
envisaged, for they were gathering and debating issues of the major importance in the 
course of the "legal" activities of the AYÖD. However, these years were the time at 
which the twofold character of Öcalan's emerging group predominated. 
... 
Naturally, 1974 and 1975 were the two important years during which I devoted 
myself to the revolution in Turkey. In those years ADYOD [the replacement of 
AYÖD after its ban] was set up and I was the prime person responsible for it. (... ) I 
was engaged in its primary organisational works as one of the main figures. 1 
subordinated the duties of my own group to it [the perspective of a revolution in 
greater Anotolia]. (Kücük, 1993, p. 74,75) 
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d. The Declaration of the Group and the "Return to the Source" 
The next major step in the formation process of the Group was the "Dikmen Meeting" 
arranged at the end of 1976 following several sub-gatherings. The exact number of the 
participants is not clear. "Between 20 and 25 people" is the figure mentioned in the 
Party sources. 
The importance of this meeting held in Dikmen (a suburb of Ankara) stems 
from its two vital resolutions. 
First, a "central" committee composed of Öcalan, Haki Karer and Kamer 
Ozkan was elected to lead the Group. This was the first organisational committee in 
the history of the movement. But in terms of Ocalan's leadership, it was the first and 
last organisational election in the PKK's history. Öcalan has since been the 
"indisputable" and "indispensable" acting leader of the movement, to the extent that he 
was again elected as the "General President" in the sixth and seventh (extraordinary) 
congresses of the PKK while he was in a one-man prison in Turkey9. No one has even 
been put forward as Deputy President, in order to prevent any confusion about 
Öcalan's "indispensability". Instead, the actual leadership has been replaced with a 
"Presidency Council" composed of nine known members. Moreover, any suggestions 
that Öcalan passes to the Party through his solicitors, including extremely vital 
decisions such as the ending of the 15-year long armed struggle - and the consequent 
withdrawal of the Party's armed guerrilla forces from the official territories of Turkey 
- are approved and implemented at once by the PKK without any resistance or 
opposition. An extract from his dialogue with Ertugrul Kürkcü focusing on this 
particular point is instructive. 
Kürkcü. Right, have you, for example, ever been elected [in the organisation] in any 
form of procedure? 
Öcalan. The election has never been required. 
K. Natural leader. 
0. It is something beyond naturalness, ... 
K. At this point for instance; when you make decisions on these issues, do you 
consult about, or...? 
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Ö. An extensive consultation process does in fact take place in these circumstances. 
Namely, I give a precise opinion; then I do not step back until I convert that opinion 
into the opinion of the person I am in contact with. This is another secret of my 
success. That is to say, I work with the person who has come to the point where 
he/she is ready to die in defence of the opinion, which I gave as my opinion. 
K. Is it still like that? 
0. Yes, it is still. This is my style of constructing the organisation. 
K. The number of people is now very many. It is not 20, but 20 thousand. 
0. It is still like that. 
K. Are the words enough for 20 thousand people? 
0. A work cannot be accomplished unless a profound grasp of the work is acquired. 
It is not a matter of making common decisions. We cannot execute these great 
activities by an ordinary organisational determination unless the opinions are 
appropriated to one's spiritual structure, heart, or to the whole personality as a great 
aim. My whole talent lies behind this; to play the role of a great artist. I mean, by 
saying an artist, being like an artisan. ... I spare no effort and 
do not leave a dot of 
imperfection in devoting my whole life to this belief. They believe and then make 
their decisions. The need for elections consequently does not appear. And the way 
in which works are executed is still the same. ... (Öcalan, 
1995a, p. 56,57) 
The second and more important distinguishing "event" of the meeting was the 
resolution on returning home to Kurdistan, a resolution recorded as the "first 
organisational determination towards undertaking not an imitative but a real 
revolution" in the history of the Party. Considering other Kurdish political initiatives' 
- aspiring to a "Kurdish 
National Liberation Revolution" in "Turkish Kurdistan" - 
while their headquarters were based in Ankara or Istanbul, 
1° the resolution on returning 
home would have drawn and deserved more attention. 
Öcalan designated a large meeting of the Architects and Engineers Association 
of Ankara, where a wide range of leftist political circles were expected to be 
represented, as an opportunity to declare the Organisation's resolution and his 
determination to implement it. The Organisation did not yet have a publication as a 
means of distributing its views, whereas many of the other groups or parties had taken 
their names from the periodicals published prior to their formation, such as Dcwrimci 
Yol (Revolutionary Path), Halkin Kurtulusu (People's Liberation), Rizgari (Liberation) 
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Özgürluk Yolu (The Road to Freedom) etc. This lack of a publication was one of the 
distinct features of the group and it continued until the foundation of the Party. 
The Organisation's publications are neither the exclusive nor the most reliable 
sources for study - but these are the best sources available to the researcher in Turkey, 
where data concerning the Kurdish issue are difficult to locate. Information based on 
quantitative investigations into the Organisation's period as a group is kept by Turkish 
security agents and has never been published. Nor will it be until the Kurdish question 
is completely settled. Although he worked on behalf of the State, Ismet G. Imset, the 
editor of the Turkish Daily News 11, also complained about the lack of sources relating 
to this period: "In 1986, a detailed study on the formation, foreign contacts and 
structure of the PKK was prepared by two official security departments but has never 
gone into print" (Imset, 1992, p. 13). 
e. The Meeting in Fis: The Founding Congress of the PKK 
In accordance with the resolution to "Return to the Source" and related sub- 
resolutions, "Apocular" initiated a propaganda campaign targeting the "home" 
population. A series of accompanying meetings focused on certain provinces. The 
first provincial targets were Gaziantep, Maras, Elazig, Dersim (Tunceli) and Agri. 2 
Several meetings had been held in and around these selected "pilot territories" by 15 
May 1977, many of them chaired by Öcalan himself. 
Despite their radical diagnoses of the Kurdish question, the PKK did not get 
substantially involved in violence until Haki Karer was killed in Gaziantep" on 18 
May 1977, three days after the accomplishment of the sequence of meetings. Karer 
was shot dead in the course of an argument provoked by the member of an emerging 
group of the "Kurdish Left" (Isterka Sor - Red Star), which had only been in existence 
for several months. Karer became the "first martyr" of the "Apocular" (Followers 
Apo) group with his Turkish origin providing additional pride. The Group had lost its 
"Second Man" - one of the three members of the first leadership committee. 
Nevertheless, the expected clashes between the two groups did not take place. Instead, 
the "Apocular" accelerated the meetings oriented towards the establishment of a party. 
They had occasional clashes with groups on the Turkish and Kurdish Left such as 
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Halkin Kurtulusu in Gaziantep and Maras, Özgürlük Yolu in Agri, Devrimci Sol in 
Elazig, Partizan in Dersim and with the KUK and DDKD in Diyarbakir and parts of 
the country towards the Southeast. 
"When Haki Karer was killed in Gaziantep, we said: `The state decreed the 
death sentence for us' ", the "adventurer"Öcalan narrates, when conveying the 
atmosphere of those days. They were in a serious quandary as they sought to answer 
two questions: "Will the Group survive or not? Or, will it upgrade itself or not? " 
... 
The process from 1977 to 1978 was a determining process to decide whether "we 
shall be a party or continue as a group". After having a very hard time, we had come 
to the point: "Let's give ourselves a party name; we are weak, we are powerless but 
it would at least be good if a party name was to go down in history". (Kücük, 1993, 
p. 77). 
Due to the death of Karer, the Group was prompted to decide on the foundation of the 
party and it drew up the Party Program Draft "in memory of him" following the 
meeting held in Bagcilar district of Diyarbakir. The Draft was later published with the 
title of Kurdistan Devriminin Yolu (The Path of Kurdistan Revolution), also known as 
the "Manifesto". 
Following another intensive propaganda campaign in the light of the 
Manifesto, the foundation congress of the Party in Fis14 was arranged for late 
November 1978. The congress took six days, gathered with 22 delegates and ended on 
27 November. The "Fis Meeting" produced the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) 
with General Secretary Abdullah Öcalan and the first Central Committee, including M. 
Hayri Durmus, Cemil Bayik, Mazlum Dogan, Mehmet Karasungur, Kesire Yildirim 
and Sahin Dönmez (Serxwebun, 1982). It also decided to set up the magazine, 
Serxwebun, to be issued monthly as the central organ of the Party. From then on, all 
communiques would be signed with the party name, the PKK. 
133 
Notes 
' The Workers Party of Turkey [Türkive Isci Partisi (TIP)] is the first leftist party of the republican era 
in which all left-wing groupings merged. I later banned due to its sounding Kurdish issue in Turkey. 
2 The "circle" first begun to be known as Ozgürlük Yolu (Freedom Path) and later became the most 
influential and massified movement of the late 1970s in the main provinces of "Turkish Kurdistan" while 
the PKK was only a marginal group. The leaders of the group revealed that their organisation had been 
party (TKSP- Socialist Party of Turkey-Kurdistan) since 1974. However, the Group was dissolved 
following the coup d'etat on 12 September 1980. 
3 Apocular literally means the "Followers of Apo" 
° Suleyman Demirel has been one of the main political figure in Turkish parliament since mid 1960s 
who was eventually elected as eighth Cumhurbaskani (The president of the Republic) following the 
unexpected death of Turgut Ozal in 1993. 
5A village near the border between Turkey and Kurdish populated Eastern Anatolia. 
6 AYÖD: Ankara Yuksek Ögrenim Dernegi (Ankara Higher Education Association) was a student 
association, which was founded by the youth group, Dev-Genc, as legal platform for sympathisers of 
Mahir Cayan. 
7 Here, by "Mamak Days" (the "first and last" experience of imprisonment in Mamak prison up until his 
abduction from Nairobi, Kenya) Ocalan implies the imprisonment months which he terms his 
"incubation period". 
R Following the resent (April 2002) dissolution of the PKK in eighth congress Cemil Bayik has been 
elected to the Presidency Council of KADEK and appears to be the "co-ordinator" of the Council. 
9 Ocalan was re-elected with no opposition in eighth ordinary congress as the General President of 
KADEK. 
"' The "Politburos" of these groupings continued to operate in Turkish metropolises until they were 
banned and dissolved by the harsh military coup on 12 September 1980). 
11 The paper is in fact a State bulletin targeting foreign readers. 
12 Interestingly the targeted provinces did not include, at the outset, the "capital city" Diyarbakir and 
other South-eastern towns which were relatively more "developed" regions in terms of national 
sentiments, and which consequently bore a profitable potential. 
13 Gaziantep is a large semi-industrial city on the border of Turkey and Kurdistan. 
14 A village in the town of Lice nears the city of Diyarbakir. 14 The Workers Party of Turkey [Türkive 
Isci Partisi (TIP)] is the first leftist party of the republican era in which all left-wing groupings merged. I 
later banned due to its sounding Kurdish issue in Turkey. 
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Chapter 4 
THE IDEOLOGY AND PROGRAMME OF THE PKK 
This chapter puts the mutation of the PKK's ideology and programme into perspective. 
The ideology, aims and objectives are examined in their totality. The discourse, views 
and ideas of the Party are examined in relation to setting objectives and corresponding 
activities. 
I The Theoretical Development of the Party and its Programme from 
its Foundation to Öcalan's Arrest 
To understand how the organisation was formed and how it works within the scattered 
Kurdish population, we have to look at the ideology and theory of the PKK '. 
Even more importantly, considering this study's highlighting of the weight of 
the "subjective element" in the rise of the Kurdish movement in Turkey in the 1990s, a 
critical knowledge of the ideological and programmatic evolution of the PKK will help 
shed light on the organisational growth. 
The apparent theoretical-programmatic orientation and transformation 
throughout the large number of party publications - from Manifesto (1978) to "My 
Defence", Declaration on the Democratic Solution of the Kurdish Question, ("Second 
Manifesto", 1999) - reflect the organisational confrontations within the Movement. 
The evolution of the PKK's theory of the revolution manifests the ground of individual 
motivation, and consequently of the resources of mass mobilisation surrounding 
Kurdish nationality and/or sociality. 
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a. Ideological and Programmatic Framework 
Just before the founding congress was held in a village affiliated to Diyarbakir, the 
first written Party document appeared. In a highly concealed and camouflaged flat in a 
"posh" ward of Diyarbakir, Öcalan, with one of his senior comrades, M. Hayri 
Durmus, laid down the basic principles and objectives of the foetal PKK - "a 
manifesto for proletarian revolutionaries of Kurdistan" (Öcalan, 1978, p. 12). The 
paper was introduced in the first issue of an illegal magazine, Serxwebun, the official 
organ of the Central Committee of the PKK, and later printed as a booklet: The Path of 
Kurdistan Revolution (Manifesto). A brief overview of this document will be very 
helpful - for understanding the Group's early initiatives and how Ocalan arrived at his 
defence against the prosecutors of the State Security Court of Turkey. 
The document is the first literal expression of the Group's conception of the 
world and its basic socio-political aims and objectives - even if the emergence of the 
gathering can almost be traced back to 1973. So it has been labelled a "Manifesto". 
Unlike other Turkish and Kurdish leftist political parties and circles, "Apocular" 
(Followers of Apo) did not have periodicals for propaganda purposes and for 
recruitment, until the Party's foundation meeting. There was only a "Draft 
Programme" in hand distributed to the prominent members of the group to "study" in 
early 1978. Öcalan frequently refers to this "discretion" as the necessary measure 
taken against the State's operations. 
The content and rhetoric of the Manifesto look like an ordinary copy of any 
conventional Communist Party's programme - however, it does present ideas for a 
distinctive future, unlike many of the other Kurdish political and cultural groupings. 
The "symptoms" are nevertheless not ideological nor are they theoretical formulations, 
but rather show the spirit of the language and the additional emphasis on the extent of 




deem leading our people with ideological, organisational 
and political means to be a sacred and historical task. (Manifesto, p. 190), 
Having a life distant from the Kurdistan Revolution would be no different from a 




If the people of Kurdistan venture into a war, they should be absolutely prepared 
for a protracted people's war which will have to pass through long and various stages. 
(op. cit. p. 198) 
Apocular2 proposed the party to be Marxist-Leninist and "a revolutionary party of 
proletariat and peasants of Kurdistan" (Ocalan, 1978, pp. 153-158). A brief definition 
of the early PKK was provided: "a political organisation under the guidance of 
scientific socialism" which would be pursuing the "holy and historical task" of leading 
the "Kurdistan Revolution" (op. cit. pp. 190,194). 
They begin with the historical explanation of the social and political roots of 
"colonialism", in view of Marx's "materialist conception of history", with frequent 
references to the terms "class societies", "class struggle", "surplus value" and "labour 
exploitation, and so on. Then, they summarise the general picture of world politics 
with particular emphasis on the contention between the Imperialist and Socialist camps 
- the Cold War following the "Second Imperialist War". The "Kurdistan 
Revolutionaries" group takes its position in favour of the "progressive struggle of the 
Socialist System under the USSR against imperialist expansion", as well as being 
critical of the "revisionist" and "opportunist" policies of the Soviet Union of the time. 
Still, the group welcomes the Soviets' active support for the "national liberation 
struggles of oppressed peoples" around the world. 
The focus of the second part is the "Society of Kurdistan" - where the history of 
the "colonisation of Kurdistan" is presented. They also give an account of the socio- 
political structure of Kurdish society, with a more detailed map of the classes and the 
strata of "Mid-Northwest" Kurdistan (the Turkish-ruled territory). 
In the last part, the national, regional and international dimensions of the 
Kurdish Revolution are discussed: the positive and negative legacy with which the 
"Kurdistan Revolutionaries" started their initiative; the objective and subjective 
aspects of the conditions; the features, targets and duties; the method and tactics; the 
fundamental source of power and the allies of the Revolution; and the Revolution's 
place in the "Middle-east and World Revolutions" - all are discussed and clarified 
(Manifesto, pp. 183-214). The revolution is defined, outlined and, to some degree, 
scheduled in this early draft programme. 
According to this: 
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a) Our era is the era of transition from capitalism to socialism and proletarian 
revolutions. 
b) Kurdistan is an inter-state colony. 
c) A national liberation struggle is an unavoidable duty in order to gain the freedom 
and independence of the Kurdish people. 
d) The Kurdistan Revolution shall be a national and democratic one, and the ultimate 
end would, in long term, be the socialist revolution with an uninterrupted transition 
to a "classless and non-exploitative" society. 
e) The revolution's political objective is to establish an independent, united and 
democratic Kurdistan. 
f) The revolution must be led by a revolutionary party of the proletariat which needs 
to be initiated by a "minority" composed of patriotic youth and intellectuals 
(enlightened) who are disassociated from material production. 
g) The primary social base and the leading class of the revolution has to be, in spite of 
its numerical and ideological weakness, the working class. The secondary social 
base of the revolution and senior ally of the working class are the peasantry and the 
urban petty bourgeois. The international allies are socialist countries, the working 
class parties of capitalist countries and the liberation movements of oppressed 
peoples of the world. 
h) The targets of the revolution are the conquerors of Kurdistan (the Turkish state) and 
its native feudal-collaborators, and the imperialist powers behind them. 
i) The all-in-one use of ideological, political and military forms of the struggle is 
necessary for the success of the national liberation of the colony Kurdistan. 
The striking point is that the views, diagnoses, proposals, aims and objectives outlined 
so far are simply a copy of all the other fellow political initiatives' programmes 
claiming to undertake Kurdish national and social emancipation. This was contrary to 
the widely received idea that the rest of the Kurdish political circles did not have a bias 
towards armed struggle. Those who gathered around certain periodicals advocating 
national aspirations in the 1970s, and later in the 80s, argued over who was the "oldest 
party" while issuing extreme programmes following their safe escape to Europe from 
the Turkish coup of 1980, had emphasised the inevitability of the military means of 
struggle since their groups had existed. The relevant lines in the programmes of these 
initiatives were fairly identical. We will now briefly go through the expressions 
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employed about the "armed struggle" by the three principal groups which had 
remarkably drawn more popular support among the Kurds of Turkey than the PKK in 
the late 1970s. 
The Vanguard Workers Party of Kurdistan (PPKK - Partiya Pesenga Karkeren 
Kurdistan) known as DDKD or Sivancilar: 
The PPKK, during its national and social liberation struggle, does employ legal, 
illegal, semi-legal, peaceful, non-peaceful (from mass riots to armed people's war) and 
all the forms and means of struggle according to the concrete circumstances. (PPKK, 
Program, 1984, p. 26). 
The Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan (TKSP) known as (ÖzgürlükYolu - Freedom 
Path) which later changed its name to Kurdistan Socialist Party: 
We hitherto, in a policy towards the victory of the national democratic revolution, 
insistently emphasised the importance of the followings: 
0 ... ; according to circumstances, also including the armed struggle, to apply many 
ways and forms of struggle either individually or one in another. (Burkay, 1989, pp. 
66,67) 
The Kurdistan Liberation Party (PRK - Partiya Rizgariya Kurdistan) also known as 
Rizgari (Liberation): 
Even if our general strategy is peace and democracy, we must battle against this unjust 
war to which we are compelled. ... 
Kurdistan Liberation Party is determined to 
continue this war until all colonialist and imperialist powers get out of our country and 
until one single man survives. ... 
Kurdistan Liberation Party will organise 
PESMERGE UNITS; in urban and rural districts in order to DREAD, DRIVEAWAY 
and DEMORALISE4 the military corps of invaders. ... Kurdistan Liberation Party 
will initiate the preliminary destructive attacks ... such as sabotage, assassination, 
provocation etc. prior to launching the general offensive of the Pesmerge forces. 
(Siyasi Program, rizgari, Kurdistan Kurtulus Partisi, 1988, pp. 66,67,68,69). 
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These groups used this language because the term "armed struggle" was so impressive 
a means of agitation and there was an indisputable belief among the Kurds under 
Turkey that they had no chance without arms. 
b. Implementation Followed by Evolution 
Yet the rest of the Kurdish nationalist configurations, despite the intensive use of the 
agitation "value" of such language, did not attempt any implementation of proposals 
for armed struggle. 
I had a principle for myself: Why did I dare to initiate and believe in this war? 
Because the greatest harlot is one who does not fight. 
My word at the very beginning was this; I moulded myself to believe this. All of these 
men [implying the leading figures in the Kurdish groupings which claimed to 
undertake the national cause -AKO] are dishonest. Why? Because, I said, they 
prostitute themselves more than a prostitute. I said, I will not be like them, I will 
fight for loftier aims. In short, in those early times I orientated myself in believing 
this, and this belief, look, is my nutriment, my sap. It still drives me. Naturally, the 
belief on its own is not good enough, I also mentioned tactics. Tactics are indeed 
much more intelligent than the devil. (Öcalan, 1996b, p. 115). 
A group of "patriotic youth-intellectuals off the material production" (Manifesto, pp. 
160,161) agreed to playing "the motor-role of revolutionary intellectuals armed with a 
science of history" (Touraine, 1995, p. 105). The "bunch" of university students from 
mainly the social science faculties of Ankara-based universities, whose leader 
concluded from the science of history that "those peoples or classes - either 
progressive or reactionary - who are not able to configure a conscious and organised 
`minority', they cannot reach their economic and political goals" (Manifesto, p. 160), 
decided to undertake the struggle "under the guidance of scientific socialism" (op. cit. 
p. 161). 5 
The specific story of the PKK under Öcalan is the issue from here onwards. 
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c. The Evolution of the Years of Armed Propaganda 
The PKK had its initial experience of the armed struggle when it interfered in a tribal 
clash in the Kurdish towns of Siverek and Hilvan in 1979. The PKK saw this as part 
of the fight against the collaborator tribes (in this occasion, Bucaks), in the sense of not 
being a guerrilla war but "armed propaganda". This is immediately followed by the 
coup d'etat of 1980 and the partial escape of leading figures, including Öcalan, to the 
Bekaa Valley (Lebanese territory under Syrian control) which was occasionally to be 
compared with Mohammed's "Hegira". The next programmatic publication appears 
subsequent to these experiences with the title of "The Problem of Kurdistan National 
Liberation and the Way of Solution; Kurdistan National Liberation Front - Draft 
Programme" (Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulus Problemi ve Cözum Yolu; Kurdistan Ulusal 
Kurtulus Cephesi - Program Taslagi, 1982). 
This initial document of the series appeared during the 1980s, reflects the 
circumstances and confrontations encountered following the settlement of the training 
guerrilla groups in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley and accordingly crucial usage of South 
Kurdistan (Northern Iraq) as a passageway and/or bases behind the lines. It is partly a 
promotion of the programme submitted in the Manifesto with an effort of 
corresponding the Movement's principals and objectives with a "front" organisation. 
But, on the other, we come across certain alterations to some basic points at first 
glance, which are not necessarily dependent on the "witty" concerns about the 
framework of a front programme. On the contrary, the emphasis on the proletariat and 
socialism has its extension along the lines - if not as strong and frequent - with the 
familiar idiom. However, the diligently constructed alterations focuses on three 
susceptibilities: 
1- The interrelations, solidarity and the independent will of the national liberation 
movements of each part of Kurdistan. 
2- The need to put more effort into finding the possible way of solving the Kurdish 
national question corresponding with the interests of revolutionary-democratic 
people's powers within the borders of sovereign states, 
3- The Greater Kurdistan. 
And the final point is put in more explicit words. 
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... 
To work towards handling the question of the independent, united and democratic 
Kurdistan State on a regional conjectural basis, for it is closely linked with the 
interests of the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of the region. (Kurdistan U11usal 
Kurtulus Problemi ve Cözüm Yolu, p. 198) 
Yet in the Manifesto of 1978, the slogan of "Independent, United and Democratic 
Kurdistan" has its frequent emphasis in bold print. Also, "the other theses and forms 
of solution (referring to "regional autonomy" and "federal unity"), for they do not tend 
to disturb the existing State borders, are reformist, and consequently reactionary views 
(Manifesto, p. 204). So attempting to solve the Kurdish question within the borders of 
the colonialist states would mean they would become the usak (servant-collaborators) 
of the "bourgeoisie of the sovereign nation" (PKK Kurulus Bildirisi, 1978, p. 50). 
Thus the change mentioned may be assessed as the first major alteration in the 
basics of the PKK's programme since the foundation of the party, constituting the 
seeds of the "Second Manifesto" which were to be declared in a cell of the Imralli 
Prison in Turkey by Abullah Öcalan in 1999. The change, in fact, does not bear a 
crucial significance relating to the Organisation's essential objectives because the 
PKK - of in particular the 1980s and 90s - avoided employing the term "independent- 
united Kurdistan" but rather has been obsessed with the idea of "Free Kurdistan" 
instead. Further, the terms "freedom" and "independence" were to be gradually 
employed with reference to the individual's spiritual structure (Öcalan, 1986a, pp. 
107-112) as the organisation grew. [This is re-emphasised in the "Second Manifesto": 
"... I focused on the notion of independence far more in the sense of ideas and 
individual will" (Öcalan, 1999c, p. 90)]. Additional attention is paid to the concepts 
of "free personality" and/or "freed individual" in philosophical accounts of 
Ocalan 
which dealt with human lifestyle and the meaning of life (Öcalan, 1995b, 1996,1999a 
et al). So, how then can the changes be defined or, what is "new" here and does it 
present a remarkable significance in the development of the theory of the PKK? It is 
the restatement of the party programme because of being faced with the harsh reality 
of sitting down at the "wolves' dining table". The early 1980s were the time when the 
PKK was beginning to walk with its feet on the ground. And accordingly, on the one 
hand, restate its policies for the struggle for Kurdish national emancipation appropriate 
to the regional and international "vitals" of the Middle East, and, on the other, cease 
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from the idiom and formulations moulded in reaction to Kurdish "reformist- 
collaborators" and Turkish "social chauvinists". Such slogan-like agitating phrases 
implying a "united-independent Kurdistan" almost withered away towards the late 
1980s. 
In the course of the preliminary years to the guerrilla war of 1984, another three 
major publications [Kürdistan'da Zorun Rolü (The Role of Coercion in Kurdistan), 
Örgütlenme Üzerine (About Organisation), Kurdistan'da Kisilik Sorunu, Devrimci 
Militanin Özellikleri ve Parti Yasami (The Question of Individual's Personality in 
Kurdistan, the Traits of a Revolutionary Militant and Party Life)] appeared and 
showed how the Party's theoretical efforts intensified. Even if the date of issue of the 
latter is 1985, it is, as others, substantially composed of unnamed editing of lectures 
delivered between 1981 and 1983 by Abdullah Öcalan, prior to launching the guerrilla 
offensive which was planned for 1983 but postponed to August 1984. Öcalan, in his 
teachings gathered in these books, continued to be strictly within the boundaries of 
orthodox Marxism to the extent that the bibliographical list of these three editions are 
additionally identical and limited to five to eight Marxist classics. The eighty. four 
footnotes and quotations of "The Role of Coercion in Kurdistan" referred to only eight 
authors: K. Marx, F. Engels, V. I. Lenin, J. Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, G. Dimitrov, V. 
N. Giap and Le Duan. The sixteen sources of "About Organisation" are from Marx, 
Engels, Lenin, Giap and Che Guevera; and eighty three of "The Question of 
Individual's Personality in Kurdistan" are yet again from certain works of Marx, 
Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Dimitrov and Victor Serge. 
Yet each of the theoretical works is put into three individual subjects. The first, 
Kürdistan'da Zorun Rolü, insists on the indispensability of the use of force against 
Turkish "colonialism" for the success of Kurdish national liberation policy. Öcalan 
kept on this line of the policy of war, "the intensified extension of politics executed by 
weaponry", by taking it as the fundamental form of struggle until a couple of weeks 
before his arrest, excluding several unsuccessful attempts at unilateral cease-fire 
between 1993 and 1998. "... The only way [to liberation] is to organise and enlarge 
the fire-power of guerrilla corps and orientate them towards almost all targets" 
(Serxwebun, June 1999). The second, Örgiitlenme Uzerine, focuses on the 
organisational particularities of a party, which were to undertake leading the 
"atomised" Kurdish society. While advocating many points and principals of a 
Leninist party in common with the rest of the Kurdish and Turkish "radical left", the 
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substantial and distinctive part of the argument of the work is concerned with the 
"reorganisation of the whole society" (Örgütlenme Üzerine, 1983, p. 13). Rather 
than structuring a "Marxist-Leninist party of the working class" an overall 
reorganisation is proposed because Kurdish society has been the victim of a 
"deliberate disorganising programme from top to bottom implemented by the Turkish 
colonialists" (op. cit., pp. 11-13). This is the initial distinguishing theoretical point of 
argument that separates the PKK from the other Kurdish political circles of Turkish 
ruled Anatolia. The third, Kürdistan'da Kisilik Sorunu (The Question of Individual's 
Personality), endeavours to initiate a "raw" matter of discussion. The roots and 
dimensions of the "degeneration" of the "Kurdish personality" are discussed with the 
aim of forming the personalities of the "Humanisation Movement". This is the unique 
aspect of the PKK's theoretical, philosophical - and practical - identity that 
determines both the successes and failures of the Party. I will examine this feature of 
the PKK further in the light of the findings of my field research. 
Each theme in these editions of Öcalan's teachings actually constitutes the 
corners of the structural triangle of the PKK: armed struggle, an organisation that 
transcends the notion of class and moulding personalities appropriate to such an 
organisation. But the "question of personality" is important in the PKK's 
organisational development - as will be explored in the following two chapters. 
d. The Years of Building the Guerrilla War 
We discussed earlier how the theoretical development of the PKK's conceptual agenda 
is a reflection of its organisational confrontations. This is truer in the years of armed 
struggle from 1984 to 1999. 
The reflections of practical problems confronting the organisation are 
consequently more apparent in these writings. Similarly, the evaluations concerning 
the nature of the socialism of the Soviet Union and "experienced socialism" (or 
"actually existing socialism") of the world developed - in fact metamorphosed - 
subsequent to the spectacular fall of the "iron curtain" and the demystification of the 
factual spectacle behind the curtain. On the other hand, the theoretical efforts of these 
years gradually become more and more composed of editions of verbal lectures given 
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by Öcalan to his pupils as his "indispensability" or charisma emboldens simultaneous 
with the accumulation of the social and political effects of the guerrilla activities. 
At the outset of the guerrilla war, the accounts of world socialism and revolution 
continued for some time to be under the "heavy influence" (Öcalan, 1999b) of cold- 
war socialism. There were many symptoms of the Stalinist approach. He talks of 
"unique examples of world-wide creations of socialist labour-heroism" (Öcalan, 
1986a, p. 126), great socialist construction of 1930s and 40s which "made the 
reversion back to capitalism almost impossible" (Öcalan, 1992, p. 75) and places 
emphasis on Trotsky's animosity towards socialism in the mid 1980s. 
Trotsky - who claims that the socialist establishment under the dictatorship of the 
proletariat would not be survived in one country in the long term, and that it would 
absolutely have to be expanded into Europe with fellow revolutions - as a result of 
disbelief in the revolution in Russia deteriorated his position against it, following a 
bitter quarrel he was driven out of the Party and the country, and, in consequence, he 
reconciled with imperialism to the extent of being the enemy of the revolution. 
(Öcalan, 1986a, p. 125). 
But he was to firmly state that he Trotsky is the voice of "anti-bureaucracy" and 
"further universalisation" (Ocalan, 1992, p. 27) in 1987 - while adding in the 
following paragraph that without a "revolutionary bureaucracy" it would have been 
impossible to shelter the revolution from imperialist offensives in the historical context 
of Soviet Russia. 
On the eve of collapse of the Soviet Union, the estimations of its latest stage of 
socialist progress were still overwhelmingly optimistic or, in his words, "fairly 
pretentious and exaggerated" (Öcalan, 1992, p. 323). In his speech delivered on the 
seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution, the pretension was beyond 
exaggeration. 
Socialism, just at this point, entered into a new stage - from the institutionalisation 
stage to the maturation stage. If the ephemeral and indistinct Khrushchev era - also 
bearing the quality of a transitory period between the reigns of Stalin and Brezhnev - 
is not taken into account, the Brezhnev era is indeed a progression and maturation of 
institutionalised socialism. (Öealan, 1992, p. 28). 
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Even though Öcalan wants to believe the Soviet establishment's loyalty to the socialist 
cause up until April 1989, the "Soviet Union does remain loyal to the socialist 
principals, but there is a right-deviancy today in the tactics nevertheless" (op. cit. p. 
161). As other political standpoints who took part in the controversy surrounding the 
nature of the Soviet system as defenders of the "socialist castle", the PKK too was 
compelled to "some" self-critical reassessments by events in the Eastern Bloc. 
In January 1990, he talks of the "emergence of a bureaucratic capitalist class in 
the socialist countries" (op. cit. P. 197) and of the "impasse of the October 
Revolution since Lenin was doomed to pragmatism" for he was deeply concern about 
the personalities of almost all members of the Politburo which was his creation (op. 
cit. p. 204). Yet in further months Öcalan began to sound off about the PKK's vulgar 
accounts of world socialism as they seemed fascinated by the geographical scope of 
the "socialist camp". They "should not have" evaluated the gains of socialism 
according to its percentage of territorial domination such as one sixth after the First 
World War and one third after the Second. "Today it is becoming much more obvious 
that instead of approaching socialism from such an angle, it needs to be reduced to an 
individual's personality and pursued to the extent that he/she becomes socialist; 
namely, the extent of living socialism within his/her spiritual structure should have 
been the point of attention" (Öcalan, 1992, p. 252). Then he confesses: "We too, for a 
long time, took up with such accounts of world socialism" (op. cit. p. 324). And 
Öcalan reaches the eventual conclusion on behalf of the PKK with a much sharper 
reverse from Brezhnev's "mature socialism" in his speeches of May Day and August 
of 1991. 
But it appears that the Soviet experience is the realisation of a process which was 
inspired by socialism rather than being an experience of socialism, in which 
honourable socialists also struggled, and as a result, which emerged in the forum of 
national socialism with the rise of sociality and class related entities that held 
capitalistic longings but did not have the opportunity of becoming bourgeois at the 
time. (Öcalan, 1992, p. 292). 
In other words, 
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Today, the overwhelming majority of the men of the Soviet Union are in an eager 
search for capitalism. What then does this mean? We certainly do not intend to say 
that the complete Soviet Socialism is mere capitalism. ... 
The conclusion that shall 
be drawn from this is that the fact of the matter is a flourishing of capitalism 
obtained under the label of socialism by a greedy capitalism, in the conditions of an 
underdeveloped country of weak national growth and less-developed means of 
production. (op. cit., p. 332). 
In consequence, he stated that the collapse of "mature socialism" actually freed 
socialism from suffocation. So it was not socialism that collapsed but "a system which 
institutionalised many features of capitalist, even of feudal, society by extremely 
dangerous implementations" (op. cit. p. 337). 
Apparently, these statements are not novel diagnoses for those who did not have 
the standpoint of the "socialist castle" defenders or, in particular, who were inspired by 
Trotsky's critiques of October Revolution. For instance, Furedi, while arguing how to 
"generate enough surplus and disposable labour-time, to move from the `realm of 
necessity' to the ' realm of freedom' " for a full development of the individual as the 
central project of Marxism (Furedi, 1986, p. 9), arrives at a quite similar conclusion in 
his words, some years before the collapse. 
The strength of the Soviet system under Stalin lay in the way it overcame 
constraints on the mobilisation of resources. To realise its objectives, Stalin's regime 
could draw on a vast reservoir of natural resources and labour. Through the use of 
terror the regime also eliminated much of the demand for consumer goods, thus 
diverting funds for accumulation. Stalin's regime was more successful in mobilising 
resources than it was in using them efficiently, but in the thirties and forties the 
consequences of the inefficient allocation of society's labour-time were not widely 
apparent. Indeed the exigencies of the Second World War revealed the strengths 
rather than the weaknesses of the Soviet system. (Furedi, 1986, p. 63). 
Furedi was pointing to the extent of wielding socialism in terms of both material and 
spiritual means for the economic structure of Russia, drawing attention to the strength 
of the Soviet system. For Furedi, an economic development of society in the 
framework of socialist objectives must have been inextricably linked to the full 
development of the individual, "the central project of Marxism", instead of eliminating 
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the demand for consumer goods. What Öcalan was concluding was that "Russia 
wielded socialism in order to develop its own form of capitalism" substantially in the 
course of the "socialist construction" of the October Revolution because a socialism of 
the genuine liberation of mankind must "infiltrate into the spiritual structure of the 
individual" and mould the "individual who constructs the socialism in his/her little 
nucleus" (Öcalan, 1992, p. 360). 
So the purpose of this part of the argument is to highlight the theoretical 
development of the PKK in relation to "actually existing socialism" which have been, 
"for a long time", almost the primary source of controversy for pro-Marxist political 
mainstreams of Turkey and Kurdistan, as it was in many parts of the world. On the 
other hand, it will draw attention to the little or nothing effect of such metamorphosis- 
like theoretical and programmatic transformations on the grassroots and mass base of 
the PKK. 
As the war of the Kurdish guerrillas expands, Öcalan abandons both the rhetoric 
of classical Marxism and the agitation language of "national liberation". This is 
gradually replaced with an idiom peculiar to himself, rather engaged with more 
universal and philosophical concepts such as "humanisation", "socialisation", "human 
emancipation", "analysing the Self', "freed personality", "pure human being" etc. 
The PKK movement, ... 
in brief, is a movement that is composed of individuals who 
became devoted, not only to the requirements of being human, but to the average life 
of the average living being; who are resolved to live as a progressive species, a species 
of humanity, in Kurdistan; who are determined that the nobility of such an aim may 
only be realisable through a resistance against this dreadful guilt; who believe that the 
advance on the path of humanisation is feasible only through every sign of life which 
is created in the course of the resistance against this barbarian, and aware that only on 
this basis can national and social identity be attained; who reorder and remould all 
aspects of their life in accordance with these exigencies. (Öcalan, 1986b, p. 17). 
Even if the PKK had a sharp reverse within months about the Soviet experience 
subsequent to its end in failure, Öcalan stood contemplating the questions of socialism 
in terms of its establishment within the "individual nucleus" in the Party's third 
congress held in 1986. In the speech given on "Planning the Activities and Armed 
Struggle" he substantially argues the questions of socialism and the individual while 
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titling it the "Approach to the Revolution and the Question of Personality". Following 
some generalisations he made various critical remarks on the "revisionism" of real 
(existing) socialism and its "stencilist" extension - the Turkish Communist Party of 
the time - the explanation given for distinguishing their movement from the others is 
distant from an ethnic or national context. 
We did not look at the fact from such an angle; our approach to the matter from the 
very beginning has appeared with a notable resemblance to the human species' 
feelings - from its inception to the present day - of a noble concern about a harsh 
natural obstacle, a social affair, exploitation, oppression or progress and a passionate 
desire for overcoming hindrances. Most of you [telling the delegates of congress- 
AKO] approached us with some slogans afterwards, but the approach of the entity 
which materialised in the form of PKK towards the question that it is obliged to solve 
is, in essence, within this framework. ... Of a similar kind of excitement which a 
primitive man feels when obtaining the first yield of cultivation or when taming a wild 
animal he/she has caught; of such a virtue of the earliest human being when they 
acquire it in the course of reaching the faculty of grappling with a very fierce tiger by 
using hardly developed self-made defence tools; of a spirit and wisdom which raised 
its struggle against nature to a degree of scientific solving creativity; of the noble will, 
desire and resolution of a man of religion who emerges in the context of very 
oppressive social circumstances; yes, a similar kind of way to all these, if we also 
perform in this way when approaching our very reality, and, if we do not deform and 
degenerate it afterwards, then we may be humanised and shall be able to advance 
gradually on this path. (Öcalan, 1993a, p. 183). 
Throughout the talks about the "genuine nature" of the movement, Öcalan emphasises 
the spiritual reformation of personalities who take the initiative of the revolution, and 
every so often refers to the material and spiritual nature of early civilisation. The 
notion of man's self-reproduction thus constitutes the essential part of the texts. The 
theme of discussions increasingly abounds with references to the individual's will and 
ability of self-analysis, self-transformation and self-recreation. While stressing that 
they "must very deeply penetrate into the spiritual atmosphere - and live up to it - 
which may be felt in the course of the formation of every new religion, at the inception 
of every new mode of production, in sum, at the emergence of every new process 
which gives further strength to the human being", the central issue is rather concerned 
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about the "how" of getting there. "The item on which we contemplate is production of 
individual's personality. Namely, first of all, you will have to produce yourself". 
And, in an obvious materialist manner of saying, adds that they believe the realisibilty 
of the recreation of personality because "history is a considerable witness of this" and, 
for him, "who ever neglects this is simply a reactionary" (op. cit. p. 190). Then from 
such a point of departure, on many occasions, he universalises the definition and 
objectives of the organisation. 
Essentially, the thing to be comprehended among all these is that our movement bears 
certain peculiarities in grappling with the epoch, in opposing the whole history of 
mankind and in analysing its very insight. Only the style of our movement's struggle 
is moulded in the context of the particularity of Kurdistan. Being a militant who was 
to execute this struggle or becoming the representative archetypes of the newness of 
this reality are intimately related to one another. Compare your personalities with 
this reality, resolve its complexity into its elements and make it reach a settlement. 
Certainly, we do not talk about orienting oneself towards some superficial changes. 
Let's give you another ten-fifteen years time, or can history give us this time? But then 
let's not miscalculate, let's not insist on antiquity, let's not be caught unawares. 
Wherever we go, since our creative unity is not developed in this mould, we shall not 
be welcomed either in the world or in the region or in the country. ... That means to 
say, materialisation of these traits of our movement in the form of a national liberation 
or a freedom movement will bring out the strength to overcome the problems of the 
humanity which both capitalism and socialism could not [overcome]. ... In our case, 
the nature of development is not a mere nationalisation of Kurdistan. The reality of 
Kurdishness in fact, to a considerable degree, represents the fusion of other nations. 
This precisely signifies, in its factual entity, the material basis for synthesising 
internationality or humanity in a most noble form. ... 
Because there is, in our case, to 
a certain extent, the presence of Arabisation, Persianisation and Turkification. ... In 
this sense, our existing national liberationism means - in its most broad sense -a 
movement of freedom for it is both, at the same time, in a battle with the total 
elements of capitalism and in an encounter with the narrowed and vulgarised forms of 
socialism. (Öcalan, 1993a, pp. 190,191) 
The philosophical construction of the idea here appears to be a sort of combination of 
Marx and Plato, or in the post-modern form of argument, a version of Touraine's 
notion of "subjectivation" or "reconstruction of the figure of the Subject" (Touraine, 
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1995, p. 204-215,370,371) which he innovates in the arguments of New Social 
Movements, and asserts that it radically differs from the idea of class struggle for it 
appeals not to the logic of history but to the freedom of the Subject. 
If we are to resist total oppression, we must mobilise the total subject, the religious 
heritage, childhood memories, ideas and courage. ... Having recently lived through 
the catastrophes brought about by the authoritarian modernisation forced upon us by 
totalitarian States, we now know that the production of the subject - the emblematic 
figure of modernity - is only possible when consciousness does not divorce the 
individual body from social roles, or the old figures of subject that was projected into 
the world in the form of God, from the modem will to construct oneself as a person. 
(Touraine, 1995, p. 211). 
Sometimes in response to questions, Öcalan emphasisises his childhood background, 
childish longings and religious references. "If a child does not betray his/her longings 
and utopias, he/she will never be a bad adult" he says when replying to Kücük's 
question. "I am", he continues, "a forty four year old child. That means, I grew up 
without betraying the longings and utopias of my childhood" (Kücük, 1993, p. 37). 
On another occasion, he focuses on the "principal of conduct" which he claims 
supersedes the sense of class and the Leninist boundaries of Marxism ( the "Marxism 
of the imperialist era". 
- Now, in our case, we 
did not contemplate moulding our humanity or personalities 
according to such principles of civilisation, but according to natural principles. In 
other words, this was not according to the rules for the development of a class society, 
but according to very natural principles. What are these natural principles? In sonic 
cases, it was the principle of childhood or of the earliest days of mankind. We did not 
lose sight of this. It was part of my strategy for action. (Özcan, A. K., 1999, p. 65). 
In the early stage of the interview I held, I aimed at his further exemplification on the 
response to Kücük's question relating "childhood memories". 
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- You say, "I grow up without betraying the longings and utopias of my childhood" 
or "If a child does not betray his/her longings and utopias, s/he will never be a bad 
adult" ... 
- Yes, not betraying childhood, getting "back" to the principles of conduct from the 
earliest human societies, taking these principles as fundamental guidelines and within 
that framework, examining civilisation, class societies, politics and art, diligently and 
with focus. This approach is at the same time very easy and very difficult. it is 
difficult to become as pure as either the first human being or as a child, but it is more 
basic. It is very difficult for those who have been brought up according to the 
principles of civilisation but it is also very attractive and pleasant for those who are 
interested by the concept of human naturalness. And, in this sense, we do have a 
philosophical approach and effect. (Ozean, A. K., 1999, pp. 65,66). 
In the approaches to the conflicts and the grasp of the roots and settlements of the 
social questions, the point of view, throughout the Öcalan's talks of 1986 congress, 
corresponds with the definitions above focusing on the self-reconstruction of the 
individual - transformation of the Self into Actor. Within the framework of Marx's 
materialist conception of history, the fundamental question of humanity from the 
outset of civilisation to the present is taken as the field of departure and the "cause" of 
the "Freedom Movement" is defined accordingly. 
... 
The process of humanity's progress is in this manner, and scientific socialism has 
actually elucidated this. As early mankind became capable of producing little more 
than his/her needs, the instinct of man's fierce greed was stimulated and mobilised, 
and the eagerness to accumulate appeared. One party in the society, namely exploiters 
or rulers, thus, came to being. Once they ascended to the throne, they did not desert it. 
Here is the source of all wars, violence and terror in social existence hitherto. The 
overall aim of freedom fighters is to emancipate humanity from this millennial chain. 
(Öcalan, 1993a, p. 193) 
Because of his materialistic approach, "since it [Kurdistan] is an international colony; 
since it is a place in which humanity is ignored to the utmost and regarded as a 
hundred per cent its property, then the revolution of Kurdistan shall he international 
and the property of humanity in proportion to it" (Öcalan, in Kücük, 1993, p. 145). 
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As an extension of such an approach, the universality and historicity of the "burden" 
of the "Freedom Movement" is commented on further in the party congress of 1986. 
If attention is turned towards the point, humanity is faced here with deep-rooted 
losses, unjustness and deprivation of freedom. But if we are willing to live as human 
beings, we must then regain them [what we have lost]. This is an immense conflict. 
This conflict will determine the strength and the tactics of the war and the lifestyle of 
our movement. Since, as the fact that lies in the essence of the conflict is so 
significant, and if our movement does not want to lose, then it must passionately 
embrace the meritorious values bearing the vital sense of life. ... 
Our freedom 
movement will insightfully handle this question for the purpose of solving it in its 
entirety. And it will strive to solve the question by using a method which will need to 
go beyond the methods of violence experienced in the struggle of slaves against slave 
owners, of serfs against the lords of the manor, of the proletariat against the 
bourgeoisie, and retrieve all the losses in this way. This is the scientific elucidation of 
the fact that we have handled. (op. cit. p. 193,194). 
The universalising aspect of the "Kurdistan Revolution" took up much discussion at 
the party congress, held in the second year of the guerrilla war. Then, the rhetoric of 
the classical Marxist ideology gradually transformed into more philosophical accounts 
of "personality" and "lifestyle" - the personalities moulded in the course of the war 
with its way of living peculiar to itself who were to be the seeds of a future freed 
society harmonised with its entire naturality. And evaluation of the "holy war" they 
have endeavoured to initiate is done accordingly. 
... 
Notwithstanding that we call it the national liberation war, it is actually a great 
humanity war, a cultural and social development war; it is both a personal and 
economic development war, the war for gaining political emancipation and for 
flourishing in every respect. The war is a lifestyle for us. That is to say, it also has an 
economic content; and it is a fundamental form of production, a form of the 
reproduction of everything. (Öcalan, 1993. P. 202). 
This quality of the war he defined is considered as the condition of the development of 
politicisation and a form of production in Kurdistan. "As profoundly as we transform 
this war into a lifestyle", Öcalan states in continuation of his talk, "we shall he able to 
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enhance the liberation and development of the form of production. As much as we 
develop the war we may do so in political life. The formation of the individuals' 
personalities, the development of the social and cultural sphere may only be possible 
through this war. Here is our party policy on war". The meaning of the "victory" of 
which they are in pursuit, in consequence, is sensed corresponding to the definition of 
the war above, in which its men were to be shaped. 
There have hitherto been accounts of victories within the framework of an apparent 
front-line, of direct fighting with the enemy in a vulgar form, and of the dominance of 
weaponry. Whereas such an approach to victory is so insufficient. The greater and 
more detailed war, and the one which is not quite apparent is the "inner" war. Since 
the war is so great a phenomenon, since everything is mobilised and dedicated for it, 
then it has to be dealt with on the level of the human being who executes it. The only 
acceptable comment on the war executed in Kurdistan would thus be the one which is 
expressed in terms of the human species it has realised. (Ocalan. Serxwehun, 1993). 
e. The Years of Massification and the Collapse of Existing Socialism 
These efforts of Öcalan - not of the PKK - were accelerated and intensified in 
particular from 1990 onwards due to both the collapse of the Soviet system and the 
rapid rise of confrontations of massification occurring in the spring of this year. Yet in 
these years he continued emphasising the "indispensability" of socialism and socialist 
ideology while abandoning the classical Marxist-Leninist idiom. A sequence of books 
(Kücük, 1992, Öcalan, 1992,1993,1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1997,1998, 
1999a et al., Öcalan and Belli, 1999) focusing on today's questions of socialism, the 
individual's personality and the "renewed" or "re-humanised" man of the future of 
socialisation, appeared amongst the party publications. They were composed of party 
instructions, lectures, addresses, interviews and dialogues of no any leading figure of 
the PKK, but only of Öcalan on various occasions. (This will be argued further in 
chapter seven which is more engaged with the questions of the organisation). He puts 
additional emphasis on the inevitability of socialism and its inextricability with man's 
nature. "Being without socialism means leaving oneself without air" (Serrº1'ebun, 
May 1993), says Öcalan, in a May day speech and, "the socialism that is receded from 
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human nature would no way have been doomed to collapse" later in the course of an 
interview with a Russian journalist (Serxwebun, October 1995). He subsequently talks 
about a new programme of international socialism transcending the classical 
perceptions of class structures and conflicts. 
The approach of 19th century socialism is absolutely insufficient. It always solidly 
takes the notion of "class against class, national liberation against colonialism" as the 
premier standpoint. This is needed to some extent, but essentially the initial aspect 
should indeed be the flourishing of the socialist democracy. Struggling against the 
terrible destruction of the environment and consumption insanity is also essential. 
This may then be the new programme of socialism. Such a programme will obviously 
be both the merest expression of socialism and the liberation of humanity itself. 
(Öcalan, 1998, p. 30) 
Anything other than socialism, for the Öcalan of the early 1990s, would not pervert 
human beings towards a "social bestialisation". According to this, "being dubious 
about socialism is equivalent to be dubious about the human being and its social 
existence" (Öcalan, 1992, p. 283)) While naming the overall era of class societies as 
"Civilisation Satan" (Serwwebun, December 1996), for it shaped mankind's spiritual 
structure on the basis of selfishness, greed and power, he sees socialism as the only 
way of escape from the bestialisation "flood" of the capitalist-imperialist era. 
"Socialism, in our day, is the name of the struggle against the insanity of consumption, 
the destruction of nature, and against capturing the society by the global media and 
similar kinds of epidemic social diseases" (Öcalan, 1998). In consequence, the main 
slogan of the 90s was invented accordingly: "If imperialism is compelling humanity to 
bestialisation to its cells, we then must compel it to the humanisation to its atoms". 
In this sense, socialism is the only option for the future of humanity. It used to be 
called socialisation. Now we term it socialism. When socialisation stops 
bestialisation begins. And dangerous dragons breed in the social circumstances of 
capitalism. It is thus a socialist struggle, in this stage of the capitalist-imperialist era, 
that is the only pathway to emancipation. It is the single vital condition for a humane 
survival! If such a generalised and prevalent bestialisation is not hindered, humanity 
will come to an end. And in this sense, I say, insistence on socialism is insistence on 
becoming a human being. (op. cit., 1998, p. 30). 
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From this perspective, the PKK leader began to globalise the theory of the revolution . 
On occasions, he defines the PKK as a "Humanisation Movement" (Öcalan, 1994a; 
White and Logan, 1997) and their aim as founding a "Republic of Humanity" 
(Serxwebun, October 1995, September 1996). And it is evaluated as the core entity of 
the "Peoples' Federation of Middle East" (Serxwebun, May 1992) because, for them, it 
is the "Gordian knot" (Manifesto, p. 208) of the surrounding geography. Towards the 
late 90's, the term "Great Anatolia Revolution" (Serxwebun, December 1997) was 
gradually employed instead of Kurdistan Revolution. For the PKK, the socialism of 
Kurdistan shall not be a "geography socialism" but the "human socialism". And the 
contemporary slogan of socialism was to be "everything is not for the Party and State 
but for Humanisation and the Humanity Republic" (op. cit. Oct. 1995). Ocalan's 
definition of the "movement of the PKK" of October 1991 was the first literal 
expression of the notion of the "Humanisation Movement" by which all these were 
followed. 
The PKK movement, beyond being an entity of nationalisation and national 
emancipation, is a humanisation movement. For that reason, our struggle is not only 
for the liberation of the Kurdish people but it also, in a sense, means the liberation of 
the humanity of the world. The loftiness of the Kurdish people will in the final 
analysis mean the loftiness of the world's humanity too. If a people has so descended 
to the bottom in a part of this world, I think one cannot speak of the exaltation of 
humanity. Ignoring Kurdistan to such an extent is the measure of the world's 
foolishness, and we will arrive at humanity from this very contradiction. (Öcalan, 
1994a, p. 517). 
An ironic language, anyhow, is used following the paragraph above during the 
narration to the pupils. "I do not tend to make you feel sorry, but I have to state that 
the works are not so simple as you think". Yet, when replaying White's question 
asking the Party's "class politics" he gives fairly identical definition in a slightly 
different manner. 
... You should call our movement a 
humanitarian movement - not a class movement 
but a movement for the freedom of the human being. So, you can't understand the 
movement, by looking at the PKK only through the spectacles of class struggle 
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(Abdullah Öcalan, pers. Comm., Lebanon, 2 July 1992). (White and Logan, 1997, p. 
229). 
Yet Öcalan makes comparisons of their work with the Islamic, French and Russian 
revolutions, and, in particular, proposes to accomplish the Bolshevik's "semi- 
revolution" - or "quasi-revolution" - (Öcalan, 1992, p. 98) of October. He defines 
the PKK in terms of being the remedial way out from the depression of experienced 
socialism. 
It is becoming clearer that the PKK is the peculiar name for being consistent in 
grasping and believing the essential theme of socialism, and of defending it insistently 
against all the forms of degeneration at a time when the depression has begun to 
deepen, but in conditions where the chance of escape is viewed as not being fairly 
possible. (Serxwebun, June 1991). 
The main critique of the Soviet Revolution by the PKK is based on the view that it is 
the victim of a vulgar materialism for they exhausted all the energy of socialism for 
the growth of the economy, Party and State. The Soviet experience of socialism and 
its versions of the other parts of the world were a kind of "primitive" or "childish" 
socialism. Whereas "the socialism of Kurdistan is a great human revolution which by 
all means does not recognise the borders", and, according to them, the State should 
have been dissolved in the people. But in experienced socialism the process has 
occurred the other way round; people have been dissolved in the State and Party 
(Serxwebun, October 1995). Thus, for the PKK, shaping a socialist individual is more 
vital than establishing a state or a party (Öcalan, 1998, p. 180) because "if the 
question of socialist cadres is not overcome, either in case of the victory or of 
executing a quite ordinary political or military activity, everything may promptly 
reverse" (op. cit. p. 22). In the course of the interview with the Russian journalist, 
Öcalan asserts that the self-critique of the existing socialism is also presented by 
himself and, thus, rather focuses on the notion of moulding the man of socialism and 
his corresponding lifestyle. 
The fundamental objective of socialism is to create the personality of a new man. ... 
Consequently creating the personality of a new man is essential for our ideology. .... 
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Because socialism represents the novelty and nobility of humanity, socialism needs to 
be transformed into a lifestyle and needs to infiltrate society. 
The new man, accurate man, good man is socialist man. Why then should it be 
imprisoned in borders? Why then should it hide itself? (Öcalan, 1998, p. 179) 
In Öcalan's view, this universalistic approach to the objectives of socialism may well 
be the historical task of the inhabitants of upper Mesopotamia - the cradle of primitive 
humanisation. In addition, this very background of Kurdistan "may be quite a 
component of the material base" for the success of the PKK's re-humanisation 
attempt. 
This country, just as it played the role of being the cradle of civilisation in its past, in 
our time, - through overcoming the immense conflict between down-trodden 
humanity to an extent that had never been seen before and that is compelled by 
capitalist-imperialism and nature and social life - may yet again initiate the role of 
rescuing humanity and of being the cradle of re-humanisation of the same weight and 
loftiness. Our party, if a concession is not made from its essence of taking great 
humanity as the fundamental source of action, if full awareness and sensitiveness are 
not weakened [in defence] against the vulgar policies of experienced socialism, all 
sorts of capitalistic traits and yet against the base illnesses of feudalism, will indeed be 
able to obtain the chance of being the vanguard orienting humanity from the most 
backward conditions towards a most developed stage of humanisation. (Serxvvebun, 
March 1993). 
Further, the leader of the PKK, in the course of talks and dialogues, frequently 
ventured onto defining himself or on explaining the realisation and development of his 
personal spiritual structure in terms of this very global conflict. For example, "... If 
such a form of combined conflict did not exist, I would by no means be able to survive 
myself" or "I am the product of such a logic of the current merciless intricate relation- 
conflict wholeness" (Öcalan, 1994a, and et. al. ) he says at various occasions in his 
teachings. There are many similar expressions and explanations of himself throughout 
his talks of almost a quarter of a century to the extent that one may conclude that it is 
one of his basic methods of educating and/or motivating his militants. In this case, as 
regards contemplating the history of mankind, he again refers to himself: "One can say 
that I devote the largest share of my efforts to myself. I strive to see, to hear, to 
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perceive, to feel the sciences, the philosophies and the religions those which are as old 
as humanity, and whatever can be seen, heard and felt as far-reaching as my eyes, my 
ears and my spirit are able to see, to hear and to feel" (Serxwebun, October 1994a; 
Öcalan, 1995b, pp. 59-110). 
Being aware of this gradual intensification of rather exalted universal objectives by 
tackling man's nature, made me to fomrulate question when I interviewed him in front 
of over a hundred of his militants and fighters in the Party Central School. I asked him 
the story of diversion from the "two words" (colony and Kurdistan) to this re- 
humanisation perspective. 
- At its outset, your movement appeared to be an attempt to revitalise the Kurdish 
nation, which had been "buried in concrete" by the young Turkish Republic, an 
attempt to smash that "concrete" to pieces. Later, however, particularly now in the 
1990s, it has acquired a more universal and humanistic dimension. Now you focus 
on human nature, human personality and the spiritual structure of human beings. 
What has caused this progression from national identity to the quest for 
humanisation? (Özcan, A. K., 1999, pp. 56,57). 
He somehow tended to ignore the question, or probably aimed at provoking the 
questioner as a consequence of his leadership style. 
- It would be very difficult 
for any ordinary social scientist to comprehend me. I think 
that, despite all your efforts, you are not going to be able to understand. In fact, my 
method does not fit into the imagination of ordinary human beings. Only I, so far, 
know how and who I am fighting. ... (op. cit., p. 
57). 
I briefly reform and insisted on my question for it was not the answer. 
-... I wanted to know how or why you have redirected your emphasis from 
rediscovering a buried national identity to the point of universal re-appropriation of 
the human essence. 
- These were only key words. You have to place the key in the door and turn it in the 
relevant direction before you can open the door and see inside the room. These words 
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were not the whole edifice. The subsequent developments are well worth looking at. 
(op. cit. p. 57) 
Literally, what one may infer from the narration above is that the national words are 
rather regarded as instrument of the genuine struggle. In fact, Öcalan was to put it into 
more "undressed" words in the monthly magazine Serxwebun, the central organ of the 
Party: "In this sense, national liberation is only a means of my struggle" (Serxwebun, 
December 1997) 
Along with the insistence on socialism, and subsequently on humanisation, the 
weight given to the term "ideology" is remarkable enough to mention. One of the 
earliest publications of the Party, following the Program, Manifesto and Foundation 
Bulletin, is "What is the Ideology and Politics, and How is it Emerged? " was typed, 
photocopied and distributed among the early party cadres and printed subsequently. 
The cause of the functional stage at which they arrived so far is largely attributed to 
the ideological efforts. While, in 1987, Öcalan regards the main source of their 
success as diligently putting all the efforts of the Party into the implementation of the 
"Marxism of Imperialist era, Leninism" to the concrete circumstances of Kurdistan 
and "welding the Leninist theory of revolution into the material condition" of their 
country (Öcalan, 1992, p. 51); towards the late 90s, he points at the crucial importance 
of ideology in the process of furthering their activities (Öcalan, 1998, pp. 58-67). 
Moreover, he finds the cause of the historicity of his leadership and its effectiveness in 
filling the gap of "ideologylessness". 
Why then can I be so effective? I am currently considered to be a miracle, this is 
because I revealed the state of ideologylessness and absence of morale in the Kurdish 
existence within the framework of my personality, and the extent of my own self- 
realisation through this very unveiling corresponded quite easily with the concrete 
circumstances of this phenomenal social and political existence. In fact, the 
miraculous quality of every historical leap emanates from such a conjunction. 
(Öcalan, 1998, p. 59). 
So he tells his pupils in confidence: "If you brake the link between yourself and 
ideology you will bestialise", and accused them of being "ideologyless": "I am afraid 
of you because you are ideologyless. In the past, people used to say 'you are 
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irreligious, immoral'. ... Now ideology has replaced all these concepts". He firmly 
relates the "descended" state of the people of Kurdistan and the way of his action also 
with ideology. 
Instead of saying "our people are ignorant, thoughtless" which is repeated in 
abundance by everybody, we will in general say: Our people is ideologyless, without 
morale and have been descended to the level of bestiality because of being deprived of 
these basic concepts. ... If I could become a great voice, the most fundamental cause 
of this is improving myself ideologically. If the fact is looked at from a closer 
distance, one may see that I did not work vulgarly with weapons. I did not work with 
money either. My style of executing the work is through ideology. (op. it. p. 59) 
Then he gives a definition of the Party, in this occasion, in terms of ideology. "Just in 
this point - what is the PKK? " asks and answers Öcalan, "The PKK is primarily the 
movement of inventing the ideology and morale of the reality of a people whose 
ideology and morale has totally collapsed" (op. cit., p. 64). 
And the ideology with which Öcalan works and "grows up" with is Marxism: 
"ideologically I am nourished by Marxism" (Öcalan, 1995a, p. 78) he conveys during 
the dialogue with a fellow Turkish prominent revolutionary activist of the early 70's; 
and tells his militants: "To what extent socialism may shed a light on your existing 
traits? It is important. Because it is our ideological guide. That is to say, it is the fuel, 
the consciousness, the soul which make you walk. What can your feet do without it? " 
(Öcalan, p. 151). I mean, throughout Öcalan's teachings, the explicit emphasis on 
the terms socialism, Marxism and also Leninism is bold in proportion with the refrain 
from the word communist or communism. (For the word "communist" has not just 
derogatory but also dangerous connotations in Turkey and Kurdistan. It is translated 
and penetrated into people's Turkish as "dinsiz-Allahsiz" [irreligious-Godless] and 
"ana baci tanimaz" [the man who do not recognise the limits of mother and sister in 
terms of sexual intercourse]). 
To summarise, the ideology of the PKK at its inception generally squares with 
the framework of a commonplace version of classical Marxism in the Cold War era, 
with its hesitant and/or balanced critique of Soviet socialism. The ideological spirit of 
the Party's programme is fairly identical with an orthodox communist party in spite of 
the scarce usage of the term "communist". The programmatic objectives in terms of 
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the national emancipation cause, including the "unavoidable necessity" of the armed 
struggle method to attain its goals, are additionally identical to fellow Kurdish political 
initiatives, which existed at the outset, apart from the spirit of the PKK's language. 
Among the written materials of the early years of the organisation (the late 1970's) 
there are no remarkable peculiarities deserving elucidation, with respect to either its 
ideological framework or programmatic schedule or theoretical accounts of the state of 
affairs of the day, apart from the enthusiastic - and also aggressive to some extent - 
ingredients of the language which I considered to be the roots of its future 
organisational prominence. As the struggle furthers, transformations, alterations and 
modifications - and in some cases metamorphoses - occur due to the simultaneous rise 
of mass participation and confrontations. In certain stages of organisational expansion 
and progression, universal efforts at micro (reshaping the individual's personality) and 
macro (the re-humanisation attempt for an "unaccomplished" move into socialism) 
levels intensifies while classical Marxist-Leninist rhetoric withers away. Likewise, 
with regard to national ends, the change of circumstances is immediately reflected in 
programmatic targets to the point where the overall renewal of the Party programme 
occurs at the seventh extraordinary party congress, which was held following Öcalan's 
call from Imralli Prison for the withdrawal of guerrilla forces from inside Turkish 
State borders. 
In addition, the phenomenon of the ideological and theoretical body of the PKK 
merely consisted of Öcalan's recorded-edited verbal "activity" of fairly two decades - 
from his escape of 1979 to his abduction of 1999 - except from some initial texts of 
late 70's. The scarce books of several prominent figures of the Party are the ones with 
memorial context, with the single exception of Mazlum Dogan's Collected Writings 
edited afterwards, someone who was killed in Diyarbakir Prison of Turkey at the age 
of 22 in 1982. This is why Öcalan does not avoid emphasising the fact from time to 
time by saying, "I execute the revolution with my tongue". 
However; of the principal peculiarities of the PKK to itself, the one which needs 
further elaboration is the consistency of insistence on socialism within the framework 
of its perspective of perception, even if the use of language in this regard is 
substantially shifted depending on the Party's positional policies. For instance, in 
talking to a Russian journalist, Ocalan contemplates the subject to the extent of 
penetrating the lack of Stalin's education by Lenin, Lenin's warnings about the 
potential dangers of Stalin and the importance of his bequest in this case, and even 
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further into Stalin's marriage when arguing the questions of Soviet socialism (Öcalan, 
1998, pp. 179-181). But when Öcalan responds to the "retired" American diplomat 
David A. Korn or to the professor of political science at Tennessee Technology 
University, Michael M. Gunter, he produces an "extremely temperate" language. 
Gunter reminds Ocalan of the removal of the hammer and sickle from the PKK's flag 
at the 1995 congress and its subsequent efforts to "de-emphasise its earlier Marxism". 
Gunter then asks him: "What do you say to those who say this was a cosmetic change 
and that you are still a Marxist, a communist? " Here is the complete response. 
Öcalan: This is just propaganda. It is not possible for us to be communists. Why did 
the Soviet Union collapse and the United States has not? It is because the communism 
made the government every thing, but human being nothing. The United States 
represents development. (Gunter, 1998, p. 82). 
As it is shown from the quotations from him so far that Öcalan, in this brief response, 
employs the term communism in quotation marks implying actually the "experienced 
communism", but quotation marks are not visible in verbal statements! And the 
relating part of question and the "drizzled" lines of answer to Korn are as follows: 
- ... In addition, is Marxism-Leninism the 
ideology of the PKK? 
- ... 
As a people and party we are harmed by this socialism. ... 
I am not in the 
position to explain very briefly as to what sort of perception of socialism we have in 
every aspect. But I can confidently convey that our understanding of socialism is not 
... a socialism 
in which the individual is shrunk to its bottom limit but the State is 
swollen to its top limit. 
... Rights for the individual as much as the needs of society, social 
benefits and 
social order as much as the needs of the individual is what we are trying to be loyal to 
as a principle. I think this is enough of an explanation to introduce ourselves. 
(Öcalan, 1998, pp. 99-101) 
The eventual paragraph does present some association with Marx's proposal of "from 
everyone according to his/her ability, to everyone according to his/her need" for a 
matured communist society. Or in other words, it is rather a super-structural version 
of it. That is to say, the leader of the PKK, as the only builder of the Party's 
theoretical and ideological body from the foundation of the Party to his arrest, kept on 
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insisting on the socialist ideology and its universal aspirations, and he somehow 
governed his language of this realm in "dressing" it according to the Party's standpoint 
of a durational position. Yet, one tends to conclude, at first glance, that he has not 
been in pursuit of such a language as such in his Defences and statements raised from 
the one-man prison of Imralli island, which are solidly backed as a whole and deemed 
to be the "Second Manifesto" by the PKK. Whereas the very governance of the 
"extreme-temperate" language has been extremised further to the extent that one can 
hardly notice the difference. For example, it does not seem to be easy to state whether 
he refuses the principle of "self-determination right of nations" or actually criticises 
the comment and application of the principle in the following sentence: "The right of 
nations for self-determination' which came into fashion in the 70's, which was 
interpreted only in terms of separate state in the course of its applications, was, indeed, 
an impasse in this specific context". (Öcalan, 1999c, p. 12). But the firm attitude 
towards socialism and its significance for the future of humanity have not been 
moderated as such. 
Whatever the language is, the PKK's overall programme reconstructed with 
major alterations, even in certain aspects metamorphosed into a distinct party 
programme following these defences, and was approved with no considerable 
opposition at the extraordinary congress held afterwards. 
II Following Öcalan's Arrest: The "Second Manifesto" 
To develop the argument of the PKK's ideological and theoretical journey, the 
defences produced during the trials, and the statements released through his lawyers 
subsequent to the verdict of death sentence are more than worthy of being looked at. 
In distinguishing the consistent, flexible, inconsistent, firm and ignored aspects of the 
journey, these documents will, to a vital extent, be useful. For the changes that 
appeared here are not customarily relevant to a movement claiming to undertake 
national liberation. 
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a. The Legal Defences at Imralli Prison 
One cannot miss the defendant's immediate concern (the point at which my argument 
is directed. In the early lines of introduction to the first defence, Öcalan, referring his 
earlier statements as regards the war, a separate state, violence and accusations for 
making tactical proposals, promptly comes to the ideology and programme of the 
PKK. He begins with the extract below from his statements made during the press 
conference of 15 March, 1993, at which the initial unilateral cease-fire declared. 
"We are not demanding an immediate separation from Turkey. We are realistic on 
this subject. Do not interpret this [cease-fire] as a simple tactic [serving a hidden 
agenda]. There are many reasons as to why [we are realists]. Those who understand 
the historic, political and economic situation of the two peoples [the Kurds and Turks 1, 
know well that separation could not take place. They [the Kurds and Turks l are 
intertwined like flesh and bone". (Öcalan, 1999d, p. 7). 
This is followed by three other extracts from the statements made at the latest 
unilateral cease-fire declared on 1 September 1998, emphasising their genuine 
understanding of war and violence, and their "essential objective" for democratisation 
of the Republic rather than forcing its abolition. Then he comes to the point. 
I am quoting these for this particular reason: there may be some who tend to 
incorrectly claim that I have come to such a standpoint due to the harsh conditions of 
my solitary confinement. Even in the indictment, I have the impression that my earlier 
statements taken under interrogation will not be of considerable significance. But 
however, my statements have laid bare the necessity of altering of both the PKK's 
programme and its political structure with its narrow, strict ideological approaches of 
the fiery 70s in the light of the composition of the world and Turkey in the 1990s. 
There is an emphasis on the need for revising and updating the principles and 
programme [of the PKK] in the aftermath of an immense experience. IItalics added]. 
(Öcalan, 1999c, p. 10). 
What would he then imply by "alteration of the programme and political structure" or 
revising and updating the principles of the Party with its "narrow, heavy" elements of 
ideological approaches descended from the fiery 70s'? There are extensive texts of', not 
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implications, but of illuminating explanations indicating the deep-rooted alterations to 
the programme of the PKK, surrounding the concepts of "Democratic Solution", 
"Democratic Republic" and "Free Togetherness". From the national-programmatic 
point of argument, one may, without exaggeration, infer that the only thing that 
remained unaltered is the name of the Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan - Kurdistan 
Workers Party) which actually contradicts the essential framework of the texts. But a 
similar assertion cannot be made with regard to the revisions and updates of' the 
principles of the party as those are based on socialist ideology. On the contrary, the 
ideological aspects relating socialist purposes and aspirations of the Party are dealt 
with far less than the "inevitability" and/or "nobility" of democratisation. From the 
ideological point of argument, the "heavy" rhetoric of the "fiery 70s" and, rather more, 
the reflection of the principle of "the right of nations for self-determination" to the 
terminology of PKK's theory and programme in the form of separate state, is meant by 
the "necessity of alteration" which are indeed superseded by a diligent moderate 
language. On the other hand, even if it is briefed under certain subtitles of the main 
defence, the insistence on the belief in socialism as "the only future of humanity", is 
expressed in a "straight-forward" locution. But it is phrased simultaneously with an 
over-highlighted stipulation: evolutionary and democratic socialism. 
Öcalan's "Second Manifesto" (Kürt Sorununa Deniocratik Cözüm Manifrstoseu - 
The Manifesto of Democratic Solution of the Kurdish Question) consists of three 
defences produced against the Turkish State institutions of jurisdiction. If one were to 
give the most broad outline of the defences, it may well be reduced to a word or a 
phrase: Solution or Democratic Solution. They are consequently a presentation of a 
bold picture of an attempt at persuasion of the Turkish Establishment for an 
"exterminated" settlement to the Kurdish question within the existing Misak-i Milli 
(the National Pact of 1920) borders of Turkey, which is believed to be the most 
feasible, most accurate and most dignified resolution [of the sanguinary conflict of 
centuries] for both parties. In respond to the allegations claiming Apo's surrender and 
conversion because of the fear of death, his justifications also gather around the notion 
of solution: "This is the celebrity of the Apo personality. The Apo personality is th, e 
solution personality. ... the temperament of my spirit, my attitude is keeping in the 
same style as my march shaped outside. It is conjectural. It is linked with being the 
strength of the solution" (Özgür Politika, 6 June 1999). In the statement released 
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through his solicitors while touching on the matter of his survival and death he points 
again at the solution. 
The case is not whether I stay alive or die. However, understanding me will lead 
everybody to win. Both the society and the state will benefit from this. I could take a 
position of another sort. I could easily strike a non-concessive attitude. But if I 
desired the solution, I should not have taken such a position. I myself survive for the 
solution, I urge myself forward for the solution. (op. cit., 6 June 1999). 
Yet in the introduction of the main defence, he repeatedly emphasises the cause of the 
standpoint he had to form. He states that he did not attempt to "revert to either a 
classical Kurdish nationalist line or the leftist interpretation of this very tendency" 
because, "a sterile repetition, no matter how heroic it is", would not "contribute much 
to the ideal of freedom". 
... 
In general, the PKK's [ideological] defences have followed the two opposite 
extremes; either a stubborn defence of the classical line, or the abandonment of that 
line. This, in a sense, is the same as having no solution. I made it a point to go 
beyond this. (Öcalan, 1999d, pp. 9,10). 
Öcalan contemplates further on the "why" of this "converted" aspect of himself by a 
philosophisation on the transition of his personality, for he regards this as the method 
of his "analysations" (referring his teachings). "Scrutinising a splendid search-for 
freedom in the framework of my personality has become my methodology. " And, 
"making an attempt to try for it, here too, was an expected issue" (Öcalan, 1999c, p. 
12). By the end of main defence, "although it might not be needed", he, however, puts 
down one more heading, "My Personal Status", before passing on to the Conclusion. 
In the paragraph of introduction tending to give an abstract of this heading, he talks of 
a "transitional" stage of his personality. 
... At this point, my greatest 
fear is the non-completion ofa project oj'humanity left at 
the halfway point. Therefore, my greatest expectation from life is the chance of 
transition from an overly-competent personality of a rebel-for-freedom to that of 
fighter-for-peace which contains freedom. Only for this reason I regarded the 
necessity of my survival as a fundamental point of departure in the course of the 
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overall process of my arrest, interrogation and of subsequent events. The personality 
of peace - and, likewise, that of the society of peace - is a theoretical endeavour 
which requires both political, social, and, in addition, detailed psychological analysis 
to a greater extent than is assumed. ... As I have emphasised, a war, or any kind of 
action of violence, which does not aim at a noble, sacred and very necessary peace is 
madness. In accordance with this rule [understanding], it was crucial that I should 
unveil the aspects of the personification of a man of a peace which is needed to a vital 
degree, not only theoretically but also morally, politically and practically [Italics 
added]. (op. cit., pp. 12,13). 
The reflection of this personal transition, or "upgrading", to the cause of national 
liberation will be discussed in the course of comparison of the earliest and latest 
programmes of the PKK because the programme of "re-foundation" is, as I mentioned 
earlier, a kind of systematised edition of this reflection. Here, thus, I shall have to go 
through Öcalan's ideological temperament as regards the socialism along with the 
"why" of his positional state in Imralli Prison, for they relate my point of argument - 
the balance of national and ideological aspects of the PKK. 
Even though it is quite limited in comparison with the "repeated" proposal of' 
"uniquely solvent" capability of "free togetherness" under a democratic republic, 
Öcalan does not refrain from arguing the questions of socialism and his present 
position towards them. He continues to make every endeavour to govern his style, but 
it is more straight forward than the one employed in response to the American former 
diplomatic mission's question concerning this. Under certain headings of the "Second 
Manifesto", such as The Emergence of the PKK and a New Stage in the Kurdish 
Question, Transformation Problems within the PKK or My Personal Status, we find 
firm elements in defence of socialism and beliefs in its significance for the future of 
humanity. However, he begins with a gathered account of democracy-evolution- 
revolution under the first heading following the Introduction - Victorious Democracy 
at the End of 20th Century. 
Democracies rather possess an evolutionary language, but they essentially rest on 
revolutions. The most crucial thing is the appropriate time for the democratisation of 
a revolution. Revolutions that fail to democratise, either engender dictatorships or are 
eventually run wild led by anarchism. ... 
To become stuck to the revolutionary stage 
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also means to be fixated on all kinds of conservative bureaucratism as much as on 
counter-revolution. ... 
Today's democracies, ... then in the 20th century, resisted the unforgiving 
dictatorship of fascism and the totalitarian regimes of its adversaries, experienced 
socialism, and announced its final victory at the end of the century. ... It derives its 
actual power from being the answer to the needs of society's naturalness. ... Coercion 
produces rapid development, but also easy downfall. Whereas the democratic system 
might produce slow development but does not engender easy downfall. (Öcalan, 
1999c. pp. 13,14). 
He concludes that the crucial thing [for democratic systems] is transforming 
democratic values successfully into not only solutions of social problems but also into 
its power of governance. "The best politics or politician", for Öcalan, "will then seek 
its/his/her identity through the personalities of individuals, leaderships and the nature 
of parties who/which shall be capable of representing this very power" (op. cit. p. 
15). 
Once having given this a preliminary base for a relevant conversion of their 
well-known revolutionary language into a well-formed evolutionary one, Öcalan 
returns to the peculiar background of the Turkish-Kurdish relations of almost two 
centuries. Following a scrutinised picture of the Republican era in particular, he again 
comes to the point. Namely, he gives an assiduously structured definition of the PKK 
in ideological and non-national terms. 
The PKK is indeed the latest extensive movement of Kurdish rebellion which has 
emerged and developed initially as an ideological rebel movement between 1970 and 
1980, but later from 1980 to 1990 as a political and operational movement, of a 
utopian theoretical group which departed with a theoretical-practical exploration of the 
world's stormy revolutions and counter-revolutions of the time, on an objective base 
which had been shaped by the infrastructure and superstructure of the Republic's 
preceding fifty years. In spite of its formal Kurdishness, it is a unique territorial 
freedom movement which took progressive steps towards combining the arts of 
politics and war. (op. cit. p. 27). 
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When arguing the "Transformation Problems within the PKK", Öcalan gives another 
definition - but in terms of lifestyle: "The PKK is the free life of a new man as much 
as it is so of a people". 
Yet it is believed that the Party should transform itself from a revolutionary 
organisation to a democratic organisation. The PKK leadership persuaded itself that 
the Party had accomplished its revolutionary task (Öcalan, 1999d, p. 31,32; Program, 
1999, pp. 46-55) by now ( even by the early 90s because the years followed became 
"rather self-repetitive years" (Öcalan, 1999d, p. 41). According to the Programme 
echoed from the Defences; the war did its part: They have come to believe that this 
war produced its effects through its extensive, deep-rooted influence of the years, and 
changed many things to the extent of a non-revertible state; that the "democratic 
revolution" eliminated the tribal-feudal social structure apart from "some remnants 
and traditional customs" (Program, 1999, pp. 47,48); that, even if the assimilation has 
not been completely stopped in the sense of language, it is considerably driven back by 
the democratic revolution in terms of feelings and culture; that the Kurdishness 
converted from an entity from which everyone ran away, to an identity of which 
everyone is proud because of its contribution to freedom, democracy and humanity; 
and that, while the first condition of being involved in politics used to be the denial of 
Kurds, now, there are many people who are active in the politics on behalf of the 
Kurds. And thus, "it became impossible to execute a colonialism of pre-1984 within 
the Kurdish people whose political and democratic consciousness flourished" (of). cit., 
pp. 51,53-55). Namely, the Kurdish people no longer resemble the earlier Kurdish 
people; "Kurdistan is no more early Kurdistan" (Besikci, 1990, pp. 50-56). In 
consequence, the PKK should from now on continue its "genuine march" by the 
method of not violent-revolutionary but democratic-evolutionary means of action. 
... 
Giving birth to itself by force does not mean that it [the PKKI will keep on growing 
up in the same way. The birth of a child, too, occurs as a result of a gigantic difficulty 
but then its natural development takes place without difficulty. This is a law of nature. 
Qualitative leaps both engender and are engendered by force, but it is quantitative 
development that is essential. (Öcalan, 1999c, p. 39). 
In terms of national undertakings up until the arrest of Öcalan, the self-critiques of the 
movement's recent past gather around three highlighted points: a) The self-repetition 
170 
of the mid and late nineties and not being prepared enough mutually with the State for 
a democratic outlet, b) Exaggerated assessment of earlier Kurdish rebellions based, on 
the one hand, on misinterpretation of the establishment and authoritarian development 
of the Turkish Republic, and on the other, on the non-national nature of their 
leaderships6 and c) not being sufficiently frank and confident on the only adequate 
solution of "free togetherness within the Misakk-i Milli (i. e. existing) borders of 
Turkey". Therefore, as a result, the overall programme of the Party has been rewritten 
appropriate to a re-foundation. Nevertheless, the prospect of the Party's socialist 
views and its reflection to the programmatic dimension are quite distinct. Even more, 
the undertakings put down in the very new programme of "democratic liberation" 
(Programme, 1999, p. 50) is proposed for a future leap towards socialism (oh. cit. p. 
70). 
Under the heading "The Problems of Transformation within the PKK", the 
overall intellectual effort devoted to some dialectical accounts of the questions and 
future of socialism, which are substantially reedited in the renewed programme by the 
method of simply not using the quotation marks. The main concern here is not how to 
avoid the future hindrances or the potential preventatives on the way to gain the 
national cause those which are engendered by the PKK's hitherto insistence on 
socialist ideology and objectives - that is widely believed [by the major nationalistic 
circles] to be the obvious source of the high price already paid so far by the Kurdish 
nation. 
On the contrary, Öcalan focuses on how to meet the historical exigencies of 
socialism within the actuality of the PKK's theoretical and practical existence with a 
deep concern of being the victim of a law of the societal nature formulated by himself 
as "if you do not solve, you will then be solved" or, in other words, "if you do not 
overcome [the obstacle at a historical conjunction] you will be overcome". Both the 
critique of "Sovietic" socialism, its manifestation in the Turkish Marxist left of 1970s 
and the self-critique of the stretch of the dogmatic aspect of the early PKK during the 
90s was guided by this very concern. "For it [socialism] did not manage to open the 
adequate channels within its own system to freedom and equality which meant to he 
the part of its essential nature; for it did not actualise both economic and political 
progressions which have even been ventured by capitalism and partly reflected in the 
mundane life of the ordinary individual, socialism has simply died of the luck of 
breathing", he states, and continues: 
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Although the heavy global depressions stemming from capitalism were not only its 
[socialism's] fault, but because it was still held responsible for them, socialism would 
either solve the questions or be dissolved. Because they could not be solved, it was 
doomed to be dissolved and ultimately was dissolved. (Öcalan, 1999c, p. 33) 
Even further disabilities of socialism spread around Turkey, for "the socialism 
introduced to the Turkey of the 1970s was far behind the adequate seriousness of 
ideologies", or the transfer of socialism to Turkey "was conducted in a more eclectic, 
imitative and schematic manner than that of capitalism". He then compares it with the 
emergence of the Islamic sects. "There existed", according to him, "not the ideology 
of socialism but its hypocritical sects, namely the fake factions". And in consequence, 
"once again, the rule of `if you cannot offer the accurate solution, you will he 
dissolved' produced its result, i. e. the Turkish socialist left promptly disappeared as 
the coup d'etat of 1980 took over. This is the very concern that made him impose the 
PKK for a comprehensive change of strategy and for a new programme, before 
missing the opportunity. 
Those who do respond in time to this law of the evolution of the social dialectic will 
enjoy development, but those who do not will not merely be able to escape from 
being left under the wreckage of massive sufferings and meaningless losses. in the 
context of the social transformations we are undergoing at an intense rate in our day, 
we see the application, virtually under laboratory conditions, of this very law in 
some corner of the world every day. Not to draw a conclusion from this is possible 
only if one is blind or extremely conservative. (Öcalan, 1999c, pp. 33,34) 
In other words, Öcalan believes that life would "not tolerate those who stand outside it 
for long". He warns his party by referring to the broadest law of the social dialectic 
formulated briefly by Marx as, "the relation of production which does not further the 
powers of production turns into a barrier to its progression and shall thus he 
superseded inevitably". Once again this is a kind of political version of Marxist socio- 
economic formulation: "A force that does not take life further turns into a hindrance; 
on such occasions, transcending [eliminating] the force itself becomes the most vital 
requirement of revolution". That is to say, in the final analysis, alteration has become 
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inescapable; but to what extent, or, what would be the limit of alteration? For the 
reason that, "an alteration brings [the entity subject to change] to an end, another 
creates historicity" (op. cit. p. 38). 
However, no significant hesitation about the extent of change appears within the 
"Second Manifesto" in terms of either national objectives scheduled in the Manifesto 
and the modified Programme of 1995 or of the method of revolutionary violence (the 
strategy of "People's War") operated for almost two decades. (These were partly 
discussed in the foregoing and I shall briefly examine them again while making a 
sequential comparison below between the programmes). On the contrary, there is no 
hesitation about the "consistency of insistence" on the socialist objectives and the idea 
of utopias and romanticism is found throughout the whole text of the re-foundation 
proposal. 
Just as capitalism incorporated the gains of socialism into its own democracy by - 
even allowing the foundation of communist parties - paying more attention to the 
human rights at the roots of socialism than socialism itself, and thereby outstripped 
experienced socialism; the socialism of the new era will regain its great power for 
solutions through incorporating all the values of not only capitalism but of those of all 
human history and through facing the dangers before the new humanity. (Öcalan, 
1999c p. 33). 
Following the statement emphasising the death of socialism due to "a virtual lack of 
breathing" as "the most progressive, egalitarian and freethinking form of democratic 
development at the start of century" which "went on to exert a pressure on capitalism 
to the utmost", Öcalan constructs several comprehensive sentences containing a firm 
defence and prophecy of socialism with no noticeable tactical governance of his 
language as such. In other words, the loyalty to the future of socialism and belief in its 
potential political, social and philosophical strength are expressed rather in an 
"undressed" style. He defends in confidence: 
... 
This of course does not mean that socialism left no positive legacy. The historical 
role it played in bringing about the social and national institutions that characterise our 
age, and in the emergence of the classes and nations enjoying a greater degree of 
equality cannot be disputed. What capitalism had achieved in only a limited way over 
several centuries, socialism exceeded in half a century. (Öcalan, 1999d, pp. 36,37). 
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In continuation, he makes fairly broad and firm prophecies. 
... 
There is no doubt that it will flower again on its roots. Again it is inevitable that, 
socialism, i. e. scientific socialism as the manifestation of a further scientific analysis 
of the social actuality, will re-flower in its mature age by overcoming the basic 
problems of humanity. It will form the antithesis to the thesis posed by contemporary 
capitalism with its extreme inequalities and especially its inability to cope with 
history, with nature and with social problems. The socialist experiment which has in 
fact left a great deal of experience behind; through a sense of obligation to synthesise 
what it has to gain for mankind with its hitherto gains, and through recovering its 
capacity of being the only solvent power to level the social imbalances by flourishing 
its theory and correct and rich practice amongst one another, particularly in the 
provinces of the nature-environment, women-children-population, history, culture, 
ethnic and religious minorities and national complications ... will prove 
its capability 
of replacing its raw democracy, which essentially led to its very dissolution and from 
which capitalism even benefited to a considerable extent, with its most developed 
democratic system in its matured stage. (Öcalan, 1999c, p. 33). 
But within the contemplation called "My Personal Status" towards the conclusion of 
the main defence document, Öcalan lays emphasis on his loyalty to socialism. He re- 
emphasises that he retains his belief in the ability of socialism to be the answer again 
to the problems of society and the epoch by presenting its genuine democratic 
perception and the frank application of it (Öcalan, 1999d, p. 106). 
Alongside these broad generalisations, he outlines his view by suggesting 
democratic socialism for present day Turkey. "The role of non-development of 
democratic socialism, which is actually an indispensable need for society, is vital in 
aggravating the societal complications to the current level in Turkey" (Ocalan, 1999c, 
p. 91). 
From such a point of departure he again draws a dialectical conclusion: 
From consolidation of thesis and antithesis a new synthesis is born. The antagonism 
of the State-PKK leads to the synthesis of the Democratic Republic, and of its victory 
(op. cit. p. 40). 
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There will be no need for citing the reflections of Öcalan's statements focusing on 
socialism to the new programme, for they are conveyed virtually in the form of the 
removal of quotation marks. However, a couple of points may be worth mentioning 
which in a sense transcended the Leader's perspective. Just before passing on to state 
the "Duties of the Democratic Transformation" in a sequential order, the seventh 
extraordinary congress of the PKK, while re-constructing the schedule of the Party's 
activity sphere, drops a note of pre-warning. 
The democratic transformation of which we have defined the features is actually 
proposed to be a preliminary stage in order to reach our actual aim at socialism, and 
will undertake the following tasks. (Program, 1999, p. 70). 
Also, in the recent issues of Serxwebun subsequent to Ocalan's standpoint in the 
Imralli prison, there has been a striking intensification of articles and speeches 
concentrating on the "socialism of the PKK" held/signed by either the Presidency 
Council of the PKK or a named member of the Council. One may effortlessly notice 
the additional emphasis on the socialist aspect of the PKK in these editions. Many 
similar and distinct accounts and definitions of the Party's earlier and present nature in 
terms of socialist ideology may be selected (Serxwebun, 1999-2000). From January 
1999 to July 2000 thirteen lengthy these articles and speeches of either prominent 
figures or Presidency Council members, published in the central organ of the Party, 
Serxwebun. Of these emphases, the most brief and bare one, I believe, is that 
expressed in the one signed with "Prescience Council" and published in the May 2000 
issue entitled "Socialism is Not the Ideology of Class in its Narrowed Sense". 
From this angle, to know, to appreciate and to acknowledge socialism is crucial. If we 
refuse socialism, there will be no Party left. There will be no more PKK. (Serxwehun, 
May, 2000). 
In summary, with respect to the social standpoint, the ideological perspective 
broadened along with the furtherance of aspirations and tenets of socialism, and, in 
addition, the "democratic transformation" that they "have determined" under the 
"Democratic Republic", which is featured by "free togetherness" within the existing 
State borders of Turkey, is regarded as a preliminary stage (Program, 1999, p. 70) in 
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order to attain the eventual goal - socialism. This will then be referred to in the course 
of the arguments of the forthcoming chapters tackling the questions of the individual, 
the organisation and their peculiar interrelations. 
We may now pass on to drawing a very basic skeleton of the latest programme 
(the "Second Manifesto") with comparison to the primary (Manifesto) and modified 
(1999) ones in terms of the aspect of national undertakings. 
b. The Programme of "Re-foundation" 
The national standpoint of Imralli Prison had its illustrated echo in the new programme 
of the PKK approved at the extraordinary congress. It is to a large extent a 
systematised edition of Öcalan's defences and does indeed contain substantial changes 
in the sense of the Party's national structure. Here are the first two sentences of its 
introduction: 
Our Party movement is entering in a process of deep-rooted changes and 
transformations. The currently ongoing changes and transformations are at a 
strategic level and are occurring in the form of re-foundation. 
The programme of "re-foundation" has been rebuilt in accordance with not the target 
of "Independent, United and Democratic Kurdistan" (Manifesto, p. 202) or of "A 
Democratic People's Dictatorship in an Independent and United Kurdistan" (PKK 
Foundation Declaration, 1978, p. 55) but of a "Democratic Republic"; in accordance 
with not the violence of the "protracted people's war" but with the pressure of political 
escalation and mass mobilisation for a "Democratic Solution"; in accordance with the 
language of not a frightening "revolution" but of a fondling "evolution". Namely, the 
PKK will no more be in pursuit of a separate independent State of Kurdistan, a violent 
Kurdistan Revolution and of eliminating the Turkish army or its sovereignty in 
Northwest Kurdistan. 
Glancing through the programmes, a conceptual variation is striking. In addition 
to an apparent moderation of the style, the concept of "Kurdistan Revolution" is 
converted into "Democratic Transformation" which associates with the notion of 
"Great Anatolian Revolution" formerly introduced by Öcalan (Serrwehun, December, 
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1997). The heading under which the political, social and cultural "duties" of the Party 
which was written down in a sequence has become "The Duties of Democratic 
Transformation", whereas in the former two programmes it was called "The Duties of 
the Kurdistan Revolution" (Manifesto, p. 190; Programme, 1995, p. 71; Programme, 
1999, p. 70). Among the sequence of tasks of the Democratic Transformation, the 
following articles would be worth taking from the "national liberation" point of 
argument in comparison with the relating lines of the earlier two programmes. 
In the Manifesto of the Movement's inception and the Programme of 1995: 
1- The prime objective of the "Kurdistan Revolution" is stated in both as being "to 
create an Independent and Democratic Kurdistan", and consequently "the essential 
nature" of the revolution would be "A National Democratic Revolution". In order 
to accomplish the task; for the Manifesto, "the Turkish political and cultural 
colonialism and military invasion must be abolished", and in the words of 1995 
programme, "to end every means of sovereignty of the Turkish colonialism and so 
of the imperialism behind it" (Manifesto, pp. 192,193; Programme, 1995, pp, 
67,68,72). Whereas in the Programme of 1999, the prime objective of the 
"Democratic Transformation" is to "end every means of sovereignty of an 
oligarchic structure and of its extension on the society" (Programme, 1999, p. 70). 
Here, the sovereign oligarchic structure and the society subjected to its sovereignty 
are not named. However, in the context, it is clear that what is meant is the 
"Turkish State", and the "whole population under its rule". Also, in the beginning 
of the attached Party Constitution, in front of the "Organisation's aim: " they are 
expressed by name: "To bring the sovereign power of Turkey's oligarchic structure 
and its extensions on the Turkish and Kurdish peoples to an end, ... " (From here 
onwards, comparison will have to be between the programmes of 1995 and 1999 
because in the Manifesto, the tasks are not sequenced in articles. Also, comparison 
between the programmes of 1999 and 1995 with the most recent modifications 
approved at the fifth congress of the PKK will thus be more significant in the sense 
of clearer indications pointing at rapid metamorphoses as regards the national 
targets of the Party). 
2- Programme, 1995: "To pillory the concessionist policies such as `territorial 
autonomy' or `autonomy' etc., those which do not aim at breaking the colonialist 
yoke and which in essence requires compromising with the colonialists, and keep 
on the continuing determined struggle against those approaches"' (p. 72). 
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Program, 1999: "To develop a democratic political system on the base of Turkey's 
political wholeness and constitutional citizenship in which the free participation of 
Turkish and Kurdish peoples is realised" (p. 71). "... To further the solution of the 
national question without disturbance of the boarders, within the framework of 
democratic transformation and free unity" (p. 76. ). 
3- Programme, 1995: To create a national-independent and democratic society under 
the governance of people's democratic rule" (p. 73). Programme, 1999: "To 
create a free and democratic society under the rule of the Democratic Republic" (p. 
71). 
4- Programme, 1995: "Not to recognise any permission for setting up a military base 
and right of privilege for any foreign State on the land of the country" (p. 73) 
Programme, 1999: "To be in favour of reducing the army within the framework of 
protection of the borders and of its conversion from the state of being an entity of 
menace" (p. 72). 
5- Programme, 1995: "To establish national institutions of education and culture 
instead of the colonialist's educational and cultural institutions. To provide the 
opportunities and arrangements for the development of all dialects of Kurdish, and 
to encourage one of them to be the national language" (pp. 75,76). Programme, 
1999: "To work for obtaining the legal guarantee in order to be able to develop the 
Kurdish mother-tongue in every respect (p. 75). 
From the selected articles above, it's obvious the programmatic transformation of the 
PKK goes beyond customary alteration or modification. It is not quite relevant to a 
party that was meant to be leading a national liberation struggle. Therefore, calling the 
seventh extraordinary congress a "re-foundation congress" or 
Ocalan's defence a 
"Second Manifesto" is not a mere exaggeration. The change is more than a 
transformation. It is rather a metamorphosis. According to the structure of the new 
programme, the Workers' Party of Kurdistan is literally no longer a party of Kurdistan, 
but of an official Turkey. The reconstructed programme resembles the programme of 
a legal socialist party of Turkey within the borders set out by the National Pact. For 
instance, the programme undertakes the abolishment not of Turkish sovereignty in 
Kurdistan, but of the sovereignty of an oligarchic structure over the people. Likewise, 
it does not target a national emancipation but aims at "furthering the solution of the 
national question within the framework of democratic transformation". What it 
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"jealously" retains among the duties listed in the constitution, as a manifestation of the 
PKK's peculiar internationalist socialism, is the assumption of unity among the 
peoples of the Middle East, which traces itself back to the foetal PKK. It is this 
assumption to which Graham E. Fuller, the former CIA high official expert on the 
region, also draws attention. 
... For this reason many 
Kurdish intellectuals from different states see the PKK as the 
only modern Kurdish political movement, based on ideology rather than tribalism. 
But the PKK has also pursued an unabashed policy of violent guerrilla warfare in 
southern Turkey. It is led by an elusive and doctrinaire leader Abdullah Öcalan ("the 
Avenger") operating from exile, who aspires to social revolution across the entire 
Middle East. (Fuller, 1993, pp. 115,116). 
The phrase describing the unity of Middle Eastern peoples is "transformed" from the 
"Federation of the Middle East" to the "Democratic Union of the Middle East" 
(Programme, 1999, p. 77). 
Concluding Remarks 
The theoretical process of transformation, the programmatic metamorphosis and the 
development of a consistent insistence on socialism that the PKK has undergone are 
outlined above. Even if I had reduced them to the briefest detail, I would have had to 
refer to a great number of quotations, because this outline constitutes the crucial aspect 
to which the Organisation's cadre recruitment and build-up of mass mobilisation 
relates. The body of party publications, to which I have partly referred, are not 
composed of attacks or self-defences shaped in the course of debates with fellow 
political rivals, but are only composed of the teachings of the Party. These texts are, 
despite their repetitions, more voluminous than those of an average party. What is 
more, the overwhelming majority of them consist of Ocalan's verbal lectures, 
dialogues and interviews. In addition to the leadership's intensive theoretical and 
ideological performance, its unusual programmatic conversion is important in 
connection with one of the fundamental issues in the next two chapters - the build-up 
of mass support and mobilisation, and the activation of the grassroots. 
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Also, the metamorphosis of the Party's national standpoint does not of course 
mean that the Party has deserted the cause of Kurdish national entanglement. The first 
sentence of the Introduction to the main defence, from which the programmatic 
metamorphosis of the Party's national aspect sprouted, is devoted to dispelling such an 
inference. 
My defence is not so much based on detailed replies to the charges in the indictment 
prepared by the Chief Prosecutor [of the State Security Court], as it is about what I see 
as a more important topic: how to reach an historic reconciliation from a revolt under 
the leadership of the PKK, and increase the possibility of a solution to the Kurdish 
issue. (Öcalan, 1999d, p. 7) 
Therefore, could this entire odyssey be a scrupulous "chapter" in the book of the 
PKK's "devilish" (Öcalan, 1996b, p. 115) tactics? Since Öcalan has placed an 
"overflowing" emphasis on tactical creativity in his teachings, which he believes to be 
absolutely necessitated by the very nature of the Kurdish struggle, this question si 
relevant. So in 1989, Öcalan gave this speech: 
One should not approach reconciliation in the form of selling every value that one 
possesses in order to save one's life, as is done by some opportunists. But it is exactly 
this way of acting which is performed by many, under the label of tactics. The form 
of reconciliation which incorporates the idea that everybody uses tactics in socialism 
and that many vital values can be abandoned in the case of difficult conditions is 
absolutely not right. We oppose all sorts of tactics which tend to mean the loss of the 
indispensable. (Öcalan, 1992, p. 137) 
The question of whether the PKK's transformation is a real evolution or a scrupulous 




1 The phrase "the PKK's theory" is not employed in the sense of a sociological or political theory that 
explains social phenomena, but to refer to the Party's views on the specific and general questions of the 
region and the world. 
2 The group also called themselves, at that stage, as "Kurdistan Revolutionaries". 
Pesmerge: Special term for Kurdish soldier or fighter 
4 Capital lettering is as in the original text. 
5 Ugur Mumcu, the prominent Turkish author-journalist, devoted his latest uncompleted book, Kurt 
Dosyasi (The Kurdish File), to this tactical odyssey of Ocalan. An explosive placed under his car in 
1991 killed him, while he was writing the aforementioned book. The murderer or murderers are still 
sought. In the book he focuses on the mutual "devilish" tactics launched by dcalan and the MIT 
(Turkish Intelligent Service) in order to find out whether Öcalan or the MIT used their rivals for their 
aims. (Mumcu, 1993). 
6 The assessment of the nature of earlier Kurdish uprisings against Turkey as being non-national does 
actually trace back to the early PKK. It is stated in the Manifesto that in those (Kurdish rebellions the 
Kurds were both "mutually wielded as a mere pawn by England and Turkey" and the "right resistance 
endeavours of Kurdish people were diverted to serve their own benefits by the prominent tribal-tcudal 
leaders" of the time. (Manifesto, pp. 125,129). However, it is illuminated further here. 
7While in the Manifesto, the proposals "such as in the form of 'territorial autonomy', 'cultural 
autonomy', 'federal unity' etc. " are accused of being "reformist" and "therefore reactionary" theses "fier 
the reason that they do not touch the State's borders; in the introduction to his main defence, Öcalan 
states that "even separate state, federation, autonomy and such similar approaches are backward, 
sometimes obstructive in comparison with the richness of the mode of democratic solution". (bcalan, 
1999d, p. 11) 
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Chapter 5 
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE ORGANISATION IN THE PKK 
SOURCES OF MOTIVATIONS 
I The Socio-political "Heritage" of Kurdishness: Ashiret and Ihanetl 
Unless we describe the unique socio-political background of Kurds, it is not feasible to 
explore the PKK's organisational decisiveness - the subjective share - in the 
development process of the most recent Kurdish "insurrection". 
If the "insurrection" - which culminated in the high-profile abduction of Öcalan 
from Nairobi - led Fuller, the former vice chairman of the National Intelligence 
Council at the CIA, to reveal that "almost invariably, however, once the Kurds no 
longer served the immediate political goals of the external powers, they were 
abandoned" and to confess that "for the first time in modern history, control over the 
Kurdish problem has slipped out of the grasp of all regional parties as Kurdish politics 
has taken on a momentum of its own" (Fuller, 1993, p. 108), then it must have a legacy 
"appropriate" to itself. 
Before the Movement gathered momentum, "to be sure, various Kurdish 
guerrilla forces regularly served the external powers as a handy tool with which to 
weaken local regimes" (op. cit., p. 108). So the history of all this must be discussed. 
a. The Constancy of Tribal Existence 
The majority of those who have written on Kurdish ethnicity or nationality have paid a 
great deal of attention to the tribal structure of Kurdish society and, consequently, the 
endemic disunity among Kurds. The intellectual efforts devoted to the subject have 
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addressed not only its cultural and political dimensions, but also the economic aspects 
of Kurdish tribal existence. 
The clearest theme in the literature is on unchanged tribal existence. The 
arguments of Wigram and Westermann are very similar. They point towards the 
"changeless character" of this endemic feature of the societal body and stretch it out to 
cover millennia. 
The only element of Kurdish culture which has changed much in the 4,3(X) years of 
known Kurdish life is the language. The Kurds took the Iranian basis of their 
language from the Medes and Persians about twelfth century BC They still resent any 
invasions of their lands and any other intrusion upon their independence just as 
sharply as they did when Xenophon, the Athenian, led his ten thousand Greeks 
northward out of Mesopotamia through the "Karduchian" villages in 4(X) B. C. In this 
respect, the only thing which has changed among the Kurds is the type of weapon 
used. Indeed, the only progress worth recording in Kurdish life is that where once 
the Kurds fought with bows and arrows, they now shoot guns. A predilection of the 
Kurds for shooting at moving objects, preferably at human beings, has not altered 
much since Xenophon time. ... 
The social and political organisation under which the Kurds have always lived is 
tribalism. Once, in the tenth century AD., they established a fairly extensive 
Kurdish kingdom - but only for the lifetime of the chieftain. (Westermann, 1946, p. 
52). 
With reference to their numerous "chronicle" uprisings, 
2 Westermann finds no 
remarkable national ingredients in Kurdish struggles. 
During the years between the Treaty of Lausanne and 1942, two serious revolts of 
the Kurds had occurred in Turkey, three in Iran and three in Iraq. These revolts 
indicated a vital spirit of resistance to control on the part of the Kurds; but it is a 
mistake to interpret them as evidence of a conscious and active feeling of' Kurdish 
unity and nationalism or even of an overwhelming desire for statehood. ... For the 
Kurds have never been a unified people. They have no national tradition, no 
background of unity and no experience of self-rule. (o/) cit., p. 52,54) 
Westermann was writing just after the Second World War while the Kurdish Republic 
of Mehabad was experiencing its "independence" - which had been proclaimed some 
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months before with the backing of the Soviet Union. Wigram wrote in the wake of the 
First World War. But both reach similar conclusions. 
"The characteristic feature of the Kurds seems to be that it has never changed 
during the historical segment between 1000 BC and 1900 AD. The Kurds are a 
type that have strong, skilful traits and they are attractive in many other respects. 
But, in fact; it is not clear, say, whether because of the eccentric complexion of the 
mountains in which they were born or the lack of some constituents in their 
formation process, the Kurds are a type of community that has stayed at the 
halfway point. In respect of social development, they have never come out of the 
"tribal stage", and are still experiencing this stage" (W. A. Wigram, Suryanrler ve 
Komsulari, s. 7). (Nikitin, 1986, p. 147). 
"A type of community that has stayed at the halfway point" is my understanding of the 
term (yarim kalmis bir tip) from the interpretation of the Turkish edition of the excerpt 
above. However, my actual perception in this context would be that Wigram genuinely 
tends to call Kurdish society "a semi-humanised" or "semi-civilised" society. If we use 
philosophical literature's definition of the "human being" as "political animal", then 
Jwaideh's diagnosis of the Kurds' state of politicisation is pointing in a very similar 
direction. Wadie Jwaideh relies on "many valuable clues" from a wide range of 
references in related spheres, and thus confidently describes the most developed forms 
of the political conceptions and practices of the Kurds. 
The autonomous Kurdish political system has never gone beyond the level of 
ashiret [Denotes the entire tribe (Bruinessen, 1992, p. 61) or "a federation of tribes 
over which a paramount chieftain may preside" (Kinnane, 1964, p. 10) - AKOI. 
Those Kurdish leaders who succeeded in founding states followed an Islamic rather 
than a Kurdish pattern of political organisations. The ashiret institutions have thus 
become the most perfected form of Kurdish institutions in consequence. (Jwaideh, 
1999, pp. 59,60). 
Jwaideh also foresees the vital influence of tribal institutions on the future political 
orientations in Kurdistan, while highlighting the conscious interference in the affairs of 
tribal entities by the neighbouring rulers of the country (op. cit. p. 60) for the purpose 
of impeding the further politicisation of an ethnic nationality. Further, Jwaideh remarks 
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that "the peculiar tenacity of the Kurdish tribal sentiment ... has on numerous occasions 
proved even stronger than the religious sentiment" (op. cit. p. 63). 
According to Wigramthe term ashiret strictly means tribe or clan (Wigram, 
1922). The glossary of the book explains it with a single word: "Feudatory". He 
emphasises the extent to which this configuration extends to Christian dwellers in the 
region. 
All the Mussulman dwellers in the land were until lately "ashiret", and much in 
the same position as the Highlanders "beyond the line" in days previous to the 
"forty five". A fair proportion of the Christian dwellers there, happening to have 
arms, are "ashiret" as well. (Wigram, 1922, p. 167) 
The verdict of Bois, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, leaves no space for discussion about the 
actual structure of Kurdish society: "A fundamental element of Kurdish society is 
without dispute the tribe". (Bois, Th., Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. 5., p. 471) 
Yet these shared views are not only found in foreign works. They also crop up in 
two native sources, Serefname and Mem u Zin, written in the late sixteenth century, as 
well as in the early writings of Z. Gökalp, a Kurdish ideologue of Turkish nationalism. 
Bedlisi, conveys that no accord or co-operation exists among the Kurds. He formed the 
epigram: "No common view recognised within the Kurdish ethnicity so far that links 
them to one another except the `kelime-i sahadet'3 which expresses the singleness of 
the God" (Bedlisi, 1998, p. 22). 
With respect to the "cause" of this peculiarity, he mentions a number of strange 
stories, and elects to tell the one which ends with the malediction of the Prophet 
Muhammed. "All being well, the Almighty God will never allow this community to 
achieve unity and concord; because if they unite, the world will be destroyed in their 
hands". The conclusion of Bedlisi, the oldest Kurdish historian, is not so far-removed 
from Muhammed's malediction. 
In accordance with Hazreti Muhammed's Sunnah4, they consider marrying four 
non-concubine women as inubah (religiously tolerated or lawful - AKO); then, if 
they can cope, they add four concubines to them. So they procreate with the 
permission of the Almighty God, and multiply rapidly. If killings were not 
widespread among them, there would possibly be scarcity and famine not just in 
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Iran but it would also spread out all over the world because of the multiplication of 
their generation. ... (Bedlisi, 1998, p. 
23). 
He also claims that the Kurds may rebel because of the most worthless causes, and that 
they are keen to commit serious crimes due to unimportant blunders and trivial slights. 
Soane refers to some widely told stories in this regard. 
... They are always ready to tell stories against themselves of this very 
characteristic. 
There was once a Khan of the Herki of Oramar (in the Hakkari), who bitten by a 
fly, scratched the place, five minutes afterwards irritated still, and again he 
scratched. Yet again it commenced, and he snatched a pistol from his belt, and 
cursing the father of flies, shot his finger off. 
Two Kurds were discussing the position in which the star Sirius (which marks the 
end of the warmest weather) might be expected in the firmament. Without any 
abusive language they disagree as to the position, stop upon the road, and fall upon 
one another. One remains there dead. (Soane, 1926, pp. 395,396). 
Nikitin refers to a French traveller's "contradictory" impression about the general 
quality of the Kurdish character. 
"Kurds, notwithstanding their wildness, bear a deep sense of honour nevertheless; 
they are known as men of their word. If a Kurd promised to take you somewhere 
safe and sound, you can trust him/her without fear or hesitation. But the day after, 
if you meet the same person again following the accomplishment of what is 
promised, he/she robs you and kills you like a dog" (Nikitin, 1986, p. 145). 
Researchers have underlined the distinct features of each individual tribe. These 
differences do not allow broad generalisations on Kurds as a homogenous ethnic entity. 
Edmonds points towards the linguistic differences in a land with varying national 
characteristics. "Kurdistan is a land of high mountains", he states, "with difficult 
communications; for centuries it has not had any political unity which might have given 
it a common literature; it is therefore not surprising that local dialects vary almost from 
valley to valley" (Edmonds, 1957, p. 7). Soane emphasises the worries of scholars 
about summarising the prevailing national features. "Yet the character of the Kurds is 
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one on which the would-be writer is to experience enough difficulty, for the tribal 
character differs so much as to make one summary quite inadequate for the whole 
nation". However, like others, he advances a firm generalisation and, yet again, points 
towards the tribal loyalty as an unquestionable value of the "whole nation". 
The true feudal spirit is strong in the race. Devoted to the mountains, to his own 
clan intensely proud of being a Kurd, the northerner will take the arms at the word 
of his chief, never asking to hear his reason. ... A steady faithfulness, a 
recognition of the given word, a generous affection for the near relatives, a manlier 
treatment (among the southern and middle Kurds) of his women than is seen 
among any other Musulman race, a keen literary sense and love of poetry, a ready 
willingness to sacrifice himself for his tribe, and a fine pride of country and race. 
(Soane, 1926, pp. 393,395; italics added) 
The millennial handicap of the Kurdish ethnic nature based on "unfortunate" tribal 
consistency is also the main concern of the earliest literary work of Ahmede Xani, Mern 
u Zin, written in 1695. Laizer, while referring this "classical" concern, states that Xani 
is "probably the most accomplished Kurdish writer of classical time, renowned for this 
Kurdish epic Mem u Zin (a Romeo and Juliet style tragedy) [who] had recognised three 
hundred years ago the dilemma of Kurdish internal political division". Laizer translates 
an extract from Xani's epic poem titled Our Dilemma. 
As if the Kurds held the keys to the border 
every tribe as strong as wall 
whenever the seas of the Turks 
lash the oceans of the Persians 
rising and colliding 
it is the Kurds who are washed in blood 
and set one against the other 
generosity, benevolence and chivalry 
bravery, self possession and courage 
are attributed to every Kurdish tribe 
famed for their swords and their honour 
brave as they are proud 
in equal measure 
they despise submission 
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spurn domination 
and for this remain isolated 
fighting one another, ever divided 
(Laizer, 1996, p. 206,207). 
The suggestion of "feudalism" and of "tribalism" among Kurds in Gökalp's words is 
worth quoting: 
Whoever looks at the wide-ranging escape from military service among the Kurds 
deems this nation to be without ideals. Or he/she thinks that they are cowards. 
Whereas loyalty to ideals is extremely strong. But because these ideals are not 
about the country, or patriotic ones, they are not inclined to enlist for military 
service. Their tribal ideals are so vehement. They, man and woman, find great 
pleasure in sacrificing their life, their wealth, their children for this ideal. ... 
The tribal ideal is extraordinarily strong to the extent that it dominates man's 
sexual love, which is the most vehement passion of individual. (G8kalp, 1992, pp. 
39,40). 
Gökalp supports his diagnosis by referring to the well known quatrain of a Kurdish folk 
song which expresses a girl's refusal to marry her lover due to the family's and the 
tribe's opposition to the boy: "Nav mezine picuk nahe/Esira min qail nahe" (The name 
is grand, it cannot be passed down/ My tribe does not approve). 
By quoting from sources dating back decades and centuries, it is not my intention 
to imply that tribal bonds are confined to Kurds' past history. In contrast with the 
PKK's latest programme to eliminate the tribal-feudal structure apart from the 
"remnants and traditional customs" (Programme, 1999, p. 48), this structure is a reality 
of Kurdish social, political, cultural and economic existence. 
This societal phenomenon of the "Turkish Kurds" functions currently, even 
given the changes that have taken place in the past two decades and undeniably the 
extensive transformation towards transcending tribal structures and hence re- 
socialisation. The extensive changes and outstanding remains constitute two sides of a 
coin. While the PKK hardly managed to gather twenty thousand guerrillas in twenty 
years, the State - which hardly recognised Kurds as "Turks of Kurdish origin" - 
enjoyed rapid activation of over sixty thousand ofcial "village guards" during several 
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months in 1986. These guards are still retained, in spite of the PKK's abandonment of 
armed struggle since 2"d August 1999 and the withdrawal of its guerrilla forces out of 
Turkey's national borders since the first day of the following month. There are also 
thousands of official and unofficial "voluntary village guards" reserved as eager to fight 
against the PKK guerrillas. Even the unofficial-unpaid "village guards" of the Bucak 
tribe 5 in the town of Siverek6 are publicly numbered at "over ten thousand" by state 
officials and by the tribe's prominent figures. Tthe leader of the tribe, Sedat Edip 
Bucak - who was the only survivor of a car crash in November 1996 and who was 
found with the dead bodies of a high ranking police administrator and a man convicted 
of murder (who had been on the run for more than sixteen years) - is a current member 
of Turkish parliament for the DYP (True Path Party). Seydi Eyuboglu, the leader of 
Sheyhanli tribe of approximately 30 thousand members in Kurdish city of Urfa, is 
another current MP of the TBMM (Grand National Assembly of Turkey), along with 
many other scarcely literate chieftain-MPs from various parties. Eyuboglu's interesting 
and illustrative interview was broadcast on the Turkish television channel, Star TV, on 
January 28,1999. The translation of a segment of the interview transcript is as follows: 
Question: In tribes, do women have the right of words /i. e. the right to join the 
process of decision making], and in tribes, why does a man marry more than one 
woman? 
Answer: In tribes, women do not have the right of words. The reason they do not 
have this right is our region's tradition. For example, if I intend to give my 
daughter to someone, I would question his family's previous 3-4-5 generations. 
That is to say, I take his structure [personality], his family, and his tribal status into 
consideration. That is to say, marriages take place absolutely according to the 
arrangement of equivalent persons found among the tribes. And this issue, this 
tradition is descended from our ancestry and still continues. Therefore, the issue of 
the right of words for women is as I said. In fact, such a demand does not exist on 
the side of women. And everybody is pleased with the situation. 
Q.: How many children do you have? 
A.: Mine? I have seventeen. 
Q.: Are you thinking of more? 
A.: I would guess that one more is on the way. 
Q.: Are you thinking of another marriage in addition to your existing wives? 
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A.: Mr Saadettin [Interviewer], to tell the truth, I was thinking of it, before I 
involved in politics I was thinking of it. 
Q.: For example, how many would you go up to? 
A.: I would go up to four. 
Q.: Masallah! [Wonderful! What God has willed]. 
A.: My elder brother is now at three. One of my father-in-laws is at four, the other 
at three. Only my deceased father stayed at one. Generally it goes up to two-three- 
four. So, such is the matter; politics bound our [my] hands and feet. I mean, I can 
say, it prevented our chance of marriage. And it [politics] has always bound us and 
blocked our way. If politics was not an obstacle, I would have resolved on going 
up to four. 
Q.: You had that intention? 
A.: Yes. From time to time, when I joke with my wives, they keep saying: "You 
have the right". That is to say, "You can go up to four". 
Then the interviewer diverts the subject of the dialogue to politics, specifically elections, 
because it is widely known that members of the tribes do not vote for political parties 
but for what the chieftain imposes. Furthermore, there are a considerable number of 
"fixed" Members of the Turkish Parliament, based on the "guaranteed" tribal 
constituency, no matter which party nominates them. 
Q.: Suppose a chieftain said: "You will vote for the Party A or Party B ". If, then, 
votes for parties other than what you [chieftains] said come out of the polling box, 
what happens in that case? 
A.: It does not occur. 
Q.: Say it occurred. 
A.: Nothing happens. 
The programme continued with interviews with young boys and girls complaining about 
the high rate of baslik7 in the region, which had climbed to 1,5 billion Turkish Lira. It 
also featured a lord of the manor who owned the Bilece village, Urfa, and who was 
desperately trying to sell his village with its 150 inhabitants for 3 billion. Even the 
author of "A Modern History of the Kurds", rather prefers to put more emphasis on this 
"unchanged side" of the coin. 
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The agha was still intermediary between illiterate villagers and the outside world. 
It was irrelevant that the state had abolished the class distinction of 'agha', 'beg' or 
'shaykh'. These families still operated the village guesthouse, the focus of rural 
life, and still mediated individual or collective village difficulties with local 
officials. No much had changed since Ziya Gökalp's description half a century 
earlier (page 95). (McDowall, 1996, p. 397). 
My questionnaire was targeted at reaching an understanding of today's tribalness among 
Kurds. I aimed to bring out the extent of tribal consciousness in comparison with 
national consciousness. How far has the sense of national belonging superseded the 
tribal one in the Kurdish family following the remarkable supra-tribal changes within 
the ethnic body of "Turkish Kurds" during the last two decades? The questions 
numbered 28 and 29 were structured as follows. 
  Do you remember when you first became aware of your nationality? 
  Do you remember when you first realised that you belong to a tribe? 
The finding was striking: While 84.4% of 184 respondents remembered when and/or 
how they became aware of their national identity, 26.6% of them remembered the time 
they realised they belonged to a tribe (Table 7 and Table 8). This means that 73.4% of' 
the respondents were born into their family as a "natural" member of the family's tribe. 
Whereas, 84.4% of them became aware of their Kurdishness due to somewhat 
of a coincidence. Namely, they somehow became a Kurd afterwards! And this was the 
phenomenal aspect of Kurdish society in terms of which the PKK premeditated and 
initiated its inception, and with which its organisational peculiarity has been 
considerably shaped. 
b. Tribe and the "Kurdish Tribe" 
Is the tribe peculiar to Kurds? If not, why has it continued so zealously, and what is its 
significance to social development in the rest of the world'? 
The tribe as a social institution and tribalism as a spiritual/cultural or ideological 
device are, of course, not entities peculiar to Kurds and Kurdistan. Tribe as a form of 
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sociality is a universal entity. "The history of the human race", Morgan states in the 
preface to his well-known Ancient Society, "is one in source, one in experience, one in 
progress". 
Since mankind were one in origin, their career has been essentially one, running in 
different but uniform channels upon all continents, and very similarly in all the tribes 
and nations of mankind down to the same status of advancement (Morgan, 1919, p. 
vii). 
In all parts of the world, tribes appear to be the creation of pre-recorded history. The 
emergence of the tribal form can be traced back to primitive communal human sociality 
in which society has not yet been cleaved into classes and during which the "the idea of 
government in the human mind" (op. cit. p. 104) is fertilised. 
The State, which became indispensable to class societies, emerged from this 
initial governmental form of sociality, which transcends the primitive family-clan 
groupings that did not exceed 20-30 people. So tribe, as a socio-political institution, is 
in fact a great leap forward in the history of human social development. It replaces the 
far smaller and primitive clan system8. "The tribe", Davis defines, "is a kinship group, 
including typically a number of clans or gents; it has as a rule a common language and 
a putative or magical common ancestor" (Davis, 1978, p. 202). 
The Kurdish tribe is certainly no exception to the universal process of human 
social development. What is more, given the generally acknowledged view that the 
Kurds are the indigenous inhabitants of the "cradle of civilisation", the Kurdish tribe 
may well have been a prototype of the tribal entities of humankind. Therefore, van 
Bruinessen's assertion claiming that the term "of standard anthropological usage, 
`tribe"' ... "appear[s] to 
be a straightjacket that ill fits the social reality of Kurdistan" 
(van Bruinessen, 1992, p. 59) is not a relevant concern. Here, the "uniqueness" of 
Kurds is rather exaggerated. The actual unique aspect is not the cultural or political 
quality of the Kurdish tribe but the constancy of tribal structures among the Kurds. In 
addition, given that the land and people form a 
"prototype" of tribal institutionalisation, 
this may well have been one of the effective factors of this constancy as a consequence 
of the dialectical logic of development. 
While the tribe emerges as a premise of the primitive era of human sociality, it 
does not wither away simultaneously with primitivity. The acknowledged universal 
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pattern is that it emerges in primitivit, retains itself in slavery, matures in feudality and 
ends with the nation state of capitalism. So the seeds of nationalism are planted in 
mature tribalism. Morgan, while pointing at the fact that "the great body of the 
aborigines were found in independent tribes illustrates the slow and difficult growth of 
the idea of government under gentile institutions", dichotomises the concept of tribe 
with nation. 
Tribe and nation, however, are not strict equivalents. A nation does not arise, until 
gentile institutions, until the tribes united under the same government have coalesced 
into one people, as the four Athenian tribes coalesced in Attica, three Dorian tribes at 
Sparta, and three Latin and Sabine tribes at Rome (Morgan, 1919, p. 104). 
A great deal of consensus appears among the scholars in their view that the nation is 
eventually the outcome of the coalescence, amalgamation, integration, dissolution and 
finally withering-away of tribes, by forming a "whole" people under "one" government. 
Accordingly Gellner too, just like Morgan, highlights the "contrast" between tribalism 
and nationalism. 
The contrast I am here drawing between culture-mediated nationalism and structure- 
mediated tribalism is, of course, meant to be a genuine analytical distinction between 
two objectively distinguishable kinds of organisations; it must not be confused with 
the relativistic or emotive opposition between my nationalism and your tribalism.... 
In this sense nationalisms are simply those tribalism, or for that matter any other kind 
of group, which through luck, effort or circumstance succeed in becoming an 
effective force under modern circumstances (Gellner, 1983, pp. 96,87). 
Elie Kedourie also contrasts tribalism with nationalism. He criticises descriptions of 
nationalism as "new tribalism" by some scholars - those who make the analogy to 
indicate that, like the tribe, the nation excludes and is intolerant of outsiders. For 
Kedourie, "such characteristics ... are common to all 
human groups, and cannot serve 
to define either tribe or nation". He states that "the analogy is not only unable to shed 
light on the matter, it can also mislead". While the relation of the tribesman to his tribe 
is generally regulated, by unquestionable customs considered to he "part of the natural 
or divine order", Kedourie states that the citizen's ties are arranged, legitimised and 
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governed by General Will and/or the "edict of legislative Reason" (Kedourie, 1966, 
pp. 74,75). And he comes to the firm conclusion. 
Nationalism and tribalism, then, are not interchangeable terms, nor do they describe 
related phenomena (op. cit., p. 75) 
In Hobsbawm's view, tribalism falls into his concept of "popular proto-nationalism" or 
the "proto-national", which he relates to "certain variants of feelings of collective 
belonging which already existed" (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 46) there - to be worked on by 
emerging national forces. So we may deduce that tribe is succeeded by a broader, more 
rational social formation - the nation. 
What is peculiar to Kurds is that the Kurdish social structure has been arrested 
in tribality. For instance, in the classical pattern (Europe), tribalism is a kind of fertile 
ground for the nascent nationalism, but in the "Kurdish pattern" it is the basic sterilising 
factor for a would-be nationalist adventure. That is, while tribalism served to form 
nationalism in general, the Kurdish tribe has been an effective deforming entity in 
terms of an ordinarily viable nationalism in Kurdistan. 
So the "fragmented politics" of Kurdish nationalism is not just an outcome of 
the fragmentation of land and population. It is rather the absolute lack of national 
desires and aspirations in the fragmented minds of the tribal structures that remain in 
Kurdish society. In short, the Kurdish tribe has never begun to evolve towards having 
market "sentiments" for its own commodity production in an envisaged broader ethnic 
patrie. This is the factor that renders Kurdish nationalism without nationalism`'. The 
very same factor also causes "the absence of nationalism" in Scotland, which became 
"a form of Scottish self-determination" (Nairn, 1981, p. 126). 
The peculiarity of the "arrested tribality" that haunts the Kurdish social structure 
is by no means related to the nature of tribal existence. The most general definitions of 
tribe and tribalism fit in with the tribal structures of Kurds just as "problematically" as 
those that fellow communities have experienced in the rest of the world. It is with the 
"following stage" that the Kurds have had trouble, ever since Kurdistan was introduced 
to modernity: the absence of a bourgeoisie inspired by a "home market" emoted by 
rational "market sentiments". 
1° 
Scholars acknowledge that "a bunch of intellectuals" always initiates national 
movements with bold romantic-maximalist aspirations (Chapter 1). This "initiating 
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stage" has been a sine qua non for all nationalisms. True, in almost all Kurdish 
uprisings too, there has been a modest group from the intelligentsia involved with 
similar "national" aspirations, including latest and most tribally-based uprising which 
occurred in Dersim under Turkey in 1937-38.11 But the trouble with the Kurds, namely 
the Kurdish tribe, is that there has never been a "hope-giving" base for a "rational" 
bourgeoisie who would take over the job and accomplish the "following stage" -a 
nation-state with a "home market". Kurdish tribalism did not ever generate an 
"adolescent" bourgeoisie among itself who seriously aspired to a profitable "home 
market" in which the future ruling class would have been a self-leading superior entity, 
nor did Kurdish tribalism let it emerge from the surroundings. 
The Kurdish tribe's most "profitable" option -or the only option for survival as 
a "mountain people" (Guttians)- has been the consolidation of tribal ties in order not to 
miss the "opportunity" for a position of inferiority. And the "tradition" has not been 
confined to the past at all. Tradition "jealously" extends its verdict to the very 
contemporary fate of Kurdishness. The most recent experience of resistance has 
manifested "tradition" in the unquestioned support of the Kurdish masses for Öcalan's 
proposal of a "Democratic Republic" of Turkey. 12 
In the initial chapter, I discussed the inevitable alienation between the departure 
and the arrival of nationalist "victories" by giving examples of some well-known 
experiences in modern history. 
What ought not to be overlooked here is that the departures and arrivals of' 
"national" movements are without exception doomed to be alien to one another. The 
primary "things" longed for in the hearts of the entrepreneurs of national 
emancipation, generally within the intelligentsia, and the "things" envisaged in the 
heads of the bureaucrats who accomplish the national construction are gravely 
distinct. In a general way, while the former departs from "national sentiments", the 
latter arrives at "home market" longings. The former is driven by the impetus 
stemming from aspirations to enjoy and experience their innate ethno-cultural 
elements in the face of others'. The latter are attracted by the gains of "control of the 
distributive system" (Hall and Martin, 1975) against respective others'. The former 
moves from the "heart", and is consequently emotional and maximalist, the latter 
moves from the "head" and so is by nature calm, rational and realistic, and also 
pitiless. An old Turkish saying expresses: "While the sheep concerns itself with its 
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life, the butcher concerns himself with its meat". In the case of national movements, 
however, the "butcher" is always the eventual winner (Chapter 1, p. 51). 
When the Kurdish experience is the case, one cannot elide the fact that a "butcher" did 
not come into existence at all. The "sheep" (a kind of "poor" intelligentsia with 
considerable mass support) has always interfered with the myriad of tribal resistances 
against foreign invaders but the actual accomplishing entity, the "butcher" (a young 
bourgeoisie longing for the existing and/or potential profits of the "home market), did 
not emerge. It is thus: Kurdish nationalism has kept tackling the "pains" of departing. 
In fact, Kurdish tribalism has never prospered. The words of Gellner's dichotomy of' 
tribalism and nationalism, in this sense, well define the so-called "Kurdish 
nationalism". 
Tribalism never prospers, for when it does, everyone will respect it as a true 
nationalism, and no-one will dare call it tribalism. (Gellner, 1983, p. 87). 
The fact is that Kurdish tribalism did not prosper, so "no-one will dare call it" true 
nationalism. Moreover, Kurdish tribalism does not aspire to a national market, for 
which a nation-state may be the sine qua non. The most passionate aspirations of a 
marginal intelligentsia will not suffice for a movement to be defined as a "true 
nationalism". 
This appears to be the most distinct feature of all the Kurdish ethnic resistance 
movements that have occurred throughout the last two centuries in all parts of 
Kurdistan. The PKK-led resistance against Turkey has not differ from the others in this 
respect. 
c. The Appreciation of Treason amongst the Kurds 
Travellers and observers have noticeably identical impressions regarding the 
"treacherous habits" among the Kurds (Soane, 1926), as they do about the unquestioned 
loyalty to tribal "values". Both Soane and Nikitin talk of Millingen's experiences in 
particular with regard to the Kurds' easy inclinations towards betrayal, scheming and 
counter-scheming. Nikitin cites Millingen, saying: "The Kurd is traitor, and he does 
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not hesitate to have the blood of a person on his hands who takes refuge under his own 
shelter" (Nikitin, 1986, p. 146). In order to emphasise the bravery of the Kurdish 
women in joining the fray, Soane refers to Millingen's "fantastic story". 
Millingen, a traveller among the Kurds, quotes a fantastic story of how the Kurdish 
women form themselves into bands for the decoy and robbery of the unfortunate 
traveller. " (Soane, 1926, p. 397). 
Another continuing feudal - in fact pre-feudal - phenomenon in contemporary Kurdish 
society is vendetta, which became one of the main factors in the infiltration into 
"Kurdish personality". The frequent blood feuds and "peace dinners" organised to 
bring vendettas an end (generally arranged with the attendance of government 
ministers, mayors and the local "fixed" MPs) are customary "accessories" of the news 
agenda of Turkish media. The battles stretch across the Turkish metropolises. In fact. 
the bulk of "voluntary village guards" from the Bucak tribe reserved as "rapid reaction 
force" against the PKK guerrillas may well be explained by very vendetta -like 
sentiments, which can be traced to the clashes of 1979 between the party and the tribe. 
As far as Kurdish national-politics is concerned, Hasretyan has the most interesting 
document demonstrating the cultural dimension of vendetta's penetration into the 
society. He cites an oath excerpt signed by the tribe leaders who decided to join the 
Organisation, Xoybun'4 [Independence], which got involved to some extent in the Agiri 
(Ararat) Rebellion that took place against Turkey in 1930. This was the first rebellion 
that had an organisation partly involved in it. At the end of its foundation congress the 
party composed an oath text to be signed by the chieftain attendants, along with two 
declarations to the public and the Socialist International. 
Brotherhood Oath 
Commencing from now onwards, the date of signing this oath, for two years; if it 
threat which endangers the security and existence of the Kurdish nation does not 
emerge, and, if an attack on ºny life and honour and on others who are obligated to 
protect their family and Kurdishness ... 
is not made by another Kurd, I swear on 
my religion, my honour and my sacrednesses that I shall make every effort to avoid 
using a gun against any other Kurd, to postpone the solutions of vendettas and 
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other disagreements, ... to a time after these two years [italics added]. (Hasretyan, 
1995, p. 198,199). 
Because of the highly volatile nature of the issue, even making any endeavour to 
resolve the conflicts associated with vendettas is not allowed, but merely postponed for 
a fixed time, for the "Kurds are sometimes cruel against others, but always pitiless 
against themselves" (Nikitin, 1986, p. 13). 
Turkish journalist R. Balli has a more interesting anecdote than Hasretyan's 
document. While Turkish-speaking Balli was interviewing a peshmerge commander 
from Southern (Iraq) Kurdistan, he had to use a "village guard" from the "Turkish 
Kurds", fighting against the PKK on the side of Turkey, as an interpreter. At one stage 
in the interview, the commander had come to say, "aggressors cannot stand against us 
because they are jash'5". Balli's anecdote deserves to be quoted. 
When our interpreter came to the sentence he hesitated and stopped. Then he put 
all his effort into finding a relevant word for "jash "... In fact, I knew what the word 
meant from my years at university. The term `/ash" which is translated as "donkey 
foal" in the dictionary, is, in Kurdish political terminology, employed for "traitor", 
"collaborator". 
The discomfort of interpreter did not seem to be coming to an end. He was still 
arduously searching for a Turkish word for `jash". Even my interference, by 
saying, " OK, I understand", did not persuade him to give up. After he had 
exhausted all his efforts and language skills, he eventually found the way out! Here 
is his verdict. He declared, while ceasing to look me in the eye: 
"Dash.. Namely, people like myself. " 
Despite rapidly reconnecting all the fuses in my nervous system, I could not 
prevent my whole body from shaking. My God, neither a Catholic nor a traditional 
Leninist would venture into such tyrannical self-criticism! 
Do not get me wrong. My intention is not to call sonne people "traitor" or 
"collaborator". I am dealing with how these human beings see or experience 
themselves. 
The only remaining alternative from my point of view was to be ashamed of' 
myself. Because, at the end of the day, I am a journalist in that region, where 
human beings have such deformed and destroyed personalities. 
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What do you think? Does the subject need to be elaborated on by psychologists? 
(Balli, 1991, pp. 15,16). 
Treason is a cursed phenomenon in every society, no matter if it occurs within the 
framework of national or class or personal relations. It is, of course, cursed in Kurdistan 
too. However, what Balli's anecdote indicates is that it has infiltrated the "Kurdish 
personality" considerably and is to some extent appreciated in Kurdistan - at least 
within some components of the societal structure. Nevertheless, tribal treason has 
evidently not flourished as the national one has. On the contrary, tribal treason is by no 
means tolerated; that is to say, tribal loyalty has somehow been "jealously" and 
"stubbornly" preserved. 
II The Nature and Resource Field of the Organisation 
The arguments and observations above have been selected from a wide range of 
historical sources. The aim is to illuminate the raw and well-matured ground from 
which the PKK originated. 
Obviously, the question of "how it has come there? " can not be neglected. But 
this question falls outside of the realms of this study. Rather, my study is tackling a 
question that revolves around "how it has come here from there? " I ask how and/or 
why Kurds have "for the first time in modem history ... slipped out of the grasp of" 
(Fuller, 1993) treason to a considerable extent, in their latest "adventure" undertaken 
with the PKK. For this reason, a study of the process of the "implantation" and 
functionalisation of the individual in the PKK's organisational structure is needed. 
In his teachings, Öcalan often tells of his organisational efforts in the early days. 
One of the most repeated dialogues is the one he held with an old villager, which 
symbolised a "question" and a "diagnosis" bearing a chilling warning. The old man in 
his seventies, sitting against the wall in the village with a chip of wood in his hand 
picking the earthen ground in front of him, responds to the indoctrination of young 
Öcalan - who intends to stimulate his hopes about the Kurds' fate - by pointing at the 
chip of wood: "Oglum sen su kuru agaci yesertebilir misin? Oglum, haklisiniz, unta 
devlete devlet lazim" (My son, can you make this dry piece of wood sprout? ... 
My son 
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you are quite right, but [standing against] a State requires the State) (Özgür Politika, 
February 14,2000). Since every single Kurdish attempt to win some freedom in 
Turkey invariably culminated in a "heavy handed" suppression followed by massacre, 
deportation and evacuation due to an apparent treason, there was a dead silence and a 
solid hopelessness before the PKK launched its war. Being well aware of this 
phenomenon and in spite of agitating about the inevitability of the armed struggle 
against "colonialist Turkish State" in bold-and-capital lettering, almost a dozen Kurdish 
political configurations never ventured to initiate this struggle, and they consequently 
withered away. Thus, Öcalan kept repeating in his defence: "One-third of the Kurdish 
[social] reality is ill, one-third is maddened and on-third is captive" (Öcalan, 1999c, p. 
87). 
a. A Dormant Resource 
My knowledge of the historical sources above and my knowledge of recent affairs in 
relation to the Kurdish question led me to investigate the possibility that the power- 
source of organisational performance in the grassroots body and the mass base of the 
PKK is fundamentally the firm grasp of and the reaction to the "intrinsic" nature of 
Kurdishness. This seems to be the core resource that the leadership of the PKK 
targeted for mobilisation of the grassroots and masses. They mobilised by engaging 
with human nature within the framework of Marxist-socialist ideology, on the basis of 
the Kurds' deformed ethnic sentiments, which they call the "Kurdish personality". 
A kind of "dormant resource" is an indispensable pre-requisite for all 
nationalisms, Nairn states. 
It [nationalism] always imagines an ideal "people" ... and it always searches 
urgently for vital inner, untapped springs of energy both in individual and the mass 
(Nairn, 1981, pp. 102,103). 
Öcalan starts from two primary interrelated diagnoses which he expresses on every 
occasion: "Kurds are a people of degenerated-debased (Düsürübnüs)1(' state"; and, 
"Other than the Kurds, no people exists in the world which has become the soldiers of 
others in such a disgraceful way . 
In keeping with these and similar statements 
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Öcalan quite frankly concludes in the third congress of the Party, 1986, that the Kurds 
have not "a base of ethnic nationalism" which will orient them "to a customary 
nationalisation as seen in many other countries" (Öcalan, 1993a, p. 191). The 
diagnosis of "degeneration" (Düsürülmüslük) is the prime and most distinctive theory 
of the PKK. It was this theory under which the latent Group ("Apoists") of the 
movement gathered and under which the Party attained unity and continuity. At the 
same time, it is as a result of this theory that Öcalan is constantly accused of treating 
the Kurdish people in a derogatory manner by the rest of the Kurdish political- 
intellectual circles. "Kurds are a dishonestised/scoundrelised (namussuzlastirilmis)", 
"nationally emasculated" people or "you were emasculated" (Özcan, A. K., 1999, p. 
74) are the terms that Öcalan habitually employs in the course of his dialogues and 
teachings (cözümlemeler). According to Öcalan's diagnosis, the degeneration and/or 
"debasement" manifest themselves in the Kurdish lifestyle in two main forms: 
1) There exists an extreme inclination among Kurds towards presenting themselves as 
resembling others. Namely they imitate the image and complexion of sovereign 
nations, for it is not "feasible" to live as a Kurd. This is additionally true of the 
Northwest population under Turkey, where Kurds are deprived of the basic elements 
of ethnic identity such as a name and a language, which varies incomparably from 
the other parts of the country ruled by Iran and Iraq. 
2) Kurds are unlimitedly brave, resistant and pitiless against themselves and, in 
consequence, treason has "infiltrated the genes" of the people to the extent that 
treason is appreciated in Kurdistan. 
In keeping with this diagnosis, the PKK's educational-organisational efforts - in fact, 
Öcalan's speeches - place intensive emphasis on the 
Kurdish man's "rich memories" of 
military service, through which he enjoys the rest of his life. According to 6calan, tile 
"endemic" decade-long vendettas caused by a goat or chicken or a fence or an 
argument between two children, are indeed the most acknowledged characteristics of' 
Kurdishness by everyone bearing an average familiarity with the community. The 
memories' "richness value" appreciates in proportion to the worst beatings, swearing, 
insults and the difficulties experienced during the service, and the vendettas' "dignity" 
and "seriousness" is evaluated by the number of decades they lasted and the dead they 
produced. In daily agitation-aimed propaganda activities, Öcalan uses a sentence which 
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is associated with this Kurdish "national" legacy and which is not understood in terms 
of being a direct "collaborator" with the "foreign enemy", but of being one pitiless 
fighter pitted against another: "There is no one in Kurdistan who has not become 
involved in some type of treason". 
Thus, this Kurdish ethnic reality appears to be the fundamental raw resource 
-"untapped springs of energy" (Nairn, 1981, p. 1020- that is partly converted into and 
partly utilised as the well refined "sap" through which the PKK started and decisively 
extended its organisational functionality. Using this resource, the Party oriented itself 
towards questioning the meaning of men's lives and originating the argument of "how 
men ought to live" (Öcalan, 1995b, 1996a and 1999a) in an organisational existence. 
When one intends to study the PKK's individual-organisational interactions, it would 
be more plausible to examine the framework of the PKK's educational "inculcation" as 
part of the process of cadre and/or fighter recruitment and the organisation's 
functioning organic execution rather than its constitutional structure. Considering that 
the very same material and spiritual base existed in Turkey and Kurdistan as was 
present for a dozen other Kurdish political initiatives advocating a "holy national 
liberation struggle" against the "fascist-colonialist State of Turkish Republic", there 
naturally have to be some distinctive factors in the Organisation's nature which have 
enabled it to be the leading force in the outbreak of the most recent Kurdish resistance 
against Turkey. There is a fundamental underlying cause of the PKK's ascendancy 
above all the other initiatives claiming to be liberation movements, and this cause 
requires sociological identification. However, despite their quite peripheral significance 
to the Organisation's working order, we need to know about the basic constitutional 
structure and certain of the alterations made in the course of programmatic reformation 
and reconstruction before we can proceed to the actual "life" of the organisation's 
functioning. 
b. The Basic Organisational Structure 
There is no principle in the organisational structure of the PKK or in its constitution 
that distinguishes it from conventional socialist/communist parties or From other 
"Parties of Kurdistan". This is also true of the early PKK. The party's primary 
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organisational structure defined in the constitution resembles an ordinary Marxist- 
socialist party as much as its fellow organisations' initiatives do18 (See Appendix 2). 
The fifth party congress of 1995 made minor alterations to the constitution, and 
further ones were approved in the seventh extraordinary congress of 1999. 
Under the influence of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its affiliated system, 
the classical terminology of 1970s was eliminated from the text and the term General 
Secretary was replaced by the "General President" in 1995. The "Council of General 
Presidency", which consisted of several prominent figures elected by the Central 
Committee from amongst themselves, was to be configured according to a new 
constitutional article approved in this congress 19. The change of the party emblem and 
the removal of the sickle and hammer from the Party flag was also accomplished in this 
constitution. 
In 1999, the Central Committee was replaced by the "Party Assembly". The 
emblem of the party - and the flag - was again changed. The yellow torch that had 
been placed in the red star in 1995 - which superseded the sickle-hammer - was now 
superseded by the full red star. This could be considered as a particular emphasis on 
the "socialism" of the party. The other minor changes were terminological 
modifications. 
Nevertheless, the definition and the traits of the "individual" necessitated for the 
membership of the Party remain the same in both "updated" programmes and this 
definition goes back to the time of the PKK's formation - the mid-1970s (Programme, 
1995, p. 80,83,84; Programme, 1999, p. 79,81,82). The framework for the 
personality of the membership, which originated at the inception of the organisation, 
extends into these modified constitutions. 
The changes seem to be rather superficial and/or tactical changes, such as 
saying the party member "struggles [mucadele eder] for socialism" instead of "fights 
[savasir] for socialism". This has more to do with the basic lifestyle, beliefs and 
ambitions required of the person who decides to step into the Party than it has to do 
with the official constitution. Hence, this will be a matter for further discussion. 
c. Party Membership 
The procedures for becoming a member of and for dismissal from the PKK is simply 
put down in the constitutions. The issue is "cleared" in two paragraphs totalling 72 
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words in the constitution approved by the fifth congress, and totalling 53 words by the 
1999 extraordinary congress (Programme, 1995, p. 81; Programme, 1999, p. 79,80). 
The procedures are basically about the period of provisional membership in which the 
person is being tested for approval or disapproval and the party organ which decides 
upon the final approval. While the period had been "six months" and the organ was the 
"Central Committee" in the former constitutions, the period was reduced to three 
months and the approval institution stated as the "Party Assembly" in the most recent 
one. But this is by no means a matter at issue in organisational practice as it is actually 
experienced. 
Even if the entire constitutional articles are of quite peripheral importance to the 
facts of party life, the definition of the "party member" has significance, for it presents 
clues to the nature of the PKK's "organisational life". The membership constitutes the 
most essential feature of the Party, and it also overwhelmingly determines the successes 
and failures of the movement. 
A party member is one who acknowledges the programme of the party and is 
responsible for its implementation; who takes the will of the party as fundamental 
and gradually attaches themself to the party's will; who joins party life and tactical 
application [daily practical activities] all day in an organ of the party; who 
exuberantly works for the party's fundamental aims in the manner of not making 
concessions, of not following self-advantages and of unlimited self-sacrifice by 
embracing the party's demeanour, tempo, and style through undoing oneself' 
[analysing-remoulding one's personality]; and who devotes his/her life to the cause 
of the party [italics added]. (Programme, 1995, p. 80). 
In the 1999 constitution, it is passed exactly as above with elimination of the final 
component of the sentence, "who devotes his/her life to the cause of the party", 
The PKK is a solid, "all-day" professional organisation. This aspect may he a 
peculiarity of the Party's organisation, but it is not the entity that defines the quality of 
the organisation. In other words, full-timeness or professionaljty is not a property that 
characterises the PKK's organisational nature, and nor do the extremely firm 
constitutional articles. Instead, it is the member's complete deprivation of "personal 
will" and of "private life" that is the most distinguishing feature of the PKK. The use 
of the term " all day" (or literally "whole day" [turn gün]) instead of "full-tinic" is a 
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deliberate choice here. In fact, unlike the rest of the text of the constitution, the 
definition and the duties of the member, along with the features, is diligently structured 
as corollary of the particular approach to a point - the point that transcends the 
conventional boundaries of a Leninist party. 
When an individual - either man or woman - decides to attach himself/herself 
to the party's activities as a full-time member, it ought unalterably to be all day "work". 
In other words, the incorporation of individuals into the PKK's organisational body 
does not encompass daytime working hours between sunrise and sunset, but the whole 
day and night of 24 hours. That is to say, the members of the PKK ought somehow not 
to have "private time" or a "private life" regardless of who/what they are: man or 
woman, single or married, a childless couple or parents, senior citizen or teenager. This 
is indisputable or non-negotiable in the PKK. As a matter of fact, it is the first 
condition for being able to be a component of a party cell. As a "corollary" to the 
nature of the Organisation, a member - not only a guerrilla - does not have a permanent 
address at which he/she practically lives, does not have a private home that he/she may 
keep for their own usage, does not have a family of which he/she is practically a part. 
If a provisional member merits, gains and is eventually approved as a professional 
(cadre), he/she then must withdraw themself from all social establishments (relations, 
institutions, belongings) that would usually be part of a person's life. For example, 
when the wife or the husband of a family - with or without children - becomes a 
member, he or she leaves the rest of family even if the member works for the party in 
the very same locality - as does a teenager. 
Or, if both husband and wife join the party, then the home is either abolished or 
converted into one of the common places that a group of party members share, and the 
responsibility for any child/children is taken over by the party20. The same regulation 
applies to every "cadre" of the party who is based either in the Kurdistan part under 
Turkey or in Turkey or in other parts of Kurdistan or abroad, including Europe. This is 
what they call "party life". According to "party life", a member is essentially defined 
as one "who ... attaches 
himself/herself to the party's will; who joins the party life ... 
all day". Members are also defined by what the Party twice stated in its constitution 
about the nine sequential "duties of the party member" (in the 1999 constitution had a 
sequence of eight, but it combined the last two duties into one). The duties include: 
"To live in accordance with the party constitution and party's moral norms" and "To 
live within the framework of the requirements of the party membership". In 
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consequence, having been approved as a member of the Party is perceived as an 
introduction into a novel way of living rather than being a member of a political 
organisation. Hence the term "becoming PKK" [PKK lilesmek] is always employed 
throughout the party publications instead of "how to be a member of the PKK". 
d. Organisational Procedure and the Search for Democratisation 
The basic principle of the working order of the Party is clearly stated in the constitution 
to be Democratic Centralism (Programme, 1995, p. 95). In the 2000 Constitution, the 
first sentence of this section has been slightly changed: "The organisational procedure is 
regulated according to the principles of democratic participation and administration" 
(Programme, 2000, p. 87). However, the rest of the section remains the same in this 
most recent constitution. That is to say, the principles of the organisational procedure 
have, in essence, been retained. The reason for restructuring the first sentence, in which 
the term "Democratic Centralism" is employed, is because it seems to associate the 
PKK with the conventional communist parties and the seventh congress of the PKK has 
made every endeavour to get rid of the jargon of the "real socialist" orthodoxy. In 
addition, Öcalan's recently intensified emphasis on democracy and socialist democracy 
is obviously reflected throughout the programme and constitution of the year 20M. 
Nevertheless, the realisation of actual organisational practices has always been in 
accordance with the "irrelevant" circumstances of Kurdish reality. In other words, the 
principles of Democratic Centralism or Socialist Democracy have not been substantially 
realistic and/or practicable so far. These principles have, to some degree, been 
implemented in the peripheral organisational configurations (such as youth 
organisations or religious communities or cultural activities), in the provincial or 
regional guerrilla units and probably in the party congresses, but not in the mainstream 
of the PKK's organisational execution. In particular, this has never been the case for 
Öcalan's position in the Party. 
Also Öcalan does not refrain from expressing this. He even places additional 
emphasis on his undemocratic position. In response to Kürkcü's2' questions, such as 
"have you, for example, ever been elected [in the organisation] in any form of 
procedure", the answer is fairly firm: "The election has never been required" for Öcalan 
works "with the person who has come to the point where he/she is ready to die in 
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defence of the opinion" (See the complete dialogue in Chapter 4), which he gave as his 
opinion (Öcalan, 1995, pp. 56,57). In brief, even if the general application of the 
organisational rules and regulations stated in the constitution are not totally invalid, the 
workability of the organisational performance is based on persuasion or - in more 
appropriate term - inculcation rather than constitutional principles. 
The PKK did attempt to inaugurate some more democratised organisational 
practices in the early 1990s. This did not work because the cadre body of the Party was 
not ready for - or even familiar with - the practical significance of the notion. In 
November 1992, PKK's organisational entities in Europe led a free election among the 
Kurds over almost the entire continent22 to establish a National Assembly. They were 
trying to transfer organisational initiatives from professional party activists to the people 
themselves in accordance with Öcalan's understanding of socialism. However, the new 
structure did not work, and somehow dissolved in its second year. Then they had 
another attempt at constituting the National Assembly in 1995. It, too, has encountered 
a fairly identical ending with the former attempt. 
Whereas Öcalan and the management centre of the PKK were quite determined 
and optimistic about the enterprise, and put more effort towards appropriate outlets to 
enhance the participation of the people in the organisational decision-making processes 
to try and prevent a Soviet-like destiny of a "spectacular" collapse. Just a year before 
the elections, Öcalan, on the pretext of conveying his message on the thirteenth 
anniversary of the PKK's foundation through a live telephone linkage, conducted a 
"live" call to the "Patriotic People of Kurdistan" which devoted the opening of the Party 
to people and ended with the words "I am saying with confidence in the PKK that this 
world cannot be without socialism, one cannot live in this world without socialis, n". In 
the call, the emphasis on the "Kurdistan National Assembly" was striking. 
Now, we have more work to do. What is this? To originate our genuine assembly. 
... 
A national assembly, a national congress of Kurdistan has to be configured. We 
learned this lesson very well and our party, while entering its fourteenth year, will 
also undertake this as a primary task. It [the PKKI will obtain the workability and 
validity of the Kurdistan National Assembly. (Öcalan, 1995, p. 415). 
In the beginning of the year of the initial elections, January 1992, Öcalan gave some 
"chilling" warnings such as "as seen more often than not, an armed movement which 
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does not fulfil basic duties in the interests of people is a movement that becomes the 
calamity of people" and "many people [cadres] may promptly emerge as immense 
careerists by relying upon the PKK's influence, and thereupon they may well be in the 
position of controlling huge privileges, if not now but in the coming times it will he 
possible", and thereafter he came to the actual "why" of the concern. 
In the light of lessons we have learned from the latest international experiences, not 
being a party force which stands completely above the people but which becomes 
the servant of the people, and not being a dysfunctional assembly but an innovation 
of an assembly which is functioning and determining everything [A. K. Ö. ] is the 
most fundamental - and distinguishing - task that we will fulfil for socialism. The 
success that we achieve in this respect will at the same time be the success of 
socialism. (op. cit., p. 315). 
In another part of this "new year" talk, he specifies his concern - the "calamity" of the 
Bolsheviks' socialism. 
The course of affairs is grave; life has been converted into a very grave state. After 
seventy five years today, in view of what has been done to the October Revolution 
- to itself, to its essence, to its word - we clearly see that one cannot quite succeed 
with things as such, as it has been asserted and thought, by making literary rhetoric 
in the name of revolution, even further, by believing in its eternity. What I mean is 
that there have been great assertions and promises made for some time on behalf of 
these kinds of revolutions. But in the end, it has been obviously revealed that they 
could not oppose/resist offensives, even if these are at least in appearance or 
temporary. All these demonstrated that we need comprehensive and novel thoughts 
with regard to the matters of revolution. (op. cit. p. 307). 
The main concern of the talk is the search for an outlet for his over-consolidated 
professional organisation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The talk also 
contemplates new feasible or workable measures towards democratising the Party. The 
only outlet on which he concentrates is to open the organisation to the people - "the 
genuine fountain". In consequence, the search for elected "people representatives" as 
new social leaders becomes more apparent and is expressed in a more concrete manner. 
"If our people has known itself a little and has started to see its own interests to some 
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extent, then we will say to them `so, such is the matter, here is the opportunity! Let the 
Party still to perform its vanguard duties, let it be the centre of say ideology, politics, 
tactics. But its power is limited, you are the millions ... so you select the best 
representatives for yourself! ' Or, if there are some, we must find and bring out a 
handful of honest men/women in Kurdistan. If not, we have to create them" (op. cit. 
pp. 319,320). Then, exemplifying himself as usual, he proceeds. 
... Death 
is always there; in fact everyday people are dying like any creature in the 
streets, and what is more [they are dying] for the enemy. Wouldn't an honest 
person emerge and say "death is always there, I am here for lofty interests, national 
interests, and for humanity? " Wouldn't such men/women emerge from among over 
thirty million humans? I believe that they will definitely emerge. Even a man like 
me who is in a most difficult state, who is the most unable to say these words can 
talk this much. Let me say, I could talk both for the nation and every kind of class 
and stratum. And thus I started from myself. If I can do this, why not some others 
among the more than thirty million men and women. It will come about. It will 
occur more powerfully than expected,. We need to know how to make it happen. 
Every individual person of the people needs to be forced [encouraged] in this 
regard. (op. cit. p. 320). 
In the months and years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was defined 
as a "re-birth of history - 1989 revolutions" (Kumar, 1995, p. 189) by some political 
theorists, increasingly "chilling" confrontations were engendered by the sudden 
massification of the movement in early 1990 and also by the effects of the very "1989 
revolutions". Öcalan seemed desperate not to lose close organic contact with the 
Kurdish masses shouting his name and the Party's slogans. There was an increase in 
"strong analyses" ((özümlemeler) appearing in the pages of PKK's monthly central 
organ Serxwebun. These cözümlemeler asked for people's organic participation in 
Party activities. Öcalan's violent-transparent arguments followed one another "at the 
cost of divulging themselves" (Öcalan, 1994b, p. 13) in various party publications. 
Almost three quarters of the Political Report submitted to the Fourth Congress of the 
PKK (held between 25-31 December 1990) by Öcalan as [still] "General Secretary" of 
the party, was devoted to frank - and even offensive - arguments over the "inner 
questions" about "democracy" and the "close contact" of the Party with people. The 
main theme of these writings was various re-definitions of democracy, democratic 
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education, its essentiality and its indispensability, with an emphasis on democracy's 
linkage with the people's direct will. Such words as "Democracy is a phenomenon that 
absolutely needs to be taught and kept alive to the utmost both by education and by 
experience" or "Democracy is the very activity of the people's coming to itself" or 
"Democracy is the absolute backbone in the people's organisational entities" are the 
most striking ones along these lines. Thus, more concentration on "giving way to 
people" to enjoy direct participation in the organisational bodies has become the central 
theme of the educational efforts. 
... 
We are in favour of giving way to people [to rule] and of protecting this. But 
there are many party cadres who make decisions on behalf of the people, who do 
not even give people the right to talk. ... The people will talk, the people will 
decide, the people will make its choice, the people will make changes. Our 
understanding of democracy is precisely this; it should not be distorted. (Ocalan, 
1992, p. 187). 
The frequent references to socialism's experience of a collapse have an additional place 
in these accounts of the democracy of the Party's socialism. 
... 
Many democratic revolutions have been initiated, many so-called socialist 
democracies have been attempted to create. In the end, it has become evident that 
they all put the people aside, that the bureaucratic apparatus has become the 
calamity of the people, and then, that they [socialist democracies have been 
overthrown by the very people who had become the followers of those whom the 
people did not know. ... You cannot put aside ties with the people even for a 
moment. If you do this, the demagogues interfere in affairs. And they steal the 
people from you and take them away, and furthermore, they position them against 
you and dethrone you. Here is the scene of all Eastern European countries, here is 
the tragic end of Ceaucescau, here is the wreckage of the chiefs who used to say 
"here I am the best". (op. cit. P. 187,188,189). 
From this view, the boundaries of incorporation have been expanded to the extent that 
they encircle the "primitive" institutions (agha`3 , sheikh, chieftain etc. ) with the 
intention of "dysfunctionalisation". The purpose of broadening the limits as the 
fundamental way of democratising the Party was to be twofold: The incorporation and 
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thereby dissolution of the preserving elements of the tribal structure in the Party's 
frontal or peripheral organisations and giving way to new social leaders or to new 
people's representatives - "historical personalities". 
... 
Ashiret cannot be eliminated, chieftainship too cannot be eliminated, but they 
can be dissolved in national institutions. We shall tell them this: " Well, you be 
chieftain, but with few national features. You will not say only "my tribe, my 
family". Only if they say "My tribe too has a significance in the nation, my family 
too has a value among all the national values, it is loyal to it [the national caused 
and I am from now on its [national significance's] chieftain, its representative" will 
we allow their existence. The actual work of dissolving them is not that difficult. 
If it is accurately handled, dissolving the existing traditional institutions and 
personalities in the national pot is not difficult. And the most important thing is 
that we will settle the [matter of] historical personalities. 
There are historical personalities in the hearts of our people. Now, they literally 
burst in on us. There does exist a new leader type, a people's new militant type in 
abundance for whoever looks for it. If the party cadres, guerrilla commanders look 
around themselves, they will come across countless people's representatives. 
(Öcalan, 1995c. P. 327). 
Several months preceding the November 1992 elections were devoted to "genuine" 
democratisation. Fearing the implications of the collapse of Soviet socialism, Öcalan 
warned: "If we do not take adequate measures, a novel sort ool' aghas will emerge 
amongst the very PKK cadres who will not be less tyrannical than those who existed in 
the past". This statement was published in three pro-PKK papers and magazines (The 
central organ of the party Serxwebun, the daily paper Özgür Gündem, the monthly 
youth magazine Devrimci Yurtsever Genclik) 
24 in the months just before the elections 
for the National Assembly. 
Open elections were held in Europe and some other parts of the world where an 
adequate Kurdish population reside - and illegal ones were held in Kurdistan and 
Turkey. But again the election did not work - so the arguments for democratisation 
continued. 
Several months after the announcement of the National Assembly, a lengthy 
editorial article with the heading "People Assemblies in Kurdistan and On the State- 
Party Relations" was published in the Party's central organ Serxwebun "on the way to 
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becoming a State in Kurdistan". The main concern of the article was the relations 
between party cadres and elected representatives, or, in fact, the attitude of party cadres 
towards elected people's representatives. 
If we do not intend handing the people over to some persons who no one knows, to 
agha and gendarme-like personalities, to newly emerged despots, then, first and 
foremost the party cadres must assimilate themselves into democratic culture, be 
absorbed into democracy and convert democracy into a lifestyle for themselves. ... 
The Party ... will not govern 
the State by instructing people's assemblies. The 
governance of the State, uniting the masses around ourselves and motivating and 
directing them towards a common end will be through mass organisations. 
(Serxwebun, April 1993). 
Despite everything, the initial National Assembly attempts failed. It withered away 
towards the end of 1994. Almost the same experience - but with less participation by 
voters - was repeated in 1995. It encountered an identical 
destiny to the former 
National Assembly. (Further discussion on this event - especially the causes of failures 
- is undertaken in the next chapter). 
Recently, 1 August 2000, a new attempt containing more radical elements was 
introduced to the public. It was called "People's Assemblies" instead of a National 
Assembly. The new attempt is similar to the old because the overwhelming majority of 
the assemblies will be constituted by elected members voted for by the people. It is 
different from the old because the assemblies will have the authority to dismiss the 
professional party cadres. This authority is clearly expressed in an individual article of 
its constitution: "The People's Assemblies, ... have the right to 
dismiss the provincial, 
regional and local co-ordinators [of the Organisation] 
by two-thirds of the majority 
votes in a confidential ballot". But in fact, the latest attempt has been far more of a 
total fiasco than the previous ones in proportion to its radicalness. It was silently 
dropped from the Organisation's agenda. Whether or not any renewed form of such 
endeavours will function is an issue for the future, but what is known so far is that the 
constitutions of previous inaugurations have not 
been essential to the reality of the 
organisational life of the PKK. 
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e. Party Education 
Education is one of the two vital components ("Education" and "Organisation") of the 
PKK's organisation. Rather than formulating the rules of constitutional procedure, the 
substantial share of Öcalan's leadership work lies in "producing" individuals 
appropriate to the "organisational life" of the PKK by an education of which he is the 
primary source. His speeches are called "cözümlemeler"25. On occasions, he says "We 
are an education movement" and asks "If there was not such an intensive education in 
the history of the PKK, would the PKK exist today? " (Öcalan, 1994a, p. 358). And he 
stretches "organisational life" to every aspect of life. 
... 
Life in the organisation is a completely organisational life. From all your 
conducts and behaviours to the most official authoritarian attitude, from 
conversations at dining tables to a vigorous address, these are all organisational 
life. The enemy, today, is most irritated by this feature of us. "They all resemble 
each other as if they were manufactured by a single machine" says (the enemy( (op. 
cit. p. 130). 
As a manifestation of the requirements for being attached to the organisational structure 
of the Party as a member, the philosophy of "lifestyle" questioning "how men ought to 
live" occupies a major space in the teachings. Accordingly, concepts such as 
"analysing oneself', "undoing oneself' and "reshaping oneself' are the fundamental 
themes in the Party's educational efforts. The Party uses these concepts in order to 
innovate a way of living and gradually develop the desired mode of life - which 
resonates with Raschke's "new" paradigm of the "way of life" or "mode of life" created 
for the New Social Movements of Western societies (Offe, 1985, p. 825) - within the 
organisation which is believed to be "in peace with genuine human nature". 
The philosophy of education here, in a sense, is associated with Plato's notion 
of "three-fold division of soul" (reason, spirit, appetite) and the accurate equilibrium 
among those fundamental "parts" of man's soul. Plato calls this the "spiritual balance", 
by which, he asserts, the individual may always attain peace and justice within the 
personality of oneself. Because I was aware of the additional weight of his 
philosophical efforts which are devoted to the individual's personality and spiritual 
213 
structure throughout his teachings (talks), I constructed a lengthy question in this regard 
in the course of the dialogue we held when Öcalan was in the Middle East. 
- There are two rival parties in the sphere of philosophy, which goes back through 
several thousand years of human history. One party, in essence, suggests that man 
is by nature self-regarding and can never be otherwise; s/he always puts him/herself 
first and organises all aspects of life according to instincts or motives. The other 
school of thought maintains that the human mind is originally a blank sheet and all 
knowledge is the product of subsequent experience. Consequently, a human being 
has a chance of changing his or her own nature. For example, Plato tends to say 
that the perfect man can be formed by the force of knowledge and education. 
Within this context there is a claim regarding the spiritual structure of human 
beings, which divides it into three centres (the threefold division of the soul): 
Reason, Appetite and Spirit. The first group assert here that man is a passionate 
being whose major motivations are beyond control and that reason is the slave of 
passion. Whereas, according to the second group, human beings are essentially 
rational and aware of this themselves; consequently they have the ability to restrain 
their instincts and passions. In view of such philosophical approaches to human 
nature, I think that there are some considerable points to be made in terms of the 
life of the PKK. What do you say? 
-I feel sorry about this subject as well. I 
have striven hard not to be in conflict 
with human nature, not to let it take the wrong path... Whether it is my instincts or 
my conscious judgement, I leave them absolutely unrestrained. It could be said 
that they are in contention with one another. I think that the one which is more 
correct will not yield to domination over one another. If a good balance is kept 
between the two, you can make enormous strides forward, or you can become a 
genius; or a politician, a soldier, an artist. My particularity in this subject is, I 
think, on the one hand, constant deploying of reason, on the other hand never 
putting aside any religious, juridical, even philosophical moral values as much. I 
deploy a principle such as "let human beings be unrestrainedly natural", but at the 
same time I am an absolute obedient servant of sonne rules and regulations. I keep 
an extremely sensitive balance on the horns of the dilemma ... One must not belittle 
instincts. They are vital and life is under a strict influence of instincts. But. of 
course, without the principle, if you say, "everything has to be according to 
instincts", your lifestyle will be bestial. Likewise if you say "everything according 
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to dogmas" you will become a hermit. I am trying to define an existing distorted 
state of human beings in which both principle and instinct have been led astray. I 
am still striving to analyse it. (Özcan, A. K., 1999, pp. 79,80). 
A definition of the ideal type of a "new mankind" is expressed , very simply, in terms of 
naturalness in a related part of an interview: "According to me, the natural human being 
is the greatest human being" (Öcalan, 1997, p. 81). By this, he means the one who 
keeps the self's "three" fundamental spiritual elements in the right balance, so "in peace 
and justice" as "not yield to domination over one another". As a corollary to this, 
Öcalan, the only "source" of party education, gives another definition of the movement 
he leads: "The movement of great human naturalness" (Serxwebun, December 1996). 
The policy and application of "cadre education" in terms of both form and 
content is fundamental to the PKK's existence. Öcalan's two expressions on this are 
famous among the grassroots: "I execute the revolution with my tongue" and 
"Everybody thinks that we are a practical movement which promptly ventures into doing 
things; on the contrary, we are a theoretical movement, we say forty but do one". This 
particular aspect, the dimension of the "educational activities" in the organisation is, at 
the same time, the source of the PKK's "subjective share" in the "most recent Kurdish 
insurgency" against Turkey. That is to say, just as the firm grasp of and reaction to the 
"intrinsic" nature of the overall background of Kurdishness (tribe and treason) - the 
dormant resource - is the fundamental power-source of organisational performance 
among the grassroots and mass base of the PKK, the source of the firm grasp n/' and 
reaction to the "intrinsic" nature of Kurdish ethnic existence lies in the Party's 
educational activities with their particular form and content. 
No doubt, the form of the education, the method and particular arrangements for 
it, is inferior to the actual content. However, it is diligently organised and planned in 
proportion to the "susceptibility" to the content. For the purpose of this study, I spent 
four weeks in the two (one for'Turkish, the other for Kurdish speaking pupils) "Party 
Central Schools" based in Syria, where Öcalan himself was giving his teachings. And 
previously in 1992, I was included in the group for an "Intensive Party Education" 
programme held at a "Party Home" in Europe as a result of my voluntary contributions 
as an interpreter for the Kurdish community in London. 
The form of the Central Schools fairly resembles a garrison with no military 
training, but they are secured by a sentry system in which militants on duty carried 
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rifles. The overall programme of the education in the school, with scarce exceptions 
such as interviews and/or dialogues with Ocalan or party meetings or perhaps party 
conferences, is composed of Öcalan's verbal - and edited texts of these talks - teachings 
which are called "Analyses of the Party Leadership" or, in brief, "Leadership26 
Analyses" [Önderlik Cözümlemeleri]. Öcalan was dividing his week between Turkish 
and Kurdish schools by spending approximately 3-4 days in the former and 2-3 days in 
the latter. The lingua franca was Turkish rather than Kurdish and consequently the 
number of learners in Turkish centre was visibly greater than the other - around two 
hundred. I was told by Cemil Bayik, one of the earliest comrades of Öcalan and senior 
figures in the Presidency Council, that the Öcalan's tempo has been constant since 1980. 
In fact, the total number (pages) of books containing published and unpublished 
"cözümlemeler" corroborates what Bayik said to me. Every single one of these talks 
and the instructions given to the heads of the guerrilla corps over the radio are recorded 
by a video camera, then edited, printed in the form of books and distributed to party 
organisations all over the world27. 
They are named by the months in which the "cöziimlemeler" is delivered, such 
as "March Analyses - 1987" [Mart Cözümlemeleri], "September Analyses - 1993" etc. 
month by month for almost eighteen years from 1980 to Öcalan's arrest. Öcalan's 
published books contain material selected afterwards from these "monthly hooks" of the 
"party education". The live tele-talks on Kurdish satellite television (Med - later Medya 
- TV) during the period of 
his escape (from the date of his departure from Syria, 
September 9,1998, to his abduction from Kenya, February 15,1999) were also 
evaluated as "cözümlemeler", and recorded, edited and distributed to all units of the 
Organisation. Further, since the defence lawyers began to visit Öcalan in the Imralli 
Prison, the notes of weekly visits by the group of lawyers have been regularly edited and 
distributed as the "Notes of Visits". The Political Report which has been submitted to 
the seventh extraordinary congress also consists of the relevant parts of the "Defences" 
and "Notes of Meeting" produced in the one-man prison of Imralli island of Turkey. 
I was incorporated into the lessons (Cözümlemeler) during the time I spent there. 
On average, each talk took between three and four hours, and the classes were not 
classified by age or sex, or according to people's preceding educational level. Öcalan 
comes, talks and goes without sitting down. Occasionally, and no one knows when he 
will do this, he asks questions of persons he picks by sight among the all-militant 
audience and constructs Socratic dialogues. The one who is picked stands up and does 
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not sit back down until Öcalan quite noticeably orders them to do so (in practice at least 
twice), regardless of the person's sex, age, oldness or newness, including Cemil Bayik - 
the man who is generally regarded as the "Second Man" even if it is categorically 
denied that is not and or ever will be a Second Man in the PKK. Öcalan did almost the 
same thing with me and took the initiative in asking questions: "I ask you: What do I 
look like? What do you think that I resemble, as a person who reads those books a lot? 
What will happen to my [bad] situation? Where does my ending tend towards, according 
to you? ". Yet an incident I witnessed there would, I believe, illuminate the atmosphere 
into which the "47özümlemeler" are born. 
In the course of a morning class, which was to be part of the "July 
cözümlemeler", a slight creaking sound was heard because the modest sound of a 
house-fly would have been obvious in the dead silence of the average sized hall. It was 
thought to be caused by a chair from the right side of the hall where women militants 
were sitting. Öcalan promptly interrupted his sentence: "Who was it? ". He did not get a 
response. He repeated his question a bit more loudly. No response was forthcoming. 
He hesitated for some seconds as to what to do, then went back to his talk. A few 
minutes later the same sound was heard again. He stopped more abruptly: "Who was 
that? " There was absolutely no answer from anyone. He insisted: "Whoever has made 
that noise, take your chair and get out of here". There was no answer and no creaking. 
Öcalan waited for a few more seconds and continued. Exactly the same sound - but 
with a slightly more obvious intensity, giving its direction away a small extent - was 
heard once again. Öcalan stopped, looked around, then looked up to the ceiling: 
"Himm! [yes] It is coming from there". He nodded and re-concentrated on the talk. 
The creaky noise was merely caused by the sheet-metal roof of the hall due to the heat 
of the July sunrise in the Middle East. No one, among more than one hundred and fifty 
men and women, old and young, seasoned and new militants who were spiritually ready 
to die for their cause, ventured to say anything. Around one hundred people set fire to 
themselves in less than four months for the man talking there, more than a dozen of 
them burnt to death (See Appendix 3), and a considerable number of them experienced 
the very same atmosphere of this Party Centre School. There were, of course, no 
beatings or killings because of similar incidents. But the incident may be explained by 
the influence of Öcalan's leadership style. 
My week's experience of "Party Education" arranged in a "Party Home" in 
Europe led me to conclude that the organisers of these educational activities make every 
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endeavour to imitate the atmosphere of the Party Central School. In fact, one of the 
main materials of education is selections from the video tapes of Öcalan's 
"cözümlemeler" produced in the Central School in the atmosphere outlined above. I 
was taken to the "home" - it was a quite large house - on the night of 26 January and 
given a lift back on the night of 2nd February. There were about fifteen of us consisting 
of approximately one third female participants. I had absolutely no clues as to where 
(which town or even country) I had been taken. It was a two or two and a half hour 
drive from Brussels. We did not get out of the car, and did not even look out of the 
windows, for we had been warned not to do so in order to prevent drawing attention of 
any kind. A couple of shifts of boys and girls - probably militants - supplied us with 
food and drink during the week. The breakfasts and meals were prepared, cooked and 
served by a daily sentry system. The programme was intensive. The actual sessions 
lasted from 8 a. m. to 10.30 p. m. The sessions generally took one hour and fifteen 
minutes and the break time between the sessions was fifteen minutes. After the final 
session of the day, one and half hours was left for unnecessary free discussions based on 
the day's issues. This was followed by bedtime - at midnight. Men slept on the ground 
floor and first floor, and women on the second floor. The daily timetable was well 
ordered and strictly followed. 
Waking up 7.00 a. m. P. M. Sessions 2.00 - 3.15 
Breakfast 7.30 3.30-4.45 
Sessions 8.00-9.15 5.00-6.00 
9.30-10.45 Dinner 6.00-7.45 
11.00-1200 7.45-9.00 
Lunch 12.00 - 14.00 9.15- 10.30 
Free discussions 10.30 - 12.00 
The bulk of "party education" in the PKK rests on two columns: the personality and 
lifestyle of militant, and the "intrinsic" treason of Kurdishness that is believed to stem 
from tribility and family. 
Yet these columns are treated as being mutually interrelated, and this 
understanding of Kurds led the Leadership's argument towards human nature and 
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thence to universality. Because the Leadership believes that degeneration, debasement, 
dysfunctionality and dehumanisation in the "Kurdish personality", based on tribe and 
treason, are so deep-rooted and have thereby devastated the humane elements of human 
nature in the country, they endeavour to re-humanise the community so as to challenge 
this spectacle. 
Kurdistan is the place where humanity itself fades away in its most solid form. It is 
humankind's oldest cradle. A magnificent victory for humanity may be gained in 
the place where it has been most "deformed". Such magnificence will be in 
proportion to the debasement. Namely, if in some place, humanity descends so 
sharply and deeply, then the concomitant rise of humanity will be as strong and 
splendid. (Kucuk, 1993, p. 125). 
The framework of education features the influence of Marxist-socialist ideology - 
hence the dialectical materialism. However, a systematic education of classical Marxist 
principles and theory is by no means taught as part of the intensive educational efforts. 
The "theoretical" portion of socialism in the Party's systematic programmes is limited 
to Öcalan's emphasis and insistence on socialist tenets and aspirations, and his 
contemplation on remoulding the individual's personality for "genuine socialist 
relations", which I discussed in a former chapter. This is a phenomenon which was in 
fact a strength of the PKK at its inception but later - in particular, by late 1980s and 
throughout 90s - it became a handicap. (See Chapter 7). 
The subject headings of the "education programme" in my notes of the 
weeklong experience were copied from the actual papers as follows: 
A) Introduction 
1- The Education Policy of the Party and its implementation 
2- Educational Activities in Society 
3- The Colonialist Education in Kurdistan and the Destruction Created by lt 
4- Pacification Activities of the Coup D'etat of 12 September [ 1980] 
B) The Subject-Matters of the Week 
1- Education within the Party 
2- What Is the Party Leadership, Who Is the Party Leadership and What is the Most 
Accurate Representation of Him? 
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3- Fundamental Features of the Party Leadership 
4- How the Leadership Can Be Rightly Represented in the Life 
5- Apo and Apoism: The Party Leadership is the History of a Historyless People 
6- The Vitality of the Organiser Militant and Its Apparent Outcomes 
7- Historical Development of the Party Organisation and the Relations of 
Comradeship 
8- The Persistent Tradition and Militant Personality in the PKK: a) The Militant Past 
of the Party, b) The Traits of Party Militant In the Revolutionary Action 
9- On the Questions of the Party and Guerrilla War 
10- Becoming Party [Partilesme] and the Questions of Becoming Party 
11- The History and Social Base of the Political Liquidation in Kurdistan: The 
Treason 
12- The Lifestyle Within the Party and on the Right Relations 
13- Critique and Self-critique 
14- A Revolution Based on Men-Women Common Sovereignty 
15- The Kurdistan Revolution is the Movement of Women's Emancipation 
16- The Form and Content in the Party 
17- The Six Stereotypes of Individuals 
A list of subject headings of the "Political Education Programme of 20 Days" for a term 
of "fighter candidates", cited by Nihat A. Özcan, is consisted of ten items, and while 
no a Marxist-Leninist doctrine related one is found among them, three of those are 
(numbered 4,9 and 10) concerning about personality and lifestyle: "I. History of 
Kurdistan, 2. Society of Kurdistan, 3. History of the Party, 4. The culture and Moral 
of the Party, 5. The Features of Turkish Bourgeoisie and Army, 6. The Nature of 
Special War [of Turkey] and Its Tactics, 7. Popular War, 8. Guerrilla War, 9. The 
traits of a Commander, 10. Style and Behaviour" (Özcan, N. A., 1999, p. 424). 
It is clear that no heading relating socialist theory or the philosophy of socialism 
appears among the above subjects, but each of these headings is discussed under 
detailed subheadings. Two of the subjects have further details to be studied by 
sympathisers and provisional members: The Fundamental Features o/' the Part,, 
Leadership and The Traits of the Party Militant In the Revolutionary Action. The 
subheadings of the former are as follows: 
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a) He is the intensified expression [form] of science. 
b) He is the merciless pursuer of truth. 
c) He is independencist [bagimsizlikci - independence lover in the sense of individual's 
personality rather than of a State] under any conditions. 
d) He takes the balance of powers into account but does not take it as fundamental and 
relies on the genuine power [of people]. 
e) He is the balanced combination of firmness in principle and flexibility in politics, 
and possesses a great talent for manoeuvring. 
f) He does not fit into the existing moulds [patterns of leaderships]. 
g) He does not recognise the limits to progress; he always goes along at his peak. 
h) He is atilimci [dashist or the person who does not hesitate to innovate]. 
i) He is an analyser [able to analyse things] and decisive [in having desired results]. 
j) He is always targeted at gaining and succeeds. 
k) He is the highest representative of the loyalty to labour. 
1) He has a talent for decisive persuading and educating. 
m) He is an explorer and researcher, and has a deep knowledge of history. 
n) He is the combination of sagacity, determination/stability and bravery. 
Each of the features is explained and exemplified in details ranging from two to five 
pages. The latter, The Traits of Party Militant In the Revolutionary Action, which is 
sequenced in almost exactly the same way in all constitutions (1978,1995,2000) as 
"the traits (or personal conditions) of the party member" mentioned above. These traits 
are as follows: 
He or She 
a) bears a great love for the country and its humans, 
b) is in favour of a democratic regime, 
c) fights for socialism and is internationalist, 
d) bears love and respect towards his/her comrades and people, 
e) is the representative [model/example] of the new socialist ethic, 
f) is not a coward or selfish but brave and self-sacrificing, 
g) should keep a good balance between firmness and flexibility, 
h) is careful, sensitive and measured, 
i) is, in educating oneself, investigative and exploratory, 
j) should not be dogmatic but creative, 
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k) does not work haphazardly but in a planned way. 
Each trait which a militant needs to attain membership is broadly discussed. 
Strikingly, there are no elements of socialist ideology within the education 
programme. Instead the spiritual aspects of man's personality are focused on. No 
elements of national sentiments, such as a focus on national dignity, are found among 
the subject or materials of the education. Whereas we find in the speeches of the 1986 
congress (third congress of the PKK) that Öcalan places apparent emphasis on the study 
of socialist doctrine and is consequently well aware of the "vital importance" of the 
knowledge of socialism for their struggle: "We see socialism that it is the most 
scientific expression of our day's level of progression of humanity and social science. 
... 
We must thus take scientific socialism, but the single-ply of its scientific essence, as 
the real basis" (Öcalan, 1993a, p. 214). 
In another talk "On the Party Organisation" he becomes more specific in this 
respect: "We really strive to create a revolutionary party which is to he under the 
guidance of scientific socialism. ... I also said this earlier, if you had been 
knowledgeable about socialist doctrine, we could argue very well and the disparity 
between views would not have disturbed us too much" (op. cit. pp. 225,254). The 
most probable/plausible cause of the contradiction is the educational state of the 
militant body of the Party. Recent research on the educational levels in a Kurdish 
province under Turkey, Sirnak28 indicates a phenomenal state of affairs. 60% of the 
population of the province are illiterate. 75% of the rest of the population (who are able 
to read and write) are educated only up to primary school. The percentage of illiteracy 
rises up to 75% in agricultural (or rural) areas. Only 2% have graduated from 
universities among the non-illiterates (Mortan, 1998). In view of the considerable 
percentage of the party's grassroots who are somehow related to the peasantry, the 
educational grounds for a proposed "party education" guided by socialist doctrine 
become disadvantageous. However, while the noticeable implications of a systematic 
teaching of socialist doctrine are not found in the Party's educational activities, there is 
a bold emphasis on the identification of the party and its ideology with Marxist-Leninist 
socialism. 
The findings generated by responses to a field research questionnaire reflect this 
aspect of the party education. I constructed two similar questions falling on separate 
pages of the questionnaire: "Is the PKK, in your opinion, a national liberation party for 
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the Kurds? " and "Is the PKK a nationalist party? " The answer of "No" to the former 
question is 94.5%. That is to say, 94.5% of respondents do not believe that the PKK is 
a nationalist party, for the term "nationalism" is deemed to be a derogatory notion and 
it is defined within the framework of bourgeois ideology by Marxist-socialists. The 
percentage of "No" responses climbs up to 96.5% among the more educated activists, 
from high school level education and above (Table 3). In response to the latter 
question, 70.1% of activists believe that the PKK is a national liberation party for the 
Kurds (Table 2). That implies that the PKK is not nationalist but "national 
liberationist". This of course does not define the precise ideological and political nature 
of the Party, but provides us with a mere example of "national liberationist" movement 
in its communist "ideological form" (Seton-Watson, 1965, p. 15), or, in Lester's words, 
the dazzling confusion of "national communism" (Lester, 1997, p. 42). 
However, among the responses to two similar questions asking about the PKK's 
dominant quality and their main expectations from the Party, the percentage of the 
respondents who are interested in the Party's socialist aspect is quite low. While the 
main expectation of only 2.7% of the respondents is the "struggle for socialism" (Table 
15), the socialism of the PKK comes first for 20% of them (Table 4). 
Similarly, in response to an open-ended question asking for the briefest 
definition of the PKK, the second largest percentage of the respondents, 18%, defined 
the Party in national terms, following the unclassifiable total of "other" answers (Table 
18). 
In the overall content of the educational activities of the PKK, the usage of 
socialism, its materialism, its dialectics, even "its psychology" is obvious, but the actual 
theoretical elements of its doctrine have by no means been the issue of party education. 
"I felt the need to use the socialist method of psychology very deeply" because "if' you 
do not contemplate and work daily on the [production of] socialist militants, the 
[existing] personalities can convert the party into a very solid feudal instrument at 
once" (Öcalan, 1998, p. 22). However, the very "production of socialist militants" is, 
in the experience of the PKK , attempted 
by a "single machine" - 
Öcalan's talks during 
20 years, using an extremely centralised method. 
Öcalan's talks over two decades (from the late 1979 to early 1999) are almost 
the only source material for the educational efforts of the PKK. Thus, the quality (or 
content) and quantity of these talks are of the utmost importance in respect of cadre 
recruitment and/or grassroots motivation. The talks' total quantity in pages or time was 
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impossible for me to find out, because many of them are unpublished and are kept as 
confidential documents by the party. However, I extrapolated an approximate figure 
from the regularity of unexceptionally recorded talks. First, the number of pages in all 
the published books is certain and provides a clue. Here is a list of these books, with 
the English translations of their titles and the number of pages they contain. 
Title Date Page 
A Militant Personality in a People's War 1994 552 
About Organisation 
Collaboration, Treason and Revolutionary Resistance 
History Is Concealed in Our Time and We Are in the Commencement of History 
How Man Ought to Live? -I 
How Man Ought to Live? - II 
I Look For a Negotiator 
Insistence on Socialism is Insistence on Becoming a Human Being 
Letters 
Political Report to the 4`h Congress 
Political Report to the 5`h Congress 
Political Report to the 7`h Congress of the PKK 
Questions of Socialism and Revolution 
Selected Interviews -I 
Selected Interviews - II 
Selected Interviews - III 
Selected Writings -I 
Selected Writings - II 
Selected Writings - III 
Selected Writings - IV 
Selected Writings -V 
Selected Writings - VI 
The "Special War" in Kurdistan 
The Cease-fire and its Reflections 
The Colonialist Republic Is Dirty and Guilty 










































The Guide of Life and the Army 1996 403 
The Initial Talks 1999 258 
The Kurdish Love; How Man Ought to Live? - III 1999 210 
The Kurdish Patriotism and Our Duties 1992 628 
The Language and Action of the Revolution 1996 336 
The Liquidating of Liquidation 1993 525 
The Manifesto of Democratic Solutions to Kurdish Question 1999 166 
The Manifesto of Freedom: Zilan 1999 103 
The People's Heroism in Kurdistan 1994 296 
The People's War and Guerrillas in Kurdistan 1991 586 
The Perspectives of Victory 1996 142 
The Questions of Progression in the PKK and Our Duties 1994 308 
The Reality of Leadership and the Experience of PKK -1 1992 381 
The Reality of Leadership and the Experience of PKK - II 1992 362 
The Role of Coercion in Kurdistan 1983 316 
The Talks of 3rd Congress 1993 490 
The Talks of PKK Prison Conference 1994 345 
The Talks of Rome 1999 334 
The Woman and Family in Kurdistan 1992 388 
Transformation Process and Tasks 2000 204 
Turkish State and the Reality of Leadership in the PKK 1992 194 
We Will Change the Countenance of the Middle East 1994 367 
Total pages 16,653 
The talks of Öcalan (both the lectures and telephone-radio instructions or 
dialogues) have been quite regular since his flight from Turkey to Lebanon. It would 
then be plausible to calculate the approximate total in pages by the approximate 
lengths of the talks delivered in a week. Three or four lectures are given in a week and 
each takes three to four hours. (This is what I witnessed during my stay of four weeks 
in the Party Central School. I have also been told by Cemil Bayik, the "Second Man", 
that this is the "tempo" which started when the group decided to be a Kurdish 
Movement in 1976. But the talks were not recorded regularly as such until Ocalan's 
escape). In pages, each talk ranges from 30 to 50 AS pages. This is more or less 
equivalent to 600 pages a month. The sum total of the pages over twenty years is 
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144,000. This, of course, is not a firmly reliable figure. But it is also by no means an 
exaggerated figure. Moreover, it excludes the tele-talks and interviews. And this very 
fact seems to be the fundamental cause of the "indispensability" of Öcalan's 
leadership29 and consequently of the terrifying actions executed by individuals of both 
sexes and various ages who were shouting his name (Biji Serok Apo - Long Live Our 
Leader Apo) when they set fire to themselves. 
Among those several hundred self-sacrificing (either through setting fire to 
themselves or blowing themselves to pieces with explosives) individual actions, two 
are particularly illustrative of the party education being overwhelmingly centralised on 
Öcalan's talks. 
One was executed by a woman, Zeynep Kinaci, in Dersim on 29 June, 1996. It 
was a "suicide attack", where she penetrated a group of soldiers who were singing the 
Turkish national anthem, with a large amount of explosives tied around herself. She 
was blown to pieces with more than ten soldiers following the explosion. Zeynep 
Kinaci was a 24 year old married woman who graduated from Malatya; 0 University 
with a degree in social sciences and used to work in a state (not private) hospital as an 
x-ray technician. She began to work professionally for the Party with her husband two 
years before (1994) the "action". She joined the guerrilla forces operating around 
Dersim in 1995. Prior to the "suicide attack", she recorded three messages in the form 
of letters: "To the Party Leadership" [Öcalan], "To the Kurdistan Women Freedom 
fighters" and "To the Patriotic People of Kurdistan and Revolutionary Public 
Opinion". In the first letter, she constructs a sentence containing a spiritual definition 
of the PKK in terms of a universalistic socialist aspiration and belief, following a very 
brief story of her background and attachment to the Party: "Our struggle; which has 
developed, has become the property of all humanity and gradually converted into the 
only hope of oppressed peoples on the way to lofty socialism in the vanguard of our 
Party, has also brought a people [Kurds] to an exalted state ... who were at the 
threshold of a complete degeneration ... for the 
first time in the history". She also sets 
out a diligent - but peculiar - framework for a comprehensive type of political leader. 
The leader is a person who represents the most desired form of life at the highest 
level, namely with its innovations and progressions in accordance with it new 
man's new idea of society, who regulates his/her complete life according to the 
people's life, who literally lives with the pains, emotions and demands of the 
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people and consequently finds his/her destiny directly tied in with the people's 
destiny, and who shoulders practical duties to the highest extent for liberation. 
She then expresses her feelings about the "Leadership", manifesting the fact that party 
education is over-centralised on Öcalan's teachings. In view of the fact that she is a 
cadre of only two years standing and has never met Öcalan, the manifestation of his 
influence is signified by some outstanding clues. 
My President, 
... If we even sacrifice our 
life to you, it is not adequate in comparison to your 
unlimited labour and efforts. I wish we had things further than our life that we 
could sacrifice. You re-create a people through your own life. We are merely your 
work. You are the assurance of the whole people of Kurdistan and the future of 
humanity. Your life gives us honour, love, courage, confidence, trust and belief. 
The whole people of Kurdistan and the millions of humans are loyal to you in peril 
of their life. The attractiveness of your life also profoundly influences our life. In 
the most difficult circumstances, we think about your love for us and obtain a 
spiritual strength. You are the one who is most loyal to the martyrs. On this basis, 
we will absolutely not hesitate over the triumph of our demands [italics added. 
In addition, the final sentence of the letter to the "Party Leadership" is interesting 
coming from a "suicide guerrilla" who has killed more than ten soldiers: "1 carry out 
this action because I love life and humans". A similar expression regarding the love of 
life31, human beings and nature is striking in the letter to the "People of Kurdistan and 
Revolutionary Public Opinion" which also emphasises her belief and trust in 
Öcalan. While blaming the "imperialist powers" behind Turkey for the "inevitable 
pitiless outcomes" of the war, she once again focuses on her love of life, peace and 
fraternity. 
I shout to the whole world: "Hear me, open your eyes! " We are the children of a 
people that has had their country taken away and has been scattered to the four 
corners of the world. We want to live in freedom in our own land like human 
beings. Blood, tears and tyranny must no longer be the destiny of our people. We 
long for peace, fraternity, love, humanity, nature and life more than anyone. We do 
not want to cause war, to die or to kill. But there is no other way of gaining our 
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freedom. It is the imperialist powers and their lackey, the Turkish State, which are 
responsible for the war. 
She also discusses the woman question and points towards the main defect of 
"experienced socialism" about the question in her letter to the "Women Freedom 
Fighters". She states that the "scientific socialist theory proposes to provide women 
with the opportunity for a humanly life", and criticises the approach of real socialism 
which has not handled the woman question within the framework of "scientific 
socialist principles" or in accordance with its uniqueness, but rather within general 
questions of humanity. That is to say, the most remarkable point in the letters which 
highlights the limits of party education is that party activists are given the intensive 
aspirations and firm beliefs of socialism without the basic principles of dialectical 
materialist doctrine. 
On the one hand, Kinaci, emphasises the socialist longing for universally 
humane content and the "principles of scientific socialism" to the extent of 
subordinating the Kurdish struggle by saying "our struggle; which ... has become the 
property of all humanity and has gradually been converted into the only hope of 
oppressed peoples on the way to lofty socialism ... has also brought a people to an 
exalted state". On the other hand, by saying "you [Öcalan] are the one who is most 
loyal to the martyrs ... [and thus] we will absolutely not hesitate over the triumph of 
our demands" she feels herself to be a "martyr" prior to the "suicide attack". 
Considering that she had graduated from a university where the majority of militants 
in the Party had not, the dimensions of the PKK's subjective share in the process of 
motivating its militants and grassroots support by an intensive and monopolised 
system of party education become clear. 
The other outstanding "action" was performed in Germany by Eser Altinok, 
who informed on the PKK's activities to the German police for some time, and who 
then drank petrol before setting fire to himself "in order to burn up all the imperialist 
influences that had infiltrated his spirit". The letter he wrote to "Dear Mum" while he 
was preparing himself for this "action" is philosophical. 23 year old Eser attempts a 
dialectical account of the "wrestling" between the enemy and the PKK "with all their 
might" within his spiritual structure. The notion of the enemy in Eser's letter 
transcends the Turkish State or even imperialism. He repeatedly underlines the term 
"enemy" but does not specify it as being either Turkey or imperialism. lie rather 
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associates the term with the one party of class struggle who have "govern[ed] the 
sufferings" of humankind since the "inception of world humanity" and expresses his 
confidence in the "harmonious" future of humanity through dialectical thinking. 
... 
The source of every painful phenomenon is the enemy. The enemy does not 
only create pain but also governs it. ... The world's humanity was not born with 
pain. ... 
it [humanity] is passing through such a stage in our time. In the future, 
this darkness which we call pain will wither away because the world's humanity 
did not emerge with pain but at ease. This fight will consequently culminate in 
ease. It is so because ... every 
beginning contains the character of its end. 
He deepens his concept of the "enemy" and puts more emphasis on the "internal class 
struggle" both in the PKK and in the spiritual wholeness of himself. 
The class struggle within the PKK is the struggle between the parties who want to 
end the pain and those who want to keep the pain alive. The ones who strove to 
deform the essence of the PKK at its inception are on the one side and the General 
President of the PKK Abdullah Öcalan on the other. The fight that is executed by 
these two parties against one another within the PKK is more intensive than the one 
against the enemy. I felt this intensity within myself, I lived with it everyday. 
Eser Altinok joins the Party in late 1993, receives "intensive" party education in Europe 
in 1994 and becomes a professional party activist. He receives his earlier education, 
equivalent to pre-university college here in the UK, in Germany. Because the PKK is 
outlawed in Germany, he is arrested and imprisoned for almost eight months in 1997 
due to his organisational activities. However, during his imprisonment, he experiences 
conflicts within himself and eventually agrees to inform on some fellow activists in the 
PKK and causes some of them to be arrested. Following occasional usage for 
operations by the German police, Eser repents of what he is doing. The interesting 
explanations he gives in his letter are about the period between this repentance and his 
appalling "suicide action". A paragraph in the letter concerning political action and the 
"renewal" process of the individual's personality tells us something about the PKK's 
"party education". 
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A new personality realises by müdahale [intervention/interference]. To achieve a 
new personality, to reshape one's emotional body, to adjust the brain in accordance 
to the new; all these can actualised by müdahale. To intervene in the formation of 
the personality, to generalise the positive aspects [of the personality] and regulate 
them according to the Party, to unite the power of the feelings and the intellect in 
aiming at this target and, in the final analysis, to defeat the enemy within one's 
spirit and on this basis to feel the Leadership, to keep alive the Leadership in your 
spiritual structure and to integrate the Leadership into one's surroundings entails 
politicisation. This is because politics means a practical entity, namely it falls in 
the field of müdahale. ... 
There is no other meaning of politics. 
The above paragraph is a preliminary generalisation intended to describe the actual 
process of his attachment to the PKK. In continuation, he focuses on his "inescapable 
end" and exposes the essence of the process: "The way of my attachment to the Party 
determined the result because I did not grasp politics as intervening in one's existing 
personality. I wielded the Party for my personal interest ... I could not grasp even the 
`P' of the PKK within its genuine framework. The thing existing in my personality is 
not the PKK's political terbiye [good manner acquired by education and experience] 
but the enemy's political terbiyesizlik [ill-manneredness, bad manners]". As a result, he 
sees himself as a traitor - "because", Eser repeats, "every beginning conceals the seeds 
of its end in itself' - and endeavours to illuminate the specific cause of the final effect 
by exposing his spiritual state in terms of Plato's notion of the "spiritual balance" 
between reason and appetite. 
I created emotionlessness in the name of emotion. I locked my brain for the 
sake of a dirhern32 pleasure. A bucking [like a horse] pleasure means that the brain 
becomes locked. 
Then he tries to describe for his mother how the "contention between the enemy and the 
PKK"... "with all their might" caused his particular spiritual imbalances. Even if he is 
aware that the "mum" is not in the position to perceive "what a non-PKK life and 
Leadership style" is, he still makes the attempt to describe his situation. 
Mum, you may never sharply feel the heat of the feeling of penitence in the depth 
of your spirit. It is not a feeling of which you are always conscious. It hides itself 
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in a corner of your spirit. When the other spiritual entities which prevent the 
sovereignty of this feeling in the spirit - which are indeed potent entities - begin to 
weaken, lose their omnipotence, it [the feeling of penitence] launches an offensive 
and conquers the spirit. If the material conditions which have a grasp on spirit and 
mind present an adequate atmosphere for bringing ease of mind and causing the 
feeling of penitence to cease, it [penitence] is replaced by gratuitousness. But if 
such an atmosphere does not sufficiently exist ... penitence leaves the sovereignty 
over the spirit to its opposite; penitence withdraws into its corner in order to erupt 
one day. During the period of this process, the feelings and inferences formed to 
justify the event, the circumstance (which caused the feeling of penitence) and its 
form and content all become the sovereign of the spirit. 
The feeling of penitence is not something like a straw flame instantly blazing and 
going out but a volcano which becomes dormant and rekindles at times. It has 
occasionally shifted from being sovereign to being oppressed in my spirit. I am 
very happy for I [have decided to] set fire to myself. It is so because this time, on 
this occasion, I will by no means let this feeling be oppressed by anti-depressant 
pills! ... 
I thought that I would have entirely eliminated and destroyed this feeling 
... and that 
it would have been non-existent as a feeling when I was completely 
consolidated into the enemy in theory and practice. Whereas I realised that it had 
hidden itself in a corner of my spirit. The corner in which it hid itself is the 
footprint of the PKK. This is what the PKK is like. Once it enters the spirit, it 
never leaves. 
The 23 year old European-born militant of the PKK, Eser Altinok, reaches his eventual 
conclusion and expresses it in an ironic style: "The feeling of penitence tells me this: 
The most beautiful sight of a traitor is his/her burnt-to-ash heart". And in accordance 
with this conclusion, he constructs an interesting final paragraph. 
I will also burn the enemy with myself. I will not burn an individual but a class. 
When I bum the imperialism inside myself, I want to convert my heart into ashes. 
If I swallow the petrol and also pour it into myself, 
I will be burning my heart from 
inside. I am conquering the castle from within its walls. 
The excerpts I have quoted from the letter are selected to draw attention to the very 
main focuses of the PKK's organisational education. I have striven to demonstrate in 
the foregoing discussions and analyses that this education is first and foremost targeted 
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at rekindling the dormant anti-treason sentiments of the Kurds as "untapped springs of 
energy" (Nairn, 1981, p. 102), accumulated in their unique ethnic background. In 
addition, the party leadership proposes, through simultaneous endeavours, to reassess 
"human nature" in terms of Plato's belief in education and his method of "self re- 
creation", and in terms of Socrates' philosophy of "know yourself'. 
III Charismatic Messiah or Messianic Charisma 
The indisputable charisma endowed to Öcalan's abbreviated name, Apo, is an effective 
source of motivation both within the party organisation and among the Kurdish 
masses, and deserves further study. We need to take a closer look to the concept of 
"charisma", not because it is one of the main themes of this research, but because the 
charismatic authority under Öcalan that operates in the party structure and the 
supporting masses has much to do with motivational effects in the movement. And 
because charisma has much to do with the messianic expectations of the helpless 
masses, we also need to make a brief reference to Messianism. 
Charisma is one of the precarious or, so to speak, "slippery" concepts of the 
sociology of politics -and, of course, of the sociology of religion as politics. A similar 
intellectual challenge dominates the atmosphere surrounding messianism. The 
ideational coverage of theorisation on both concepts encompasses a wide segment of 
human history. Messianism, for instance, ranges from God's messenger (prophet) to 
Mazzini's "people", from Plato's "philosopher ruler" to Hegel's "World Historical 
Individuals", from Marx's "proletariat" to Gramsci's "elite of intellectuals". In a 
similar pattern, charisma ranges from God or gods itself/themselves to the most 
hardline anti-religious or so-called materialistic leaders of secular movements. 
Thus, in order to avoid such a "slippery" path towards the multidimensional 
arguments of a wide-ranging literature, I shall have to condense -or even "solidify"- 
these two intricately interrelated concepts into a single path of cognisance. By doing 
this, of course, the individuality of each will not be denied. The susceptible "autonomy" 
of concepts is taken for granted. However, since this study relates to a movement that 
provides - and is propelled by- a secular foundation, a focus on "charisma" is apposite. 
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a) The Problem of the Concepts 
The term "Messiah" derives from the Hebrew mashiah literally meaning "the anointed 
one". It denotes a "chosen" individual, or, in Christian theology, the Christ. The idea of 
"chosenness", afterwards, exceeds the individual and stretches to encompass either it 
group or a class or a people or a nation, and so on. Charisma comes from Greek word 
kharisma which means "gift of grace". And that is given by a divine power or, in 
secular cases, is an inborn quality of the individual. But both the messiah and the 
charismatic individual, according to believers or followers, are "chosen" and/or "sent" 
for redemption and/or salvation of a country or people - or, in case of "socialist 
messianism", for the "total redemption of humanity". In fact, both phenomena are 
"closer relatives" than is generally recognised in their respective literatures. The very 
idea -or the culture- that nurtures these "unbridled" and "awesome" powers (charisma 
or the messiah) with "ramifications of an individualised hegemony" (Lee, 1992, p. 44) 
relates the revolutionary yearnings of the helpless mob ("incapable of achieving order 
for themselves") -that is, Nietzsche's "herd". 
Scholars are confident of three points regarding messianism: a) that it is 
attached to the human need for "revolution"33 (the indispensable hope for total 
redemption from social evil) as a "comprehensive movement of thought" (Talmop, 
1960, pp. 17-24; Duncan, 2000, pp. 48-61; Wegner, 2000, pp. 68,6934), b) that it 
originates from the "Messiah" of Christianity, and c) that its idea of "chose nness" can 
be traced back to Judaism's "chosen people". Duncan firmly states that the "concept of 
a `chosen people' penetrated into Christian thought from Judaism" (Duncan, 2((X), p. 
141). Arguing for the "Jewish ingredient" in "political messianism", Talmon points at 
"the fact that Karl Marx was of Jewish ancestry" (Talmon, 1960, p. 77) and further 
states that "it was the Messianic urge that sent Marx upon his quest" (op. cit., p. 505). 
On the other hand, the "elasticity" of the term "messianism" employed in the related 
literature cannot be overlooked. This is the "characteristic feature of all movements and 
ideas described as forms of `messianism"' says Duncan, and he quotes R. J. Zwi 
Werblowsky. 
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The term messianism... denoting the Jewish religious concept of a person with a 
special mission from God, is used in a broad and at times very loose sense to refer to 
beliefs or theories regarding an eschatological (concerning the last times) 
improvement of the state of man or the world and a final consumption of history, ̀s 
(Duncan, 2000, p. 6) 
The concept of charisma contains a similar problem. Although, as Conger puts it, "there 
is a little disagreement in the literature over the locus of charismatic leadership"'6 
(Conger and Kanungo, 1988, p. 23), it is not clear whether it is a religious or non- 
religious phenomenon. It involves both supernatural and secular endowments. And its 
repositories are not only individual persons but may also be "groups" or "objects" such 
as "kinship groups", "blood lines", "status systems" or "an institutional structure 
regardless of the persons involved" (Spencer, 1973, p. 343)37. Also, it is not yet settled 
whether the "power of charisma" is deployed for "good" or "evil", or whether it is 
"neutral". There is a "problem" in the lack of consensus on the precise meaning of 
charisma, because the term has been applied to very diverse leaders, 
Despite the increased attention being focused on charismatic leadership in the 
academic literature, to date no scholarly consensus has emerged on the precise 
application of the concept of charisma. (House and Howell, 1992, p. S3), 
Howell refers to Willner's "mediating" statement, which accords with a classical text - 
the concept of "charismatic authority" theorised by Max Weber. 
It should be underscored that, in accordance with Weber's example (119241 1947), 
'" 
charisma is used in a value-neutral manner. As Willner ... points out, charismatic 
leadership is "inherently neither moral nor immoral, neither virtuous nor wicked ... 
such questions arise only when we wish to evaluate whether a particular charismatic 
leader has used the relationship in the service of good or evil. " (Howell in Conger 
and Kanungo, 1988, pp. 214,21.5) 
Yet, "the problem" of the literature is found in the absence of "an explanation of the 
process by which charismatic leadership has its profound effects" (Shamir, House and 
Arthur, 1993, p. 579). Accordingly, to overcome the problem, research efforts are 
exhausted in analysing the "profound effects" that are generated on followers by 
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charismatic leaders (op. cit., 1993 and et al. ). And Jermier talks of confusion about the 
"vague concept" charisma that necessitates "additional imaginative new theories, 
critical reconceptualisations" (Jermier, 1993, p. 218). 
Scholars have explored two main areas when analysing the phenomenon of 
charisma as a "process": the personal attributes of leaders as an inborn "seed" and the 
social tension of conflicts and contradictions as a nurturing "soil" accompanied with 
followers' perceptions/responses. While the scholars with psychoanalytic approaches 
are rather inclined to restrict themselves to the person of charisma (Popper, 2000, pp. 
734,735), inquiries in the social-psychological field investigate the persona of leaders 
(Gabriel, 1997, pp. 319,330). Namely, some stress the sociological insights of the 
phenomenon by calling attention to the "soil" that yields charismatic leaders. Others 
focus on the leader's performance in terms of either "sacrifice/suffering/benefiting" or 
his/her personality as "a constellation of individual qualities", or on leaders' upbringing 
and backgrounds. On the other hand, when the central focus is charisma's relatively 
positive or negative consequences, intellectual efforts are devoted to the dichotomous 
"faces" of charisma: personalised and socialised or transactional and transformational 
types of leaderships (Burns, 1978; Howell, 1988; House and Howel, 1992; Lee, 1992: 
Popper, 2000; and et. al. ). In fact, the mainstream of the literature overwhelmingly 
acknowledges the relational dialectic between leader and followers. It is the creation of 
a twofold process: the person of the leader with relevant inborn qualities and the 
persona of the leader influenced by the tension of social affairs. 
Thus, charisma is not a thing that can be possessed by an individual. Neither does it 
emerge automatically from certain circumstances regardless of individual qualities 
and initiative. Stated more precisely, charisma is a process that exists only in social 
relationships. It is a product of the qualities and actions of individuals and 
situational factors, but the nature of the situation is its most important determinant. 
(Jermier, 1993, p. 221). 
And charisma is in any case recognised as a fateful social power that cannot he 
trivialised. 
However, the idea that resides at the roots of the concepts, Messiah and 
Charisma, is the revolutionary expectations of the masses -the nwh that is alien to 
ruling and rulers- no matter whether their usage is in the service of good or evil. The 
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helpless mob, which "does not `distinguish' itself, does not become independent in its 
own right" without organisers (Gramsci, 1971, p. 334), has so far never dispensed with 
its radical expectations of total emancipation from social evil. This has always provided 
fertile "soil" to give rise to charismatic messiahs or messianic charismas. Here, the 
defining difference is associated with the timeline of human development. The progress 
of humanisation from the primitive/ancient to our days transformed supernatural 
messiahs towards relatively secular charismas. Accordingly, while explanations of 
messianism are worded in religious terms, charisma is conceptualised instead in secular 
or modern or in "materialistic/deterministic" terms. 
b) The Reification and Ramifications of the Power of Charisma: How It Operates 
In view of the problematic definitions of the concept charisma, as with many other 
concepts in the social sciences, the crux of the phenomenon -or Weber's "charismatic 
authority"- appears to pursue the questions of "how it faithfully operates among the 
followers" and "for whom it, in the final analysis, operates" -just as we discussed 
earlier in Chapter One on nationalism. The charisma of the dead, such as in Khumaini's 
Iran (Sanasarian, 1995; Saeidi, 2001), is rather grandiose and is easily considered, but 
contemplating the mechanisms of its "unbridled" power in the course of the 
"routinisation" of the charismatic leadership would be a more difficult sociological 
enterprise. 
Charisma, as an "unbridled power", demonstrates itself through "legendary" 
successes in "battle" (Spencer, 1973, pp. 345-347) and salvages its followers from 
despair and disperses the tension of the existing "status quo", whose very tension 
legitimises and is "substituted" (Jones, 2001, pp. 759-761) by the ralionallh' 
institutionalised new charismatic authority. This charisma becomes indispensable for 
the emerging "bureaucratic staff'. Further, if its very power has recently salvaged the 
followers or has just dispersed their hopelessness, then charisma is "reborn" as a rapid 
deus ex machina for the "adolescent" ruling stratum that has come out of the process. 
This facet of the phenomenon reveals the genuine socio-political process vis-Ii-vis 
charisma and its charismatic ["transformational" (Burns, 1978)] leadership. This 
process of the "ramifications of an individualised hegemony" (Lee, 1992, pp. 43,44) is 
236 
largely overlooked in the vast literature on the subject, in spite of Weber's articulation 
of the process under his major subtitle (The Routinisation of Charisma [1947, pp. 363- 
373]) to "Charismatic Authority" -the classical reference source. This may be why 
Spencer, while finding charisma as always involved with "a relationship between the 
group and the leader", has repeatedly "refused to consider the charisma as either a 
sociological or psychological phenomenon" (Spencer, 1973, p. 348). 
In his article on the "two faces" of the process, in a scholarly analysis 
containing examples from Islam and Hinduism; Lee briefly pulls the crux of the 
sociological/political phenomenon into the mainstay of his argument and raises "the 
problem" of charisma. 
Generally, the problem of charisma is a problem of unbridled power that is 
psychologically awesome and socially threatening. This is the contemporary 
meaning of charisma, expressed in numerous studies of idiosyncratic power and its 
organisational consequences. ... For Weber, it was not the moral teachings that 
became routinized but the personal authority of the charismatic individual once he 
transferred his command to an impersonal, stratified order. By reallocating the 
source of routinization in the individual, rather than in the teachings, Weberinn 
revisionists have been able to argue that the charismatic qualities of individuals 
once enshrined within institutions can assume a life of their own, in effect 
producing charismatic institutions which in a sense transcend individual 
idiosyncrasies but from which particular incumbents of corporate roles can enjoy 
tremendous power flowing from them (Shils, 1965; 9). (Lee, 1992, pp. 42,43). 
Lee, therefore, states that the central concern of contemporary researchers on charisma 
needs to be "the dialectical relationship between the personal and social or cultural 
sources of charismatic power" (1992, p. 44). In a similar mode, Spencer, though 
contradicting his refusal of charisma as a sociological or psychological phenomenon, 
draws attention to the "diffused form" of charismatic power "in the stratification system 
of society" (Spencer, 1973, p. 342). Whereas, in contrast with "Weberian revisionists", 
Weber begins his explication of the "routinisation of charisma" by situating his 
argument on the base of the "stronger ideal and also stronger material interests of the 
members of the administrative staff'. He first underlines the inevitability of it radical 
change in the pure form of charismatic authority, which "exists only in the process of 
originating", towards taking "on the character of a permanent relationship forming it 
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stable of disciples or a band of followers or a party organisation or any sort of political 
or hierocratic organisation ... ". Then he goes on to the causes of the inevitable 
transformation, in fact, the metamorphosis. 
The following are the principal motives underlying this transformation: (a) The ideal 
and also the material interests of the followers in the continuation and the continual 
reactivation of the community, (b) the still stronger ideal and also stronger material 
interests of the members of the administrative staff, the disciples or other followers of 
the charismatic leader in continuing their relationship. (Weber, 1947, p364). 
The vitality of the strong "ideal and material" interests, Weber adds, "generally become 
conspicuously evident with the disappearance of the personal charismatic leader ... 
which inevitably arises" (op. cit. ). Thinking of the charisma of the dead when "the 
problem of succession" arises, the reification of the power, allocated to the hierarchy of 
the newly arisen ruling apparatus, adds to the sense of the genuine significance of the 
"routinisation" of charisma, in other words, of the "radical change" in the charismatic 
authorityao 
Weber's "routinization of charisma" denotes seizing the power of charisma from 
the person of the charismatic leader to guard the "interests of the administrative staff, 
... so that their own status 
is stable on a day-to-day basis" (Saeidi, 20)l, p. 222). In 
fact, power is a non-individual phenomenon. Jermier advises thinking of charisma "as a 
pattern of interactions" which necessitates a cosmos-like (a well-ordered hierarchized 
whole) communal structure as sine qua non to be reified. He applies to Foucault's 
metaphoric words. 
... 
Power must be analyzed as something which circulates, or rather as something 
which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never 
in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or a piece of wealth. Power 
is employed through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate 
between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and 
exercising this power. 41 (Jermier, 1993, p. 221). 
In this very sense, charisma is a mere property of' the "bureaucratic staff". Any 
charismatic authority temporarily operates through a body of staff. A body of corporate 
staff that steers political affairs defines a bureaucratic apparatus. Thus, the 
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"bureaucratic administrative staff' is not only a sub-property of "legal authority" but 
also of "charismatic authority" - both in the charisma of the living and the deceased .4 
The power of charisma, in all cases, undergoes two main stages: a) the emerging 
process, "the process of originating" in Weber's words, and b) the process of 
"routinisation" or, so to speak, of the institutionalisation of routinisation. In both 
processes the power is still based on the "attitude of awe" or "reverential posture", or 
"enthusiasm". But while in the former period the power is targeted at the tension, 
conflict and contradictions of the status quo, and consequently is deployed for the 
mobilisation of followers and masses, in the latter it is devoted to securing the status 
quo, and is consequently "sacrificed" for the reestablishment of the "loyal" followers 
and the demobilisation or stagnation of the masses. The former period, in general, 
squares with the duration of the struggle against the existing ruling order, and therefore 
charisma functions as "messianic power" for the followers and entrepreneurs "that can 
fan `the spark of hope' in the dimmest political possibility" (Wegner, 2000, p. 72). The 
latter period squares with the time of ascending to the throne and afterwards, and in 
consequence, "radically" changes. Its demonstrated power is now in the service of 
guarding the new status order. And this is precisely why the ubiquitous "hallmark" of 
the process of rationalisation or institutionalisation or "routinisation" of charisma is the 
clear-cut elimination of dissenters -no matter what religious or secular or Marxist 
stamp the process bears4;. 
Charisma, in the person of the leader, "emerges in a field of conflict and 
contradictions and is so sustained" (Perinbayanagam, 1971, p. 395) as messianisnz. it 
first operates as a pivotal revolutionary force to either end or transform the "rules and 
resources that maintain structural order" (Lee, 1992, p. 41). Then it rapidly reverses for 
the sake of the "ramifications of an individualised hegemony" (op. cit. p. 44) devoted to 
maintaining the new status order as a pivotal reactionary force. That is, it has "two 
faces": It both operates for individual or group or mass mobilisations and for the 
hegemony of the corporate body. It is an indispensable tool in the absence of 
institutionalised civic organisations which are ruled by rules. 
To summarise, the "magic" power of the charismatic leadership of political 
parties -or of organised leading entities of non-local social movements exclusive of the 
field of business, etc. - emerges as a force sparking revolution. It has thus always been 
messianic. However, the "unbridled awesome power" arrives, in the final analysis, at 
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its mission: to operate on the part of newly emergent bureaucratic staff to 
institutionalise and to class so as to assure their "stronger ideal and also stronger 
material interests". And it continues to function since it succeeds regardless of the 
existence or absence of the person of charisma. 
This recurrent "face" of human social development appears to reoccur until civil 
political organisations in every aspect of life have superseded -or obtained mastery of- 
the political parties that have been "instruments of the maintenance and the widening of 
power of some man over others" (Panebianco, 1988, p. viii). That is, the "sparking" 
power of both revolutions and "counter-revolutions", charisma, will be antiquated when 
the reification of what is called civil society is the case of total societal. 
c) The Routinisation of "Apo" Charisma 
The type of leadership that A. Ocalan and the PKK experience is evidently a bold 
charismatic one. No additional proof is needed in this respect. In particular, in terms of 
being "foreign to all rules" or at least "intellectually analysable rules" (Weber, 1947, p. 
361), the organisational body of the PKK functions under a "pure form" of charismatic 
authority. A considerable proportion of the Kurdish masses and the whole structure of 
the organisation have recognised Apo as the "possessor of the quality" who has arisen 
"out of enthusiasm, or of despair and hope" (op. cit. p. 359) from the early 1990s 
onwards. This has been the case to such an extent that Öcalan himself has begun to 
complain loudly. In response to a related question from a Turkish journalist, he 
chastised his followers for not being critical of him: "My suffering is in their 
submission like slaves.. . They either do that [blind obeying] or run away. This is my 
problem too" (Balli, 1991, p. 282). 
The nature of Öcalan's charisma does not provide us with an arguable 
distinctness in comparison with equivalent present or past experiences in the East, West 
and Middle East. What is unique to Kurdish societal praxis and its interaction with 
Turkey's Kurdish policy, is that the routinisation of Ocalan's charisma has been reified 
before the institutionalisation of the Party. Even, one may say, the routinisation firmly 
took place without the party having institutionalised. 
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The processes of institutionalisation and routinisation in charismatic organisations 
unavoidably follow a simultaneous path of development, for they mutually nurture one 
another. Both processes require, in a de facto flaw of organisational working, the 
elimination or dysfunctionalisation of the person of charisma, just as has been the 
recurrent face of history in examples such as those of Mao, Lenin, Ataturk, and even 
the prophets and so on, regardless of their secular/materialistic or religious character 
(elaborated in Chapter 1). Even if the person of charisma does not like it, the process of 
institutionalisation "shadows" the routinisation of charisma. 
Personal charisma is, besides, generally associated with strong resistance to 
institutionalisation. The leader, in fact, has no interest in organisational reinforcement 
which would inevitably set the stage for the party's "emancipation" from his control. 
(Panebianco 1988, pp. 66,67). 
That is, the resistance of the charismatic leader by no means has the power to prevent 
the routinisation and/or institutionalisation taking place. This is because charismatic 
power too "is employed through a net-like organisation", and the "material and ideal 
interests" of the administrative-bureaucratic staff is far "stronger" than the love for the 
person of charisma. This appears to be the plausible reason why Pedahzur and E3richta 
call to mind Maor's critique of Panebianco in "defining a charismatic party as un- 
institutionalised" (2002, p. 34) for Panebianco places the institutionalisation and 
routinisation against one another. 
In a charismatic party (before the routinsation of charisma), the absence of 
institutionalisation and the presence of a very strong centralisation of authority ... are 
associated. (Panebianco, 1988, p. 66). 
Whereas the institutionalisation of charismatic parties takes place precisely along with 
the routinisation of charisma. And this is probably the fact that drove Rose and Mackie 
to develop the concept of "charismatic institutionalisation" (Pedahzur and Brichta, 
2002, p. 35). 
The institutionalisation of Öcalan's party began to be on the agenda of the 
organisation in the second half of the 1980s when the movement enjoyed evident mass 
support and major recruitment. The organisation established a popular army and front 
241 
flanks along with many sub-branches of various fields of activities (exemplified in 
Chapter 6, I b). The party even ventured into self-contained "general elections" twice 
(1992 and 1995). In fact, these were all fatal enterprises44 just as is now the case for 
KADEK. (The preceding PKK is factually there with its routinised charismatic 
authority -with its "foreign-to-rules" working under the name of KADEK). However, 
while the institutionalisation attempts of the PKK have not produced noticeable results, 
the effective routinisation of Apo Charisma has held sway since the early 1990s despite 
everything. Also, the elimination of Öcalan by his arrest in 1998 has not so far effected 
considerable changes in either the decisive influence of his charisma or its routinised 
working. 
The question of Öcalan's charisma in terms of organisational entanglements is 
further discussed in Chapter 6 (II e). 
Conclusions 
Both the form and content of "party education" and the dominance of Öcalan's talks in 
the overall educational activities of the PKK have constituted the fundamental base for 
the organisational motivation of cadres and the grassroots. In other words, the nature 
and intensity of the educational efforts, which are literally composed by Ocalan's 
"tongue", have had a decisive effect on the motivational extent of national sentiments 
of the tribal "Turkish Kurds". And the very form, content and intensity of the 
monolingual education reproduced the "Apo" charisma in the tension of Turkey's 
Kurdish question as a nurturing "field of conflict and contradictions" and his charisma 
has been thus "so sustained" (Perinbayanagam, 1971, p. 395). In turn, the "Apo" 
charisma as an "unbridled power that is psychologically awesome and socially 
threatening" ('Lee, 1992, p. 42) had profound effects on the organisation's mass 
activities. On the other hand, the same sources of motivation - "at a certain stage" of 
the PKK's quantitative growth within the framework of de facto organisational 
procedures shaped extensively by itself (Öcalan's "tongue") with the additional 
contextual effects imposed by the failure of Soviet Socialism - turned into the 
Organisation's fetters throughout the 1990s, just like the "destiny" of the "conflict 
existing between the social forces of production and the relation of production". The 
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most general rule of social progress discovered and formulated by Marx has just 
produced a typical result in the development process of the PKK. 
... 
At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society 
come into conflict with the existing relations of production ... with the property 
relations within the framework in which they have hitherto operated. From forms 
of development of the productive forces, these relations turn into their fetters. 
(Marx, 1971, p. 21). 
This is the main theme of Öcalan's self-criticism, which he formulated in an 
epigrammatic style: "If you do not solve, you will then be solved" or "If you do not 
overcome [obstacles], you will then be overcome [by them]". But the resource of 
mobilisation under Öcalan's leadership with his "routinised" Apo charisma is still 
active and effective. The dominant slogans of the HADEP congress, which gathered 
about 100,000 Kurds in Ankara, were the ones containing Öcalan's abbreviated name 
"Apo" and the name of the island, "Imralli", where he is imprisoned. 
Consequently, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit has given a statement 
through the press: "The HADEP congress has to be a warning to everyone". Yet, 
several months ago, Ecevit was attacked by opposition parties in the Turkish assembly 
for he had received "only applause" (Turkiye, June 13,2000) when he sounded his 
opposition to the death sentence in a limited public meeting held in a hall on his visit to 
Diyarbakir. Notwithstanding the fact that an over-centralised organisational nature 
moulded by Öcalan's theoretical and practical dominance has turned into the PKK's 
fetters since early 1990s, the organisation, as it stands, has succeeded in mobilising its 
cadres, the grassroots and the Kurdish masses. The findings of two related questions of 
my field research indicate the influence of Öcalan's leadership cult. I constructed two 
questions to find out the grassroots' perception of the most fundamental cause of the 
PKK's success and the reason for their sympathy towards the Party in the first place. In 
response to the latter question (Table 11), the two highest percentages of the answers of 
the activists pointed towards (one directly, the other indirectly) the leader of' the Paurty: 
24.4% of respondents ticked that they first became sympathetic to the PKK "through 
the leader" and 38.04% of them "through observations". I interpreted the 38.041%ß of 
who ticked the option of "through observation" as an indication of the effect of the 
leader because observations extensively encompass Öcalan's power, due to the 
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perpetual usage of the "Apo" icon by the State's propaganda machine - the instruments 
of mass media. In response to the former question, the answer and the percentage were 
more clear: 50.5% of grassroots believes that the most fundamental cause of the success 
of the Party is its leader (Table 10). The next highest percentage, 19.5%, is one which 
points towards ideology as the main cause of the party's success. This may be 
interpreted in terms of the effect of the party education composed by Öcalan's "tongue" 
and its consistent insistence on socialism. In view of the fact that I carried out field 
research after Öcalan's "metamorphosed" standpoint (with respect to the PKK's 
national undertakings at its inception) that he formed in the Imralli prison, my findings 
are significant in relation to the Party's educational efforts, and consequently in relation 
to Öcalan's leadership style, in the "built-up" (Turner and Killian, 1957) work of 
motivating cadres, grassroots and masses. 
The findings reveal that the range of the PKK's organisational decisiveness - 
the subjective share - in the development of the most recent Kurdish insurgency against 
Turkey is substantially determined by the educational efforts of the Party, which are 
merely materialised by Öcalan's (recorded and unrecorded) speeches over almost 
twenty five years and the significance of these speeches to the organisation's 
procedures and performance. McCharty and Zald refer to Turner and Killian's (1972) 
conclusion which states that "... there is always enough discontent in any society to 
supply the grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organised 
and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group". They 
then go further that "grievances and discontent may be defined, created and 
manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organisations (McCharty and Zald, 1977, p. 
1215). In 1957, Turner and Killian highlighted the very aspect of' collective action 
and/or resource mobilisation in more firm words. 
... But crowd 
behaviour does not consist of the mere release of repressed 
tendencies to action; it is built up. The social cohesion of the crowd does not 
emerge through a sudden synthesis of common, unconscious, psychological forces; 
it is developed. (Turner and Killian, 1957, p. 58). 
This is more true of the phenomenon of the PKK in the specific context of "Turkish 
Kurdistan" and results from the unique policy of Turkey - and its strict application - 
towards Kurdish existence which has most recently manifested itself again through an 
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incident45 that occurred at the HADEP congress held in November 2000. (The incident 
dominated Turkish media's news agenda on the following day, rather than the congress 
itself. The media was not interested in the State's policy but in the MEP's 
"conspiratorial" endeavours targeted at "propaganda and show") 
The building-up of a "national" collective action among the tribal Kurds is a 
phenomenon of the PKK's philosophy and its experience of the structural individual- 
organisation linkage. But this very phenomenon is, as a corollary to the PKK's stage of 
development, a central property of the Organisation's failures, defects and impasses, 
and of its questions and confrontations. This will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
Notes 
t Ashiret: Tribe or, in some cases, a confederation of tribes. Ihanet: Treason. 
2 Including the most long-lasting one against Turkey in Dersim 1937-38 (prior to the PKK). the one 
against Iran which culminated in the Republic of Mehabad for eleven months in 1946, and the prolonged 
neshmerge war for decades under Molla Mustafa Barzani against Iraq. 
The sentence in the Koran (Qur'an) of Islam expressing the confession of faith which is believed to he 
one of the five conditions of Islam. 
° The practices and rules not laid down in the Koran but derived from Mohammed's own habits and 
words. 
5 The tribe against which the PKK initiated its "anti-feudal, anti-collaborator" armed struggle in 1979 
within the framework of "armed propaganda". 
6 The town that the proponents of the Party (HADEP) regarded as the legal extension of the PKK still 
cannot enter without being concealed. 
7 Money paid by the bridegroom to the bride's family. 
A Martin van Bruinessen states, first, that the boundaries between tribe and clan "are rather vague", then 
he immediately adds the difference that tribes are "often much larger" in number (van Bruinessen, 1992. 
57). 
The phrase "nationalist without nationalism" is employed for Kurdish nationalism by Abbas Vail and is 
a use of words that solely fits the Kurdish "national" reality, which he also defines as "a historical 
anomaly which is nevertheless true". Vali also makes a footnote here and refers to the PKK's total 
abandonment of overall nationalist demands including even modest ones such as a federal system in 
official Turkey. He correctly states that the PKK "is the only significant modern Kurdish political 
organisation which started its campaign with a clear nationalist strategy demanding independence for 
Kurdistan". Vali points out the state of ambivalence in the spectacle of the latest PKK. 
However the radical change in the strategic objective of the PKK does not seem to have affected its 
nationalist discourse, which appears side by side with arguments for a political solution in the framework 
of Turkish sovereignty. This paradox testifies not only to an ambiguous political identity, but also to the 
curious case of nationalists without nationalism, which characterised the discourse and the practice of the 
Mahabad republic five decades earlier (Vati, 1998, p. 94). 
In fact, the "nationalist discourse" too has been affected from the dramatically radical changes in the 
strategy of the movement since Vali's article was published. The "national" and "revolutionary" rhetoric 
has gradually "calmed down" and almost withered away since then. Eventually, in its eighth congress 
held in April 2002, the organisation converted itself from a "party" to a "congress" (KADEK - Kongreya 
Azadi u Demokrasiya Kurdistan [Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congressl) through which the 
PKK-led Kurdish movement abandoned a programme which was aspiring to and/or undertaking rule- 
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power. The overall strategic objective is to have a "Democratic Republic" of Turkey in which the 
culture-related and identity-related questions of Kurdish community are resolved. 
10 This "intrinsic" trouble may well be attributable to the overall socio-political history of the "keepers of 
the cradle of civilisation" in conjunction with the dynamics and contradictions of the course of 
civilisation's history since its inception. Naturally, this requires additional research and discussion, which 
falls outside the realm of this study. 
1 In the Dersim uprising, Dr. Nuri Dersimi -in his confined circle- attempted to convert the resistance 
into a "national" initiative, but either the leader of the uprising or the few backing tribes were not familiar 
with such aspirations as "Kurdistan" or the "nation-state". 
12 Öcalan justifies his proposal of a "Democratic Republic" by encouraging the PKK members to he 
consistent with their party's loyalty to socialist beliefs and aspirations held since its outset, but no one 
may assert that the masses have adopted such a novel approach to the struggle following a conscious 
consideration in the light of socialist principles. 
13 Millingen, Wild Life among the Koords, p. 244. 
14 Several Kurdish associations and societies with the support of various Armenian circles gathered in 
Lebanon in October 1927 and held a congress for the purpose of liberating the parts of Kurdistan and 
Armenia under Turkey. The congress ended with the announcement of the newly established United 
National Party, which came to be known as Xoybun. 
15 Jash, in a literal translation, means "donkey foal" but it is accepted in Kurdish political terminology as 
denoting xain [traitor]. 
"' The Turkish word "dü#irülmd$" literally means "debased". The leadership of the PKK, in fact Öcalan, 
employs this term to denote the "intrinsic" state of the Kurdish people which manifests itself in two main 
"unique" traits: imitating oppressors and being unlimitedly brave and cruel in fighting against one 
another. This appears to be the most distinct aspect of the Party's approach to its own people. When the 
case in point is an organisation which undertakes a "national liberation", the notion becomes more 
striking because the nationalism not only "always imagines an ideal" (Nairn, 1981, p. 102) nation but 
also emphasises and exaggerates its "greatness" among followers for whom subordination is not 
"deserved", and oppression is not "acceptable". This, on the other hand, points at the unusual aspect of 
"Kurdish nationalism" which in effect does not aspire to the "final goal" of every nationalism, a nation- 
state, but the emancipation of a denied ethno-cultural identity. This is more true of the Kurds tinder 
Turkey, where both the denial and absorption of the Kurdish population have been furthered far more 
boldly than in the respective parts of Kurdistan annexed by Iran, Iraq and Syria. 
17 Jwaideh penetrates the historical background in this aspect of his/her thesis, and describes several 
important personalities in the history of the Middle-East, such as Selahaddin Eyyubi and Han 7. end, who 
established and ruled the states and empires on behalf of other peoples of the region (Jwaideh, 1999, pp. 
7,35). 
18 All the organisational configurations appearing during the 1970s in the part of Kurdistan under'I'urkey 
claimed to be Marxist-socialist with the exception of the early KDP in Turkey. But it too, later in 1973, 
changed its name first to T-KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party - Turkey) then to KIP Kurdistan Iscci 
Partisi (Kurdistan Workers' Party)], and stated its first article as "The Kurdistan Workers' Party is the 
political party of the working class of Kurdistan equipped with Marxism-Leninism. " (Hasretyan, 1990, p. 
128). 
19 Following Öcalan's arrest, it was publicised as the "Presidency Council" and its members increased 
from 9 to 11 including 2 women at the 7`h Extraordinary congress. 
20 There are various arrangements for the "party children" appropriate to the conditions of the country, 
neighbouring states and Europe. 
21 Ertugrul Kurkcu was the chair of DEV-GENC (a Turkish revolutionary youth organisation which 
existed as a legal peripheral configuration of the illegal THKP 
[People's Liberation Party of Turkeyl to 
which Öcalan was a loyal sympathiser) until 1972. In that year, 
he was the only survivor found after the 
Kizildere clash in which the rest of leading figures of the 
THKP were killed, including its charismatic 
leader Mahir Cayan who was regarded as Turkish Che Guevara. 
22 The actual "election" was held in four parts of Kurdistan and was obviously not as free as it was in 
Europe. It was held in a strictly clandestine and 
illegal way and had very limited participation. 
23 The lord of the manor. 
24 The latter two were being published legally in Turkey in the early 1990s. 
25 cözümlemeler is Turkish word that literally means "analyses". However it has a particular meaning 
which denotes Ocalan's inculcation talks. 
On almost every occasion these talks are recorded, edited 
published and distributed to all party units, and used as almost the only material in the education 
programme of party cadres. 
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26 The term "Leadership" (Önderlik) has actually become the official title of Öcalan within the Party. On 
questioning a member of the management committee of the School who had warned me about my use of 
the word "you" (siz) in the dialogue between myself and Ocalan, I was told that they perceive him as an 
"institution" rather than a personality. Öcalan also views himself as an "institution" : "Leadership is an 
Institution. I am not an individual but an institution. There are peculiarities in this institution. If it walks 
[works] then it will do the work, and the PKK has done some work. " (Öcalan, 1994, p. 457). 
27 The "monthly books" and video-recorded forms of these "cözümlemeler" are easily obtainable in 
London, and one Party activist in London who had experienced various Turkish prisons over three years 
due to his organisational linkage with the PKK told me that the monthly magazine Serxwebun (the 
PKK's central organ which is illegal in Turkey) and "Tapes of cözümlemeler" were arriving at prisons 
regularly. 
28 Sirnak is the town in which HADEP (the pro-Kurdish legal party backed by the PKK) can not 
officially open its branch because of the severe oppression by the "village guards" of the State but it 
nevertheless polled the largest share of the votes in 1999 elections. 
29 I attended the 4`h congress of HADEP (the pro-Kurdish legal party backed by the PKK) held in Ankara 
on 26 November 2000. The number of delegates at the congress was just over 800 but the police 
officials' estimate of the masses gathered around the congress hall was 100,000. The dominant slogan 
expressed sympathy for and loyalty to 
Öcalan: "Selam! Selam! lmralli'ya Bin Seam" I Salute! Salute! 
Thousand Salutes to Imralli (the island where Öcalan is imprisoned)]. The following day, the chief' 
officer of MIT (Turkish Intelligence Service) declared that allowing TV broadcasts in the Kurdish 
language would be beneficial (Hurriyet, November 28,2000). This was followed by an immediate 
statement from Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish Prime Minister, emphasising that the views of the chief of'the 
MIT should be seriously considered because "the HADEP congress has to be a significant warning to 
everyone". 
30 A Kurdish populated town in Turkey towards the western border of Kurdistan. 
3'This dialectical expression of the "love of life" can be traced back to early militants in the PKK. The 
reply of Kemal Pir, one of the two Turkish founder-members of the PKK who died on the 561x' day of a 
hunger strike in Diyarbakir Prison in 1982, to E. Oktay Yildiran, the head of the prison, has a similar 
philosophical flavour. In response to the military commander's question attempting to persuade him to 
abandon the hunger strike during his final days, "Don't you love life, Kemal? ", Pir's answer is 
interesting: "We love life so much we are prepared to die for it". 
32 The smallest unit of weight used by ancient Ottomans 
33 The common reference point of the literature on charisma, Max Weber, is additionally firm about the 
"revolutionary force" of charisma and believes that it "is scarcely in need of further discussion". When 
comparing it with rational and traditional types of authority, Weber finds the "charismatic type" to he 
their antithesis in terms of being "foreign to all rules", and he consequently concludes that it is "a 
specifically revolutionary force" (Weber, 1947, pp. 361,362). 
3 Wegner, in his penetrating article, "Messianic Historicity" in Rethinking Marxism, is more inflexible 
on the "revolutionary rupture" of messianism: "... the messianic is always revolutionary, it has to be" 
(Wegner, 2000, p. 68). 
35 Footnoted by Duncan: R. J. Zwi Werblowsky, "Messiah and Messianic Movements", in F_, u. vc lupc, rcliu 
Britannica, 15`h edn (Chicago, 1974), Macropaedia, XI, p. 1017. 
36 Conger points towards "a relational basis" as the "widely accepted" diagnosis of charismatic 
leadership in the related literature. "Charisma is believed not to reside solely in the leader and his or her 
personal attributes but rather in the interplay between the leader's attributes and the needs, belief's and 
perceptions of followers" (Conger and Kanungo, 1988, p. 24). 
Martin E. Spencer cites from Weber's Economy and Society (1968) edited by Guenther Roth and Claus 
Wittich. 
38 Cited by Howell from Willner, A. R. (1984, p. 12), The Spellbinders: C'harLvr,, atir Politic "a/ 
Leadership, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
39 Shils, Edward (1965). Charisma, Order and Status. American Sociological Review 30,199-213. 
40 With regard to the ramifications of the charismatic power, 
both E. Sanasarian (1995) and A. Saeidi 
(2001) present informative arguments on the 
Ayatollah Khumaini's (or Khomeini's) case. The former 
scholar delineates how the "routinisation" 
institutionalised through the governing apparatus of theocratic 
Iran during the lifetime of the person of charisma. He in particular exemplifies the institutionalisation of 
Khomeini's charisma within the military establishment, the "backbone" of the state, and its premier body 
Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards). The latter scholar extends his argument to the penetration and 
solidification of "economic charisma" 
in the post-revolutionary and post Khumaini Iran. and figures the 
extent of charismatic power in terms of the redistribution of income and wealth. 
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41 Jermier excerpts from Foucault, M. (1980). Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 
1972-1977. Edited and Translated by Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books. 
42 "God" has been functioning for millennia as an effective charisma though it is solely a "persona" of a 
non-existent "person". God is a charisma, the messiah is the prophet and the prophet is the resulullah 
(representative) or messenger of God. This fact of history shows how the messiah is charismatic and how 
charisma is messianic. 
°; For empirical information about the example of unforgiving elimination of dissenters in Iran see 
Sanasarian, 1995, p. 195. 
as This may be attributed to the Kurdish societal "heritage" of "arrested tribality" which we partly 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter. While "consistent" tribal structure did not give way to Kurdish 
sociality to be introduced with modern forms of institutionalisations that transcend "tribal institutions", 
the perpetual existence of profound tribal and religious leadership types provided a rich "experience" fier 
routinisation of charismas. But this culturalised praxis of Kurds needs comprehensive elaboration 
which would provoke further inquiries into the persistent aspects of Kurdish "history froren". 
45 The Kurdish born German MEP, Feleknas Uca, intended to convey her party's message to the congress 
in Kurdish because her Turkish was poor. As she began to speak in Kurdish, the police officer 
superintending the congress promptly interrupted her by pointing out the relevant legal article in a book 
in his hand, "any language other than Turkish" is forbidden. She, however, was "allowed" to continue 
conveying her message in German. 
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Chapter 6 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PKK 
QUESTIONS, CONFRONTATIONS AND THE IMPASSE 
This chapter will address the main theme of the study - the organisational function - 
by investigating the PKK's difficulties. 
The inner dynamics of the PKK are examined from the point of view of the 
questions, confrontations and paradoxes within the Organisation. We will extend and 
broaden the examination of the PKK's "subjective share" in the process of Kurdish 
revitalisation during the period 1993 to 1999. So this chapter will concentrate on the 
deficiencies, contradictions and the problematic nature of the PKK's organisational 
structure. 
But we must begin by clarifying the dynamics which gave rise to the PKK 
instead of giving rise to other Kurdish movements - in order to understand why the 
movement declined and shrunk. To that end, I shall explore the PKK's earlier years, 
during which the movement built its foundations of collective action among Kurds 
while ignored the world around them - from the aftermath of the 1980 cot/) d'etal to 
the mass uprisings of the early 1990s. 
I The Organisational Ascent 
a. Clarifying the Cardinal Point 
Theories of "collective action" or "collective behaviour" are sociological efforts to 
explain the processes of people's acting together. The different versions of these 
theories, with shifting emphases on objective and subjective factors, can help us 
analyse social movements within the framework of "cause and effect relations". 
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Scholars in the field devote their intellectual endeavours to providing adequate 
answers to the questions of why and how, vis-ä-vis the realisation processes of 
collective social phenomena. 
The shifting emphasis, either on contextual factors or on constructed internal 
dynamics of the collective phenomenon is a key argument among scholars. So the 
recurrent problem in this sociological field is caused by the entanglements caused by 
searching for the "right balance" between these two phenomena. While theories of 
"collective action" and "resource mobilisation" are seen as approaches paying greater 
attention to the organisational factors; while the perspective of the "political process" 
further contemplates the broader multiple processes "taking the existence of potential 
grievances for granted" (Diani, 1992), and while these theories have similarly 
dominant emphases on the "how" of phenomena, the "New Social Movement" 
approach is instead deemed to be tackling the "why" question. In view of Touraine's 
increasing attention towards the notions of "subject" and "actor", and of the 
production of the Subject by "modernity in crisis", and considering his definitions of' 
the Subject as "the labour through which an individual transforms himself or herself' 
into an actor" or as "a call to transform the Self into an actor" (Touraine, 1995, pp, 
205-222,368-375), one may say that the focus of the approach of NSM also tends 
towards the decisiveness of the subjective share in the collective action processes, and 
consequently towards the "how" of collective phenomena. Despite their valuable 
contributions to sociology in general and in particular to the sociology of social 
movements, the arguments remain unresolved. However, Melucci constructs three 
fundamental questions in order to facilitate the "understanding of collective 
phenomena in terms of action". 
- Through which processes do actors construct collective action? 
- How is the unity of the various elements of collective action produced? 
- Through which processes and relationships 
do individuals become involved - or 
defect from - collective action? 
(Melucci, 1989, p. 20). 
In "seek[ing] answers to these questions", one still has to elaborate the "how" of the 
processes, namely the inner dynamics of the subjective configurations of people's 
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acting together - the creativity, productivity, motivativity and transformativity of 
individual-organisation interrelations. 
No doubt, the realisation of a process, which culminates in people's acting 
together, is a result of various sub-processes' it is the outcome of multiple processes 
and requires the combination of different components for it to happen. Tilly isolates 
"five big components" in the collective action process (interest, organisation, 
mobilisation, opportunity ad collective action itself) and asserts that 
Collective action consists of people's acting together in pursuit of common 
interests. Collective action results from changing combinations of interests, 
organisation, mobilisation and opportunity. (Tilly, 1978, p. 7). 
These components are "vulnerable" to the processes that may either enhance or impede 
"the formation of cognitive frameworks and systems of relationships necessary for 
action" (Melucci, 1989). Even a process may well be, at the same time, impeding and 
enhancing the changing components. So in the situation confronted by this study, the 
uniqueness of Turkey's policy of denial about the Kurdish question, on the one hand, is 
an impeding constraint in terms of organisational opportunities - and on the other hand 
it could also serve as a means for mass mobilisation in terms of individual motivation'. 
Some Turkish experts on the Kurdish question draw attention to this. When 
explaining the oppressions of the Kurds by the Turkish state, Martin van Bruinesscn 
immediately adds that "the same repression has also contributed much to strengthening 
the PKK" (van Bruinessen, 1988, p. 45). Similarly, Kutschera talks of "the extent and 
ferocity of the repression" by the regime which "thus cleared the way for the PKK" 
(Kutschera, 1994, p. 13). 
In the preceding chapters, I have tried not to lose sight of this study's points 
regarding the most specific structural base of the emergence and formation of the 
PKK: a) the specifity of the Kurdish social-political background - constancy of tribe 
and treason, and b) the peculiarity of Turkey's Kurdish policy; namely, the particular 
nature of Turkey's Kurdish question -a categorical denial which is maintained by the 
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severe use of force. I have since hypothesised that the PKK is a phenomenon peculiar 
to Turkish politics resulting from these dual peculiarities. 
These aspects are discussed as the basic twofold contextual factor in the PKK's 
early life - and as a common structural condition available to the actors in the fellow 
Kurdish political-cultural organisations that emerged before the later PKK and which 
drew considerably more public support than the PKK prior to the 1980 coup d'etut - in 
chapters two and five. I defined the former ("tribe and treason") as the "intrinsic" 
tradition in the socio-political "heritage" of Kurdishness, which is targeted as a 
"dormant resource" by the leadership of the PKK. I discussed the latter ("policy of 
denial-repression") as being the "seeds of Turkey's Kurdish question". However, I 
share the view that the explanations "founded upon common structural condition[s]" 
ignore "the very processes that enable or inhibit actors to define the circumstances of 
common action" and are incomplete in "explain[ing] how certain individuals come to 
recognise themselves in a more or less sense of `we"' (Melucci, 1989) insofar as these 
individuals sacrifice their "private life" to an "organisational life". In other words, 
such explanations omit the causality of how individuals transform their lifestyle from 
being "for oneself' to "for ourselves". 
Further, the diagnoses regarding the two peculiarities are not the products of 
the novel efforts of this study. On the contrary, they are the primary themes of many 
authors in the field, to whom I have referred throughout. So I chose the central 
question of my study as focusing on the determinative internal factor in the growth of' 
the PKK while constructing the research strategy in accordance with this, which 
necessitates understanding the inner dynamics of the "Revolutionary Modernizers" 
(White, 2000) of Kurdistan. That is to say, I have so far handled the organisational 
factor (what I call the "subjective share") in the realisation processes of the collective 
phenomenon of the most recent Kurdish attempt at a "national emancipation" as the 
focal point of my exploratory efforts. I have thus undertaken the discussions of these 
two interrelated and unique contextual entities to clarify the cardinal question of this 
study. 
In the light of these sophisticated discussions developed by prominent scholars 
of social movements, I stated that the framework of this study would he to ascertain 
the most convincing answers to the "how" question of the process. Accordingly, this 
central issue is to some extent explored in the preceding two chapters. It has been 
partly discussed in relation to the programme and ideology of the Organisation, and it 
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is articulated further in the arguments about the organisation-individual linkage in the 
PKK. In this chapter, I shall extend the argument and the exploration of the 
"organisational share" in the processes of the Kurdish "national" collective action - 
but rather in the light of the questions and confrontations of the Party which will, I 
expect, contribute to the understanding of the "share". 
It will be easier to identify the genuine questions and confrontations if we first 
clarify the period which resulted in the factual ascent of the PKK above its fellow 
movements. 
b. The Rising Decade: From the 1980 Coup D'etat to the 1990 Mass Eruptions 
On the eve of the "official ,2 military intervention on 12 September 1980, Abdullah 
Öcalan managed to escape from Turkey, as did many other leading figures in various 
pro-Kurdish political groupings. A difference in the escape's significance and its 
outcomes began to be revealed after the guerrilla offensive - simultaneously launched 
against Turkey in the Kurdish towns of Eruh and Semdinli (McDowall, 1996, p. 40, 
Imset, 1992, p. 40) by the PKK on 15 August 1984 - and the course of affairs which 
followed. 
Certain forms of resistance organised by the PKK at Diyarbakir Prison in 
protest against "brutal torture practices" following the military take-over hinted at a 
remarkable separation from the rest of both Turkish and Kurdish legal/illegal opposing 
political configurations: the "tradition" of self-immolation in the history of the 
movement was initiated by a Central Committee member in the PKK, Mazlum Dogan, 
(known as the "theoretician" of the Party, and appointed as the person responsible for 
the publication of Serxwebun by the Party's foundation congress) on Newroz'day, 21 
March 1982. On 17 May 1982, four members of the PKK (Ferhat Kutay. Esref Anyik, 
Mahmut Zengin, Necmi Oner) set fire to themselves and were burnt to death "hand-in- 
hand". They were later to become famous in the Party as the "Four". Some two 
months later, at the same prison and for the same reason, a group of prominent PKK 
members went on hunger strike on 14 July 1982, which culminated in four deaths 
(Kemal Pir, M. Hayri Durmus, Akif Yilmaz, Ali cicek). The first two were members 
of the central committee and had been among the seven participants of Öcalan's initial 
organisational meeting of 1974. 
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While these developments occurred among PKK prisoners, the Party was 
engaged with gathering its escaped militants in Bekaa Valley (a Syrian-controlled 
Lebanese territory) to be prepared for a long-term Vietcong-style guerrilla war. The 
PKK managed to gather "several hundred" (Öcalan, 1991, p. 21) members and 
sympathisers, and held two successive congresses in 1981 and 1982. 
The 1981 meeting was a sub-congress, which differs from regular party 
congresses held every fourth year. In accordance with the resolutions adopted in these 
congresses, the leading cadres who had escaped focused on recovering from the 
impact of the 1980 coup, and utilised the years 1981 to 1984 as a "border 
reconnaissance and preparation period" (Imset, 1992, pp. 29-36) for the well-known 
guerrilla "Offensive of 15 August". 
Following the organisational preparations in terms of both structure and 
material military requirements - along with the firm elimination of the "dissident 
voices" within the Party (op. cit., p. 37) - the historical offensive which marked the 
commencement of the "low-intensity war" of fifteen years between the PKK and 
Turkey reified on 15 August, 1984. The clashes in the first seven years led to more 
than five thousand deaths (Irrset, 1992, p. 26), and after ten years, over twenty 
thousand deaths (Kirisci and Winrow, 1997, p. 126). 
Of the initial preparations for the proposed guerrilla war in the organisational 
sense, the most remarkable was the foundation of a military wing called "the 
Kurdistan Liberation Forces" (Hezen Rizgariya Kurdistan-HRK . This was modelled 
on the Vietcong, and was composed of basic teams of three fighters, and a structural 
hierarchy formed from teams and units. A unit consisted of three companies, a 
company consisted of three teams. The initial body of the HRK was composed of 
three units (Imset, 1992, p. 129), namely, the total of the PKK's military force at the 
outset was less than a hundred guerrillas recruited mostly from the "Kurdish peasants 
(or recent ex-peasants)" (White, 2000, p. 211). Later, following the resolution 
adopted by the third congress of the PKK held in 1986 (Birand, 1992, p. 141) the 
HRK converted into the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan, ARGK (Artes(a 
Rizgariya Gele Kurdistan), due to increasing public support from and attachment to 
the armed struggle by the Kurds of Turkey. 
The period 1984 to 1990 is the one in which the "unpreventable" rise of the 
PKK was established, creating the potential for mass uprisings (serihildans) of the 
early 1990s. There are three interrelated principal aspects of these years: 
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1) The initial aspect begins with a false dichotomy between both parties in 
grasping the actual extent of the "15 August Blow". While the state officials 
depreciated the "First Blow" with an over-confidence, the PKK leadership dared to 
carry it out, but with hesitation - namely with under-confidence. Ismet G. Imset, the 
former editor of the semi-official daily paper published in English, in his 
comprehensive work traces the "over-confidence" of the Turkish State's "ordinary 
officials" back to the early eighties by referring to the quiet aftermath of the 1980 coup 
d' etat. 
Once those terrorists "on the streets" were rounded up and sent to prison, Ankara 
relaxed, believing as in the case of the Turkish armed left, this would be the end of 
another threat to the stability of the country. But was it? 
Facts have shown that the over-confidence of the government back in the early 
1980s only served to help the PKK through its days abroad of intensive 
preparations for launching attacks on Turkey and upsetting the social balances of 
the south-east [implies Kurdistan under Turkey-AKÖ] by intimidating the local 
people. (Imset, 1992, p. 7) 
Also, as stated earlier, the State's over-confidence continued until a while after the 
first offensive and it belittled the uprisings saying that, in the light of its "rich" 
experience of the earlier "twenty eight" attempts, which had been made by "primitive 
rebels". On the other hand, the protagonists of the first offensive themselves were in 
an under-confident spiritual state due to the very same "rich" and "pitiless" lessons of 
past experiences - the lessons which taught the vital role of "internal treason" in the 
crushing of all previous rebellions. Öcalan frequently underlines the anxiety and 
hesitation in his talks when he contemplates the atmosphere of the "inception years". 
In the beginning of the closing address to the Party's third congress (1986) he 
describes these years. 
If we try to look at the historical and present significance of our congress; our 
deep-rooted and historical questions have for the first time found the opportunity 
to discuss it in such an atmosphere. ... 
I am thinking about our state in the first 
congress... I remember my fears and anxieties at that time. We had given a party 
name to ourselves but would we continue? 
I was wondering whether the fiasco 
would knock on our door. Would the steps we had taken meet the target or not? 
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We acted amongst these anxieties and hesitations for years; we experienced many 
things such as organisational depressions, defections of persons [from the party] 
and refusals to shoulder the tasks etc. (Öcalan, 1993a, pp. 305,306). 
In the speech of the fifth anniversary year (1990) of the "Leap Forward of 15 August", 
Öcalan states that "not only friends, but also the very persons among the executors of 
the action believed that the step they were taking had no chance of success. The 
feeling of `Yes, we will be quelled, this attempt will end in failure' was the dominant 
spiritual state in which they were expecting their demise" (Öcalan, 1992a, p. 116). 
He, occasionally evaluates their action as being a "miraculous leap forward" (Ocalan, 
1998, p. 59). But both parties hurled themselves into a comprehensive and ceaseless 
struggle with all their might - and the very nature of the struggle in these years 
culminated in a remarkable extension, expansion and consolidation of the PKK's 
organisational structure. The Party configured its two main flanks of the popular front 
and the popular army: The National Liberation Front of Kurdistan, ERNK (Eniya 
Rizgariya Netewa Kurdistan) was established in 1985 and declared as such on Kurdish 
national day (Newroz), 21s` March. 
The HRK, which hitherto operated within the framework of "armed 
propaganda", was converted into the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan, ARGK 
(1986) - the first "popular army" in the history of "Turkish Kurds". The Organisation 
built its overall body in the form of a "Party-Front-Army triangle": the parts' (as the 
ultimate political structure), the popular front and the popular arnmv. The ERNK 
divided itself into four sub-flanks in 1987 so as to organise its various social strata 
individually: YKWK (Workers Branch), YRWK (Intellectuals [aydinj Branch), YXK 
(Youth Branch) and YJWK (Womens Branch) which was eventually to be converted 
into the Women's Party at the PKK's sixth congress held between 19 January and 16 
February 1999 (Özdag, 1999, p. 225). The frontal flank of the PKK, ERNK, stretched 
its organisational network around almost the entire world (White, 2000, pp. 175,202) 
wherever an adequate Kurdish population could be found, such as Russia and other 
Soviet Republics, some Eastern European countries, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Libya, 
Britain and Canada etc., but in particular all the countries of Western Europe by the 
end of 1989. In brief, while the State, a short while after the "Leap Forward of 15 
August", realised the extent of the danger and deepened its struggle by utilising every 
means at its disposal, the PKK leadership, under the pressure of fears, anxieties and 
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hesitations, put every endeavour into expanding and consolidating its organisational 
structure to secure the developing guerrilla war. This is the first aspect of the "build- 
up" period (1984-89) of the decade in which the PKK rose, and, at the same time, it 
seeded one of the prime elements of the ground from which the main difficulties of the 
Organisation arose during the declining period of the 1990s. 
2) Secondly, the most "self-destructive" activities were carried out by the PKK 
in this period. In the name of fighting against the traitor "feudal elements" (van 
Bruinessen, 1988, p. 42) and village guards, a considerable number of villages and 
villagers were attacked and many civilians including women and children Markey and 
Fuller, 1998, p. 147; Aydin, 1992, p. 185) were killed in these clashes. Even if many 
of them were probably carried out by Turkish army "dirty tricks" squads (White, 1997, 
p. 249) in dubious circumstances, Öcalan admitted that such offensives were "indeed" 
conducted by "their own people" (Ikibine Dogru, October 22,1989, p. 23) and 
"inevitably" women and children also lost their lives (Öcalan, 1999c, p. 114). 
Similarly, during these years the Organisation executed a number of PKK dissidents 
who were called either "traitors" or "divulgers" or "hostile elements", including some 
ex-CC members (Gunter, 1990, p. 74; Imset, 1992, p. 83; White, 2000, p. 145) anti 
carried out executions even as far afield as Europe. At worst, the killings facilitated 
the disguise of further devious eliminations within the organisation, which were 
unveiled afterwards. In particular, some guerrilla commanders, such as Hogir (Cemil 
Isik), Halil Kaya (Kör Cemal), carried out many executions (Serxwehun, June, 1991) 
in their provinces due to similar accusations. Such incidents even continued through 
to the early 1990s. For instance, seventeen prominent guerrillas were executed in a 
week by a Central Committee member who was commanding Maras (Southwest) 
province, Ali Ömürcan (Terzi Cemal), on the accusations of "being recruited by the 
enemy as agents" (Serxwebun, August, September 1993). It is trot yet quite clear 
whether Ali Omürcan himself was a state-infiltrated figure or a mentally ill - but 
talented - personality who managed to reach membership of the CC of the Party. Fie 
was, however, executed by the PKK afterwards because of those "devious murders". 
The Organisation took a turn towards corruption as a result of increasingly 
devious murders: the critique and self-critique mechanism began to turn into some 
basic repetitions and imitations, to the extent that Öcalan complained about the 
militants' "over-formalised" approach to himself, at the cost of jeopardising his 
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"charismatic authority". (The nature of Öcalan's leadership is partly handled but will 
be discussed further below). When responding to Balli's concerned questions, he 
seems to be literally rebelling against the Kurds' particular attitude towards criticism. 
Question. ... 
It is widely said [by the other socialists] that the only remedy for a 
functional critique-self-critique process is the freedom of critique of the First 
Man. ... 
Is there freedom to criticise Apo in the PKK? 
Answer. If they criticise me, it will be of great assistance to me. I said this to 
2000 e Dogru4. It [Kurdish personality] has been debased so much so that he/she 
cannot free himself/herself from behaving as a slave. My suffering is not in being 
criticised but in not being criticised. My suffering is in their submission like 
slaves. The thing that I need the most is a heavily dosed [dosaji yuksek] critique. 
Q. But I have not come across a different view in your publications. Always party 
leadership, party line... 
A. They either do that or run away. This is my problem too. (Balli, 1991, p. 
282) 
Similar emphases on worries about this two-way "barren" attitude towards his 
leadership are found among several other interviews with Öcalan (Perincek, 1990; 
Birand, 1992; Serxwebun, April, 1991, January 1992, and et al). But the fact of these 
polarised attitudes has by no means changed nevertheless for it was necessitated in the 
course of "ruitinisation" of Apo Charisma on the part of "institutionalising" (Chapter 
5, III) administrative staff of the Party. 
3) The third aspect concerns what Tilly calls "opportunity" of collective action. 
These years also denote the duration in which the PKK effected the changes that 
allowed it to reach its apex of the early 1990s, with its absolute isolation in the sense 
of relations with the "whole range of Kurdish nationalists and Turkish leftist groups" 
(Gunter, 1990, pp, 62,66). Further, these hostile relations resulted in occasional 
clashes between the PKK and various Kurdish or 
Turkish parties and circles (Middle 
East Times, 14-20 February, 1992; White, 1997, p. 226), such as the KDP (Kurdistan 
Democratic Party - Irak), the PSKT (Socialist Party of Kurdistan of Turkey), Halku , 
Kurtulusu (HK - People's Liberation), and Dev Yol (Revolutionary Path), etc. 
Notwithstanding the fact that an "accord document" was signed between the PKK and 
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the KDP in 1983, it did not last long and was invalidated due to the conflicts that arose 
after the 15 August Offensive (Öcalan, 1993b, pp. 447-449). Sheri Laizer attributes 
the "anti-amalgamation" to the other organisations' dependence on foreign powers, 
who have betrayed the Kurdish people "on every occasion". 
The PKK was opposed to amalgamation with other Kurdish parties, all of which it 
inevitably labelled `reformist'. It has always taken its political decisions without 
consultations, being highly critical of the other Kurdish political parties and their 
leaders. The party claims to depend solely on the Kurdish people and on itself, 
refusing to rely on the dubious support of outside movements or nations where no 
good reason exists for doing so - history having illustrated that the Kurdish people 
have been betrayed by foreign powers on every occasion that a Kurdish leader 
relied on them. (Laizer, 1996, pp. 90,91). 
Probably because of a combination of the first and second aspects, namely, due to the 
Organisation's under-confidence based on the previously "inverted fate" (ec, kus talih) 
of Kurdishness (and especially Turkey) and an over-sensitivity to the "intrinsic" 
prevalence of traitorous tendencies, or perhaps because the nature of Öcalan's 
leadership was not adept at enduring internal and/or external oppositions, the PKK 
elite did not tolerate critical approaches both from within and from people close to it. 
Or it was the object of hostile approaches and aggression. Whatever the reasons are, 
the fact is that these years were a period in which mutually extreme hostile relations 
were evident between the PKK and the "others", and the PKK managed to survive, to 
develop and eventually to reach a peak of organisational expansion and influence in 
the spring of 1990 with an absolute absence of a "component" - or an element of it 
component - of collective action. 
The test of real events has demonstrated that - whatever one thinks about it - the 
PKK now commands real support among Turkish Kurds. An uprising (serf/iildan) 
in the Turkish section of Kurdistan that begin in mid-March 1990 had serious 
effects on many aspects of politics in Turkey as a whole, which require 
examination at this point, as these events illustrates the degree to which the 
Kurdish national movement has developed spontaneous militant forms 'fronen 
below' (Middle East International, 13 April 1990: 13-14; Human Rights ill 
Turkey, April 1990; Kurdistan Liberation, April 1990: 5-5; 'I'lu' Independent, 7 
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April 1990; Middle East Times, 3-9 April 1990,27 March 1990). (White, 1997, p. 
232). 
The founder of an illegal and daily operational paramilitary unit organised in the 
region (allegedly founded in late 1980s) also states the extent of the PKK's mass 
mobilisation capability when he sounded a "chilling warning" for the State forces in 
the introduction to his book about his direct experiences as part of the Organisation's 
activities. 
... 
If, in the South East, shopkeepers shut or open their shops with a telephone 
call, if tens of thousands of humans can gather, march and shout slogans such as 
"DOWN WITH TURKEY", "LONG LIVE OUR LEADER APO", if clashes take 
place in towns over hours or even days, and if all these are approved with silence 
in the name of "HUMAN RIGHTS", then that means something has to he 
changed. [capital lettering cited as original] (Aydin-, 1992, p. 6,7). 
As a result, the string of uprisings which erupted on the streets - and pathways of rural 
localities - of the relatively less assimilated Kurdish provinces in Turkey (East and 
Southeast) in March 1990, and which had substantially withered away by 1993, 
without dispute marked an entirely novel historical era for Kurdish politics and 
sociality. It introduced a newly detribalised mass participation in struggle to the 
history of the Kurds in their modern national sense. But the very same era 
simultaneously multiplied the entanglements upon which the "turning" of the 
Organisation's historical success "into [its] fetters" have rested. 
c. The Apex Years: Settlement of the Impasse 
The "March Serihildans" prompted an influx of new recruits into the Organisation. 
Thousands of men and women from the rural and urban populations, particularly frone 
among the high school (Lycee) and university students of both Kurdish cities and 
Turkish metropolises joined the Party's frontal and military bodies. 
While, in 1989, ARGK issued the "Compulsory Military Service Law" for 
guerrilla recruitment, "it has been forced temporarily to close off recruitment to its 
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guerrilla force at several points since 1991, due to an inability to properly train the 
large numbers of recruits coming forward" (White, 2000, p. 197). A videotape, 
recording a hunger strike of the group of more or less fifty boys and girls in Bekaa 
Valley whose admission to the ARGK was refused, was distributed to the PKK's 
sympathisers during those years. The "tactical leadership"6 of the PKK, in 
consequence, was enjoying its organisational "peak". The front pages of the Party's 
two main magazines (Serxwebun and Berxwedan) from 1990 to 1993 became a mere 
celebration of the coming "pre-evident" victory. Berxwedan carried an Öcalan 
statement claiming "We are entering Newroz [1994] with 30 thousand guerrillas" (this 
was made at the press conference held on 28 September, 1993) on its front page in 
bold letters (Berxwedan, October 15,1993). The next issue announced that the PKK 
had superseded "all colonialist institutions" in the Turkish-ruled part of Kurdistan with 
an "absolute authority" by splashing the headline "OTORITE BJZDE" (Authority Is 
Ours) right across its front page. The sub-heading was no less firm. 
The resolutions adopted by the PKK, which are formed in concrete proposals such 
as "political parties will shut [their offices in Kurdistan], all their administrators 
and members will resign, the newspapers serving the Turkish special war will not 
be distributed, TV's will not be watched, the schools serving as colonialist 
assimilation institutions will be shut down, teachers will resign, gambling will not 
be allowed, all the officers of the TC [Turkish Republic] will leave Kurdistan, no 
one will attend the courts of the TC, no one will join the Turkish military service, 
taxes will not be paid to the TC, journalists will be allowed to come to Kurdistan 
only with permission" are implemented in perfect order. Our people have been 
devoting all their efforts towards implementing these resolutions. (13eixVt, J, &Jn, 
November 15,1993). 
The headline of the subsequent issue of Berxwedan (December, 1993) was "'The PKK 
Is Institutionalising the People's Rule Step By Step". Serxvvehun's earlier (September, 
1991) front page headline was to predict a War Government: "We Are Advancing 
towards Botan-Behdinan War Government". Press statements issued by the Central 
Headquarters of the ARGK announcing the PKK's arrival "at a stage of preparing to 
proclaim a revolutionary government in those parts of Kurdistan where the political 
and military authority of the enemy has already been broken" were also released 
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through the Kurdistan Report (op cit., October 1991, February 1992) - the pro-PKK 
magazine which is distributed throughout the world and published in most of the 
European and some of the Eastern languages as well as in English. Further, the 
proposals for the "Revolutionary War Government" were to encompass some parts of 
non-Turkish ruled Kurdistan (Behdinan is a province which falls inside the Iraqi-ruled 
territory [now mainly dominated by the Barzani-led KDP]) for the growth of the PKK 
exceeded Anatolian Kurdistan, particularly following the Gulf War (Middle East 
International, 26 July, 1991). This enabled it "to establish bases deeper inside Iraqi 
Kurdistan than ever before, as well as benefiting from a fortuitous enhancement of its 
weaponry" (White, 1997, p. 234). Laizer, in her rather journalistic work based on 
direct observations and experiences, also points towards the PKK's growth "in both 
north and south" - but in terms of 
its non-military aspects. 
In 1990 for the first time massive demonstrations in support of the PKK erupted 
in Botan province in the large Kurdish towns like Cizre and Sirnak. During 
Newroz ordinary Kurds hurled stones at the army and security forces, and 
marched openly in the streets waving PKK flags and holding up portraits of 
Abdullah Öcalan. 
After 1992 and the war in south Kurdistan, the PKK emerged as the only Kurdish 
party in that particular conflict whose deeds matched its maxims. This brought 
the PKK even greater support in both north and south Kurdistan. (Laizer, 1996, p. 
90). 
All these facts were not the whole edifice, but a facet of the peak years. The 
"unimaginable" growth of the PKK had been proven by the string of Serihildan. s 
spread over 1990,1991 and 1992. However, those achievements did not lead to a 
victory. Neither the enormous growth of the party nor the vast number of recruits to 
the militant and guerrilla body of the PKK made any difference to a modest settlement 
of Turkey's Kurdish question, not to mention the 
bold steps like the "liberated zones" 
and the "revolutionary Botan-Behdinan 
War Government", for they were 
exaggerations arising out of the state of "organisational climax". 
The fundamental question was, from the organisation-movement point of view, 
the new recruits to the Organisation following the uprisings were ironically not 
pertinent to the Organisation's means by which it previously "developed the 
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spontaneous militant forms `from below"' - "which require[s] examination at this 
point", as White puts it. In consequence, the extent of new and assorted recruits 
containing a large number of college-university students and graduates, instead of 
engendering a further "revolutionary leap forward", had mutated into the organisations 
"fetters". 
Also, the mutation had not been acknowledged by the "tactical leadership" 
under the circumstances of the "organisational peak". And the repetition of "old 
customs" shaped by the fears, anxieties and hesitations - which seeded the main 
difficulties of the Organisation during the "condensation years" (the second half of 
1980s) - accompanied by the intensive one-way education system of the Party 
(Chapter 5) inevitably "upgraded" the main organisational predicament from "fetters" 
to an impasse in subsequent years. From another angle, an organisation which had 
been enabled to "build up" its Kurdish "national" revitalisation from a "nuisance" to 
"a security threat" (New York Times, 20 October, 1991) or from a "rag-tag terrorist 
band" to "a viable guerrilla army" (Sydney Morning Herald, 21 October, 1991) by the 
"contribution" of kidnapped-abducted cadres gathered through the ARGK's 
"Compulsory Military Service Law", has actually been unable to achieve a modest 
"national" victory even with the mobilised resource of unanimously acknowledged 
massive popular support and the sheer number of new recruits. The why of this 
organisational phenomenon is examined further below. 
d. Hints of the Fall 
Hopes and slogans of the sort listed above were gradually abolished in the following 
years. The insistence on such proposals had already tended to weaken. The hopes of 
the "liberated areas" were being expressed with less emphasis - though they were still 
alive up until the end of 1994. An instruction of 
Öcalan to the "war headquarters" was 
published on the back page of Serxwebun (October, 1993) with the title "According to 
the existing course of the war, we may orientate ourselves towards the liberated 
territories" and "War Government" emphases were gradually superseded by the notion 
of "liberated territories". In the political report submitted to the 4'h congress () I' tile 
PKK (8-27 January, 1995), Öcalan repeated the PKK's proposals to orientate itself 
"towards" liberated territories. That target also faded in later years. Paul White traces 
263 
the hesitations about such hopes to as far back as 1992 and states that he had the 
impression that "Öcalan was noticeably vague on the question" when responding to 
his request for an explanation of the "organisation's conception of a Kurdish 
Parliament, for `Botan-Behdinan"' and cites the following excerpt from the interview 
he held at the PKK's training camp in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley on 2 July, 1992. 
AO: The people's power is stronger in these areas; it's also stronger for the 
national parliament, and for the government. 
PW: Which government? 
AO: The people's government. 
PW: You can form a people's government in these areas 
AO: It's being developed in that direction. (White, 2000. P. 168). 
The fading of the string of serihildans had actually begun after the 1992 Newroz 
celebrations. At the PKK's call for celebrations, the response of the Kurds of Turkey 
had been widespread and there were simultaneous uprisings throughout Kurdistan as 
well as the Western metropolises of Turkey. But the reaction of the Turkish state was 
harsh and irreconcilable. Extensive violence and bloodshed erupted, involving the 
military, the police, the PKK guerrillas and civilians. The violence and clashes 
between PKK supporters and the Turkish armed forces did not end with the Newroz 
celebrations. The Turkish state was "determined to quell the PKK Rebellion" (Kohen, 
1992) which was a full-scale Kurdish revolt. Well co-ordinated armed forces 
composed of military corps, police, militia and village guards continued their 
offensives over the following months. A city of approximately twenty five thousand 
people, Sirnak, was virtually destroyed in an assault by state forces commencing on 18 
August 1992 (Middle East International, 11 September, 1992; Middle East Time-. s, 8- 
14 September, 1992) and resulted in the death of thirty four civilians according to 
official reports. Further military operations carried out by the state on the towns of 
cukurca and Dargecit etc. in this period led to a death toll of over five hundred in 
only thirty days - increasing the total in 1992 to almost two thousand (McDowall, 
1996, p. 435; Hedges 1992). 
Despite Turkey's polarising policies, the PKK did not harden its attitude. On 
the eve of Newroz 1993,17 March, a unilateral cease-fire was declared by Ocalan 
(Kurdistan Report, April/May 1993) in the presence of the PUK leader Jalal Talahani. 
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Three elements of the cease-fire statement were highlighted: a) the cease-fire was 
"unconditional", b) the PKK "do not wish to separate from Turkey" and c) the "matter 
will be resolved within nationally agreed borders" (op. cit. ). A couple of days later, on 
19 March 1993, Abdullah Öcalan and Kemal Burkay (General Secretary of the 
Kurdistan Socialist Party - KSP), a "moderate leader", met in Syria and signed a 
protocol (Serxwebun, April 1993; Nokta, 4-10 April 1993) containing similar moderate 
demands for the cease-fire and promising joint peace efforts and future co-operation 
(Laizer, 1996, p. 95). No response was recorded from the Turkish state's side. By 
contrast, violence intensified while military operations against both guerrilla forces 
and the alleged "villages backing terrorists" continued, as did the "death squads" 
targeting the members and activists of the pro-Kurdish legal party (op. cit p. 75,76) 
the HEP (People's Labour Party). But the unconditional-unilateral cease-fire was 
extended by Öcalan on 16 April 1993 at a press conference held in Bar Elias, Lebanon. 
The HEP leader Ahmet Turk and the "moderate-soft" (ilimli) KSP General Secretary 
Kemal Burkay participated as well as Jalal Talabani (Serxwebun, April, 1993; 
Kurdistan Report, April/May, 1993 back cover) to "promote the cease-fire and 
Kurdish nationalist unity". 
Allegedly, the PKK took the "momentous" step of a unilateral-unconditional 
cease-fire following the meeting held between Öcalan and Talahani in late February 
(White, 2000, p. 167) - at which a message of the Turkish authorities was passed to 
Öcalan. This implies that the Turkish authorities had requested the ceasefire. 
Alternatively, Talabani passed Öcalan's "modest demands" on to Turkey - along with 
promises containing "PKK condemnation of terrorism", "abandonment of the armed 
struggle", "commitment to the unity of Turkey and the rejection of separatism" - 
which "were no more than had been mooted by leading Turkish politicians" to Öral 
(McDowall, pp. 436,437; Sabah, 13 March, 1993). Or the leadership of the Party 
may have been compelled by the pressure of "repression fatigue among the Kurdish 
populace" (Muir, 1993) from which the PKK was suffering. 
Whatever the immediate cause, the cease-fire proposals, which indeed 
contained a radical political departure for the PKK, were virtually made in vain. "By a 
cruel irony" (McDowall, 1996, p. 437), President Turgut 
ÖzaI7, with whom the 
"moderator" Talabani was in direct contact and whose death "proved to he an untimely 
blow to hopes" (Laizer, 1996, p. 76) "died of a heart attack" on the day after Öcalan's 
declaration of the "indefinite extension" of the unilateral cease-fire. Turkey's attitude 
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towards the cease-fire and the PKK's diligently softened demands was summed up by 
the General Chief of Staff and Prime Minister - Dogan Güres and Tansu tiller. The 
former warned: "The PKK will die like dogs in their own blood" (Dagli, 1994) and the 
latter was reported to have "cleared the way fully for military-backed policies to 
`solve' the Kurdish problem" (Imset, 1993). The cease-fire thus remained unilateral. 
Its end was proven in practice on 24 May, with an abrupt operation by a guerrilla 
detachment commanded by Semdin Sakik8 in which thirty-three unarmed Turkish 
soldiers were killed, and officially declared by Öcalan on 8 June 1993. So "the dirty 
war in Turkey" (Laizer, 1992, pp. 72-108) - which was to produce a death toll of over 
thirty thousand by the end of 1998 - started from the time when the PKK declared 
another unilateral cease-fire on "World Peace-Day", the 1" of September 1993. at the 
request of some other "mediators". By another "cruel irony", however, the PKK's 
final declaration of a unilateral cease-fire (World Peace Day, 1998) culminated in an 
international operation in which Öcalan "found himself bound, gagged, and drugged 
on a jet back to Turkey" (Howard, 1999, p. 38) from Kenya on 15 February, 1999. 
The desperate search for a "modus vivendi" was doomed from the start to end 
in failure because the decisive cause on the part of Turkey was that it took 
"momentous steps" as an indication strongly hinting that the PKK "had undergone 
military defeat and now sought whatever he could gain politically" (McDowall, 1996, 
p. 437), and also because Turkey relied on the quantitative reports of its National 
Intelligence Organisation (MIT) which "was almost certainly in receipt of satellite 
intelligence from the United States" (op. cit p. 436): Turkey hit out at "a `soft' side of 
the PKK" (White, 2000,163). Namely, this study argues, the hints of the PKK's 
decline were getting more visible and becoming "handy" to the intelligence services 
whose conclusions were based on quantitative research and the reports they produced. 
II The Organisational Vicious Circle and its Shrinkage 
As has been discussed above, the central question in this study is how Kurdish 
collective action was organised by the PKK in the context of the Turkey's past and 
present policies regarding the existence of the Kurds. In extending this discussion, I 
am focusing on the hints about the decline of the PKK in this particular section. I am 
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going to endeavour to examine the fundamental factor underlying the Organisation's 
inability to further mobilise its massive resources acquired - made available and 
mobile - for collective action and the resulting organisational shrinkage. In other 
words, we shall see the why of this organisational "pollution" and "deconstruction" at 
issue below: the why of the how. 
a. The Repetitive Cycle: Consolidation of the Impasse 
In the course of mounting pressures on Italy pressuring the D'Alema Government to 
force him leave the country, Öcalan "told an Italian daily on 1I December 1998 that 
he was planning to resign as PKK president" (White, 2000, p. 184). He also 
expressed in the same interview that the cause of such a "party restructuring" proposal 
was the 95% of the PKK who he condemned at that time. 
The resignation would "indeed be realised" if "they [the PKKI insist on not 
changing themselves", he said, adding: "If" they "continue what they have been doing 
for fifteen years, then I shall have nothing to do with them". However, the news of the 
resignation from Reuters (Rome, 11 December, 1998) was sensational, and Italian 
papers carried this with full-front-page headlines. The news became one of the 
headlines on MED TV9 too, but the resignation was reported as "distorted news". In 
fact, Öcalan confirmed the news in a live interview for MED TV a few days later: and 
repeated it in the "Organisational and Political Report" submitted to the sixth congress 
held in January 1999 (Serxwebun, April, May, June 1999). We, almost two years 
later, learned from the "Notes of Meetings" (with lawyers) at lmralli prison that 
Öcalan still insisted on this course of action as a result of the PKK's inability to mutate 
itself - he was objecting to the vicious circle caused 
by the repetition of the "old" 
which has been sheltered and/or disguised by "naivete and blind adulation". 
... 
I did say this earlier. When I was in Italy, I said: "95% of the PKK is the PKK 
which I oppose; I do not want such a PKK, I am going to resign from it". Even 
the Italian newspapers made these words a front-page headline the following day. 
I now say it again; if the existing course [of eventsl continues, if you stay 
unchanged as you do now, I will leave you. (Serxwebu, r, August 2(X)O). 
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It is one of the most striking facts that Öcalan frequently berates his followers for their 
habit of "obstinate-blind" repetition. The reality of repetition is another distinguishing 
facet of Öcalan's talks spanning more than one hundred and fifty thousand A5 pages - 
the basic material of the party's non-military education. Naturally, decades of an 
"educational inculcation" concentrating on certain matters would have been doomed to 
repetition to some extent. If the fountainhead of this inculcation is a "one-man 
Leadership", then more repetition will be inevitable. Further, if the object of the 
inculcation is a community dominated by a tribal10 structure and the Subject of 
inculcation claims to be a socialist one accomplishing the "quasi-revolution of 
October" (Chapter 4) and even undoing the damage and degeneration which 
humankind has undergone during several millennia, then the extent of repetition will 
be broader. That is to say, the nature of the leadership-movement and the society in 
which it emerged necessitated a considerable amount of repetition in its "revolutionary 
tongue". However, the particular repetition of the vicious circle in the "PKK 
movement" in the 1990s is not a quantitative increase of such general repetition but an 
additional and qualitative one which decisively altered the movement's nature and 
development. Öcalan had "an inkling" of this of sort repetition towards late 1991. He 
begins his "analysis" (cözümleme), contemplating the "party education" under the 
heading of "The Grasp of the Seriousness of Education is Essential", by saying: 
Our analyses [cözümlemeler] are all composed of a repetition. Notwithstanding 
that I try to renew it, your state of incredible slow-motion progress compels us to 
repeat, and since it compels us we are driven into more and more difficulty. This, 
then, reduces our productivity. I have an inkling that you are gradually polluting 
the life [in the party] more than before at the present time. You are obstructing the 
way to a fluent and attractive life. You do not have the right to do this at all. 
The first prerequisite for education is to take serious comprehension as the 
fundamental concern. I doubt a person's humanness who does not lock 
himself/herself into an accurate grasp of the seriousness [of educationj. (()ratan, 
1994a, p. 481). 
The final sentence of the "cözümleme" (analysis) is filled with warnings - in fact with 
menaces and swearwords - "if' they continue to "insist" [on repetition]. He Finishes 
the analysis with the following words: 
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... We are a movement that produced a revival 
from the deathbed. We can never 
admit adjectives such as non-progressing, non-reaching [the target/victoryj and 
non-achieving as befitting you. I emphasise this again and again. I reject these 
adjectives with which you describe yourself. If you insist, we will make it cost 
you dear. The PKK is a greatness. We did not dedicate our life for nothing, did 
we? We did not have this many martyrs in vain. The person who does not take 
this as an essential [principle] and does not nourish himself/herself with this, 
he/she is an alcak" [debased-dishonest-disgraceful person] near us. And you 
know the place where these alcaks go. You will have to take this greatness as a 
foundation and make it live in yourself. This cannot be objected to, one only 
carry out its requirements. 15 October 1991 (op. cit p. 505). 
By mid-1998, some months before he came to believe that he should talk about 
resignation, the level of critique had reached a "qualitatively" different degree. 
Life is not feasible with fahise [prostitute] personalities in a political sense. Even 
in other senses, nothing can be gained with this personality! How does it - being 
the product and means of a mechanism whose only work is to produce fahise 
personalities for the regime - bore you? If you insist, I will absolutely qualify you 
as [fahisel, absolutely! In fact, it reveals that you are one. What is repeating a 
fault, guilt forty times? In Arabic, this is termed `fahis". "Fahis" is constantly to 
repeat a fault, to continue an ugliness, to live with an advanced defect 
continuously. The term "Fahise" derives from here. If you retain these faulty 
personalities, [then I will say] all of you are `fahise". ... 
A prostitute in the street, 
in a brothel is much less guilty. She does not harm anyone other than herself. 
You harm the society, the party, the army. Military, political prostitution is far 
more dangerous. A person who repeats a fault 
in the same area ... 
is a dangerous 
prostitute. If a man who, above all, always repeats this, he is a street-walker 
[sürtük], and he is very dangerous. From now on, my greatest problem is to 
search for cures to stop this. (Serxwebun, June 
1998). 
Ahmet Aydin, devotes his "final (fourth) chapter" (1992, pp. 182-188) to a selection 
of Öcalan's similarly scathing sentences picked from the 1990 and 1991 talks, 
containing scolding expressions, swear-words and derogatory implications about both 
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the militants and the Kurdish people, to exhibit the "genuine nature of Apo and the 
PKK" in his own words. 
The upward motion of the level of the "critique" continues from 1991 to 1998: 
from "having an inkling that" the PKK members "are polluting the life" to qualifying 
them as "prostitutes" or "street-walkers". It continues in some refined forms 
appropriate to the circumstances of the one-man-prison on Imralli. 
What is the significance of this? To what extent does the increasing 
intensification of Öcalan's scolding of his militants from the early to late 1990s 
explain the PKK's organisational entanglements, which engendered a remarkable 
decrease in its military and political capability? No doubt, my aim here is not to prove 
the most decisive factors in the decline of the PKK by following the chronology of 
Öcalan's talks, but the ceaseless talks in fact provide a mirror-like reflection of the 
process of decline in the PKK. Also, the upward motion of the strong language of the 
"person of charisma" is "associated with strong resistance to the institutionalisation" 
of the "routinisation" of his charisma (Chapter 5, III, b, c) for he was witnessing "the 
party's `emancipation' from his control" (Panebianco, 1988). 
As has been explored earlier in preceding two chapters, the two interrelated 
and distinguishing aspects of the PKK are that its textual body consists merely of these 
ceaseless "inculcation talks" and that the talks concentrate substantially on the notion 
of the "self-shaping spiritual re-formation of personalities" within the structure of the 
Party's operating cadres. That is to say, the organisational capability or incapability of 
the PKK was very much related to Ocalan's "inculcation talks". This is not only true 
for the pre-arrest leadership of Öcalan, but also for his leadership during 
imprisonment. In the period following arrest, even if there has been a noticeable 
increase in articles signed by the "Council of Presidency" or by one of its members, 
Öcalan's accounts of general and particular issues noted down by lawyers have been 
regularly published in the central pages of the monthly central organ, SerxKwc'hun, as 
"analyses of the new stage". What is becoming more apparent under the circumstances 
of Öcalan's imprisonment is that the inculcation talks, the "Leadership's analyses", 
have been functioning for institutionalising the "bureaucratic staff" of the 
Organisation. Thus, the talks that refer to particular circumstances are additionally 
illustrative of the Party's organisational questions and confrontations, which, in the 
final analysis, have determined the outcome of the Kurdish movement against Turkey. 
Considering the individual and group self-immolations of dozens of Kurds within two 
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months (Chapter 1), and the mass mobilisations of hundreds of thousands after 
Öcalan's arrest - in spite of abandoning almost all classical national undertakings 
(Chapter 4) - in a pre-feudal society in which the deadlock of "primordial" ties has 
dominated most aspects of social, political and cultural life (Chapter 5), a sociological 
understanding and explanation of the PKK is not possible without examining both the 
philosophical and spiritual inwardness of Öcalan's talks. In fact, building a collective 
action primarily embraces intellectual intercommunication (talks, writings etc. ) and 
inspires attraction, stimulation and the eventual persuasion of individuals to act 
together, to construct "networks of informal interactions between plurality or, (Diani, 
1992) themselves for believed common interests within the framework of rules and 
procedures. Thus, proceeding with the discussion of the "organisational shrinkage" 
period of the PKK in the light of Ocalan's increasingly tense talks during the 1990s - 
in particular, from 1993 onwards - will facilitate the identification of the principal 
causes of the collective process. 
Despite the intensifying and thorough "analyses" containing open threats and 
swear-words, and the use of these "analyses" in both legal and illegal party 
publications, the repetition of wrong, or in Öcalan's term the "political prostitution" 
was not extricated from its habitual circle. On the contrary, the main predicament 
which originated in the PKK's "self-contained" years, during which the oºýer- 
consolidation of the organisational structure took place in the shadow of under- 
confidence and fear of treason, settled down and penetrated the whole being of the 
Organisation. It has circled repetitively and been routinised because "to change the 
traditional Kurdish ways" was "more difficult than to split the atom" (Gunter, 1998, 
p. 82). 
The central theme of the philosophy of the PKK's "education war", which is 
repeated throughout Öcalan's inculcation talks, has been the extrication of human 
naturalness from the "plague" of civilisation's property mechanisms (discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5). This has been implemented, according to the "Party Leadership", 
on the "degenerated" Kurdish personalities of "Turkish Kurdistan" -where "humanity 
faded away in its most solid form". However, the 1990s revealed that "extrication" 
accomplished little or nothing when both the "education war" and guerrilla war 
themselves had metamorphosed into "degenerated wars" due to corruption among the 
"bureaucratic staff' of the "routinised" charismatic authority under Ocalan. "Power 
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tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely" said Lord Acton. The 
"absolute power" with which Öcalan's charisma was endowed had its reflection 
among the "trunk cadres" as countless "mini Öcalans" whose power began to exceed 
Öcalan's power in the most harsh and absolute terms. That is, the reification of the 
power of charisma, at its inevitable "routinised" stage, denotes the "ramification of an 
individual hegemony" (Lee, 1992) -the power that may only functions "through a net- 
like organisation" (Foucault, cited in Jermier, 1993). And thereby, Öcalan has 
"confidently" come to confess that "ninety percent of the party adherents who were 
able to be, and appropriate to be, real party cadres and members have been" eliminated 
"through a deliberate coercion" (Öcalan, 2001b, p. 97). 
b. The Source of Repetition 
Three principal questions caused by the sudden increase in recruitment do in fact 
indicate the source of the repetition of certain wrongs. The extent of the "raw" recruits 
prompted by the mass uprisings was, first of all, too vast to educate and inculcate 
through the one-way and one-man educational system of the Party. Secondly, the 
"raw" recruits, on the one hand, were viewed by the experienced cadres as potential 
spoilers who would release many pollutants into the "party line" or "party life". These 
recruits were thus either subject to biased treatment and kept distant from the 
important ranks of the organisation, or the victims of prejudged expulsions and 
murders. In particular, the elimination of the "deviant" recruits who joined from 
"poisoned bourgeoisie universities and schools" was effected "without delay" owing 
to "quick-witted" diagnoses. In his recently published tedious "defence" against the 
European Court of Human Rights, Öcalan's confession about the "calamity" years of 
the 1990s is horrifying. 
Although it has not yet been precisely unveiled, it may confidently be suggested that 
ninety percent of the party adherents who were able and appropriate to be real party 
cadres and members have been victims12 of this approach through a deliberate 
coercion making them commit wrongs. Detailed investigations will unearth the 
actual truth (op. cit., p. 97). 
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On the other hand, among the new recruits, the ascent to the commanding ranks of the 
guerrilla forces was heavily determined by physical features rather than political, 
educational and leadership capacities'3. The old members were not capable of' 
educating and "absorbing" the new members according to the Organisation's 
"initiating spirit", which was defined as a self-rehumanisation initiative. Thirdly, and 
most destructively, the corruption of the measure of qualifications pertinent to the 
individual's ascent and descent in terms of organisational power and status in the 
Party, which had its origins in the late 1980s, has deepened with the multi-faceted 
effects of the new abundance of recruits. While there were amongst the new members 
"many eager pursuers of power, privilege and esteem" (Polat, 1999, p. 48) in the 
"emerging State" along with the believers in - but those who were alien to - the 
movement, among the old members there were many disguised and/or "insoluble"" 
power holders obsessed with the fear of losing their positions as well as the mass of 
devotees - who were substantially distant from organisational power. The premature 
search for the enjoyment of the "prestige-feeling that power gives" has been a 
pervasive and intense feeling among the trunk-cadre layer of the PKK. 
The state is considered the sole source of the `right' to use violence. Hence, 
`politics' for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the 
distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state. 
... 
He who is active in politics strives for power either as a means in serving 
other aims, ideal or egoistic, or as `power for power's sake', that is, in order to 
enjoy the prestige-feeling that power gives. (Weber, 1948, p. 78). 
Moreover, the corruption of the qualification mechanisms nourished the success and 
dominance of the former categories of "old members" and "new members" by 
presenting an easy basis for a pervasive and decisive mutual tacit agreeipl enl between 
these categories to "share power", and to enjoy the prestigious feelings it offers. The 
tacit togetherness of "power hunters" and "disguised/insoluble power holders" which 
was catalysed and secured by "naive and self-deceptive loyal-cadres"15 strengthened 
the vicious circle of the "repetition of the same wrongs" - the "prostitution" - and this, 
in turn, consolidated the degradation and distortion of the me'asure's of factual 
organisational procedure. As a corollary to the nature of the vicious circle into which 
the "trinity" (made of disguised/"insoluble" power holders, power hunters and it naive 
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and self-deceptive constituency) fell, the wave of new recruits in the early nineties 
resulted in an impasse for the PKK instead of a further leap forward. And the war 
[which was believed to be producing a "new human species" (Chapter 4), shaping 
"even the philosophers" (Serxwebun, April 1998, p. 14) for a PKK-ruled society] 
itself became corrupted during the era 1993-96, in which conflict escalated pitilessly, 
and was "dirtied" (Laizer, 1996,72-108) by all available means. This is precisely how 
the reification of the power takes place through "ramification of individual hegemony" 
(Lee, 1992) among the emerging ruling strata of revolutions. In the case of the 
movements with charismatic leaderships, the very process signifies the actual "face" 
of the routinisation of charisma. And this is precisely why Weber (1947, p. 364) 
repeatedly puts emphasis on the "stronger ideal and also stronger material interests of 
the members of the administrative staff" when articulating the "routinisation" process. 
In this sense, the change in Öcalan's opinion about the war within the space of months 
is worth looking at. 
The war unveils feelings which have to die and those which have to he revived. 
The war brings out the greatest power of thinking. The war, in our reality, is a 
mere intellectual education movement. The person who becomes involved in the 
war may well be a philosopher, or may aesthetically realise or beautify 
himself/herself in the best way. The war is precisely an action of self-recreation. 
... Identification and explanation of these notions are so extensive. 
But you, as an 
illiterate ignorant, do not draw the conclusion from our war reality. You are still 
saying: "Wherever the war is, there will not be thinking, politics, organisation hilt 
the dominance of an individual's wild feelings and instincts". (Ser. vvVebun, April 
1999) 
This excerpt is from the speech delivered at the opening of the 5'h Middle East 
Konferans (sub-congress) of the Party held between 15-25 March 1998. But in the 
letter sent to the VII. extraordinary congress of the PKK from Turkey's Imralli prison, 
December 1999, which was later published as a "Political Report" suhmitted to the 
congress, Öcalan had come to believe that the war had actually shaped a "fraudulent 
personality". 
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The fact of extreme repetition and the corruption of war gave rise to an enormous 
`rant' [16] and the framework for a fraudulent personality [italics addedj. 
(Serxwebun, January 2000). 
This change, in the first instance, may well be attributed to Öcalan's state of 
imprisonment under the fear of death or to his "devilish" tactics. However, when one 
examines earlier statements prior to the "unexpected" arrest, a "preliminary" motion 
towards such a change is noticeable. For example, in the "Political and Organisational 
Report" submitted to the VI. congress (12-25, January 1999) which he contemplated 
during his presence in Rome and put into words just after his departure (16, January 
1999), it is striking that Öcalan has already come to believe that the war is not 
functioning in the direction of his "recreation" expectations any longer. When 
"scattered" lines are put together, the tendency becomes more apparent. 
Let me emphasise once more: the plot which was arranged by imperialism and 
its most aggressive fascist forces in order to conclude the critical process in the 
Middle East with a war around my personality is very important and still 
continues. Why was such an offensive planned against me? There was indeed an 
accurate revolutionary activity taking place in the region [the Middle East, namely 
Syria and Lebanon]. In the recent reports you have sent, you say "Following the 
closure of the Mahsum Korkmaz Academy, the resources were not utilised 
sufficiently in spite of quite suitable educational conditions existing in the 
country". The fact is not only the insufficient utilisation of resources, but you 
caused the educational quality we achieved [in the Middle Eastj to change into an 
unrecognisable state, ... 
I was executing a merciless war of education up until the day of my departure 
from there, and I was well aware of its historical meaning. But you did not 
understand even this ... Such a selfish approach to the work by, in particular, 
almost all of our central [committee] and the overwhelming majority of our 
prominent figures in the commanding body ... [who] suffocate the outcomes of 
our activities in their personal beings, and further, carry out all these under the 
name of "loyalty to the Leadership", ... stems from the nature of your 
personalities. ... 
You may say, what link is there with the activities of the Middle East? Yes, the 
link with the education activities [we undertook] there is very concrete jobviousl. 
If these educational activities had been carried out in a country where enormous 
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possibilities existed, in all headquarters and all localities, then the tasks which, I 
said, "could score several victories" would have been effected, and, first and 
foremost, splendid successes and solutions to our war and army questions would 
have been realised. Here is the historical task whose requirements you did not 
meet and the opportunities which you missed. ... 
A friend of ours says "There is a 
wrong at the base of this work". This is not the case. Didn't we provide you with 
a guerrilla force which was able to wreck an army altogether? What percentage of 
commanders, which you insisted on making me approve, are with you now'?... 
Where are those who you authorised them to command? Who gave the 
commandership to these base creatures? I used to have gold-like cadres, they are 
all rotting in the soil now. Thousands of humans who resisted death are rotting in 
the soil. ... You evade rendering an account of what you 
did and bring the 
question to an insoluble position, and leave it. ... The thing with which I am 
infuriated is this situation. With these self-sacrificing forces, even the world could 
have been beaten into submission, and the world still is afraid of them ( the forces 1. 
And because I am the President of these forces, they [superpowers i are 
mercilessly pursuing me. ... 
There must have been a so-called error in our war-style. Insolubility must have 
been a destiny. The tongues of those who say these things should be cut off. I say 
it openly; the reality of the PKK is not this. The reality of the PKK is the reality 
of victory and work, enough for ten victories, has been accomplished. The ones 
who have dropped it to the ground should be ashamed! (Serxwcbun, April, 1999, 
pp. 13,14). 
Two main points dominate the excerpts above: 
a) the vitality and decisiveness of 
Öcalan's education/inculcation "war" in the 
processes of the PKK's rise and fall, and 
b) the determinative factor of "almost all" central [committee] members and the 
"overwhelming majority" of the prominent figures of the commanding body 
(Weber's bureaucratic staff") in the process of the corruption of education and, in 
consequence, of the corruption of war. In his daily journal of 19 July 1996, Enver 
Polat'7 quotes Öcalan's firmer words from the "4'rizümleme" of the day concerning 
the corruption of the war. 
Talking about the enemy, we may defeat it a thousand times, but alas, I cannot 
bring you to the [desired] point. You are more obstinate than camels. The thine 
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that takes me to back to square one is neither the enemy nor the people; I am now 
gradually realising better than before that it is the trunk-cadre structure with the 
central [committee] as its head. It is an extremely dangerous situation. 
The friends we interrogated are the most loyal and honest humans, but their 
factual practices are virtually taking revenge on the leadership (italics as 
original]. (Polat, 1999, p. 79,80). 
In further parts of the "Report", Öcalan becomes more explicit. In this part, his first 
objective is to break one of the three legs of the "trinity" (the naive and self-deceptive 
constituency, or the catalyst-shelter body), namely the ordinary delegates of the 
congress because he has already concluded that "self-deception is the greatest art" 
among the "middle stratum" cadres (Serxwebun, February 1997). 
You dear participants! 
I think you are discussing [the matters] and certainly you have to discuss them. I 
say it again; as I emphasised in my earlier speech, if you say "our elders sc{v and 
we do" then I say that there is no greater , cerefsis'x than you. No such elders exist 
and nor have you the right to listen like that even if there are such elders. You 
must absolutely know that you have harmed [the strugglel immensely. 
Approaching us [me] by such an understanding of seniority is the worst offence to 
us. (Serxwebun, May 1999, p. 13). 
Then, the "main head or mind" (Gunter, 1998) comes back again to the first and most 
permanent leg of the "tripod" (the disguised/insoluble power holders, namely the 
"trunk-cadres") whom he feels has led him into a cul-de-sac. Öcalan actually proposes 
to treat the sixth congress as a "re-foundation congress" before the seventh 
"extraordinary" one (Chapter 4). "If not what may happen, you could say", he warns, 
"[is that] there may be confusions, the discussions may tend towards an intricate state. 
Wherever it goes or not, our congress is a renewal of the party foundation, we re- 
establish the party if needed" (Serxwebun, May 1999. p. 14). 
... But 
it seems to me that your existing conduct is the most devilish, the most 
foolish and the most porter-like, and, at the same time, is the most insidious One. 
This, on the one hand, is a most innocent mümin-like19 style, on the other hand is a 
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most simple peasant cunning style, which both develop within each other. ... The 
most painful aspect is that I cannot see it in the individual's personality or as being 
a clique and I cannot get out of it. It is a situation peculiar to itself. ... My 
feelings, at least, tell me, "you cannot march with them". Whatever excuses you 
provide, my feelings say to me "don't draw nearer". (op. cit. ). 
The conclusion at which Öcalan arrives is that he "unfortunately cannot go further 
with the existing PKK" as it stands. He lays down the condition that if an "extensive 
and deep-rooted revision and renewal" does not take place to the extent of a re- 
foundation, the Party "cannot walk [work] after the VI. congress" and asks himself for 
the "answer" below: "If it walks [as hitherto] what happens then? " 
It will be ordinary, the repetition of the past, as we have been accustomed to. 
Well, can we endure this anymore? For example, I can no longer endure it. Let 
such a PKK be dissolved. I cannot endure this pain. ... It may be emancipation 
for me to be divorced from those who bear these [accustomed) perceptions. ... 
You cannot seduce me [into continuing as we have up to now] by playing along 
with me which you have been doing through your tricks and performances. Either 
you alter this personality of yours or I must go my own way. (op. cit. ). 
Namely, if the PKK continues to repeat its habits, Ocalan will somehow "resign". In 
addition, following the "heated" and "condensed" experience of the 66 day "Rome 
March" (Ucar, 2000,3-4-5), his hopes of being physically near to the Party 
organisation (in direct or tele-contact with the commanding body) have become 
extremely faint - if they have not been exhausted. 
If you still say "our tribe agha, our father will continue to send us . cone tfºinq frunº 
far off', then I am telling you openly, there exists no such possibility anymore. 
The self-sacrificing devotees you wanted, the money, the warm interest, the 
people's support, have been sent to you for years. Now they are at risk, I say. 
Our [my] existence still presents you with significant advantages, but this is no 
longer a reliable entity. (op. cit. ). 
Thus, while he lays down a firm condition by saying either "you re-establish the 
Party" to extricate it from the vicious circle of "political prostitution" or "I will leave 
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you", on the other hand, he strives to prepare for (at least to give way to) the "centre 
and trunk-cadres" to achieve the "new walk" without him. 
These words in Öcalan's "report" from which I have quoted large excerpts were 
shaped when the network of international intelligence agencies were breathing down 
his neck in Dusanbe, Tacikistan (Ucar, 2000,6). This was both the last "Viizümlenl( " 
(analysis) which the "main head and mind" conveyed to the "trunk-cadre" body and 
the last connection between the "Leadership" and the Party in an organisational sense. 
Since 2"d February 1999 when the plane took off from Greece, organisational contact 
ended in practice. 20 The crucial importance and specificity of this tele-talk from 
Dusanbe to the proceeding congress (the sixth) in the eastern mountains of Kurdistan 
stem from the fact that these were such historically important days for the 
organisation. The tele-talk is, therefore, composed as a kind of "testamentary 
bequest". Throughout the talk, Öcalan was additionally "transparent" and certain in 
his diagnoses and conclusions, while realising in horror that being the only "head and 
mind" of the organisation's whole existence has actually led to the PKK becoming 
vulnerable and "soft". And so, he formulates the final condition for the "inheritors" to 
consider. 
If an organisation which has absolute determination for the revolution does not 
revise and re-establish its real existence in a straightforward and responsible 
manner, it will not be able to escape from being a group of liars and deceivers. 
(Serxwebun, May 1999, p. 15). 
The talk's illustration of questions, confrontations and the impasse in the organisation 
also emanates from the sensitive circumstances in which the "report" was constructed. 
All preceding reports submitted to the congress were called "Political Reports" and 
published afterwards as a book, including the one for the VII. extraordinary congress 
held a year after the VI. congress. This talk was called the "Organisational and 
Political Report" but has not been published as a book. 
c. The Wrongs of Repetition 
We have illustrated how the "repetition of wrongs" engendered the ('KK's 
organisational shrinkage. The source - or why - of the repetition has also been 
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articulated. The remaining item is to clarify what has actually been the object of the 
repetition. Namely, what has in fact been repeated, or what were the fundamental 
wrongs that led to the organisational descent? 
I have argued, in Chapter 2 and the first section of Chapter 5, that a dual 
peculiarity in the framework of contextual factors has been the basis of Turkey's 
Kurdish question and has consequently given rise to the PKK's organisational 
particularities. This double-faceted peculiarity was, I suggested, the millennial tribal- 
traitorous (ashiret and ihanet) nature of Kurdishness and Turkey's unique policy 
about "her" Kurds based on denial and repression (inkar, tenkil). In the second part of 
Chapter 5, I endeavoured to explain the particular build-up of a national reaction 
against internal treason which was - and is - utilised in turn as a "dormant resource" 
by the leading elite of the PKK for the motivation of party activists and the 
mobilisation of the Kurdish masses. Correspondingly, tribe and treason - and furnilY - 
have been a vital concern of the Party's educational "war". This has led to it further 
two factors as being fundamental focal points of the PKK's organisational structure: 
individual-organisation and personality-lifestyle. The repetition of wrongs, which 
Öcalan phrased as "political prostitution", have materialised as manifestations related 
to those vital concerns of the Kurdish movement in one way or another. Certainly, the 
wrongs took place in various forms and in an incalculable quantity within the totality 
of the organisational activities. However, the "regularised" wrongs have mainly been. 
in the case of the PKK of 1990s, around three kinds of recurrent "deprivations" in the 
sense of the inward processes of the organisation. These were 
- officialisation of sterile education, 
- misuse of the "loyalty to Leadership" and 
- routinisation of the metamorphosed critique and self-critique mechanisms. 
Cadre education (examined in Chapter 5) has always been more than vital Ir 
the PKK's organisational existence. It has been deprived of its philosophical and 
moral ingredients, and considerably reduced to incentive or incitement-making 
teachings so as to recruit "determined fighters" against the "cruel enemy" fror» the 
early 1990s onwards. This reduction has been furthered in the education of recruits 
directly attached to the guerrilla corps (Özcan, N. A., 1999, p. 423) in the mountains. 
Whereas, just weeks before the "Spring Uprisings" in 1990, Öcalan taught21, 
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"... Those who come to join our party, who come to our primary education 
school, are in an unrecognisable state. Even we can bring out to what extent they 
represent the enemy - many of them express it through their own words - and to 
what extent they are from the people's side following an arduous effort over 
months". (Quoted in Aydin, 1992, p. 183) 
The intensive philosophical, moral and spiritual education, aimed at engendering the 
self-recreation process inside the personalities of those who come to the organisation 
in the "debased" state, therefore became converted into parrot-like imitations of' certain 
terms and phrases. The sterilisation of educational activities repeated itself throughout 
the 1990s. 
Loyalty to Leadership has been an additionally decisive "institution" in the 
organisational structure, as a result of Öcalan's "indisputable" charisma (White, 20()(), 
pp. 209-216). It is defined as denoting loyalty to the people, to the cause and to the 
future of humanity. In fact, the sterilisation of education provided grounds for stating 
"loyalty to the Leadership" rather than as a "magic key" to open every door and obtain 
desired positions and the power of command in the organisation. The repetition and 
"institutionalisation" of the wielding of this "magic key" during the 1990s gave rise to 
a caricature of Soviet-like bureaucracy in the PKK that was "most loyal to the 
leadership". In other words, the "magic key" has been well utilised by the 
administrative staff of the Organisation for their self-contained "institutionalisation" in 
the course of "routinisation" of Apo charisma. This seems to be what led Ocalan to 
say, "this party is not my party" (Serxwebun, December 1999, p. 16) anymore . und all 
"selfish approaches to the work" are being "carried out in the name of loyalty to the 
Leadership" following the horrifying "Rome March" (op. cit April, p. 12). 
The critique and self-critique mechanism occupies additionally crucial `pace 
in the inward organisational processes of the PKK for its ideology and educational 
activities. As shown in the preceding two chapters, this mechanism is dominated by 
the notion of the "production of the new man" for the "Humanisation Movenncnt" 
which was to rise from the "cradle of civilisation". In the PKK's "official view", Ihc 
critique and self-critique mechanism is the primary means of initiating sind developing 
the process of "self-dissolution" towards the invention of the re-hI manise(I ma/,. 
Generally, no questions arise about finding the faults and defects of "others", and 
consequently no discernible difficulties are net while engaging in critique. Iloowevet, 
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the "instrument" of self-critique has been metamorphosed into the "self-veiling" or 
"self-disguising" instrument of "bureaucratic authority" in the organisational structure 
due to the organisational "complications" set out above. So self-critique has been 
routinised with an imitative rhetoric and has become one of the three basic items of 
"obstinate repetition" in the years of decline. Two educated cadres in the PKK 
(Zeynep Kinaci, whose pre-self-immolation letter was explored in Chapter 5, and 
Enver Polat, whose daily journal was published as a book among the party 
publications following his death) point towards this particular aspect. Kinaci, in her 
letter (1996) "To Party Leadership" states: "It has been evidenced that the often 
repeated kinds of self-criticism which are excused by the influences of the petty 
bourgeoisie, peasantry, feudal culture, enemy and special war orientations etc. do not 
make any progress". Polat, notes a "very important" and "seriously distinct" facet he. 
witnessed at a "critique-self-critique platform" chaired by Cemil Bayik in the guerrilla 
camp. He highlights Bayik's words which underlined the "freedom to oppose the 
critiques" for the persons who did not agree with a critique of himself herself, and 
adds: "In fact, the number of persons who wield the self-critique as camouflage are not 
in a small quantity" (Polat, 1999, p. 163). 
The corruption of the measures of "loyalty to values" and the distortion cif 
norms for the individual's qualifications to partake in organisational rule have reified 
as a result of the totality of the repetition of wrongs manifested in the Party's basic 
"institutions" outlined above. This was in many ways to result in the organisational 
shrinkage - meaning the deconstruction of collective action. 
d. The Deconstruction 22 of Collective Action 
From the evidence given so far in this study, it follows that the PKK is a heavily 
ideological-educational-organisational entity. It is an organisation which is networked 
and operated by absolutely professional cadres who are deprived of their "private lit-e". 
That means the ethnic "social movement", which emerges from the "quiet" - even 
"buried" (Kendal in Chaliand, 1980 pp. 54-63)- Kurds of Anatolia, has been 
constructed, or in words of Turner and Killian (1957) "built up", through the network 
of the ideology-dominated educational-organisational works interwoven by the "off- 
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material-production" actors in the political entity of the PKK. The phenomenon has 
come into being "brick by brick". 
So my research provides support for the "constructivist" theories developed by 
a remarkable portion of social movement scholars who brought forth the idea that 
collective action is, in the final analysis, a product of the individual's organisational 
endeavours because "there is always enough discontent in any society to supply the 
grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organised and has at 
its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group" (Turner and 
Killian, 1972, p. 251) and "even further: grievances and discontent may be defined, 
created and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organisations" (McCharty and 
Zald, 1977, p. 1215). When I examined the process of the 1990s in which the Party 
fell into decline, the argument I developed in conjunction with explicating the 
questions and confrontations in the PKK's organisational discourse and practice 
supports this idea. The resulting conclusion would then be that the deconstruction of a 
collective phenomenon shall have to fundamentally be the sequel of' a somehow 
disorganisational construction - that is, the deconstruction of the organisational 
"building". But, of course, with an evident contrast: the deconstruction is as easy as 
the construction is difficult, just as it is in brickwork! This is what has been explored 
in the latter section of this chapter. 
A distinct point stood out vis-ä-vis this conclusion among the findings of the 
field survey. While the "imperialists' venture to capture" Öcalan is attributed to a 
decline in the organisation's power of mobilisation by Serxwehun and articulated in a 
lengthy editorial article, the grassroots body seems reluctant to acknowledge the fact. 
Serxwebun states, 
America, England, Turkey, Germany sat down, investigated, explored: 'these 
humans [PKK activists] are like this. ... a person 
IÖcalanl does et'ervthim, ', ley, 
catch him, then they grapple with one another. No sense qf executing 12,11-11" 
politics, struggle, anything amongst them' they said. Namely, they diagnosed all 
these features of us, and dared to launch such an offensive against us, and by the 
strength, self-confidence acquired from this 
[our state) they effected this fearless 
aggression against the Leadership. (Serxwehun, 
December 1999, r. 17). 
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The editorial article of Serxwebun puts the acknowledgement of the "organisational 
shrinkage" in further explicit words: "This war served the party less, but more the non- 
party [objectives]. That is why we did not succeed in the war, [then] such wear and 
tear, loss of strength have materialised". The grassroots do not agree with this 
nevertheless. I asked the respondents: "Do you think that the PKK fell into decline in 
the last few years? " Despite the considerable number of "No" answers in all the other 
optional questions, only "one" did not answer, but 89% of the 184 respondents said 
"No" decline has taken place in recent years. The percentage rises to 95%% among the 
less educated respondents (Table 9). Likewise, while 80.4 percent of respondents 
found "The growth of the PKK" as the actual cause which urged the USA to hand 
Öcalan over to Turkey, only 0.5 percent of them ticked "The decline of the PKK". In 
perspective, these striking findings refute my suggestion of them taking the 
organisational descent of the PKK for granted, which has even been acknowledged by 
its "Leadership" and his successors. However, if we continue to rely on the facts and 
figures that corroborate the decline of the PKK in the 1990s, how shall we then 
interpret nine tenths of the "No" answers that oppose the indisputable "such a wear 
and tear, loss of strength"? The fair interpretation would be that the human's spiritual 
propensity towards self-deception is a yet undefined "faculty" in human nature to the 
extent that it challenges Freud's "most potent" instinct of sexual desire. The 
conspicuous findings also support my suggestion that the "naive and self-deceptive 
loyal-cadres" of the PKK served the tacit togetherness of "power hunters" and 
"disguised/insoluble power holders" as a catalyst and preservative in the Party. And 
the deconstruction process, in its complexity, has actually been a result of such an 
organisational "decay". 
However, the very organisational decay handled above at a micro-level is by 
no means a unique device of the PKK that caused its inevitable descent. It is, in effect, 
a typical heir to the fate of the "national communism" of national liberationist 
movements during the second half of the last century. And, in general, it is another 
example in the sequence of the inevitable end of the "Iron Curtain socialism" of the 
belated adolescent bourgeoisie forming the "socialist camp" (Chapter l ). Even further, 
this is what happened to Caesar, to Mazzini, to Napoleon, to Lenin23, to Mao and so 
forth as the recurrent destiny of revolutionary endeavours. What is new to this 
"tradition" of history is that the process is well articulated and evidenced by Öcalan's 
recorded and "uncensored" talks of the 
last two decades. 
2K4 
e. Öcalan's Charisma: The "Party Leadership" 
Corresponding with Weber's general conceptualisation of authority and charisma, the 
"charismatic authority" operating in the persona of Abdullah Öcalan in the PKK is an 
easily-acknowledgeable phenomenon. Its extent and existence "was strikingly (if not 
chillingly) illustrated by the self-immolations of PKK supporters and members which 
began across Europe and in Turkish prisons ... in response to perceived threats to 
Öcalan's person" (White, 2000, pp. 210,211) following his abduction on 15 February 
1999. I also observed symptoms of its continuity during the HADEP congress 
(Ankara - 26.11.2000) at which tens of thousands of Kurdish masses chanted his 
name and the name of the island (Imralli) where he is imprisoned, even though he had 
abandoned the most basic national undertakings of twenty (1978-1998) years in his 
Defences. Yet the related findings of the field research of this study, which I carried 
out following his new stance on the Kurdish "national question", point the way 
towards the "routinisation" of Öcalan's charisma in that 50.5 percent of respondents 
see the "Leader Apo" as the most fundamental cause of the PKK's success (Table 10). 
Whereas the lowest percentage of the grassroots (9.2 % and 12.5 %) came up in the 
findings as activists who became sympathetic to the PKK through non-Öcalan effects 
- that is, a friend or a fellow activist (Table 11). Three out of five of the options in 
response to the question regarding the initial approach-means to the Party appeared as 
higher percentages (15.7 %, 24.4 % and 38.04 %) which somehow (one directly, the 
others indirectly24) relate to 
Ocalan's leadership. Thus, his charisma seems 
insurmountable or irreplaceable - at least in the near future. Even embodiment and/or 
incarnation of this "indispensable" charisma seem to be unrealisable. 
The point with which this study is concerned is neither the nature or the extent, 
or the future of Öcalan's charisma, but the nourishing base of its growth and, in 
particular, how it later in the 1990s became a paradox of the PKK's organisational 
structure. In the preceding three chapters, the specific causes of such an unusual 
charisma were actually shown when I examined the emergence of the party, its theory 
and ideology, and its organisational education and 
"modus operandi". In the present 
chapter, I partly elucidated the nurturing base of the "routinisation" of the Apo 
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charisma when I discussed the "wise" wielding of "loyalty to the Leadership" under 
"The Wrongs of Repetition". 
What I am going to add here is, firstly, that the development of such an 
impressive and pervading charisma in the persona of Öcalan was inevitable and is 
quite understandable. This inevitability initially lies in the fact that the "Apo" charisma 
has been nurtured by the highly tensional Kurdish question of Turkey (discussed in 
Chapter 2) as a fertile "soil" for the charisma "emerges in a field of conflict and 
contradictions, and so sustained" (Perinbayanagam, 1971, p. 395). On the other hand, 
the completely Öcalan-led PKK has opened up an historical "gap" in the millennial 
"inverse fate" (makus talih) of Kurdishness and this opening is deemed to he a 
miraculous and phenomenal development among the Kurds of Turkey, to the extent 
that it is acknowledged even by its enemy. The "first man" of the National Intelligence 
Organisation (MIT) of Turkey, Senkal Atasagun, confessed: "If we say that Apo did 
not have any effect there in 20 years, we would be lying" (Ergin, 2000). And the 
"second man" of MIT, Mikdat Alpay, says that the "PKK destroyed the fcudality" (op. 
cit. ) in the region. Also, the "interpretation" of the findings of a survey's that carried 
out among 1267 respondents - gathered in the "Special Research Report"- articulates 
the "gap" opened "this time" in the tradition of Kurdish history. 
When we look at the fact in the light of our recent history, it is evident that the 
preceding Kurdish revolts have always been the revolts of noble leaders. As soon 
as the leaders were arrested or exiled or executed, the "movement" ended. Fror the 
first time a Kurdish movement has come from below. And the difficulty of its 
repression stems from this. Ordinary people are joining a "cause" which 
transcends themselves. They discover that their lives are becoming significant, 
For the first time they believe in their ability to determine their future. (Ergil, 
1995, p. 89). 
That is, in the case of Ocalan's charisma, once again, the "charisma of the general is, 
quite simply, success in battle" (Spencer, 1973, p. 347). 
Secondly, any "charisma" - even any "authority" apart from the 
"impermanent" or "transitory" proletariat dictatorship which "itself" was houncl to 
wither away all classes and class societies (Marx, 1962, p. 452), namely, III 
authorities of (herrschaft) "imperative control" (Weber, 1947, p. 152) - co, iitraciicts 
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socialist ideology, and therein lies the potential bacteria of self-decay as is proven by 
the spectacle of its Soviet experiences. In the case of the PKK and Öcalan, this self- 
decaying contradiction is deeper and tends towards deepening further because the 
ideology of the PKK is claimed to be Marxist-socialism of a post-Soviet version. 
Moreover, because the philosophy of socialism in Öcalan's talks (as elucidated in 
chapters 4 and 5) is dominated by the notion of re-humanisation versus the "socialism 
in which the individual is shrunk to its bottom limit but the State is swollen to its top 
limit" (Öcalan, 1998), any tone of charisma contradicts the articulated ideology of the 
PKK. Any charisma denotes authority. In fact, Weber (1947) elaborates the 
phenomenon under "The Types of Authority and Imperative Co-ordination for 
imperative control]", and specifies the "charismatic authority" as one of the "three 
pure types of legitimate authority" along with "legal authority with a bureaucratic 
administrative staff' and "traditional authority" [italics added] (op. cit. pp. 328-363). 
If an ideology proposes and idealises the "swelling individual" and the "shrinking 
State", then even a modest charisma, or any other of the "three types" of authority, 
will in no way be a "bacterial" resource for the coming "decay". In addition, if a 
version of the socialist ideology of post-Soviet aspirations, namely in the case of the 
PKK, set forth the "individual's emancipation" (ozgürleme) from all "sins" of the 
"Civilisation Satan" [of class societies] in search of initiating the "mnvc'nrc'rn r, /' errat 
human naturalness" as the cardinal focal-point, then a "swollen" charismatic authority 
,, to its top limit" would lead the organisation holding such an ideology into a vicious 
circle, then into an impasse. Then, the impasse will "guide" the organisation into 
overall collapse - if the chance for diversion or reversal is missed'r'. 
The contradiction between what has been said and what has been done causes 
"depression" in organisations too, just as is true of an individual's personality. The 
contradiction between person and persona generated by the unnatural and/or inhuman 
values of the institutions of class-society superstructures is the main source of nconn- 
physically inspired spiritual imbalances and depressions in the personalities of 
individuals. As I have argued in previous chapters, Öcalan himself was becoming 
aware of the fact, and consequently has been focusing on the growing question of' his 
charisma since the early nineties. He, in particular, has concentrated on the 
"democratisation of the organisation" through "people's assemblies" of elected 
members (Chapter 5) to loosen, if not break, the structure of charismatic authority. 
But it did not work because it was quite late - in fact, too late. He therefore cane to 
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say: "This party is not my party" (Serxwebun, December, 1999, p. 16; Öcalan, 2001 h, 
p. 97). More importantly, Öcalan himself either did not want or was not aware of his 
decisive part in the process. In 1996, I asked him about any viable contemporary way 
out of the inevitable elimination of the "naive intelligentsia" (Chapter 1) in all 
previous revolutions while reminding him of the recurrent fate of overall revolutionary 
odysseys. He did not answer my question, but rather preferred to choose a humiliating 
response. 
- It would be very difficult for any ordinary social scientist to comprehend me. I 
think that, despite all your efforts, you are not going to be able to understand. In fact, 
my method does not fit into the imagination of ordinary human beings. Only t, so far, 
know how and who I am fighting. I have said, therefore, that if any researcher or 
scientist from where you have come from [implying the West] has sufficient self- 
confidence, they may attempt to learn and understand. You have tried but I fear that 
you will return with empty hands (A. Öcalan, personal communication, 15 July, 
1996, Party Central School, Syria). 
Further in our dialogue, Öcalan became more aggressive and more exaggeratedly self- 
confident. When I pointed out the contrast between what he says and what is done in 
the organisation's activities to the extent that the things he wants have in practice been 
rendered "forbidden" in the party though they are "officially" accepted and intensively 
parroted, he instead targeted my "nonsense" question. 
In these respects, if you mean what happened to prophets, what happened to Lenin 
will happen to me too, that is a nonsense story because I have organised myself in 
these aspects insofar as it is out of the reach of your perception, or I am extremely 
pitiless against all [those who do] these things. No one can use Ime I as they think.... 
There is no significant defect in my way of succeeding in things. This is so clear. 
Aren't your eyes capable of seeing this? (op. cit). 
But in the latest "defence", Öcalan ventures into a harsh self-critique. He, so to speak, 
is additionally confessional about what he himself could not do, and what was in fact 
beyond his power of understanding. 
.. I have been 
defeated by the Organisation. The marauder tendency created a state 
of insensitivity in the [party] structure to the extent that there was nothing that could 
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be done; and hence the very defeat [his helplessness] was melting me inside. I had 
come to the point of impulsively saying to an Italian paper, "I am going to resign 
from the Organisation [PKK]. (Öcalan, 2001b, p. 97). 
After all, Öcalan concludes that he had fallen into the "cursed" tradition of dogmatism 
believing the very general "banal truths" which he kept warning his pupils against. 
Falling into this cursed tradition while warning my comrades to have the best self- 
protection against it, not counting on the power of this tradition is my real self- 
critique that will be left there [for history]. (Öcalan, 2001 b, p. 275). 
However, the confessional self-critique of Öcalan, though he hopes to undo the 
"institutionalised" wrongs in the Party, has also come too late to revive the existing 
organisational body, because the organisation has overwhelmingly come to he 
dominated and consolidated by a "new ruling stratum" whose members are well aware 
of the danger to themselves. And 
Öcalan's routinised charisma continues to he the 
prime assurance of their future as a privileged stratum. In fact, 
Öcalan's charisma was 
already in the service of the party bureaucracy (trunk cadres). The power of charisma 
relates to the bureaucratic apparatus rather than to the person of charisma because the 
power "only functions in the form of a chain" and it "is employed through a net-like 
organisation" (Foucault, quoted in Jermier, 1993). In addition, charisma in its 
routinised form no more relates to some traits of the charismatic personality but to the 
very persona that is endowed to this personality by the bureaucratic staff. 
From everything said so far, it follows that there are historically "frozen" 
socio-psychological causes for giving birth to such a charisma in the form of Öcalan's 
"supernatural" or "superhuman" persona. So, his charisma was inescapable - or 
probably, vitally needed - and thus understandable. However, it was doomed to he 
converted into a cul-de-sac for the organisation because since the charisma does relate 
to a "certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from 
ordinary men" (Weber, 1947,358), its authority 
does not function through the 
charismatic person. The charismatic authority too, 
in contrast with Weber's separation 
of "pure types of' authorities, is networked and operated by "a bureaucratic and 
administrative staff' (op. cit. 
329) just as in the "legal authority". Further, both the 
charisma and its authority may well 
"be defined, created and manipulated" by the very 
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"bureaucratic and administrative staff' "for all practical purposes" in securing the 
material and spiritual privileges "that power gives" to the bureaucratic staf'f. It is so, 
no matter if the person of charisma is alive or dead. This is the case in Iraq with the 
very much alive Saddam Hussein, just as it is in Turkey and Iran in the cases of the 
deceased Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Ayatollah Khumaini. There is a crucial 
distinction which relates to the argument here: while charismatic authorities of' 
capitalist purposes perpetuate themselves and their bureaucratic staf'f' as long as the 
system exists for it is appropriate to the ideology and philosophy of capitalism, the 
charismatic authorities of articulated socialist utopias and longings does not function 
as such because it contradicts the ideology and philosophy of socialism. 'T'his has 
already been demonstrated by the avalanche of historical mutations that took place in 
the Soviet style and in its fellow "communist" authorities. That is, charisma and the 
"institution" of charismatic leadership in Öcalan's personality and his party appear 
solely to be replications of "Marxist idealism" (Nairn, 1981, pp. 329-33 I ). 
It is thus that the routinised "charismatic authority" of Ücalan has been one of' 
the paradoxical entanglements of the PKK's organisational structure, which 
contributed greatly to its shrinking in the 1990s. And Öcalan's belated attempts at a 
"personalisation" (bireysellesme) in the current party structure -a reorientation in 
harmony with socialism or collectivism and against capitalist individualism-- have 
tended to be totally ineffective among the "remaining" (Öcalan, 2001b, p. 97) ranks of 
the Party on whom he himself is doomed to rely. In brief, the charisma of Öcalan -the 
"routinisation" of "Apo" charisma, so-called the "Party Leadership" (Parts' 
Önderligi)- has proven to be a fatal paradox for the Leader and the party bureaucracy 
from which the organisation can not appear to escape. Routinisation of charisma is a 
simultaneous process with institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of party. And 
because "charisma and bureaucratisation are antithetical organisational phenomena" 
(Panebianco, 1988, p. 66), the paradoxical process has for now culminated in Ocalaui's 
serious defeat by his abduction and 
imprisonment in solitary confinement at the one- 
man prison of Imralli island, Turkey. 
2'H) 
f. The Nationalism of the PKK or the "Weakest Link" of Kurdishness 
I have striven to select the most revealing excerpts from Öcalan's talks to show how 
he defines the nature of the struggle under his leadership. I took these talks as being 
crucial for this study because the ideas, the philosophy, the form and content of these 
talks have not been shaped as claims or defences in the course of quarrels and 
arguments against enemies or adversaries. But the overall talks are actually 
materialised as efforts to inculcate his pupils in the course of - what he calls - the 
"war of education". And it is evident that Öcalan identifies the nature of the struggle 
organised in the form of the PKK substantially in non-Kurdish and non-national terms. 
In addition, no exalting expressions are found in the total sum of Öcalan's talks that 
bear any indication of a national narcissism. On the contrary, he repeatedly employs 
derogatory - occasionally humiliating - expressions for Kurds, such as "dehasecl", 
"degenerated", "dishonest", etc. Yet he does not refrain from saying "national 
liberation is only the means of my struggle" and lets it be published in the central 
organ of the Party. It was also proven by the stance he took in his 1)r%enc es, in which 
he dispensed with all classical national targets without any opposition in the PKK. 
The words "Kurds" and "Kurdistan" are the ones which a would-be researcher will 
come across most rarely in his language. Interestingly, in my personal interview 
which took around two hours, 
Öcalan did not mention the words Kurd, Kurdish or 
Kurdistan at all (Serxwebun, 1996, pp. 19,20,23). White, the author of the only 
sociological study written in English about the PKK-led Kurdish movement, talks of 
"the Real Kurdish Personality" and the "New Kurdish Person" (White, 2(XX), pp. 139, 
210). These must either be comment or wrong translations. Such terms literally cannot 
be found throughout Öcalan's talks including interviews. What may extensively be 
found about the Kurds is the "debased Kurdish personality", and regarding the 
socialist future, there is the "new 
human", "renewed" or "naturalised personality" of "a 
new lifestyle" or of "a new way of life". The 
former is not narcissistic at all, and the 
latter is by no means a novel notion. The sought-for "new man" is not only the concern 
of the socialist literature of the twentieth century 
but it can he traced hack to Plato's 
"philosopher kings" or "philosopher rulers". Above all, the non-Kurdish aspect of 
Öcalan's inculcation talks is not the "greatness" of his leadership demonstrating its 
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socialistness in not being nationalistic, but rather a manifestation of being aware of the 
"absence of a base of ethnic nationalist" (Öcalan, 1993a, p. 191) sentiments among 
ordinary Kurds - especially among the Kurds of Turkey. Further, the eventual 
conclusion at which Öcalan arrived in one of the recent "Notes of Meeting" is clear 
enough in terms of a national narcissism: "Sinirlar ve siniflar adina sawis di)nel ii 
bitty"' (Serxwebun, February 2000, p. 13). Which translates: "The era of war on behalf 
of borders and classes has come to its end". However, his charisma still functions in 
motivating not only the PKK militants but also the ordinary Kurds of Kurdistan and of 
the Diaspora. 
Collective narcissism is a national sentiment par excellence - which was 
"defined, created and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs" of modern era capitalism 
and entails the ultimate aim of sovereignty in a geographic territory. In fact 
Koenigsberg himself elaborates on the social psychology of nationalism within the 
"process of urbanisation" (Koenigsberg, 1997, p. 36-52) which genuinely denotes the 
modern era dominated by the young bourgeoisie of competitive capitalism. 
Nationalism is consequently defined as the ideology of the bourgeoisie by Marxist 
tradition. Hastings (1997) selects the corresponding conclusions of both Gellner 
(1964) and Hobsbawm (1990) which square with one another: "Nationalism is not the 
awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not 
exist"; "Nations do not make states and nationalisms, but the other way round". 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Öcalan has nothing to do with nation and 
nationalism. After all, 
Öcalan and his PKK do lead an ethnic-related opposition. In 
fact, he admits: "We cannot regard national socialism as treason" (Ocalan, 20(X), p. 
25). But, is there a "nationalism" in the PKK which actually aims to accomplish it 
nation-state? 
Any national struggle in its actual sense is, in the final analysis, a struggle for 
borders in which the "suffering mother" - the "country" - lies down (Koenigsberg, 
1997, p. 2) and for which a "holy" State is the only remedy! Nation state is "an 
essential goal of every nationalism" for which "possession of territory is, after all, it 
sine qua non" (Smith, 1983, p. xiii). Either 
Öcalan's teachings or the collective 
consciousness of the Kurds, as 
it stands, do not fit into these general or classical 
definitions of both nation and nationalism. The striking realities of the sub-division of, 
a piece of Kurdistan (which 
is sheltered by the world coalition of the superpowers its it 
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"Safe Haven") between Barzani's KDP and Talabani's PUK in the very minor 
interests of tribal leaderships, and their regular attacks on the PKK "to please Turkey" 
(Lawrence, 2000, p. 24) may also be interpreted as a weakness in - if not the absence 
of - an ordinary national consciousness in the Kurdish ethnic spirit. 
The nature of the struggle conducted by the PKK embodies all the "raw 
material" of nationalism but not nationalism itself. That is, the movement's spirit 
relates very much to the innate sentiments of ethnic-cultural, primordial and patriotic 
sorts. This "raw material", however, has never been "refined" to become a real 
nationalism of a nation-state with a national market. In other words, the PKK's 
"nationalism" has remained a "mass nationalism" which is not yet nationalism (argued 
in Chapter 1 in "The Two Faces of the Modern Janus"). And this, of course, is not 
because the leading bureaucracy of the party is so committed to socialist utopias and 
values but because they are well aware of the fact that there exists no "adolescent" or 
nascent bourgeoisie class aspiring to a Kurdish national market. More importantly, 
there exists no viably exploitable -or potentially exploitable- national market to which 
the party bureaucracy itself is/would be attracted. The economic "network" of the 
region (the Kurdish populated territories of Turkey) is dependent on and incorporated 
into Turkey's economy, which is itself already in crisis. In this sense, "market 
sentiments" among the Kurds have always been weak if not totally absent. In 
consequence, there have never been real "dreams" of a nation-state (Kutschern, 1994) 
in Kurdish ethnic resistance movements. And thus, voices speaking of sui 
"Independent Kurdistan" in each revolt have remained marginal and have always been 
subordinated to the collaboration with the Kurds' "others". 
The PKK is the first national organisation in Kurdish history in terns of 
transcending pre-feudal (not feudal) institutions as organisational entities in Kurdish 
social and political existence. But this "nationalisation" was by no means engendered 
by a nationalism of the bourgeoisie for which it "is the vehicle par excellence" (White, 
2000, p. 4). That is, the process of "nationalisation" of the Kurds of Anatolia does not 
resemble the transformation 
from Hobsbawm's peasant "primitive rebels" to it 
"modern Kurdish nationalism" (op. cit p. 3) of nation-state building. The findings of 
my limited field research and of 
Ergil's "Special Research" bring out this aspect of the 
phenomenon. Ergil asks 1267 respondents two questions relating to the "goals of the 
Organisation" (Ergil, 995, pp. 33,34): "What are the goals of the Organisation'? " and 
293 
"Which of its goals can the Organisation attain? " In response to the former question, 
while 15.3 % of respondents ticked the option of "the Independent Kurdish State", 
30.6 % ticked the "the cultural and political rights". The contrast between the options 
is more apparent in the answers to the latter question: 3.6 % said "Separate Kurdish 
State" but 15.9 % said "cultural and political rights". The diagonal comparison of 
these percentages indicates that the state-building national aspirations among the 
Kurds of Turkey represent a marginal tendency. Yet, the general picture of the 
findings, which emerged in the answers to my questionnaire, is additionally illustrative 
of this aspect. I constructed two open-ended questions seeking the "ultimate end " and 
"most innovative feature" of the PKK: "How would you briefly define the ultimate 
end of the PKK? " (Table 16) and "What is the most innovative feature of the PKKT' 
The highest percentage, 29.3 %, stated the "ultimate end" as being "national 
liberation". The second highest portion of respondents (16.3 %) defined the "ultimate 
end" as being "equality and fraternity of peoples". The third (11.9 %) and the lowest 
(4.3 %) classifiable groups envisaged a "united-independent" or "independent- 
socialist" Kurdistan. In defining the "most innovating feature", interestingly, anything 
that implied "fighting for independent Kurdistan" did not exist at all among the 
answers (Table 17). Even if 36 percent of the answers were unclassifiable, the 
expressions of "the most innovative 
feature of the PKK" gathered around the "renewal 
and continuity of the struggle" (26.6 %) with a remarkable 
distance between the next 
classifiable group which pointed to the "freedom, 
democracy and peace" (11.4 17c) 
qualities of the Party. 
So, it would be the most plausible interpretation of these findings in association 
with the "state-building nationalism" of the mobilised Kurds, if one were to state that 
the "continuity of struggle" for either "political rights" or "national liberation" or 
"freedom" do not substantially imply an "independent state" of Kurdistan in the hacks 
of their heads. In this very sense, a customary state-building nationalism 
is still the 
"weakest link" of Kurdishness. And consequently, the leadership of the PKK did not 
in fact base their struggle on state-building nationalism, in spite of the programmatic 
discourse of 1970s that aspired to do so. The "national" ingredients of the PKK's 
verbal and textual 
discourse strike one as the mere eloquence of the romantic 
revolutionary intelligentsia 
in its adolescent or infantile phase. For this precise reason, 
Abbas Vali evaluates Kurdish nationalism as a kind of "nationalismless nationalism" 
(Vali, 1998, p. 84); that is, so to speak, a glass of water with no water in it. 
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It has been so, not only because the Party claims to be Marxist-socialist but 
also because they were/are aware that there was/is no reliable resource to he a 
"vehicle" for their struggle. Further, the PKK did not wield a nationalist agitation as a 
"vehicle par excellence" in its overall struggle. While the sense of "nationalism" 
(milliyetcilik) in the Turkish-speaking nationalist mainstream of East and West 
Anatolia is a cause for pride and patriotism insofar as not being millivetci denotes that 
one is a traitor, the overwhelming majority of the PKK's grassroots members do not 
view their party as nationalist. Fully 94.5 percent of 184 respondents, which I selected 
among the PKK activists, rejected the idea that the PKK is a nationalist party (Takle 
3). Instead, the PKK wielded socialism in order to develop its own form of 
"nationalisation" on behalf of the Kurds. This was because the Kurdish socio-political 
structure in which the organisation emerged was not pre-national or feudal but prce- 
feudal and primitive, and because Turkey's policy about "her" Kurds was not actually 
a national or colonial oppression (Besikci, 1990, pp. 13-15) but an "indefinable" one 
based on denying the existence of both geography and the population. And therefore, 
the lack -if not total absence- of market "sentiments" among the Kurds of "above" 
has been a factual hindrance in the PKK's "anti-colonialist" struggle. Only an 
"irrepressible" desire and a corresponding perspective for a "home" market suffice for 
a "tribalism" to prosper which "everyone will respect it as a true nationalism" 
(Gellner, 1983, p. 87). 
A fateful deep-rooted factor caused the Kurds to be arrested in trihality, and in 
consequence, Kurdish tribalism neither gave birth nor gave way to it bourgeoisie who 
would develop a true nationalism aspiring to a "national" (home) market and 
achieving a nation-state for it. This extreme facet of Kurdish history has built a solely 
consistent "tradition" that stretches from the Gilgamesh of the Sumerians to our very 
time. The "historical tradition" refers to the Kurds' way of'survival as the indigenous 
"mountain people" of the "cradle of civilisation" which left no way open to Kurdish 
tribes other than deadly competition against one another for an "inferior position" -as 
the safest option- to the habitually changing foreign master powers. In conjunction 
with this "tradition" dating very far back, the uncompromising policies of denial of the 
latest "master" of the largest portion of the Kurds have necessitated a further strikingly 
"nationalismless nationalism" among the Kurdish population under Turkey. 
Accordingly, the main -if not the only- aspiration of the "Turkish Kurds" has 
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appeared to be the emancipation of their ethno-cultural identity, which may well be 
realised in a "Democratic Republic" of Turkey. And for this precise reason, the mass- 
support behind the HADEP or KADEK (in fact, the PKK) continue to remain -in 
some cases it has tended to rise, in spite of the "U-turn" by Öcalan and the PKK from 
overall ordinary nationalist objectives. 
Concluding Remarks 
Just as the construction of dynamics gave rise to the ascent of the PKK above its 
fellow Kurdish organisational configurations, the deconstruction of the very same 
dynamics engendered the descent in its military and civilian capabilities. The 
deconstruction process has been materialised through the repetition and proliferation 
of certain wrongs. The most "irresistible" phenomenon was/is that; all these "cursed" 
wrongs have somehow been justified and appreciated because the deep belief in the 
need for an indivisible-extraordinary organisation, in reaction to the disorganised- 
deformed state of the Kurdish ethnic existence moulded in the shadow of the 
"intrinsic" traitorous background of millennia, leached into the personalities of the 
"middle-class" executing cadres of the PKK as the sacred-immutuhlc' Orgunisatinn. 
That is, the fresh realisation of a vital need for an organisation among the "greenhorn" 
party militants and fighters - which constituted an overwhelming majority of the cadre 
body of the PKK following the rise in new recruits in the early 1990s - provided it 
handy basis for the "bureaucratic staff' to work on Öcalan's charismatic authority. 
Thereby, both the charisma and the concept of organisation were endowed with further 
sacredness by the "infantile" bureaucracy of the PKK. Sacredness is the correlative of 
immunity. The handiest means of being out of the reach of critique and questioning is 
to become a sacred organisation - which is usually materialised in the individual 
members of the "bureaucratic staff'. This appears to be the most pervasive question of 
the organisational nature of the PKK. 
The intensive "education war" of the party did produce an undeniable result in 
revitalising the "buried" Kurdish ethnic existence by introducing a "new culture" of 
organisation that transcended millennial Kurdish tribal structures. However, the 
education war did little or nothing 
in the Organisation in terms of such it universal 
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"undoing" of civilisation's property mechanisms. And, in effect, the contrast between 
the parroted philosophy and the factual functioning of the trunk-cadre body within the 
very "property mechanisms" of the "Civilisation Satan" has remained as the greatest 
contradiction in the Party's organisational dynamics. 
Öcalan's abduction was without doubt not only an outcome of the inescapable 
strength of the international conspiracy organised by "unchallengeable" global 
powers, but rather also of the Party's undisguisable decline in recent years, which 
dates back to 1992-93. It was not the strength or danger of the PKK's latest 
performance for the West's New World Order that urged the USA to arrange the 
international conspiracy against Öcalan but, on the contrary, its calculable decline of 
organisational (and consequently military) capability that inevitably culminated in the 
"catastrophic" abduction. The USA does not act on instinct or from sentiment but in 
accordance with reports and surveys based on quantitative information. From the 
USA's point of view, it was the right time to act because, for example, the party, 
which was capable of gathering almost a hundred and fifty thousand people in 
Germany for an annual festival in 1994, this time (December 1998) gathered a crowd 
of not more than fifty thousand for a vital reason - Öcalan's critical future. 
The nature and source of Öcalan's charisma may be covered by other research. 
In this study, I only touched on causality of the specific charisma's efficacy, but rather 
focused on its problematic aspect within the framework of the Organisation's 
entanglements. What I may suggest, by relying on my overall Turkish reading of 
Öcalan's Turkish talks (termed Cözümlemeler - Analyses) is that his very charisma is 
by no means a product of the combination - or mutual satisfaction - of Öcalan's 
personal narcissism and Kurds' collective narcissism (White, 2()00, p. 211) which 
would otherwise have nourished Kurdish nationalism. The Apo charisma is a resultant 
of the convergence of Ocalan's personal attributes and the highly "flammable- tension 
of Turkey's Kurdish question. 
"Kurdish nationalism" does not concur with the ordinary or classical 
nationalism of a "home" market for which a nation-state 
is the sine qua non. Insofar as 
the remaining discourse of the PKK relates only to the masses' innate ethno-cultural 
sentiments by which they continue to be effectively mohilised in the face of 
Organisation's total abandonment of all national liherationist objectives, the ethnic 
resistance of Kurds under Turkey shall remain confined within a struggle for a 
"Democratic Republic" of Turkey. And hence, their resistance shall have to he 
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defined as an "identity liberation movement" - rather than a national liberation 
movement. 
Notes 
r An incident (Chapter 5) occurred during the most recent HADEP congress held in Ankara (November 
26,2000) in which the peculiarity of Turkey's undiminished "ostrich" policy on its Kurdish question 
manifested itself in a coarse form. This incident has since become "handy" material in the PKK's 
propaganda and educational activities. The reaction of over five thousand people in the hall, who 
protested against the interruption of the MEP's Kurdish speech by the superintendent police officer, was 
phenomenal. 
Critiques on the nature of Turkish State generally converge on its "Bonapartist" or "practoriun" 
character "that is, one in which military, para-military or semi-military forces operate independently of 
the civilian political apparatus" (White and Logan, 1997, p. 247). Up until the experience of 12 Sept. 
1980, this was almost the most accurate definition of the fact. However, since then, the military 
apparatus has updated the "interventions" 
because of the difficulties encountered both in internal affairs 
and in the state's developing relations with the 
West. Consequently, the occasional-e. rplic"ir 
interventions have been converted into a constant-implicit grasp of the rule through the National 
Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu) in which the Military apparatus passed its resolutions to the 
"civilian" governmental officers (Prime Minister, other ministers etc. ) for execution in the Council's 
regular meetings. 
Kurdish national festival day. 
° Referring to the interview by 2000 e Dogru (Turkish weekly magazine) published in three issues dated 
14,21 and 28 April 1991. 
Ahmet Aydin is the pen-name used by Ahmet Cem Ersever, who founded a semi-autonomous 
organisation (White, 2000, p. 144) composed of military (gendarmes) and paramilitary elements 
(JITEM) which operated effectively against alleged PKK supporters and civilian activists, including 
several attempts to assassinate 
Öcalan. Ersever was later killed in Ankara and his death still remains 
mysterious (Bozarslan in Olson, 1996, p. 148). 
6 The phrase (taktik önderlik) is employed in the terminology of the PKK to mean the regional and local 
representatives who hold the 
direct management of party activities or, in other words, who implement 
the party's strategic policies in daily practice. 
7 The death of Turgut Ozal has been seen as suspicious in many circles including some 'T'urkish MI's 
from various parties and his son Ahmet 
Özal who is currently an "independent" MP in the 'I'IBMM 
(Turkish Grand National Assembly). They believe that Ozal "was in fact poisoned by Turkish forces 
opposed to his Kurdish 
initiative" (White, 2000, pp. 163,200). No attempt has since been made to 
investigate the claims. Allegations have even been made that his hair, which had been kept hidden, 
disappeared after the raising of suspicions. 
R Semdin Sakik was a prominent commander and CC member of the PKK. He later, in 1998, deserted 
from the guerrilla forces and surrendered to the Turkish state through the KDP. (McDowall, 1996, p. 
437; White, 2000, p. 169) 
9 The first international Kurdish-language satellite television station known as pro-PKK. It was opened 
in 1995 under licence of ITC (Independent Television Commission) of Britain. and reopened later in the 
name of "Medya TV" 
due to its licence termination by ITC. 
rÖ Tribal structure in Kurdistan is not what we generally 
find in feudal societies, which may he defined 
in terms of "Eric Hobsbawm's 'primitive rebels'... in the throes of ... capitalist modernisation" (White, 
2000) or as "proto-nation". Rather, tribal structure is pre-feudal -in fact, a somewhat higher stage of a 
primitive communal society. 
The term al4"ak has no English equivalent. It literally means "low" but is actually a vulgar swear- 
word in Turkish 
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12 Some of these party members and cadres were killed, some were expelled from the party and some 
ran away. 
13 Öcalan was to caricature this fact in the late nineties by saying, "a good guerrilla is not a person who 
has strong leg muscles". 
14 I refer to the concept "self-dissolution" - which in a way is relevant to Touraine's notion of "self 
analysis" (1981, p. 27) - widely used in the PKK's educational texts in the sense of orienting Oneself to 
the "self-recreation" process. 
15 This category is frequently defined as the "objective agents of the enemy" in PKK publications and it 
is believed to be more dangerous than the "subjective" agents of the enemy. 
16 Rant: easily exploitable material and moral/spiritual values. 
17 Enver Polat is an activist of the PKK who joined the guerrilla forces in 1996 following several years 
work for the party's central organ, Serxwebuin, and was killed in a clash with state forces in 1997. He 
left basic education in his third year of primary school and became attached to the Party in Europe in his 
late teenage years following his family's migration from Kurdistan to Germany for work. The hook he 
published, which is composed of 350 pages of his notes from his daily journal, is the most philosophical 
text among the non-Öcalan authored books. 
18 The turkish swearword "serefsiz" denotes an unesteemed, dishonourable, debased person. 
19 Mümin: Believer of Islam who never fails to follow his/her worship requirements. 
20 Öcalan himself was only informed of where he was going in the aircraft - destined fier Nairobi, Kenya 
(Ucar, 2000,11). 
21 The quotation was picked from an Öcalan teaching dated 21.02.1990 by Ahmet Aydin (1992) for 
the chapter "Selected Words from Öcalan", so as to exhibit how badly bcalan treats his pupils. 
22 Here, the term "deconstruction" does not refer to the post-structuralist theory developed by Jacques 
Derrida. It is employed to mean the steady decay of the organisational structure. 
23 In his work, The Soviet Union Demystified, Frank Furedi explores how an identical process occurred 
in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and how the "reactionary bureaucracy" consolidated its 
position as a "new ruling stratum" whose members "enjoyed widely varying access to privileges and 
wealth" (Furedi, 1986, pp. 42-45). 
24 The options of "through observations" and "through publications" are the ones which considerably 
embrace the sympathy to Ocalan 
because the PKK publications are largely dominated by his talks and 
pictures, and "observations" embodies various pro-bcalan elements as such. 
25 The survey was sponsored by a leading businessmen's association in Turkey, TOB B (Tarkive ! )d(ihar 
ve BorsalarBirligi), whose former chairperson (Yalim Erez) was a minister of government at the time. 
In the report's introduction, it emphasised that the research aimed to contribute to the "elimination of 
the terrorist organisation". 
26 It has gradually been revealed that such a chance has actually been missed, and thcreforc the party has 
officially annulled itself and converted 
into a "congress" which does not aspire to power, in accordance 




a. Summary of Conclusions 
The introduction gives a general picture of the PKK's organisational contribution to the 
mobilisation of the Kurdish masses. In bringing forth the principal issues of the study, 
the substance of the subject matter was presented along with the facts and figures on 
which the opposing parties more or less converge. 
Chapter one reviews the theorisation on nation and nationalism to provide an 
analytical framework for understanding the distinguishing aspects of the phenomenon 
under study. 
In chapter two, we discussed the historical tensions between Turkey and the 
Kurds, which gave rise to the emergence of the PKK. We saw how the "rebirth" of the 
"new" Turkish nation-state as the "Republic of Turkey" was not für 'enfed by the 
"nationalism" of "national liberation movement" by a young native bourgeoisie. Rather. 
Turkish nationalism was "repressed" by the founders of the Republic until after the 
Republic's consolidation. Only then did nationalism erupt in Anatolia, with an 
exaggerated emphasis on "Turkishness". 
In chapter three, we discussed the emergence of the PKK out of the radical 
Turkish Left in chronological order, along with the impact of particular events (),, 
Öcalan's leadership style and on the structural mould of his organisation. 
We shall now have go through the preliminary conclusions vis-a-vis particular 
points tackled in the later chapters, to highlight both the specific and the general 
conclusions. 
The Social Base and Class Politics 
It is fairly obvious that the social base of the movement is not working class - even 
though its name is the "Kurdistan Workers Party". Indeed, there seem to he similarities 
I(H) 
between the PKK-led "national" movement and the "New Social Movements" of 
advanced Western societies - certainly in respect of their social bases. Despite the 
claims about socialism and the "accomplishment of the October Quasi-revolution" after 
the Soviet Union's decline, the party's identification with socioeconomic codes (such as 
working class and/or middle class) faded away in the early 1990s and they are hardly 
mentioned now. The mass demonstrations and celebrations in the 1990s revealed that 
much of the movement's base is composed the middle-class (rural/urban or 
"old"P'new"), "decommodified" population, students and educated professionals; and 
wealthy families who make up a considerable percentage. Furthermore, the working 
class of the region (the "East" and "Southeast" of Turkey) remains distant from most 
mass activities. 
However, such a comparison between the New Social Movements of "post- 
industrial" Western societies and the "New Movement" of the nationally destroyed 
Kurdish "tribal" (or primitive) society can be based on a minor aspect of both 
phenomena - namely common rhetoric and activities that orientate towards the human 
race as a whole. Nevertheless, such similarities, particularly with regard to a re- 
acquisition of the integrity of a genuine human essence, embrace generalisable features: 
they offer cures for the destructive, vulgar-pitiless rationalism of capitalism and the ills 
of post-Soviet socialism. 
Both White and Ergil point to similar boundaries of the class base of the PKK. 
While the latter states that "for the first time a Kurdish movement comes from below" 
(Ergil, 1995, p. 103), the former draws attention to the PKK's prohibition against the 
"upper" social strata: "Despite occasionally aligning itself with so-called 'patriotic' 
tribal chieftains, the PKK never permits elite layers entry into its leadership" (White. 
2000, p. 155). Further, White seeks 
Öcalan's view on the PKK's specific "class 
politics" in the course of personal communication 
in 1992, in which he found Ocalan 
"more explicit". 
AÖ: The role of poor peasants, the workers, the intellectuals, everybody who has got 
the will to develop, could shape our policy. 
We are not only a class movement. You 
should call our movement a humanitarian movement - not a class movement, but a 
movement for the freedom of the human 
being. So, you can't understand the 
movement by looking at the 
PKK only through the spectacles of class struggle 
[italics added]. (White, 2000, p. 153). 
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Even if a similar social base was proposed for the PKK in its Manifesto (1978, pp. 152- 
161), as being composed of "urban petty bourgeoisie, peasantry, proletariat, intellectuals 
and youth", Öcalan was to declare that "The war on behalf of borders and classes has 
come to an end" (Serxwebun, February, 2000, p. 13). The questionnaire in my "illegal" 
field work was not designed to survey the social base of the Party, but still the answers 
(Table 1) give a considerable clue about the composition of the grassroots activists, with 
its unusually high proportion of university and high school graduates. 
A total of 184 respondents consisted of 44 persons who had only primary school 
education or less, 25 secondary school, 50 high school and 65 university. The 
percentage of activists who had graduated from either high schools or universities went 
up to 65.5 %. And these activists were active to the degree that they dared to fill in the 
"illegal" questionnaire. It may be concluded that while the social components of the 
"PKK movement" are rather "middle" and "low" segments in the Kurdish social 
structure (that is, the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie, and the "category of the 
population consisting of people outside the 
labour market or in a peripheral position to it 
(such as unemployed workers, students, housewives, retired persons, etc. )" (Offs, 1985, 
p. 832)], the actors of the movement are "patriotic intellectuals" - those who have got 
"the will to develop". In fact, the movement originated in a group of university students 
- mostly 
from the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Ankara (Chapter 3) - 
whose members still dominate the leadership structure. The same is true of the 
"Congress" (KADEK) that was declared following the annulment of the PKK in its 
eighth ordinary congress. This does not refute the 
fact that the "trunk cadre" body of the 
Organisation consolidated itself in the 1990s as the "bureaucratic staff" relying upon 
Ocalan's charisma. 
One of the most peculiar outcomes of the specific mode of incorporation of' 
Kurdistan by the young Turkish Republic has been the "unique" condition of the 
working class. Rather than the colonisation of a named country and a Horrid(/ nation as 
an ordinary colony, the situation of the 
"Turkish Kurds" has involved the incorporation 
of a "land" (the East and 
Southeast) and a "population" ("mountain Turks" or the 
recently invented "Turks of 
Kurdish origin") into Turkey. Accordingly, while a Kill-dish 
collaborator "sovereign class" 
(Besikci, 1990, pp. 83,84) does not exist at all in 
il)? 
Anatolian Kurdistan, the working class of the Kurdish region is a relatively privileged 
class given the economic circumstances and standards of welfare in the territory. It is it 
privilege to obtain employment in the state monopolies and the other state institutions - 
the actual structure of the so-called capitalist economy of the region (Tas, 1985) - that 
are protected and controlled by military measures in strict collaboration with the secret 
intelligence services, considering the massive unemployed population. The executive 
political authority of Turkey has given rise to this unique phenomenon, while insuring 
that pre-feudal institutions remain alive and active. 
Institutionalisation of "Bureaucratic Staff' 
A striking aspect of the movement is the contradiction between the charismatic and 
indisputable "national leader"' and the trunk-cadre structure. As the party grew, the 
leader increased his emphasis on individual extrication from the damage to the human 
being's spiritual structure throughout class societies - the millennial "muddy f'e o(prints" 
of the "Civilisation Satan" - while subordinating the party to individuals' spiritual 
reconstruction within the party. However, the militants in the peripheral 
bodies of the 
party persisted in operating the conventional structure of a socialist organisation 
by 
providing and maintaining the basis for the party to be sanctified (Chapter h), As a 
result, the party's regional and local executors institutionalised themselves as the 
"bureaucratic staff' of Öcalan's "charismatic authority" following the prompt 
organisational massification of the early 1990s. That is, the "roitinised" charisma of Alu 
has now been indisputable for the "institutionalised" bureaucratic-administrative staff of 
the Organisation. 
More strikingly, Ocalan has, in the final analysis, gotten along with this 
bureaucratic apparatus despite his menacing and abusive critique of it. 
Endeavours towards the Re-acquisition of Great Human Naturalness 
In response to a related question during an interview with the Turkish Professor of, 
History Yalcin Kücük, Abdullah Ocalan gave a prompt reply: "it' I thought that I wuulcl 
be leaving the PKK as a calamity to the people, I would prefer to take it to the grave 
with me" (Kücük, 1993, p. 296). 
In addition, he diagnoses vulgar materialism (il' it is 10 
be translated to NSM' language: vulgar-pitiless Rationalism) as the most general cruise 
of the collapse of Eastern 
Block Socialism and convincingly asserts that Russia wielded 
socialism in order to develop 
its own form of cahitalisºn (Ocalan, 1192, ph, 292-355) 
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and that socialism was a tactical means to achieve Russian capitalism and nationalism 
(Kürük, 1993, p. 290). In the course of the interview undertaken by the current author 
for the purpose of this study, Ocalan gives interesting clues regarding the genuine nature 
of his initiative when he explicitly says that the words Kurds and Kurdistan "were onl s' 
key words" to "open the door" (Chapter 4). In one of his most recent speeches 
(December 1997) he is pointing in the same direction, but in simpler language. 
I focus intensely on pure and distinguished human types. It may even he said that the 
summary of my life is in nourishing the tendency from pure towards distinguished, and 
from distinguished towards distinguished human beings. From my point of view, a 
pure human being is the most distinguished human being. I search for the distinguished 
in order to find pure human beings. But not the pure human of earliest civilisation. 
That would be too utopian. I keep asking: How will a human type of' our era he 
formed? There are humanist ideologies; what is human and what is the thing that is 
humane? In this sense, national liberation is only a means ol'ºnv struggle. ... (italics 
added] (Serxwebun, December, 1997, p. 20). 
In another interview, he tells the Turkish politician Dogu Perincek: "In point of fact, the 
most important reason for intensifying this war is to create humans who may love and 
deserve to be loved" (Perincek, 1996, p. 33) while defining the movement as it 
"purification movement" or "the movement of great human naturalness" (Özcan, A. K., 
1999). 
All definitions of the Party by its "Leadership" are conceptualised in non-national 
terms - as discussed 
in Chapter 4. In relation to the source of the pandemic and 
perpetual ills of politics, 
Öcalan seems to respond to Graham Wallas' conclusion, in 
which Wallas finds the cause of the "unsatisfactory position" of the theory of politics to 
be in the division between its theory and practice, which are held in separate hands. 
While Leslie Stevenson suggests that Plato skirts around the question of "how men 
ought to live" (Stevenson, 
1974, pp. 29,30), a great deal of the philosophy in Öcalan's 
talks, some of which are gathered in three 
books (Öcalan, 1995b; 1996; 1999a), is 
concerned with the very same question. 
Öcalan claims: "Our revolution and the history 
of the PKK is an arduous attempt 
to respond to the question of "hoºtiw men ought to live". 2 
He explains why he had to perform as philosopher, politician and military man at the 
same time. 
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The school of philosophy is an extremely difficult school. In various eras, these 
schools could hardly emerge over centuries, and their pupils at the outset were only 
taught philosophy. They did not have the chance to be involved in politics or war. ... 
Alexander the Great was influenced by Aristotle. This is an indirect influence 
nevertheless. He implemented this philosophy in the military sphere. But Aristotle is 
on one side, Alexander on another. The philosopher in one sphere, and the executors 
[of politics] are far distant. But in our case, it has to be all in one; I must he both 
philosopher and politician, and also military genius. Why? It is because, the special 
war [özel savas3] does not allow you to have any opportunity to do otherwise. 
(Serxwebun, February 1997, p. 12). 
By and large, all this contemplation and philosophising have been reduced to the mere 
parroting of the concepts of the "new man" and the "new way of life" by the "trunk 
cadre" of the Party at the end of the 1990s. This was probably the main point of' 
departure for Ocalan's instruction from Imralli prison to convert the Organisation frone a 
"party" (PKK) to a "congress" (KADEK), which was adopted with no opposition' at the 
recent (April 2002) ordinary party congress. Whether or not this will deconstruct the 
consolidated bureaucratic structure is a question for the future. 
Coexisting Mutation and Insistent Consistency 
The most recent stance of the PKK on the Kurdish "cause" - as articulated by Ocalan 
from the Imralli prison in Turkey - has not been articulated in universal terms. In fact, 
the mutation that the PKK underwent within half a year (examined in chapter four) is 
phenomenal. The "strategic target" of the Party has been altered from the "Turkish 
colonialism" of Turkey as a whole to the "oligarchic structure" of the dominant "clique" 
in the Republic (Öcalan, 2000, pp. 13,14). Rather than eliminating Turkish rule in 
Kurdistan, the incorporation of the PKK into the common State of it "Democratic 
Republic" in the "common fatherland" has become the principal objective of the party 
programme. The "national liberation" of Kurds undertaken at the inception has been 
converted into the "democratic solution of the Kurdish question" in loyalty to the 
territorial integrity of Turkey. The phrase "democratic liberation" superseded "national 
liberation" throughout the programme which was adopted by the seventh congress, 
concluded in mid-January 2000. 
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The Party dispensed with all customary national objectives to the extent that the 
Presidency Council member Nizamettin Tas was to emphasise that the PKK's 
programme was less radical than the "Democratisation Programme" of TÜSIADS (live 
tele-interview by Medya TV on 10.12.2000). The leadership of the party justifies the 
abandonment of the objectives associated with "national liberation", arguing that the 
"national task" has been accomplished. The phenomenal diversion of the programme 
from its aims and the justification of this diversion denote that the "national task" or 
"national liberation" situated in the back of the PKK leadership's minds was actually an 
affirmation of Kurdish ethno-cultural identity. 
Unlike the attitude towards national goals, the party has maintained its socialist 
ideology and aspirations. The metamorphosed programme of the Party has continued to 
envisage, not an autonomous State of Kurdistan, but a greater federation of the peoples 
of the region - the "Democratic Union of the Middle East". 
b. General Conclusion 
When contemplating the social history of mankind, despite many violent, magnificent, 
influential and historically diverting revolutions, it seems impossible to evade the fact of 
a persistent and prevalent "consistency". 
From the early stages of civilisation onwards, I am convinced that hooks have 
never been sufficient in following evolutionary and revolutionary changes, which have 
structured both the technological and societal body of humanity. Despite these changes. 
"Three Worlds" have coexisted as an inevitable outcome of class societies: 
the world of rulers, 
the world of sustenance pursuers and 
the world of science. 
The world of rulers is a world where well-organised, institutionalised bodies control the 
weaponry, economy and wealth, and where there are no restrictions on the inhabitants' 
consumption of the material, moral and scientific values produced by others. The world 
of sustenance pursuers 
is the second wherein the masses, the workers in commodity and 
10 
service production, have the "chance of achieving freedom of survival" and have some 
"privileged" constituents who become capable of observing what has been done to them. 
In Nietzsche's terms this is the world of the herd. The world of science, the third, is the 
one in which all the producers of scientific values of both natural and social studies live 
in a way unique to them - but essentially in a way of life which resembles that of the 
"inhabitants" of the world of the rulers. These second and third worlds may, in a sense, 
be assessed as one because both they themselves and their products are ruled and 
controlled by the first world. 
However, despite the sameness in their subservient position, it is more accurate 
to classify the world of scientists as a "grey" world in between the other two, as they 
bear a close resemblance to the population of the ruling world. 
Now, what would be the most general and most accurate interpretation of the 
PKK as it stands in the light of this study's overall explorations? 
It has been concluded that, firstly, the Kurdish question is not a national and/or 
colonial question in the same way experienced in the rest of the world. The combined 
phenomena of Kurdish ethnic existence and the way in which Anatolian Kurdistan was 
re-appropriated by Turkey did not constitute an adequate base for the colonisation of a 
"proto-nation" and thus of an anti-colonialist national liberation struggle. That is, the 
"new" Turkish State had not "matured" enough to be an imperial-colonialist power and 
colonise "her" Kurdistan, nor had the Kurds of Anatolia reached the stage of proto- 
nation in order to form an effective anti-colonial nationalism. Secondly, the destruction 
of the most basic elements of the human spiritual structure in the "person" of 
Kurdishness - as the result of the fusion of Turkey's unique policy about "her" Kurdish 
dominions and population based on denial-repression (inkar-tenkil) and the millennial 
"intrinsic" property of the pre-feudal Kurds (tribe and treason) - have provided an 
ideational resource which has featured in the local and universal specificities of the 
PKK. 
Thirdly, the PKK organised the first "semi-national" Kurdish opposition, which 
embodied the de-tribalisation of the "nationalisation" process. But the PKK itself is not 
a national organisation in the modern sense of nation and nationalism even if its initial 
programme was a replication of the national liberationist forum. The emergence, 
development and evolution of the PKK's ideological and programmatic nature (Chapter 
4), and the reality of the demographic map of Turkey's Kurdish population has by no 
means given rise to a state-building nationalism. It would therefore not he a coherent 
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explanation to define the PKK-led "rebellion" as a "Kurdish nationalist movement" in 
its literal sociological sense. Finally, the successes which engendered the factual ascent 
of the PKK among other organisations lie in the end-results of the philosophy and 
intensity of the cadre education in conjunction with a vitalised sense of organisation- 
individual linkage. Further, the organisational shrinkage of the PKK began to occur 
when the spirit of the re-humanisation initiative began to be transformed into the 
premature appetite of the bureaucratic staff under Öcalan's charismatic authority to 
partake in the joy of the prestigious feelings that power gives. 
The conduct of the study required that I be cautious about the extent to which the 
Party has carried out the Leadership's re-humanisation initiative within the party 
structure, for the initiative related to my hypothesis, which pointed at the non-national 
inner dynamics of the movement. While concentrating on the most decisive internal 
dynamic of Kurdish collective action under the PKK, I simultaneously endeavoured to 
raise the question of whether the movement presents any concrete clues towards 
structuring a pattern of emancipatory power, not just for Kurds and neighbouring 
societies of the Middle-East, but for the whole of humanity. I aimed to assess whether 
the PKK's initiative presents a step towards breaking a ring in the chain of the Ruling 
World and closing the gap between the other two ruled Worlds. This was because I 
found that the "Leadership" of the party, Öcalan, arduously tries to undo the damage and 
degeneration which humankind has undergone throughout class societies in the person 
of the "debased" Kurdish personality in Anatolian Kurdistan "where humanity itself' 
faded away in its most solid form". Accordingly, Öcalan has kept defining the "PKK 
Movement" in his inculcation talks over twenty years within the framework of 
universalistic and/or humanistic aspirations, to the extent that he names his party the 
"Humanisation Movement". Nevertheless, these claims might have been - either totally 
or partly -a vehicle of Kurdish "nationalism" peculiar to its manner of 
"nationalisation". Further, this philosophical approach might be treated or perceived as 
mere rhetoric, at least by the considerable number of "party officials" who may he the 
embryo of a future "novel" local branch of the omnipotent Ruling World. I have striven 
to devote my diligence to retaining a fair balance of scepticism during the study as an 
inalienable principle of scientific thinking, in order not to disturb the integrity of 
science, the complete academic integrity. 
Deluding others and, more potently, self-delusion have almost been an 
instinctual part of human nature in this world of "three worlds". Therefore, I have been 
30 
in pursuit of practical and quantitative measures in order to reach more objective 
deductions, rather than intuitive conclusions of "intellectual taste", as Weber stresses. 
Within this frame of reference, I have concluded that the manner of the PKK's 
organisational performance lies behind the revitalisation of Anatolian Kurds. And the 
newness in this organisational performance is associated with the Party's philosophy of 
cadre education devoted to the re-acquisition of human naturalness as a social being, 
which has itself determined the Organisation's success and failure in operating Kurdish 
collective action. However, the question of whether this "newness" contributes towards 
structuring a pattern of emancipatory power for the "two worlds" of the ruled (the 
workers of commodity and service production and the producers of scientific values in 
both social and natural disciplines) - whose inhabitants are equally alien to their 
products - remains unanswered. This study did not set out to answer that question, but 
merely to raise it. 
Notes 
1 Abdullah Ocalan is generally named "National leader" (Ulusal Önder) by his non-party supporters 
instead of "Party Leadership" (Party Oonderligi). 
2 In a way, Raschke introduces a similar conception of the agenda of New Social Movements. C. Offe 
conveys that "way of life" or 
"mode of life" is a substantive concept which was invented for the new 
paradigm of West European politics 
by Raschke (Offe, 1985, p. 825). 
The term "special war" in the terminology of the PKK denotes Turkey's particular way of executing its 
war against the Kurdish struggle, which rests on manipulation and 
"psychological warfare". 
° This, in a sense, reminds one of Mao's "unchallenged" re-election as "Chairman" of the Communist 
Party of China at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, following which the elimination of entrepreneur 
intelligentsia, including Mao Zedong himself, was finalised in his presence. 
5 TÜSIAD is the largest businessmen's association of Turkey and is known as Patron/ar Kuluhu (The 
Club of Bosses) 
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Diyarbakir Metropolitan towns Sub Sub 
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expectation % 
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Table: 16 
The Freedom. Democratic Renewal, Contempo Approach Collective Life- Other 
question 
democracy, republic continuity rary to woman presidency style / 
No: 22 peace of struggle socialism Total 
What is 
the most 21 16 49 06 08 04 14 66 
innovativ % 36 
e feature % % % % % % % / 
of the 11.4 8.7 26.6 3.2 4.3 2.1 7.6 184 
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Table: 17 
The in In In In socialist- In terms Freedom Other 
question national humane socialist nationalist of lovers / 
No: 27 terms terms terms terms lifestyle movement Total 
In as few 
words as 33 29 24 24 04 07 63 
possible. %34.2 
how would % 19 % 15.7 % 13.0 % 13.0 % 2.1 %3.8 / 





Please do not answer the questions before reading 
the following instructions 
1- The questions I constructed below are for proposed field research of my 
doctorate study in political sociology (in the University of Kent at 
Canterbury, UK) on the subject of "Democratisation and Ethnicity in Turkey" 
2- These questions that you are going to attempt to answer are not for the 
purpose of examining your intellectual ability but of reaching the most 
accurate empirical data in the research. Consequently, the answer that 
express yourself most is the answer that the research look for. For example, 
an answer such as "I don't know" or "I don't understand" will also be a 
valuable data for the research. 
3- The questions or your answers are not for a survey aiming propaganda or 
political activity but a scientific inquiry into the phenomenon in order to 
explore, analyse and identify as it occurs or exists. The matter, here, is not 
writing something either against or for the Party but discovering the most 
reliable reality of the phenomenon. In addition, the most accurate answers 
will eventually, I think, be beneficial to the Party. 
4- When I constructed the questionnaire, I strove to refrain from asking 
confidential information.. You may consider some questions as attempt at 
invasion of privacy. However, it is not necessary to answer such questions. 
5- The information in your answers will not be used against either an 
individual or an institution. I will use it for reaching some scientific 
conclusions which may contribute to resolution of a social problem. 
Consequently, the most accurate answers and information you will give 
without "damaging your childish innocence" will be the most significant 
empirical contribution to the research. 
Many thanks with regards. 
All Kemal 6, -can 
Canterbury - 1999 
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Questionnaire 












Place of Birth: ........... .......... 
Sex: M[] F[] 
Marital status: Single[] Married[] Widow[] Divorced[] Separated[ I 
Education: None[ ] Primary[ ] Secondary[ ] High[ ] University[ ] Post-grad[ I 
Occupation: ............................. 
Monthly net income: ............................. 
Nationality: ............................. 
Live here since: ............................. 
*** 
10- What was it first that drew your attention and made you interested in the PKK? 
11- How did you first become sympathetic to the Party? (you may tick two) Through: 
a friend[ ] an activist of the Party[ ] sympathy for its leader Apol I observationsi I reading its 
publications[ ] an experience(write below)[ ] Other[ I specify: ............................... 
....................................................................................................................... 
12- What year did you begin to work for the Party? ............................................... 
13- As briefly as possible, how would you express the reason - or principally significant 
reasons (material or spiritual) - that keep you working for the PKK? 
14- What is - or how do you define - your relationship to the Party? 









16- Is the PKK, in your opinion, a national liberation party for the Kurds? Yes[ I No[ I 
Other[ I specify: .......................................................................................... 
................................................................................................................. 17- What quality of the PKK comes first for you? Nationalist[ I Socialists I Fighting 
for both national and social emancipation[ ] Other[ I specify: ............................ 
................................................................................................................. 
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18- In the organisation, is there a goal or value that you would sacrifice yourself for? 
Yes[ ] No[ ] If yes; what? .............................................................................. 
....................................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................... 
19- Who does the party, you believe, struggle for? (tick the most relevant one) 
Kurds[ ] Peoples of Anatolia[ ] Peoples of Middle-East[ ] Other II specify: ............... 
................................................................................................................. 
20- Which power/powers of the followings that you think the Party fights against? 
Turkey[ ] USA[ ] Turkey and USA[ ] Turkey and Europe[ ] Turkey, USA and Europel I 
Conquerors of Kurdistan (Turkey, Iran, Iraq)[ ] Other[ ] specify: ................................ 
................................................................................................................. 
21- How would you briefly define the ultimate end that the PKK struggles for? 
....................................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................... 




23- How do you consider the woman participation in the PKK? Less than expected) I 
Normal[ ] More than expected[ ] If your answer is positive or negative, please specify: 
...................................................................................................................... 
.............................................................................................................. 
24 - What is the most 
functional cause of the PKK's success? (Tick one only please) Lider 
] Ideology []A new spiritual formation of the activists [] The lifestyle of the activists) I 
Organisational discipline[ ] Other [] Specify: ...................................... 
...................................................................................................................... 
.............................................................................................................. 




it could not changed? 
26- Do you think that the PKK fell into a decline in terms of its either guerrilla activity or 
capability of mass mobilisation in recent years? Yes [] since ... 199 No II 
If yes, what is the salient cause? ......................................................................... 






28- Do you remember when you first became aware of your nationality? Nol I Yes( I in year 
19..... How? ........................................................................................... 
29- Do you remember when you first realised that you belong to a tribe? * Not I Yes[ I in 
year 19...... How? .......................................................................................... 
................................................................................................................. 
30- How effective do tribal relations have influence in the organisational structure of the 
PKK? Very[ ] Little[ ] Very little[ ] None[ ]. 
- If not very; what is the main source of internal problems of the Party? .......................... 
31- Is the PKK a nationalist party? Yes[ ] No[ ] If yes or no; Why? ..................... 
32- Are there similarities between the Party and the carriers of preceding Kurdish 
insurgencies? Yes [] No[] If yes; is it in respect of: 
national demands[ ] organisational structure[ ] leadership[ ] cadre or guerrilla recruitment[ 
fighting for freedom[ ] Other[ ] specify: ................................................................ 
....................................................................................................................... 
33- What was the actual cause which urged USA to hand Ocalan over to Turkey? 
The growth of the Party to the extent that USA cannot connive at any morel I 
The calculable decline of the Party to the extent that it prompt USA to acts I 
Faults and the weakness of the Europe branch of the Party[ ] Other [] specify: ............. 
34- How do you see the future of the Party after deprivation of its leader, Öcalan? It will: 
continue to be on the decline[ ] continue to grow[ ] survive[ ] revive[ ] Other[ I Specify: 







Thank you for your valuable contribution to the research. 
All K emul Ozean 
Canterbury, 1999 
I assume that every Kurd belong to a tribe. 
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Apendix 2 




Central Committee II Central Disciplinary 
Committee 
Party Provincial Organisations I 
I Province Congress 
Province Co-ordinator 
Province Committee I (Province Disciplinary Committee 




Party Local Organisations 
Local Congress j 
Local Co-ordinator 
Local Committee 
Party Cells (Consisting of least three party members) 
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Apendix 3 
The List of Self-immolations' 
Date Name Sex Place Outcome 
1- 09.10.1998 M. Hallt Oral M Maras Died 
2- 18.10.1998 Murat Kaya M Bartin Seriously injured 
3- 19.10.1998 Mehmet GUi M Amasya Seriously injured 
4- 20.10.1998 Ali Aydin M Bastin Died 
5- 20.10.1998 Ismet Inanc M Yozgat Injured 
6- 20.10.1998. Meral Kasoturacak F Canakkale Seriously injured 
7- 22.10.1998 Aynur Artan F Midyat Died 
8- 22.10.1998. Bülent Bayram M Midyat Died 
9- 22.10.1998 Ferhat Karatas M Diyarbakir Seriously injured 
10- 22.10.1998 Mehmet Bagriyanik M Elbistan Seriously injured 
11- 22.10.1998 Selamet Mentes F Midyat Died 
12- 22.10.1998 Seyri Ipek M Sakarya Seriously injured 
13- 23.10.1998 Cennet Günes F Antep Seriously injured 
14- 24.10.1998 Aysel Ceylan F Usak Injured 
15-24.10.1998 Müslüm Muhammed M Antep Seriously injured 
16- 24.10.1998 Samet Okay M Konya Injured 
17- 27.10.1998 Hüsnü Cobanoglu M Erzurum Seriously injured 
18- 27.10.1998 Kenan Karahasanoglu M Erzurum Seriously injured 
19-27.10.1998 Mirza Sevimli M Erzurum Died 
20- 01. H. 1998 Berzan Öztürk M Stuttgart-Stamm heim Died 
21- 13.11.1998 Mehmet Aydin M Canakkale Died 
22- 14.11.1998 Erdal Ceken M Midyat Seriously injured 
23- 14.11.1998 Hanifi Kuzu M Siirt seriously injured 
24- 14.11.1998 Idris Basaran M Ceyhan Seriously injured 
25- 14.11.1998 Ismail Berkay M Adiyaman Seriously injured 
26- 14.11.1998 Ismet Akay M Adiyaman Seriously injured 
























50-27. It. 1998 















































Batman Seriously injured 
Batman Seriously injured 
Diyarbakir Seriously injured 





M Antep Seriously injured 
M Mardin Seriously injured 
F Istanbul Died 






















Bayram Koymaz M 
Bülent Akcan M 
Bülent Akcan m 
Stuttgart-Stammheim Seriously injured 
Agri Seriously injured 
Rome Injured 
Malatya Seriously injured 
Konya Seriously injured 
Diyarbakir Injured 
Malatya Seriously injured 
Konya Seriously injured 
Diyarbakir Injured 
Sakarya Seriously injured 
Trabzon Seriously injured 
Ordu Seriously injured 
Iran Seriously injured 
Diyarbakir-Dagkapi Died 
Düsseldorf Seriously injured 
Antep-Deinokrasi Seriously injured 
Siirt Seriously injured 
Ümraniye Seriously injured 
Athens Seriously injured 
Ümraniye Seriously injured 
3atman Seriously injured 
Nazilli Seriously injured 


































F Stuttgart-Hecrenhiem Seriously injured 
M Diyarbakir-Dagkapi Died 
M Diyarbakir Died 
F London Seriously injured 
M Diyarbakir Injured 
F Elbistan Injured 
F Sakarya Died 
M Adiyaman Seriously injured 
M Maras Seriously injured 
M Elbistan Seriously injured 
M Ümraniye Injured 
F Ceyhan Injured 
M Mersin-Cay Mahallesi Injured 
F Usak Seriously injured 
The places where the incidents of self-immolation occurred were overwhelmingly prisons, and the navies 
written under the "Place" column are the names of prisons 
in Turkey - except the three self-immolations in 
Stuttgart, Germany. The non-prison locations are italicized. 
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